| 0/0 |
2026/08/12 02:03 |
flow |
repro-c |
55m
Results: map[EquivalenceAnalysis:The reproducer successfully triggered the exact same WARNING in `__rb_get_reader_page` (inlined into `rb_get_reader_page`) at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` as described in the original bug report. The call trace matches perfectly, originating from `ring_buffer_read_page` via `tracing_buffers_read` and `vfs_read`. Additionally, the reproducer also triggered related KASAN slab-out-of-bounds and slab-use-after-free bugs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, which confirms memory corruption in the ring buffer handling logic, likely due to a race condition between reading and resizing the buffer. OtherCrashReports:[==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff888114e41c6c by task syz-executor350/5895
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5895 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f27d2c6cc1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f27d24141a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f27d24166c0 RCX: 00007f27d2c6cc1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f27d2414210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8fe741f0 R15: 00007ffc8fe742d8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888114e41c80 pfn:0x114e41
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: ffff888114e41c80 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5894, tgid 5893 (syz-executor350), ts 119962012130, free_ts 119863468231
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5892 tgid 5892 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
__tlb_remove_table_free mm/mmu_gather.c:228 [inline]
tlb_remove_table_rcu+0x85/0x100 mm/mmu_gather.c:291
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 [inline]
rcu_core+0x78b/0x10a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897
handle_softirqs+0x225/0x840 kernel/softirq.c:622
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:496 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x220 kernel/softirq.c:735
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:752
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888114e41f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888114e41f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888114e42000: fa fb fb fb fb fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fa fb
^
ffff888114e42080: fb fb fb fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00
ffff888114e42100: 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fc
==================================================================
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 [inline], CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981, CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981
Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
FS: 00007fa66e0826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a50ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa66d880ff8 CR3: 000000018c874000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
</TASK>
] ReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
} Reproduced:true ReproducedBugTitle:KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ring_buffer_read_page ReproducedCrashReport:==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff88810fa51c6c by task syz-executor135/5899
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5899 Comm: syz-executor135 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f62b8bb4c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f62b835c1a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f62b835e6c0 RCX: 00007f62b8bb4c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f62b835c210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdf21b0c00 R15: 00007ffdf21b0ce8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10fa51
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5898, tgid 5897 (syz-executor135), ts 121914026690, free_ts 121911882170
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5898 tgid 5897 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline]
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0xeaa/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7441
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810fa51f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88810fa51f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88810fa52000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810fa52080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810fa52100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/08/12 02:03 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
0m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/2c647d04ba64204b0de04a5458fe5db9d3049774]
|
| 2/1 |
2026/08/12 02:03 |
action |
kernel-builder |
29m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/9890265554d96e5de5c53ec258faf2227c041898]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/08/12 02:32 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
12m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
agent |
initial-researcher |
4m
Model:
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to analyze a Linux kernel bug description and propose a strategy to reproduce it
with a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive purpose of verifying a bugfix.
=== TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES ===
- When looking up C function or struct definitions, prefer codesearch-definition-source
and codesearch-struct-layout first.
- Fall back to read-file or grepper only if symbol lookup fails or when inspecting macros,
headers, or non-C files.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT propose an exploit. Focus solely on minimal technical reproduction of the bug state.
- Do NOT write long explanations. Keep your analysis and strategy proposal concise.
- Do NOT assume that the target bug has already been fixed just because a git commit title
or description mentions a similar bug or fix. Commit messages often reference related issues
or partial fixes. Proceed with proposing a reproduction strategy regardless of historical fix commits.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957, CPU#1: syz-executor422/6023
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 12 04 00 00 48 8b 43 10 be 04 00 00 00 48 8d 68 08 48 89 ef e8 75 ea 6b 00 f0 ff 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1c f9 ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 60 e8 1e 65 fc ff 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000370fa20 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88801cade000 RCX: ffffffff820c7a2b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88813fe62008
RBP: ffff88813fe62008 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1027fcc401
R10: ffff88813fe6200b R11: ffff88801cade0a8 R12: ffff88801f75d980
R13: ffffed1003eebb32 R14: 0000000000000ff0 R15: ffff88801f75d990
FS: 00007effc71086c0(0000) GS:ffff888123fe4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effc7106000 CR3: 0000000076748000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981 [inline]
ring_buffer_read_page+0x8ed/0x1710 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x2bf/0xaf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x10b/0x830 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7effc8166cde
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007effc7104198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effc71086c0 RCX: 00007effc8166cde
RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007effc7104200 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007effc7104200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007effc81e0b20
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdeadf5850 R15: 00007ffdeadf5938
</TASK>
Reply: ### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page` at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` is triggered when `__rb_get_reader_page()` waits for a writer to finish updating the reader page, but the writer appears to be stuck for 1 second (`USECS_WAIT`).
This happens due to a race condition between reading from the ring buffer and resizing its sub-buffers via `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`:
1. **Thread A** writes a smaller size (e.g., `4` KB) to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`. `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set()` updates `buffer->subbuf_order` and `buffer->subbuf_size` to the new smaller size *before* allocating and swapping the actual ring buffer pages. The allocation phase (`__rb_allocate_pages`) can take some time.
2. **Thread B** concurrently reads from `trace_pipe_raw`. `tracing_buffers_read()` sees the new smaller `subbuf_size`, allocates a new `spare` page of this smaller size, and calls `ring_buffer_read_page()`.
3. `ring_buffer_read_page()` verifies that `data_page->order == buffer->subbuf_order` (which passes, as both are the new smaller order) and proceeds to call `__rb_get_reader_page()`.
4. `__rb_get_reader_page()` reads `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)` (the new smaller size) and swaps the reader page with the head page.
5. Because Thread A hasn't swapped the ring buffer pages yet, the head page is still an **old larger page** (e.g., 8 KB) that was previously filled with data by a writer (so `rb_page_write(reader) > 4096`).
6. `__rb_get_reader_page()` then checks if `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. Since the old page has more data written to it than the new `bsize`, this condition is false.
7. The function loops for 1 second waiting for the condition to become true, which never happens, and finally triggers the `RB_WARN_ON`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this bug, we need to hit the race window where `buffer->subbuf_size` is updated but the pages haven't been swapped yet.
1. Continuously write data to the ring buffer (via `trace_marker`) to ensure pages are filled with data.
2. Continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between a larger size (8 KB) and a smaller size (4 KB).
3. Continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer.
### Minimal C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = '\0';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 1;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_join(t1, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 5/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 3966
output: 38
thoughts: 186
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the Ring Buffer Read Page Warning**
Alright, I've just encountered a concerning warning: "WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page." This immediately grabs my attention because it suggests a potential issue within the core tracing infrastructure, specifically when we're trying to read from the ring buffer. The call trace provided gives me a clear path to investigate:
* **`rb_get_reader_page` (in `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981`)**: This is the most specific function where the warning is originating. It implies a problem with how a reader is acquiring or managing a page within the ring buffer.
* **`ring_buffer_read_page` (in `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103`)**: This is the direct caller of `rb_get_reader_page`. The warning is happening *within* the process of reading a page.
* **`tracing_buffers_read` (in `kernel/trace/trace.c:7125`)**: This function is higher up in the call stack and is responsible for the overall reading of data from the tracing buffers. It seems to be relying on `ring_buffer_read_page` to do its job.
* **`vfs_read` (in `fs/read_write.c:572`)**: This is the standard VFS layer read system call. The fact that this is involved tells me that the reading of the ring buffer is likely being initiated by a user-space process or a kernel thread that's performing a standard file read operation.
* **`ksys_read` (in `fs/read_write.c:716`)**: This is the kernel's entry point for the `read` system call, confirming the user-space origin of the operation.
Given this information, my immediate next step is to dive into the source code of `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`, specifically focusing on the section around line 5957. I'm looking for the logic within `rb_get_reader_page` that could lead to such a warning. My hypotheses at this point include:
* **Race conditions:** Is there a situation where the ring buffer's state is being modified by another process or interrupt handler while a reader is trying to access a page? This could lead to an inconsistent state.
* **Incorrect page allocation/deallocation:** Perhaps a page is being accessed that has already been freed, or an attempt is being made to allocate a page when none are available in a way that triggers this warning.
* **Metadata corruption:** Could there be an issue with the internal metadata that the ring buffer uses to track its pages and reader positions?
* **Off-by-one errors:** A common source of bugs, especially in buffer manipulation, is an off-by-one error that leads to accessing beyond the intended boundaries of a page.
* **Reader state inconsistencies:** The `rb_get_reader_page` function likely manages the state of individual readers. There might be a bug in how this state is updated or checked, leading to the warning.
I'll be examining the code that handles page acquisition, page invalidation, and reader position updates. I'll be paying close attention to any locks, semaphores, or atomic operations that are supposed to protect these critical sections. Understanding the exact condition that triggers the "WARNING" will be key to pinpointing the root cause and devising a fix.
|
| 6/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:5930 LineCount:50]
Results: map[Contents:5930: goto again;
5931:
5932: out:
5933: /* Update the read_stamp on the first event */
5934: if (reader && reader->read == 0)
5935: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = reader->page->time_stamp;
5936:
5937: arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5938: local_irq_restore(flags);
5939:
5940: /*
5941: * The writer has preempt disable, wait for it. But not forever
5942: * Although, 1 second is pretty much "forever"
5943: */
5944: #define USECS_WAIT 1000000
5945: for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
5946: /* If the write is past the end of page, a writer is still updating it */
5947: if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize))
5948: break;
5949:
5950: udelay(1);
5951:
5952: /* Get the latest version of the reader write value */
5953: smp_rmb();
5954: }
5955:
5956: /* The writer is not moving forward? Something is wrong */
5957: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))
5958: reader = NULL;
5959:
5960: /*
5961: * Make sure we see any padding after the write update
5962: * (see rb_reset_tail()).
5963: *
5964: * In addition, a writer may be writing on the reader page
5965: * if the page has not been fully filled, so the read barrier
5966: * is also needed to make sure we see the content of what is
5967: * committed by the writer (see rb_set_commit_to_write()).
5968: */
5969: smp_rmb();
5970:
5971: if (!cpu_buffer->lost_events)
5972: cpu_buffer->lost_events = missed_events;
5973:
5974: return reader;
5975: }
5976:
5977: static struct buffer_page *
5978: rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5979: {
]
|
| 7/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 4906
output: 39
thoughts: 83
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the RB_WARN_ON Warning**
So, I'm looking at this `RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))` warning. My first instinct is to pinpoint the exact conditions that trigger it. I see it's tied to `nr_loops` reaching `USECS_WAIT`. Now, what does `nr_loops` represent in this context? It seems to be a counter related to some kind of waiting or looping behavior within the `cpu_buffer` mechanism.
The associated condition is `rb_page_write(reader) > bsize`. This immediately tells me something is amiss with the rate at which data is being written to the reader's buffer versus the available buffer size. The `rb_page_write` function, as I understand it, is likely involved in putting data into the circular buffer for the reader. If the amount being written exceeds `bsize`, it suggests a potential overflow or a significant bottleneck.
My next step is to deduce what `bsize` likely refers to. Given the context of "page" in `rb_page_write` and the common terminology in memory management and buffering, `bsize` is almost certainly `BUF_PAGE_SIZE`. This means the warning fires when the write operation attempts to put more data into the reader's page buffer than that page is designed to hold, and this condition persists for the duration of `USECS_WAIT` (which seems to be a microsecond timeout, fitting the `nr_loops` count).
To fully grasp the situation, I need to trace the origin of the reader's page and the data being written. Therefore, my immediate next action is to dive into the `__rb_get_reader_page` function and examine its execution flow from the very beginning. I need to understand how the reader's page is allocated, how it's presented for writing, and what might be causing the write operation to consistently exceed the buffer's capacity. This will likely involve looking at how the reader is consuming data (or failing to consume it), and how the writer is producing it.
|
| 8/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:5750 LineCount:100]
Results: map[Contents:5750:
5751: prev_reader = cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id];
5752:
5753: WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_buffer->remote->swap_reader_page(cpu_buffer->cpu,
5754: cpu_buffer->remote->priv));
5755: /* nr_pages doesn't include the reader page */
5756: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id > cpu_buffer->nr_pages))
5757: return NULL;
5758:
5759: new_reader = cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id];
5760:
5761: WARN_ON_ONCE(prev_reader == new_reader);
5762:
5763: prev_head = new_reader; /* New reader was also the previous head */
5764: new_head = prev_head;
5765: rb_inc_page(&new_head);
5766: last = prev_head;
5767: rb_dec_page(&last);
5768:
5769: /* Clear the old HEAD flag */
5770: rb_list_head_clear(cpu_buffer->head_page->list.prev);
5771:
5772: prev_reader->list.next = prev_head->list.next;
5773: prev_reader->list.prev = prev_head->list.prev;
5774:
5775: /* Swap prev_reader with new_reader */
5776: last->list.next = &prev_reader->list;
5777: new_head->list.prev = &prev_reader->list;
5778:
5779: new_reader->list.prev = &new_reader->list;
5780: new_reader->list.next = &new_head->list;
5781:
5782: /* Reactivate the HEAD flag */
5783: rb_set_list_to_head(&last->list);
5784:
5785: cpu_buffer->head_page = new_head;
5786: cpu_buffer->reader_page = new_reader;
5787: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
5788: cpu_buffer->pages = &new_head->list;
5789: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = new_reader->page->time_stamp;
5790: cpu_buffer->lost_events = cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.lost_events;
5791:
5792: return rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page) ? cpu_buffer->reader_page : NULL;
5793: }
5794:
5795: static struct buffer_page *
5796: __rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5797: {
5798: int max_loops = cpu_buffer->ring_meta ? cpu_buffer->nr_pages : 3;
5799: unsigned long bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size);
5800: struct buffer_page *reader = NULL;
5801: unsigned long overwrite;
5802: unsigned long flags;
5803: int missed_events = 0;
5804: int nr_loops = 0;
5805: bool ret;
5806:
5807: local_irq_save(flags);
5808: arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5809:
5810: again:
5811: /*
5812: * This should normally only loop twice. But because the
5813: * start of the reader inserts an empty page, it causes a
5814: * case where we will loop three times. There should be no
5815: * reason to loop four times unless the ring buffer is a
5816: * recovered persistent ring buffer. For persistent ring buffers,
5817: * invalid pages are reset during recovery, so there may be more
5818: * than 3 contiguous pages can be empty, but less than nr_pages.
5819: */
5820: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > max_loops)) {
5821: reader = NULL;
5822: goto out;
5823: }
5824:
5825: reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
5826:
5827: /* If there's more to read, return this page */
5828: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))
5829: goto out;
5830:
5831: /* Never should we have an index greater than the size */
5832: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
5833: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read > rb_page_size(reader)))
5834: goto out;
5835:
5836: /* check if we caught up to the tail */
5837: reader = NULL;
5838: if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
5839: goto out;
5840:
5841: /* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
5842: if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
5843: goto out;
5844:
5845: /*
5846: * Reset the reader page to size zero.
5847: */
5848: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0);
5849: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0);
]
|
| 9/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6644
output: 39
thoughts: 48
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the Ring Buffer Warning**
Alright, so I've encountered a warning, and my immediate instinct is to pinpoint its exact location. I see it's flagged at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957`. My next step, naturally, is to delve into the code that immediately precedes and potentially leads to this warning. Specifically, I want to examine the function `__rb_get_reader_page`. I'll be looking at the code from line 5850 up to line 5950. This block should provide the context for the warning, allowing me to understand the state of the ring buffer reader and the operations being performed just before the issue arises. My goal here is to trace the data flow and identify any potential race conditions, incorrect state management, or invalid accesses that might be triggering this particular warning.
|
| 10/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:5850 LineCount:100]
Results: map[Contents:5850: rb_init_data_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page->page);
5851: cpu_buffer->reader_page->real_end = 0;
5852:
5853: spin:
5854: /*
5855: * Splice the empty reader page into the list around the head.
5856: */
5857: reader = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
5858: if (!reader)
5859: goto out;
5860: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.next = rb_list_head(reader->list.next);
5861: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.prev = reader->list.prev;
5862:
5863: /*
5864: * cpu_buffer->pages just needs to point to the buffer, it
5865: * has no specific buffer page to point to. Lets move it out
5866: * of our way so we don't accidentally swap it.
5867: */
5868: cpu_buffer->pages = reader->list.prev;
5869:
5870: /* The reader page will be pointing to the new head */
5871: rb_set_list_to_head(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
5872:
5873: /*
5874: * We want to make sure we read the overruns after we set up our
5875: * pointers to the next object. The writer side does a
5876: * cmpxchg to cross pages which acts as the mb on the writer
5877: * side. Note, the reader will constantly fail the swap
5878: * while the writer is updating the pointers, so this
5879: * guarantees that the overwrite recorded here is the one we
5880: * want to compare with the last_overrun.
5881: */
5882: smp_mb();
5883: overwrite = local_read(&(cpu_buffer->overrun));
5884:
5885: /*
5886: * Here's the tricky part.
5887: *
5888: * We need to move the pointer past the header page.
5889: * But we can only do that if a writer is not currently
5890: * moving it. The page before the header page has the
5891: * flag bit '1' set if it is pointing to the page we want.
5892: * but if the writer is in the process of moving it
5893: * then it will be '2' or already moved '0'.
5894: */
5895:
5896: ret = rb_head_page_replace(reader, cpu_buffer->reader_page);
5897:
5898: /*
5899: * If we did not convert it, then we must try again.
5900: */
5901: if (!ret)
5902: goto spin;
5903:
5904: if (rb_page_commit(reader) & RB_MISSED_EVENTS)
5905: missed_events = -1;
5906:
5907: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta)
5908: rb_update_meta_reader(cpu_buffer, reader);
5909:
5910: /*
5911: * Yay! We succeeded in replacing the page.
5912: *
5913: * Now make the new head point back to the reader page.
5914: */
5915: rb_list_head(reader->list.next)->prev = &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list;
5916: rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->head_page);
5917:
5918: cpu_buffer->cnt++;
5919: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->pages_read);
5920:
5921: /* Finally update the reader page to the new head */
5922: cpu_buffer->reader_page = reader;
5923: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
5924:
5925: if (overwrite != cpu_buffer->last_overrun) {
5926: cpu_buffer->lost_events = overwrite - cpu_buffer->last_overrun;
5927: cpu_buffer->last_overrun = overwrite;
5928: }
5929:
5930: goto again;
5931:
5932: out:
5933: /* Update the read_stamp on the first event */
5934: if (reader && reader->read == 0)
5935: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = reader->page->time_stamp;
5936:
5937: arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5938: local_irq_restore(flags);
5939:
5940: /*
5941: * The writer has preempt disable, wait for it. But not forever
5942: * Although, 1 second is pretty much "forever"
5943: */
5944: #define USECS_WAIT 1000000
5945: for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
5946: /* If the write is past the end of page, a writer is still updating it */
5947: if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize))
5948: break;
5949:
]
|
| 11/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 8255
output: 38
thoughts: 130
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into a Potential Bottleneck**
I've encountered a rather concerning warning here, and it's screaming that something isn't moving forward as expected. The core of the issue is this `RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT)` condition. My immediate interpretation is that the writer hasn't made any progress for a full second, as `nr_loops` is being compared against `USECS_WAIT`. This threshold, `USECS_WAIT`, is my indicator of a potentially problematic delay.
What does this delay signify in practical terms? I'm correlating it directly to a situation where the `rb_page_write` operation is exceeding the allocated buffer size, `bsize`. Specifically, this means `rb_page_write(reader) > bsize`. To be precise, `bsize` is dynamically read using `READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)`, which I understand to be the current size of the sub-buffer. The `rb_page_write` function itself is essentially determined by `local_read(&reader->write)`, which tracks the current write position within the buffer.
So, the warning essentially tells me that the writer is stuck, its write pointer is advancing so slowly that it's falling behind the available buffer space, to the point where it's going to overflow or at least experience a significant performance hit. My next logical step, as any good engineer would do, is to scrutinize the `rb_page_write` function itself. I need to understand *why* it might be taking so long or why the write pointer isn't advancing more aggressively. Is there contention? Are there external dependencies delaying the write? Is there a logic flaw that's causing it to repeatedly try and fail to write? I need to dig into the implementation of `rb_page_write` to uncover the root cause of this stagnation.
|
| 12/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_page_write]
Results: map[SourceCode:2978: static inline unsigned long rb_page_write(struct buffer_page *bpage)
2979: {
2980: return local_read(&bpage->write) & RB_WRITE_MASK;
2981: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 13/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 8500
output: 21
thoughts: 22
Thoughts: **My Thought Process**
Alright, so I'm looking at this `RB_WRITE_MASK`. I'm immediately thinking about what kind of value it might hold. Given its name, it's almost certainly a bitmask. Bitmasks are used to control individual bits within a larger data word, and the "WRITE_MASK" part strongly suggests it's related to enabling or disabling write operations on specific components or fields.
My first educated guess is that it's a full mask, meaning it has all the relevant bits set. This would imply that, by default, all write operations are permitted, or perhaps that the mask is used to indicate *which* bits are *writable*. If it's the latter, a full mask would mean all bits are indeed writable.
Therefore, I'm leaning towards a value like `0xfffff`. This is a common hexadecimal representation for a sequence of 20 bits, all set to 1. It's a plausible size for a mask in many hardware or software contexts. I'll need to examine the surrounding code or documentation to confirm the exact number of bits and whether `0xfffff` is indeed the correct representation, but it's my strong initial hypothesis based on the naming convention.
|
| 14/2 |
2026/08/12 02:45 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:#define RB_WRITE_MASK]
Results: map[Output:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=341=struct buffer_page {
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-364- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:365:#define RB_WRITE_MASK 0xfffff
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-366-#define RB_WRITE_INTCNT (1 << 20)
]
|
| 15/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 8636
output: 33
thoughts: 205
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding a Potential Buffer Overflow**
I'm currently trying to understand why `rb_page_write` might be exceeding `bsize`. My initial assumption is that `rb_page_write` represents the lower 20 bits of `bpage->write`, and `bsize` is derived from `cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size`. If `rb_page_write(reader)` is indeed greater than `bsize`, it strongly suggests that the writer has gone beyond the allocated page boundary. This is particularly concerning because it implies the writer is stuck for a full second, not just during a normal page transition.
My first instinct is to question how this could even happen. The writer thread, as I recall, has preempt disable mechanisms in place, which should prevent it from being unexpectedly interrupted and thus getting stuck in such a state. This leads me to consider two primary possibilities: either the writer thread is genuinely stuck in an infinite loop or some other deadlock-like situation, or there's data corruption occurring with `bpage->write` itself.
However, I need to be more precise about `bsize`. I've just double-checked, and it's actually obtained using `READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)`. This `READ_ONCE` immediately triggers a new line of inquiry in my mind: is it possible for `subbuf_size` to be modified concurrently with the read operation? My understanding is that there *is* a feature designed to dynamically alter `subbuf_size`. This opens up the critical question: under what conditions and with what synchronization can `subbuf_size` be changed? I need to investigate the code paths that allow for `subbuf_size` modification to see if a race condition here could be the root cause of the observed discrepancy.
|
| 16/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:subbuf_size PathPrefix:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
Results: map[Output:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=61=struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta {
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-64- unsigned long commit_buffer;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:65: __u32 subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-66- __u32 nr_subbufs;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=562=struct trace_buffer {
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-588-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:589: unsigned int subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-590- unsigned int subbuf_order;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=609=int ring_buffer_print_page_header(struct trace_buffer *buffer, struct trace_seq *s)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-632- (unsigned int)offsetof(typeof(field), data),
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:633: (unsigned int)(buffer ? buffer->subbuf_size :
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-634- PAGE_SIZE - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE),
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1610=static unsigned long
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1611:rb_range_align_subbuf(unsigned long addr, int subbuf_size, int nr_subbufs)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1612-{
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1614- sizeof(int) * nr_subbufs;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1615: return ALIGN(addr, subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1616-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1621=static void *rb_range_meta(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages, int cpu)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1622-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1623: int subbuf_size = buffer->subbuf_size + BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1624- struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1648- if (cpu) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1649: ptr = rb_range_align_subbuf(ptr, subbuf_size, nr_subbufs);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1650: ptr += subbuf_size * nr_subbufs;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1651-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1658- p = ptr;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1659: ptr = rb_range_align_subbuf(ptr, subbuf_size, nr_subbufs);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1660: ptr += subbuf_size * nr_subbufs;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1661-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1671=static void *rb_subbufs_from_meta(struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1672-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1673: int subbuf_size = meta->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1674- unsigned long ptr;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1676- ptr = (unsigned long)meta;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1677: ptr = rb_range_align_subbuf(ptr, subbuf_size, meta->nr_subbufs);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1678-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1685=static void *rb_range_buffer(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, int idx)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1688- unsigned long ptr;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1689: int subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1690-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1697-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1698: subbuf_size = meta->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1699-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1704-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1705: ptr += subbuf_size * idx;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1706: if (ptr + subbuf_size > cpu_buffer->buffer->range_addr_end)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1707- return NULL;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1781=static bool rb_cpu_meta_valid(struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta, int cpu,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1784-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1785: int subbuf_size = PAGE_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1786- unsigned long buffers_start;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1792-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1793: if (meta->subbuf_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1794: pr_info("Ring buffer boot meta [%d] invalid subbuf_size\n", cpu);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1795- return false;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1798- buffers_start = meta->first_buffer;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1799: buffers_end = meta->first_buffer + (subbuf_size * meta->nr_subbufs);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1800-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1903=static int __rb_validate_buffer(struct buffer_page *bpage, int cpu,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1916- * Even after clearing these bits, a commit value greater than the
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1917: * subbuf_size is considered invalid.
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1918- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1919- tail = rb_data_page_commit(dpage);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1920: if (tail <= meta->subbuf_size - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1921- ret = rb_read_data_buffer(dpage, tail, cpu, &ts, &delta);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2173=static void rb_range_meta_init(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int nr_pages, int scratch_size)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2212- meta->nr_subbufs = nr_pages + 1;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2213: meta->subbuf_size = PAGE_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2214-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2229- rb_init_data_page(subbuf);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2230: subbuf += meta->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2231- }
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2261=static int rbm_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2272- rb_meta_subbuf_idx(meta, (void *)meta->commit_buffer));
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2273: seq_printf(m, "subbuf_size: %d\n", meta->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2274- seq_printf(m, "nr_subbufs: %d\n", meta->nr_subbufs);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2637=static void rb_test_inject_invalid_pages(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2643- unsigned long ptr;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2644: int subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2645- int invalid = 0;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2662- ptr = (unsigned long)rb_subbufs_from_meta(meta);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2663: subbuf_size = meta->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2664-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2667-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2668: dpage = (void *)(ptr + idx * subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2669- /* Skip unused pages */
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2677- if (!(i & 0x1) || !(i % 5)) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2678: local_add(subbuf_size + 1, &dpage->commit);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2679- invalid++;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2706=static struct trace_buffer *alloc_buffer(unsigned long size, unsigned flags,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2714- long nr_pages;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2715: int subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2716- int bsize;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2729- buffer->subbuf_order = order;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2730: subbuf_size = (PAGE_SIZE << order);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2731: buffer->subbuf_size = subbuf_size - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2732-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2733- /* Max payload is buffer page size - header (8bytes) */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2734: buffer->max_data_size = buffer->subbuf_size - (sizeof(u32) * 2);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2735-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2781- nr_pages = (size - sizeof(struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta)) /
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2782: (subbuf_size + sizeof(int));
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2783- /* Need at least two pages plus the reader page */
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2791- sizeof(int) * nr_pages;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2792: ptr = ALIGN(ptr, subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2793: ptr += subbuf_size * nr_pages;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2794- }
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2819- /* need at least two pages */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2820: nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, buffer->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2821- if (nr_pages < 2)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=3189=static void update_pages_handler(struct work_struct *work)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3202- *
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3203: * Minimum size is 2 * buffer->subbuf_size.
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3204- *
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=3207=int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3224-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3225: nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, buffer->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3226-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=3542=static int rb_meta_subbuf_idx(struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta, void *subbuf)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3546- subbuf_array = (void *)meta + sizeof(int) * meta->nr_subbufs;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3547: subbuf_array = (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)subbuf_array, meta->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3548: return (subbuf - subbuf_array) / meta->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3549-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=3752=rb_reset_tail(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3754-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3755: unsigned long bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3756- struct buffer_page *tail_page = info->tail_page;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=4717=__rb_reserve_next(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4766- /* See if we shot pass the end of this buffer page */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:4767: if (unlikely(write > cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4768- check_buffer(cpu_buffer, info, CHECK_FULL_PAGE);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5796=__rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5798- int max_loops = cpu_buffer->ring_meta ? cpu_buffer->nr_pages : 3;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5799: unsigned long bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5800- struct buffer_page *reader = NULL;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6378=ring_buffer_read_start(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6390- /* Holds the entire event: data and meta data */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6391: iter->event_size = buffer->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6392- iter->event = kmalloc(iter->event_size, flags);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6458=unsigned long ring_buffer_size(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6462-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6463: return buffer->subbuf_size * buffer->buffers[cpu]->nr_pages;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6464-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=7064=int ring_buffer_read_page(struct trace_buffer *buffer,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7227- if (missed_events > 0 &&
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7228: buffer->subbuf_size - size >= sizeof(missed_events)) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7229- memcpy(&dpage->data[size], &missed_events,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7247- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7248: if (size < buffer->subbuf_size)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249: memset(&dpage->data[size], 0, buffer->subbuf_size - size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7250-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=7265=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_page_data);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7267-/**
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7268: * ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get - get size of the sub buffer.
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7269- * @buffer: the buffer to get the sub buffer size from
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7272- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7273:int ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7274-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7275: return buffer->subbuf_size + BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7276-}
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7277:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7278-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=7316=int ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int order)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7340- old_order = buffer->subbuf_order;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7341: old_size = buffer->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7342-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7350- buffer->subbuf_order = order;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7351: buffer->subbuf_size = psize - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7352-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7367- nr_pages = old_size * buffer->buffers[cpu]->nr_pages;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7368: nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(nr_pages, buffer->subbuf_size);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7369-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7453- buffer->subbuf_order = old_order;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7454: buffer->subbuf_size = old_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7455-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=7498=static void rb_setup_ids_meta_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7531- meta->nr_subbufs = nr_subbufs;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7532: meta->subbuf_size = cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size + BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7533: meta->meta_page_size = meta->subbuf_size;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7534-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=7836=int ring_buffer_map_get_reader(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7893- commit = rb_page_size(reader);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7894: if (buffer->subbuf_size - commit >= sizeof(missed_events)) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7895- memcpy(&dpage->data[commit], &missed_events,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7925- flush_kernel_vmap_range(cpu_buffer->reader_page->page,
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7926: buffer->subbuf_size + BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7927-
]
|
| 17/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14259
output: 39
thoughts: 65
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`**
Alright, so I'm digging into the `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` function, and my initial reaction is a definite "yes," this function *absolutely* has the capability to modify the `subbuf_size` member of the `buffer` structure. I'm not just saying that; I've seen it, I've traced it. It's a core part of what this function is designed to do. I need to be absolutely certain about this, so my immediate next step is to dive into the implementation of `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` itself. I need to see the code, examine the logic, and confirm precisely how and when that `buffer->subbuf_size` is being updated.
|
| 18/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:7316 LineCount:100]
Results: map[Contents:7316: int ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int order)
7317: {
7318: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
7319: struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
7320: int old_order, old_size;
7321: int nr_pages;
7322: int psize;
7323: int err;
7324: int cpu;
7325:
7326: if (!buffer || order < 0)
7327: return -EINVAL;
7328:
7329: if (buffer->subbuf_order == order)
7330: return 0;
7331:
7332: psize = (1 << order) * PAGE_SIZE;
7333: if (psize <= BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE)
7334: return -EINVAL;
7335:
7336: /* Size of a subbuf cannot be greater than the write counter */
7337: if (psize > RB_WRITE_MASK + 1)
7338: return -EINVAL;
7339:
7340: old_order = buffer->subbuf_order;
7341: old_size = buffer->subbuf_size;
7342:
7343: /* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */
7344: guard(mutex)(&buffer->mutex);
7345: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
7346:
7347: /* Make sure all commits have finished */
7348: synchronize_rcu();
7349:
7350: buffer->subbuf_order = order;
7351: buffer->subbuf_size = psize - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
7352:
7353: /* Make sure all new buffers are allocated, before deleting the old ones */
7354: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
7355:
7356: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7357: continue;
7358:
7359: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7360:
7361: if (cpu_buffer->mapped) {
7362: err = -EBUSY;
7363: goto error;
7364: }
7365:
7366: /* Update the number of pages to match the new size */
7367: nr_pages = old_size * buffer->buffers[cpu]->nr_pages;
7368: nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(nr_pages, buffer->subbuf_size);
7369:
7370: /* we need a minimum of two pages */
7371: if (nr_pages < 2)
7372: nr_pages = 2;
7373:
7374: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages;
7375:
7376: /* Include the reader page */
7377: nr_pages++;
7378:
7379: /* Allocate the new size buffer */
7380: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
7381: if (__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer, nr_pages,
7382: &cpu_buffer->new_pages)) {
7383: /* not enough memory for new pages */
7384: err = -ENOMEM;
7385: goto error;
7386: }
7387: }
7388:
7389: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
7390: struct buffer_data_page *old_free_data_page;
7391: struct list_head old_pages;
7392: unsigned long flags;
7393:
7394: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7395: continue;
7396:
7397: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7398:
7399: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7400:
7401: /* Clear the head bit to make the link list normal to read */
7402: rb_head_page_deactivate(cpu_buffer);
7403:
7404: /*
7405: * Collect buffers from the cpu_buffer pages list and the
7406: * reader_page on old_pages, so they can be freed later when not
7407: * under a spinlock. The pages list is a linked list with no
7408: * head, adding old_pages turns it into a regular list with
7409: * old_pages being the head.
7410: */
7411: list_add(&old_pages, cpu_buffer->pages);
7412: list_add(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list, &old_pages);
7413:
7414: /* One page was allocated for the reader page */
7415: cpu_buffer->reader_page = list_entry(cpu_buffer->new_pages.next,
]
|
| 19/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15813
output: 39
thoughts: 173
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacking the Ring Buffer Sub-buffer Sizing Logic**
Okay, I've been digging into the ring buffer's sub-buffer ordering mechanism, and a potential race condition is immediately jumping out at me. My primary concern is around the `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` function and its interaction with the reader's page acquisition.
Specifically, I'm noticing that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` appears to modify `buffer->subbuf_size` *before* it even acquires the `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. This is problematic because, from what I can see, `__rb_get_reader_page` – the function responsible for a reader fetching a page – starts by reading `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)`. The critical part here is that `__rb_get_reader_page` doesn't seem to hold the `reader_lock` for the *entire duration* of its operation.
This gap in locking is what's triggering my alarm. If `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` changes `subbuf_size` while `__rb_get_reader_page` is in the middle of reading it and potentially using that value, we have a clear race. I'm also noting that `__rb_get_reader_page` actually acquires an `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock)` – which is indeed the `cpu_buffer->lock`, *not* the `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is taking. This distinction in lock types is key to the problem I'm seeing.
So, to recap my immediate thought: `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` holds `reader_lock` to change `subbuf_size`, but `__rb_get_reader_page` reads `subbuf_size` without holding `reader_lock` (it holds `cpu_buffer->lock` instead, which isn't the correct lock for protecting the `subbuf_size` read in this context). I need to trace the rest of `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` to confirm my hypothesis and see if there are any other compensating mechanisms I'm missing.
|
| 20/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:7416 LineCount:100]
Results: map[Contents:7416: struct buffer_page, list);
7417: list_del_init(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
7418:
7419: /* Install the new pages, remove the head from the list */
7420: cpu_buffer->pages = cpu_buffer->new_pages.next;
7421: list_del_init(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
7422: cpu_buffer->cnt++;
7423:
7424: cpu_buffer->head_page
7425: = list_entry(cpu_buffer->pages, struct buffer_page, list);
7426: cpu_buffer->tail_page = cpu_buffer->commit_page = cpu_buffer->head_page;
7427:
7428: cpu_buffer->nr_pages = cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update;
7429: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
7430:
7431: old_free_data_page = cpu_buffer->free_page;
7432: cpu_buffer->free_page = NULL;
7433:
7434: rb_head_page_activate(cpu_buffer);
7435:
7436: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7437:
7438: /* Free old sub buffers */
7439: list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, &old_pages, list) {
7440: list_del_init(&bpage->list);
7441: free_buffer_page(bpage);
7442: }
7443: free_pages((unsigned long)old_free_data_page, old_order);
7444:
7445: rb_check_pages(cpu_buffer);
7446: }
7447:
7448: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
7449:
7450: return 0;
7451:
7452: error:
7453: buffer->subbuf_order = old_order;
7454: buffer->subbuf_size = old_size;
7455:
7456: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
7457:
7458: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
7459: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7460:
7461: if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
7462: continue;
7463:
7464: list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, &cpu_buffer->new_pages, list) {
7465: list_del_init(&bpage->list);
7466: free_buffer_page(bpage);
7467: }
7468: }
7469:
7470: return err;
7471: }
7472: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set);
7473:
7474: static int rb_alloc_meta_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
7475: {
7476: struct page *page;
7477:
7478: if (cpu_buffer->meta_page)
7479: return 0;
7480:
7481: page = alloc_page(GFP_USER | __GFP_ZERO);
7482: if (!page)
7483: return -ENOMEM;
7484:
7485: cpu_buffer->meta_page = page_to_virt(page);
7486:
7487: return 0;
7488: }
7489:
7490: static void rb_free_meta_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
7491: {
7492: unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)cpu_buffer->meta_page;
7493:
7494: free_page(addr);
7495: cpu_buffer->meta_page = NULL;
7496: }
7497:
7498: static void rb_setup_ids_meta_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
7499: struct buffer_page **subbuf_ids)
7500: {
7501: struct trace_buffer_meta *meta = cpu_buffer->meta_page;
7502: unsigned int nr_subbufs = cpu_buffer->nr_pages + 1;
7503: struct buffer_page *first_subbuf, *subbuf;
7504: int cnt = 0;
7505: int id = 0;
7506:
7507: id = rb_page_id(cpu_buffer, cpu_buffer->reader_page, id);
7508: subbuf_ids[id++] = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
7509: cnt++;
7510:
7511: first_subbuf = subbuf = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
7512: do {
7513: id = rb_page_id(cpu_buffer, subbuf, id);
7514:
7515: if (WARN_ON(id >= nr_subbufs))
]
|
| 21/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17511
output: 52
thoughts: 588
Thoughts: **My Thoughts on Concurrent Ring Buffer Resizing**
I've been looking closely at the `__rb_get_reader_page` function, specifically this section:
```c
out:
...
arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
local_irq_restore(flags);
for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize))
break;
udelay(1);
smp_rmb();
}
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))
reader = NULL;
```
Here, `bsize` is read at the very beginning. I was initially concerned about what happens if `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is called concurrently. My first thought was, "If `subbuf_size` is reduced, and I've already read a larger `bsize`, then `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` would be *more* likely to be true, which seems fine."
However, I then considered the opposite scenario: what if `subbuf_size` is *increased*? If I've read an old, *smaller* `bsize`, and the writer is now operating on a new, larger page (because the buffer was resized), then `rb_page_write(reader)` could potentially exceed my read `bsize`. This would cause `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` to evaluate to `false`, leading to unnecessary waits and potential warnings.
This line of reasoning led me to re-examine `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`. My initial interpretation was that it modifies `buffer->subbuf_size` *before* any new page allocations or swapping occurs. This reinforces my concern about the potential race condition where I might be using an outdated, smaller `bsize` while a writer is working with a larger allocated page.
But then, I remembered something crucial about `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`: it calls `atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled)` *before* it changes `subbuf_size`. This immediately made me pause. My next line of thought was, "Wait, if `record_disabled` is incremented, that should be disabling the writers, right?" This is the critical point I'm now investigating – I need to verify if `record_disabled` truly prevents writers from operating during the critical resize operation.
|
| 22/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c IncludeSnippetLines:2 Name:record_disabled SourceTreePrefix:kernel/trace]
Results: map[References:<nil> TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 23/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18150
output: 32
thoughts: 39
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Investigating `record_disabled`**
My initial thought upon encountering the mention of `record_disabled` was to immediately contextualize it. My internal knowledge base flagged this as a field likely residing within the `struct trace_buffer`. To confirm this and understand its implications within the kernel's tracing framework, my immediate next step was to pinpoint its exact location. My preferred method for this is a targeted search, specifically within the relevant source code file, `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`. This file is the logical place to find definitions and manipulation of the ring buffer's operational state, making it the prime candidate for where `record_disabled` would be declared and utilized.
|
| 24/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:record_disabled PathPrefix:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
Results: map[Output:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=502=struct ring_buffer_per_cpu {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-503- int cpu;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:504: atomic_t record_disabled;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-505- atomic_t resize_disabled;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=562=struct trace_buffer {
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-564- int cpus;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:565: atomic_t record_disabled;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-566- atomic_t resizing;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=1039=__poll_t ring_buffer_poll_wait(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1109- (void *)b; \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1110: atomic_inc(&__b->buffer->record_disabled); \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1111- } else \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1112: atomic_inc(&b->record_disabled); \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-1113- WARN_ON(1); \
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2487=rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(struct trace_buffer *buffer, long nr_pages, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2545- /* Remote buffers are read-only and immutable */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2546: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2547- atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2706=static struct trace_buffer *alloc_buffer(unsigned long size, unsigned flags,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2812- /* The writer is remote. This ring-buffer is read-only */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2813: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2814- nr_pages = desc->nr_page_va - 1;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2984=rb_remove_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, unsigned long nr_pages)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2995- raw_spin_lock_irq(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2996: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2997- /*
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3048- /* pages are removed, resume tracing and then free the pages */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3049: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3050- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=3207=int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3374- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3375: if (atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)) {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3376: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3377- /*
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3387- }
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3388: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3389- }
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=4631=static atomic_t ts_dump;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4639- } \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:4640: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled); \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4641- pr_warn(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=4956=ring_buffer_lock_reserve(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long length)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4964-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:4965: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4966- goto out;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4974-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:4975: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled)))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-4976- goto out;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5100=int ring_buffer_write(struct trace_buffer *buffer,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5111-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5112: if (atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5113- return -EBUSY;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5121-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5122: if (atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5123- return -EBUSY;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5178=void ring_buffer_record_disable(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5179-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5180: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5181-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5191=void ring_buffer_record_enable(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5192-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5193: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5194-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5208=void ring_buffer_record_off(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5212-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5213: rd = atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5214- do {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5215- new_rd = rd | RB_BUFFER_OFF;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5216: } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&buffer->record_disabled, &rd, new_rd));
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5217-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5231=void ring_buffer_record_on(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5235-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5236: rd = atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5237- do {
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5238- new_rd = rd & ~RB_BUFFER_OFF;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5239: } while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&buffer->record_disabled, &rd, new_rd));
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5240-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5249=bool ring_buffer_record_is_on(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5250-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5251: return !atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5252-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5265=bool ring_buffer_record_is_set_on(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5266-{
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5267: return !(atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled) & RB_BUFFER_OFF);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5268-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5278=bool ring_buffer_record_is_on_cpu(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5284- return ring_buffer_record_is_set_on(buffer) &&
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5285: !atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5286-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5298=void ring_buffer_record_disable_cpu(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5305- cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5306: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5307-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=5318=void ring_buffer_record_enable_cpu(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5325- cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5326: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-5327-}
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6209=static inline bool rb_reader_lock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6228- /* Continue without locking, but disable the ring buffer */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6229: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6230- return false;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6639=void ring_buffer_reset_cpu(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6649- atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6650: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6651-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6656-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6657: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6658- atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6671=void ring_buffer_reset_online_cpus(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6682- atomic_add(RESET_BIT, &cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6683: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6684- }
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6700-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6701: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6702- atomic_sub(RESET_BIT, &cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6712=void ring_buffer_reset(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6723- atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6724: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6725- }
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6734-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6735: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6736- atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=6850=int ring_buffer_swap_cpu(struct trace_buffer *buffer_a,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6874-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6875: if (atomic_read(&buffer_a->record_disabled))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6876- return -EAGAIN;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6877-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6878: if (atomic_read(&buffer_b->record_disabled))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6879- return -EAGAIN;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6880-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6881: if (atomic_read(&cpu_buffer_a->record_disabled))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6882- return -EAGAIN;
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6883-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6884: if (atomic_read(&cpu_buffer_b->record_disabled))
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6885- return -EAGAIN;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6892- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6893: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer_a->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6894: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer_b->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6895-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6919-out_dec:
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6920: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer_a->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:6921: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer_b->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-6922- return ret;
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=7316=int ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int order)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7344- guard(mutex)(&buffer->mutex);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7345: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7346-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7447-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7448: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7449-
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7455-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7456: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-7457-
]
|
| 25/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22272
output: 40
thoughts: 252
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Ring Buffer Synchronization**
Okay, let's trace this out. I've confirmed that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` indeed increments `buffer->record_disabled` using `atomic_inc`. This is a crucial flag, and I've also verified that `ring_buffer_write` checks this flag with `atomic_read` before proceeding. My immediate next thought was about `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` – does it also respect this `record_disabled` flag? Yes, it does. It performs the same `atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)` check.
Now, this is where it gets interesting. I'm considering a scenario where a writer has *already* successfully passed the `record_disabled` check in `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` and is in the process of writing. If, during this writing phase, `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is called, it will increment `record_disabled` and then, critically, call `synchronize_rcu()`.
My concern then shifts to the state of `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` *after* this `synchronize_rcu()` call. Specifically, I need to understand how `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` handles concurrency and potential race conditions in this context. Does it disable preemption to ensure atomicity during its critical section, or does it rely on an RCU read lock to protect its operations? I need to delve back into the implementation of `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` to clarify this.
|
| 26/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:ring_buffer_lock_reserve]
Results: map[SourceCode:4940: /**
4941: * ring_buffer_lock_reserve - reserve a part of the buffer
4942: * @buffer: the ring buffer to reserve from
4943: * @length: the length of the data to reserve (excluding event header)
4944: *
4945: * Returns a reserved event on the ring buffer to copy directly to.
4946: * The user of this interface will need to get the body to write into
4947: * and can use the ring_buffer_event_data() interface.
4948: *
4949: * The length is the length of the data needed, not the event length
4950: * which also includes the event header.
4951: *
4952: * Must be paired with ring_buffer_unlock_commit, unless NULL is returned.
4953: * If NULL is returned, then nothing has been allocated or locked.
4954: */
4955: struct ring_buffer_event *
4956: ring_buffer_lock_reserve(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long length)
4957: {
4958: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
4959: struct ring_buffer_event *event;
4960: int cpu;
4961:
4962: /* If we are tracing schedule, we don't want to recurse */
4963: preempt_disable_notrace();
4964:
4965: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)))
4966: goto out;
4967:
4968: cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
4969:
4970: if (unlikely(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask)))
4971: goto out;
4972:
4973: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
4974:
4975: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled)))
4976: goto out;
4977:
4978: if (unlikely(length > buffer->max_data_size))
4979: goto out;
4980:
4981: if (unlikely(trace_recursive_lock(cpu_buffer)))
4982: goto out;
4983:
4984: event = rb_reserve_next_event(buffer, cpu_buffer, length);
4985: if (!event)
4986: goto out_unlock;
4987:
4988: return event;
4989:
4990: out_unlock:
4991: trace_recursive_unlock(cpu_buffer);
4992: out:
4993: preempt_enable_notrace();
4994: return NULL;
4995: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 27/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23366
output: 40
thoughts: 155
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into Ring Buffer Synchronization**
My initial thought process is to confirm a crucial detail about `ring_buffer_lock_reserve`: it explicitly disables preemption. This is a fundamental point, and I need to be absolutely sure of it before proceeding.
My attention then shifts to `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`. I recall (or deduce from the context) that this function calls `synchronize_rcu()`. This is another critical piece of information because `synchronize_rcu()` has a well-defined behavior: it waits for all preempt-disabled sections to complete.
Now, I connect these two pieces. If `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` disables preemption, and a writer starts its operation *before* the `atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled)` call, that writer will be in a preempt-disabled state. Consequently, `synchronize_rcu()`, by its very nature, will not return until that writer's section is finished.
This leads me to a significant conclusion: by the time `synchronize_rcu()` in `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` actually returns, any writers that initiated their work prior to `atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled)` will have already completed. This implies that when `buffer->subbuf_size` is modified within `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`, there are no active writers concurrently operating on the buffer. The state is effectively quiescent from a writing perspective.
However, I don't stop there. I immediately question the implication of reader access. I realize that `__rb_get_reader_page` is invoked from `ring_buffer_read_page`. This necessitates a deeper examination of the `ring_buffer_read_page` function itself to fully understand the reader's interaction with the buffer and ensure that the reader side of the synchronization is also robust and doesn't introduce race conditions.
|
| 28/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:ring_buffer_read_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:7030: /**
7031: * ring_buffer_read_page - extract a page from the ring buffer
7032: * @buffer: buffer to extract from
7033: * @data_page: the page to use allocated from ring_buffer_alloc_read_page
7034: * @len: amount to extract
7035: * @cpu: the cpu of the buffer to extract
7036: * @full: should the extraction only happen when the page is full.
7037: *
7038: * This function will pull out a page from the ring buffer and consume it.
7039: * @data_page must be the address of the variable that was returned
7040: * from ring_buffer_alloc_read_page. This is because the page might be used
7041: * to swap with a page in the ring buffer.
7042: *
7043: * for example:
7044: * rpage = ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(buffer, cpu);
7045: * if (IS_ERR(rpage))
7046: * return PTR_ERR(rpage);
7047: * ret = ring_buffer_read_page(buffer, rpage, len, cpu, 0);
7048: * if (ret >= 0)
7049: * process_page(ring_buffer_read_page_data(rpage), ret);
7050: * ring_buffer_free_read_page(buffer, cpu, rpage);
7051: *
7052: * When @full is set, the function will not return true unless
7053: * the writer is off the reader page.
7054: *
7055: * Note: it is up to the calling functions to handle sleeps and wakeups.
7056: * The ring buffer can be used anywhere in the kernel and can not
7057: * blindly call wake_up. The layer that uses the ring buffer must be
7058: * responsible for that.
7059: *
7060: * Returns:
7061: * >=0 if data has been transferred, returns the offset of consumed data.
7062: * <0 if no data has been transferred.
7063: */
7064: int ring_buffer_read_page(struct trace_buffer *buffer,
7065: struct buffer_data_read_page *data_page,
7066: size_t len, int cpu, int full)
7067: {
7068: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7069: struct ring_buffer_event *event;
7070: struct buffer_data_page *dpage;
7071: struct buffer_page *reader;
7072: long missed_events;
7073: unsigned int commit;
7074: unsigned int size;
7075: unsigned int read;
7076: u64 save_timestamp;
7077: bool force_memcpy;
7078:
7079: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7080: return -1;
7081:
7082: /*
7083: * If len is not big enough to hold the page header, then
7084: * we can not copy anything.
7085: */
7086: if (len <= BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE)
7087: return -1;
7088:
7089: len -= BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
7090:
7091: if (!data_page || !data_page->data)
7092: return -1;
7093:
7094: if (data_page->order != buffer->subbuf_order)
7095: return -1;
7096:
7097: dpage = data_page->data;
7098: if (!dpage)
7099: return -1;
7100:
7101: guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
7102:
7103: reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
7104: if (!reader)
7105: return -1;
7106:
7107: event = rb_reader_event(cpu_buffer);
7108:
7109: read = reader->read;
7110: commit = rb_page_commit(reader);
7111: size = rb_page_size(reader);
7112:
7113: /* Check if any events were dropped */
7114: missed_events = cpu_buffer->lost_events;
7115:
7116: force_memcpy = cpu_buffer->mapped || cpu_buffer->remote;
7117:
7118: /*
7119: * If this page has been partially read or
7120: * if len is not big enough to read the rest of the page or
7121: * a writer is still on the page, then
7122: * we must copy the data from the page to the buffer.
7123: * Otherwise, we can simply swap the page with the one passed in.
7124: */
7125: if (read || (len < (size - read)) ||
7126: cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page ||
7127: force_memcpy) {
7128: struct buffer_data_page *rpage = cpu_buffer->reader_page->page;
7129: unsigned int rpos = read;
7130: unsigned int pos = 0;
7131: unsigned int event_size;
7132: unsigned int flags = 0;
7133:
7134: /*
7135: * If a full page is expected, this can still be returned
7136: * if there's been a previous partial read and the
7137: * rest of the page can be read and the commit page is off
7138: * the reader page.
7139: */
7140: if (full &&
7141: (!read || (len < (size - read)) ||
7142: cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page))
7143: return -1;
7144:
7145: if (len > (size - read))
7146: len = (size - read);
7147:
7148: /* Always keep the time extend and data together */
7149: event_size = rb_event_ts_length(event);
7150:
7151: if (len < event_size)
7152: return -1;
7153:
7154: if (commit & RB_MISSED_EVENTS)
7155: flags = RB_MISSED_EVENTS;
7156:
7157: /* save the current timestamp, since the user will need it */
7158: save_timestamp = cpu_buffer->read_stamp;
7159:
7160: /* Need to copy one event at a time */
7161: do {
7162: /* We need the size of one event, because
7163: * rb_advance_reader only advances by one event,
7164: * whereas rb_event_ts_length may include the size of
7165: * one or two events.
7166: * We have already ensured there's enough space if this
7167: * is a time extend. */
7168: event_size = rb_event_length(event);
7169: memcpy(dpage->data + pos, rpage->data + rpos, event_size);
7170:
7171: len -= event_size;
7172:
7173: rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
7174: rpos = reader->read;
7175: pos += event_size;
7176:
7177: if (rpos >= size)
7178: break;
7179:
7180: event = rb_reader_event(cpu_buffer);
7181: /* Always keep the time extend and data together */
7182: event_size = rb_event_ts_length(event);
7183: } while (len >= event_size);
7184:
7185: /* update dpage */
7186: local_set(&dpage->commit, pos | flags);
7187: dpage->time_stamp = save_timestamp;
7188:
7189: /* we copied everything to the beginning */
7190: read = 0;
7191: } else {
7192: /* update the entry counter */
7193: cpu_buffer->read += rb_page_entries(reader);
7194: cpu_buffer->read_bytes += rb_page_size(reader);
7195:
7196: /* swap the pages */
7197: rb_init_data_page(dpage);
7198: dpage = reader->page;
7199: reader->page = data_page->data;
7200: local_set(&reader->write, 0);
7201: local_set(&reader->entries, 0);
7202: reader->read = 0;
7203: data_page->data = dpage;
7204: if (!missed_events && rb_data_page_commit(dpage) & RB_MISSED_EVENTS)
7205: missed_events = -1;
7206:
7207: /*
7208: * Use the real_end for the data size,
7209: * This gives us a chance to store the lost events
7210: * on the page.
7211: */
7212: if (reader->real_end)
7213: local_set(&dpage->commit, reader->real_end);
7214: }
7215:
7216: cpu_buffer->lost_events = 0;
7217:
7218: size = rb_data_page_size(dpage);
7219: /*
7220: * Set a flag in the commit field if we lost events
7221: */
7222: if (missed_events) {
7223: /*
7224: * If there is room at the end of the page to save the
7225: * missed events, then record it there.
7226: */
7227: if (missed_events > 0 &&
7228: buffer->subbuf_size - size >= sizeof(missed_events)) {
7229: memcpy(&dpage->data[size], &missed_events,
7230: sizeof(missed_events));
7231: local_add(RB_MISSED_STORED, &dpage->commit);
7232: size += sizeof(missed_events);
7233: }
7234: /*
7235: * Note, for the persistent ring buffer, the RB_MISSED_EVENTS
7236: * may have been set in the main buffer via the verification code.
7237: * But here, dpage is a copy of that page and has not yet had
7238: * the RB_MISSED_EVENTS set. As for the normal buffers,
7239: * the main write buffer does not set these bits and it needs
7240: * to be set here.
7241: */
7242: local_add(RB_MISSED_EVENTS, &dpage->commit);
7243: }
7244:
7245: /*
7246: * This page may be off to user land. Zero it out here.
7247: */
7248: if (size < buffer->subbuf_size)
7249: memset(&dpage->data[size], 0, buffer->subbuf_size - size);
7250:
7251: return read;
7252: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 29/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26928
output: 38
thoughts: 474
Thoughts: **The Interplay of Locks and State Updates in Ring Buffer Operations**
My initial thought was a simple observation: both `ring_buffer_read_page` and `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` acquire the `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. This immediately suggested to me that these two functions could not execute concurrently on the same CPU's buffer data. A direct consequence of this would be that `buffer->subbuf_size` should be immutable while `ring_buffer_read_page` is active, as `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is the function responsible for altering that particular state.
Digging deeper, I traced the execution path. I noted that `ring_buffer_read_page` calls `rb_get_reader_page`, which in turn calls `__rb_get_reader_page`. This meant that `__rb_get_reader_page` was indeed operating under the protection of `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. However, the next observation threw me for a loop: `__rb_get_reader_page` itself attempts to acquire `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock)`. This seemed redundant if `reader_lock` was already held, but more importantly, it complicated the picture.
My reasoning then led me back to the concern about `buffer->subbuf_size`. I reasoned that since `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` *needs* `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` to modify the pages (even though it changes `buffer->subbuf_size` *before* acquiring the lock), it must be safe. My thinking was that `__rb_get_reader_page` holding `reader_lock` and then acquiring `cpu_buffer->lock` would prevent `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` from making its change to `buffer->subbuf_size` while `__rb_get_reader_page` was active.
But then, the crucial realization hit me as I re-examined the sequence of operations within `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`. I saw the following critical lines:
```c
buffer->subbuf_order = order;
buffer->subbuf_size = psize - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
```
These lines are executed *before* the loop where it acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` for each CPU. This means that `buffer->subbuf_size` is indeed updated *before* any lock is acquired to protect it. Consequently, my previous assumption was flawed. `buffer->subbuf_size` *can* change while `__rb_get_reader_page` is running because `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` updates this value *before* it ever takes the `reader_lock` that `__rb_get_reader_page` also holds. This is a significant point of potential race condition that needs further scrutiny. I need to go back and meticulously re-trace the locking and data access patterns in both functions.
|
| 30/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:7340 LineCount:60]
Results: map[Contents:7340: old_order = buffer->subbuf_order;
7341: old_size = buffer->subbuf_size;
7342:
7343: /* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */
7344: guard(mutex)(&buffer->mutex);
7345: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
7346:
7347: /* Make sure all commits have finished */
7348: synchronize_rcu();
7349:
7350: buffer->subbuf_order = order;
7351: buffer->subbuf_size = psize - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
7352:
7353: /* Make sure all new buffers are allocated, before deleting the old ones */
7354: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
7355:
7356: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7357: continue;
7358:
7359: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7360:
7361: if (cpu_buffer->mapped) {
7362: err = -EBUSY;
7363: goto error;
7364: }
7365:
7366: /* Update the number of pages to match the new size */
7367: nr_pages = old_size * buffer->buffers[cpu]->nr_pages;
7368: nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(nr_pages, buffer->subbuf_size);
7369:
7370: /* we need a minimum of two pages */
7371: if (nr_pages < 2)
7372: nr_pages = 2;
7373:
7374: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages;
7375:
7376: /* Include the reader page */
7377: nr_pages++;
7378:
7379: /* Allocate the new size buffer */
7380: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
7381: if (__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer, nr_pages,
7382: &cpu_buffer->new_pages)) {
7383: /* not enough memory for new pages */
7384: err = -ENOMEM;
7385: goto error;
7386: }
7387: }
7388:
7389: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
7390: struct buffer_data_page *old_free_data_page;
7391: struct list_head old_pages;
7392: unsigned long flags;
7393:
7394: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7395: continue;
7396:
7397: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7398:
7399: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
]
|
| 31/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 28285
output: 59
thoughts: 732
Thoughts: Here are my thoughts on this potential issue:
**My Analysis of the Ring Buffer Sub-buffer Size Change Vulnerability**
Ah, I think I've spotted a critical race condition here! It seems the `buffer->subbuf_size` is being modified, and this modification is occurring *before* the necessary synchronization points are fully in place for readers. Specifically, at line 7351, `buffer->subbuf_size` can be changed. Following this, page allocation might take some time to complete, but crucially, `ring_buffer_read_page` can proceed because it only holds a `reader_lock`, and the more stringent lock isn't acquired until line 7399.
This timing is problematic because `__rb_get_reader_page` can then read the *newly updated* `buffer->subbuf_size`. The core of the issue arises if this new size is *smaller* than the old one. Let's imagine a scenario: the old size was 8192 bytes, and it's being reduced to 4096 bytes. When `__rb_get_reader_page` reads `bsize`, it correctly gets 4096. However, the page it's currently trying to process might have been written to by the writer when it was still operating with the older, larger 8192-byte buffer. Consequently, `rb_page_write(reader)` for that page could be, say, 5000 bytes – already exceeding the new `bsize` of 4096.
Now, I initially thought the writer might still be active, but then I recalled that the writer is disabled by `atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled)` and `synchronize_rcu()`. This means the writer *should* have stopped writing. Yet, the problem remains: `rb_page_write(reader)` is already past the new `bsize`.
The critical part is this loop within `__rb_get_reader_page`:
```c
for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize))
break;
udelay(1);
smp_rmb();
}
```
Since `rb_page_write(reader)` is 5000 and `bsize` is 4096, the condition `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` evaluates to `FALSE`. And because the writer is disabled, `rb_page_write(reader)` will *never* increase further. This means the loop will continue for its entire duration (1 second, which is 1,000,000 iterations) and then trigger a warning.
To solidify this, I've outlined the sequence of events that I believe leads to this failure:
1. **Thread A** calls `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(buffer, new_order)` where `new_order` corresponds to a smaller sub-buffer size than currently in use.
2. **Thread A** disables the writer by setting `buffer->record_disabled` and then calls `synchronize_rcu()` to ensure all prior writer operations are complete.
3. **Thread A** then updates `buffer->subbuf_size` to the `new_size`.
4. **Thread B**, a reader thread, calls `ring_buffer_read_page(buffer, ...)`.
5. **Thread B** then calls `__rb_get_reader_page()`.
6. Inside `__rb_get_reader_page`, **Thread B** reads `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)`, which is now the *new, smaller* size.
7. The `reader` page **Thread B** is currently examining was allocated and potentially written to when the sub-buffer size was *larger*. Therefore, `rb_page_write(reader)` on this page is greater than the `new_size`.
8. **Thread B** enters the wait loop, attempting to satisfy the condition `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`.
9. Because the writer is disabled and the current write pointer on the page has already surpassed the new, smaller `bsize`, this condition will never be met. The loop will run for its full timeout (1 second), leading to the observed warning.
My final point of inquiry is whether `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is accessible from userspace, as I've seen it can be modified via `tracefs`. If it is, this vulnerability could indeed be triggered externally.
|
| 32/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c IncludeSnippetLines:2 Name:ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set SourceTreePrefix:kernel/trace]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:buffer_subbuf_size_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:8221 SourceSnippet:8219: goto out;
8220:
8221: ret = ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(tr->array_buffer.buffer, order);
8222: if (ret)
8223: goto out;
] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:__UNIQUE_ID_addressable_ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set_1268 SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:7472 SourceSnippet:7472: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set);
] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:__gendwarfksyms_ptr_ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:7472 SourceSnippet:7472: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set);
] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:__gendwarfksyms_ptr_ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:7472 SourceSnippet:7472: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set);
]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 33/2 |
2026/08/12 02:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 29426
output: 39
thoughts: 58
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `buffer_subbuf_size_write` and TraceFS**
Ah, it seems my memory is serving me correctly on this. I recall that the function `buffer_subbuf_size_write` within `kernel/trace/trace.c` is indeed the one responsible for handling writes to this particular trace event buffer configuration. And yes, to confirm the details, this function is directly linked to the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` file residing within the `tracefs` filesystem. My next step, therefore, is to delve into the implementation of `buffer_subbuf_size_write` itself to fully grasp its operational logic and how it interacts with the underlying tracing infrastructure.
|
| 34/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/trace.c Name:buffer_subbuf_size_write]
Results: map[SourceCode:8190: static ssize_t
8191: buffer_subbuf_size_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
8192: size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
8193: {
8194: struct trace_array *tr = filp->private_data;
8195: unsigned long val;
8196: int old_order;
8197: int order;
8198: int pages;
8199: int ret;
8200:
8201: ret = kstrtoul_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 10, &val);
8202: if (ret)
8203: return ret;
8204:
8205: val *= 1024; /* value passed in is in KB */
8206:
8207: pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(val, PAGE_SIZE);
8208: order = fls(pages - 1);
8209:
8210: /* limit between 1 and 128 system pages */
8211: if (order < 0 || order > 7)
8212: return -EINVAL;
8213:
8214: /* Do not allow tracing while changing the order of the ring buffer */
8215: tracing_stop_tr(tr);
8216:
8217: old_order = ring_buffer_subbuf_order_get(tr->array_buffer.buffer);
8218: if (old_order == order)
8219: goto out;
8220:
8221: ret = ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(tr->array_buffer.buffer, order);
8222: if (ret)
8223: goto out;
8224:
8225: #ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_SNAPSHOT
8226:
8227: if (!tr->allocated_snapshot)
8228: goto out_max;
8229:
8230: ret = ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer, order);
8231: if (ret) {
8232: /* Put back the old order */
8233: cnt = ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(tr->array_buffer.buffer, old_order);
8234: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(cnt)) {
8235: /*
8236: * AARGH! We are left with different orders!
8237: * The max buffer is our "snapshot" buffer.
8238: * When a tracer needs a snapshot (one of the
8239: * latency tracers), it swaps the max buffer
8240: * with the saved snap shot. We succeeded to
8241: * update the order of the main buffer, but failed to
8242: * update the order of the max buffer. But when we tried
8243: * to reset the main buffer to the original size, we
8244: * failed there too. This is very unlikely to
8245: * happen, but if it does, warn and kill all
8246: * tracing.
8247: */
8248: tracing_disabled = 1;
8249: }
8250: goto out;
8251: }
8252: out_max:
8253: #endif
8254: (*ppos)++;
8255: out:
8256: if (ret)
8257: cnt = ret;
8258: tracing_start_tr(tr);
8259: return cnt;
8260: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c]
|
| 35/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30544
output: 36
thoughts: 86
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` Race Condition**
Ah, it appears I've pinpointed a critical area for modification: the ability to dynamically alter the subbuffer size. My understanding is that this is achievable through writing to the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` parameter.
Now, the crux of the issue, the bug I'm focusing on, stems from a race condition. Specifically, it's the interleaving of operations between `ring_buffer_read_page` and `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` that's causing the problem. This simultaneous access, or rather, the potential for it, is what I need to investigate further to understand the exact failure mode.
A crucial piece of context I've uncovered is that `ring_buffer_read_page` isn't an isolated function; it's actually invoked from within `tracing_buffers_read`. This connection is significant because `tracing_buffers_read` is a central point for how tracing data is consumed. Therefore, understanding the behavior of `tracing_buffers_read` and how it interacts with `ring_buffer_read_page` during this race is paramount. My next step, naturally, will be to delve into the implementation details of `tracing_buffers_read` itself to fully grasp the flow and the potential for this race to manifest.
|
| 36/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/trace.c Name:tracing_buffers_read]
Results: map[SourceCode:7078: ssize_t tracing_buffers_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
7079: size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
7080: {
7081: struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = filp->private_data;
7082: struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
7083: void *trace_data;
7084: int page_size;
7085: ssize_t ret = 0;
7086: ssize_t size;
7087:
7088: if (!count)
7089: return 0;
7090:
7091: if (iter->snapshot && tracer_uses_snapshot(iter->tr->current_trace))
7092: return -EBUSY;
7093:
7094: page_size = ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get(iter->array_buffer->buffer);
7095:
7096: /* Make sure the spare matches the current sub buffer size */
7097: if (info->spare) {
7098: if (page_size != info->spare_size) {
7099: ring_buffer_free_read_page(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7100: info->spare_cpu, info->spare);
7101: info->spare = NULL;
7102: }
7103: }
7104:
7105: if (!info->spare) {
7106: info->spare = ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7107: iter->cpu_file);
7108: if (IS_ERR(info->spare)) {
7109: ret = PTR_ERR(info->spare);
7110: info->spare = NULL;
7111: } else {
7112: info->spare_cpu = iter->cpu_file;
7113: info->spare_size = page_size;
7114: }
7115: }
7116: if (!info->spare)
7117: return ret;
7118:
7119: /* Do we have previous read data to read? */
7120: if (info->read < page_size)
7121: goto read;
7122:
7123: again:
7124: trace_access_lock(iter->cpu_file);
7125: ret = ring_buffer_read_page(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7126: info->spare,
7127: count,
7128: iter->cpu_file, 0);
7129: trace_access_unlock(iter->cpu_file);
7130:
7131: if (ret < 0) {
7132: if (trace_empty(iter) && !iter->closed) {
7133: if (update_last_data_if_empty(iter->tr))
7134: return 0;
7135:
7136: if ((filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))
7137: return -EAGAIN;
7138:
7139: ret = wait_on_pipe(iter, 0);
7140: if (ret)
7141: return ret;
7142:
7143: goto again;
7144: }
7145: return 0;
7146: }
7147:
7148: info->read = 0;
7149: read:
7150: size = page_size - info->read;
7151: if (size > count)
7152: size = count;
7153: trace_data = ring_buffer_read_page_data(info->spare);
7154: ret = copy_to_user(ubuf, trace_data + info->read, size);
7155: if (ret == size)
7156: return -EFAULT;
7157:
7158: size -= ret;
7159:
7160: *ppos += size;
7161: info->read += size;
7162:
7163: return size;
7164: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c]
|
| 37/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31880
output: 38
thoughts: 1736
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the Ring Buffer Bug**
So, I've been digging into this `tracing_buffers_read` function, and I've figured out how `per_cpu/cpuX/trace_pipe_raw` actually gets read. The key seems to be this interaction with the ring buffer's pages.
To reproduce this bug, my initial idea was straightforward: open `trace_pipe_raw` for reading on a specific CPU, then make sure there's some data in the ring buffer so `ring_buffer_read_page` has something to chew on. I thought the condition `rb_page_write(reader) > new_size` was the critical point.
Now, let's break down `rb_page_write(reader)`. This represents the amount of data actually written to the *reader's page*. If that page is empty, it's zero. The "bug" condition, as I see it, happens when this value exceeds the *new* subbuffer size, `new_size`.
My thinking went something like this: if I change the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` from, say, 8 (which means 8192 bytes) to 4 (4096 bytes), then `new_size` would be 4096 minus some header overhead, let's call it 4080. If, somehow, `rb_page_write(reader)` ends up being greater than 4080, I'd hit the bug.
The only way I could see `rb_page_write(reader)` exceeding the new, smaller size is if the reader page *was* a writer page before, and it was filled with more than 4080 bytes of data *before* it became the reader page.
So, my refined reproduction steps were:
1. Set `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` to 8 (8192 bytes).
2. Generate more than 4096 bytes of event data on CPU 0.
3. Start a thread to read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
4. Crucially, start *another* thread that writes 4 to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` (making it 4096 bytes).
My initial hypothesis was that the read thread, calling `ring_buffer_read_page`, would then call `__rb_get_reader_page`. If `ring_buffer_read_page` was called *before* `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` updated the `buffer->subbuf_size`, it would read the *old* size (8192). In that case, `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` would hold, and there'd be no issue.
But what if `ring_buffer_read_page` is called *after* the size change? If that were the case, it would use the *new* size (4096). My concern was that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` would have already acquired the `reader_lock` and swapped the pages, making the new reader page empty (0 bytes written), thus `rb_page_write(reader)` would be 0, which is less than 4096, and again, no bug.
This is where I got stuck for a bit. I needed to find the precise race window.
Let's consider two threads:
* **Thread A:** Executing `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`.
* **Thread B:** Executing `ring_buffer_read_page`.
Thread B calls `ring_buffer_read_page`. It acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. Then, it calls `rb_get_reader_page`, which leads to `__rb_get_reader_page`. Inside this function, it reads `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)`.
Now, here's the key: If, at this very moment, Thread A has *not yet* modified `buffer->subbuf_size`, then `bsize` will be the *old* value, 8192. If `bsize` is 8192, then `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` is certainly true, and again, no bug.
The critical race happens when:
1. **Thread A** has already modified `buffer->subbuf_size` to 4096.
2. **Thread B** calls `ring_buffer_read_page`.
3. Thread B acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`.
4. Thread B calls `__rb_get_reader_page`.
5. Thread B reads `bsize = 4096`.
6. *But*, because Thread A has *not yet* acquired `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` (Thread B holds it, or Thread A is still in the process of allocating new pages), the actual pages in the ring buffer are still the *old* ones, each 8192 bytes.
7. The reader page (which was recently a writer page) still contains data, let's say 5000 bytes. So, `rb_page_write(reader)` is 5000.
At this point, Thread B checks `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. This becomes `5000 <= 4096`, which is FALSE.
This leads to the loop that waits for `USECS_WAIT` and eventually triggers the `RB_WARN_ON`!
I meticulously traced `__rb_get_reader_page` and the subsequent `out:` label logic. The crucial part is that `__rb_get_reader_page` checks `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader)`. If this is true (meaning there's data to read on the current reader page), it immediately jumps to `out`. And at `out`, the `RB_WARN_ON` condition is evaluated with `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`.
If the reader page *hasn't* been fully processed (i.e., `reader->read < rb_page_size(reader)`), it means there's still data in that page from when it was a writer page. If the subbuffer size was just reduced, the old, larger page might contain more data than the *new* subbuffer size allows. This exactly matches the observed bug.
So, yes, the sequence is: Thread A updates `subbuf_size` but hasn't swapped pages yet. Thread B acquires the reader lock, reads the *new* `subbuf_size`, but then accesses an *old* page that's larger than the new size and contains more data than the new size permits, leading to the warning. That's my current understanding of the race condition.
|
| 38/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_page_size]
Results: map[SourceCode: 389: static __always_inline unsigned int rb_page_size(struct buffer_page *bpage)
390: {
391: return rb_data_page_size(bpage->page);
392: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 39/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33731
output: 40
thoughts: 10
Thoughts: **My Deep Dive into `rb_data_page_size`**
Ah, `rb_data_page_size`. I've been wrestling with this particular constant, and my thoughts are coalescing around its significance. It's not just a number; it represents a fundamental architectural choice, a tangible manifestation of how our system handles data at a granular level.
When I see `rb_data_page_size`, my immediate inclination is to understand its impact on performance. This isn't a trivial matter. I'm thinking about I/O operations, the constant dance between memory and disk. A larger page size might mean fewer I/O calls, which, on the surface, sounds like a win. Fewer round trips, less overhead. But then my mind immediately jumps to the flip side: memory utilization. If my pages are too large, I risk wasting precious memory. Imagine allocating a massive page for a tiny piece of data – that's an inefficiency I can't stand. It's like buying a huge canvas for a postage stamp-sized painting.
So, it's a balancing act, isn't it? I'm trying to find that sweet spot. Is this `rb_data_page_size` optimized for the typical data patterns we expect? Or is it a generic value that might be suboptimal for specific use cases? I'm considering factors like the size of individual data records, the frequency of access to those records, and the overall memory footprint we're aiming for.
Furthermore, I'm contemplating the implications for caching. A larger page size could potentially lead to larger cache blocks. This can be beneficial if the data accessed within a page is highly correlated. If I fetch a page, and I'm likely to need most of the other data within that same page soon after, then a larger page is excellent. It maximizes cache hit rates. However, if access patterns are more random, and I only need a small fraction of a large page, then the cache is effectively burdened with useless data, potentially evicting more valuable information.
I also have to consider the underlying hardware. What are the characteristics of the storage devices we're using? What's the typical block size for the filesystem? Are there any operating system-level page sizes that might influence this? It's rarely an isolated decision. This `rb_data_page_size` is likely interacting with, and being influenced by, a whole ecosystem of other parameters.
My thoughts are also drifting towards memory management and allocation strategies. How does this page size affect our allocation and deallocation algorithms? Is it going to lead to fragmentation issues? If I'm constantly allocating and deallocating fixed-size pages, and the data sizes vary significantly, I could end up with a lot of small, unusable gaps in memory.
Ultimately, when I encounter `rb_data_page_size`, I'm not just seeing a constant. I'm seeing a complex interplay of performance, memory efficiency, caching strategies, and underlying hardware. It's a prompt to question, to analyze, and to ensure that this particular knob is turned in a way that best serves the overall objectives of the system. It’s about making informed, strategic decisions that ripple throughout the application's behavior.
|
| 40/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_data_page_size]
Results: map[SourceCode: 379: static __always_inline long rb_data_page_size(struct buffer_data_page *dpage)
380: {
381: return rb_data_page_commit(dpage) & ~RB_MISSED_MASK;
382: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 41/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33868
output: 38
thoughts: 445
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Ring Buffer Page Management and Potential Race Conditions**
Alright, let's break down this puzzling behavior I'm observing with the ring buffer's page management. My core assumption is that `rb_page_size` represents the *committed* size of a page within the ring buffer.
So, if I'm looking at a reader's current page, and it has, say, 5000 bytes committed (`rb_page_size(reader)` is 5000), but the reader hasn't actually consumed any data yet (`reader->read` is 0), then the condition `reader->read < rb_page_size(reader)` (i.e., `0 < 5000`) is naturally true. This leads me to jump to the `out` section.
Now, in that `out` section, I'm checking `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. Here's where things get interesting. `rb_page_write(reader)` typically reflects the *written* size of the page, and usually, when a page is fully written, the committed size (`rb_page_size`) and the written size (`rb_page_write`) are roughly equivalent. So, if the page is mostly full, `rb_page_write(reader)` would also be around 5000 bytes. The `bsize` in question is 4080 bytes.
Therefore, the condition `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` becomes `5000 <= 4080`, which is unequivocally false. This leads to the loop and the subsequent warning, which is clearly not the desired behavior.
Now, I need to pinpoint the exact race condition that causes this scenario. My current hypothesis involves the following sequence of events:
1. **Ring Buffer Sub-Buffer Size:** The ring buffer's sub-buffer size is configured to be 8192 bytes (order 1). This is a significant chunk of data.
2. **Writing Data:** A write operation occurs on CPU 0, pushing more than 4096 bytes of data into the ring buffer. This is a critical point because it exceeds half of the sub-buffer size.
3. **Page Swapping and Reading:** Then, `ring_buffer_read_page` is called on CPU 0. This function is designed to swap the next available page from the ring buffer into the `reader_page` *and* simultaneously attempt to read some data from it.
* **Initial thought:** If `ring_buffer_read_page` actually *reads* some data, then `reader->read` would become greater than 0. However, even with `reader->read > 0`, as long as it's still less than the committed page size (`rb_page_size(reader)`), the logic would still branch to `out`, and I'd run into the same comparison issue.
* **Refinement:** My understanding of `ring_buffer_read_page` needs a bit of a tweak. It *can* consume the entire page if I pass a sufficiently large `len` parameter. If I pass a smaller `len`, it will only consume a portion. The key insight here is that I might *not even need* to explicitly call `ring_buffer_read_page` beforehand to trigger this.
* **The Realization:** If `reader_page` is initially empty, the `__rb_get_reader_page` function is responsible for swapping a new page from the ring buffer into `reader_page`. This is where I need to focus my investigation. When `__rb_get_reader_page` is called and `reader_page` is empty, it will fetch a page from the underlying ring buffer, and that page will likely contain the data written in step 2. This fetched page then becomes the `reader_page`, and its `rb_page_size` and `rb_page_write` will reflect the state of that newly swapped-in page, potentially leading to the problematic `5000 <= 4080` comparison if the written data exceeds `bsize` but the page hasn't been fully consumed. This is the race condition I need to iron out.
|
| 42/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c FirstLine:5825 LineCount:50]
Results: map[Contents:5825: reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
5826:
5827: /* If there's more to read, return this page */
5828: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))
5829: goto out;
5830:
5831: /* Never should we have an index greater than the size */
5832: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
5833: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read > rb_page_size(reader)))
5834: goto out;
5835:
5836: /* check if we caught up to the tail */
5837: reader = NULL;
5838: if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
5839: goto out;
5840:
5841: /* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
5842: if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
5843: goto out;
5844:
5845: /*
5846: * Reset the reader page to size zero.
5847: */
5848: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0);
5849: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0);
5850: rb_init_data_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page->page);
5851: cpu_buffer->reader_page->real_end = 0;
5852:
5853: spin:
5854: /*
5855: * Splice the empty reader page into the list around the head.
5856: */
5857: reader = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
5858: if (!reader)
5859: goto out;
5860: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.next = rb_list_head(reader->list.next);
5861: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.prev = reader->list.prev;
5862:
5863: /*
5864: * cpu_buffer->pages just needs to point to the buffer, it
5865: * has no specific buffer page to point to. Lets move it out
5866: * of our way so we don't accidentally swap it.
5867: */
5868: cpu_buffer->pages = reader->list.prev;
5869:
5870: /* The reader page will be pointing to the new head */
5871: rb_set_list_to_head(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
5872:
5873: /*
5874: * We want to make sure we read the overruns after we set up our
]
|
| 43/2 |
2026/08/12 02:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 35125
output: 36
thoughts: 708
Thoughts: Here are my thoughts on this, laid out as a summary:
**My Detailed Analysis of the `__rb_get_reader_page` Logic and Potential Race Conditions**
Alright, so I'm looking at this `__rb_get_reader_page` function, and it seems like there's a potential issue when the reader page is empty. The initial behavior is to swap the current `reader_page` with the head page from the ring buffer. Then, it sets `cpu_buffer->reader_page` to this newly acquired page and jumps back to `again:`.
At `again:`, the core check is `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader)`. If a new page was just swapped in, and it actually has data, then `rb_page_size(reader)` will be greater than zero, and `reader` will initially be zero. This condition will evaluate to true, and we'll proceed to the `out:` label.
Now, at `out:`, the crucial check is `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. This is where things get interesting. If `bsize` was updated earlier in `__rb_get_reader_page` to reflect a *new, smaller size*, but the `reader_page` we just swapped in is still from the *old, larger page size*, then `rb_page_write(reader)` (which represents the actual data written to that page) could very well be greater than the newly reduced `bsize`. This mismatch, as I see it, would incorrectly trigger a warning.
But here's the kicker: I realize this problem doesn't even require a race condition where `bsize` changes *while* `__rb_get_reader_page` is actively executing. The scenario described above could happen with just a subtle timing difference.
This leads me to question: if `bsize` *has* been changed to the new, smaller size, why are the pages within the ring buffer still reflecting the old, larger size?
My understanding is that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` handles this. It first updates `buffer->subbuf_size` to the new, smaller value. Then, it proceeds to allocate new pages that conform to this smaller size. Finally, it swaps these new pages into the ring buffer. This sequence creates a window of vulnerability. During this window, `buffer->subbuf_size` is already updated to the *new, smaller size*, but the ring buffer still contains pages allocated under the *old, larger size*.
If `ring_buffer_read_page` is called during this specific window, it will:
1. Read `bsize` as the `new_smaller_size`.
2. Swap an *old, larger page* into `reader_page`.
3. Attempt the check `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`.
Since the *old, larger page* has `rb_page_write(reader)` that is inherently larger than the `new_smaller_size`, this condition will evaluate to false, and the warning will be triggered.
Now, I need to confirm if `ring_buffer_read_page` can indeed be called during this window. Let's examine what `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` does. It sets `buffer->subbuf_order` and `buffer->subbuf_size`. Then, it iterates to allocate new pages, and in a subsequent loop, it iterates again to swap the pages, acquiring the `reader_lock` only within this swapping phase.
The critical question is: is `ring_buffer_read_page` prevented from executing while `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is in the process of allocating new pages *before* the swap? `ring_buffer_read_page` itself acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. However, `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` does *not* hold `reader_lock` during the page allocation phase. It *does* hold `buffer->mutex` and sets `buffer->record_disabled`.
This leads me to the next step: does `ring_buffer_read_page` acquire `buffer->mutex`? I need to trace the call chain, likely by examining `tracing_buffers_read`, to determine if this mutex contention or lack thereof exposes the race.
|
| 44/2 |
2026/08/12 02:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/trace.c Name:tracing_buffers_read]
Results: map[SourceCode:7078: ssize_t tracing_buffers_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
7079: size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
7080: {
7081: struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = filp->private_data;
7082: struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
7083: void *trace_data;
7084: int page_size;
7085: ssize_t ret = 0;
7086: ssize_t size;
7087:
7088: if (!count)
7089: return 0;
7090:
7091: if (iter->snapshot && tracer_uses_snapshot(iter->tr->current_trace))
7092: return -EBUSY;
7093:
7094: page_size = ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get(iter->array_buffer->buffer);
7095:
7096: /* Make sure the spare matches the current sub buffer size */
7097: if (info->spare) {
7098: if (page_size != info->spare_size) {
7099: ring_buffer_free_read_page(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7100: info->spare_cpu, info->spare);
7101: info->spare = NULL;
7102: }
7103: }
7104:
7105: if (!info->spare) {
7106: info->spare = ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7107: iter->cpu_file);
7108: if (IS_ERR(info->spare)) {
7109: ret = PTR_ERR(info->spare);
7110: info->spare = NULL;
7111: } else {
7112: info->spare_cpu = iter->cpu_file;
7113: info->spare_size = page_size;
7114: }
7115: }
7116: if (!info->spare)
7117: return ret;
7118:
7119: /* Do we have previous read data to read? */
7120: if (info->read < page_size)
7121: goto read;
7122:
7123: again:
7124: trace_access_lock(iter->cpu_file);
7125: ret = ring_buffer_read_page(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7126: info->spare,
7127: count,
7128: iter->cpu_file, 0);
7129: trace_access_unlock(iter->cpu_file);
7130:
7131: if (ret < 0) {
7132: if (trace_empty(iter) && !iter->closed) {
7133: if (update_last_data_if_empty(iter->tr))
7134: return 0;
7135:
7136: if ((filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK))
7137: return -EAGAIN;
7138:
7139: ret = wait_on_pipe(iter, 0);
7140: if (ret)
7141: return ret;
7142:
7143: goto again;
7144: }
7145: return 0;
7146: }
7147:
7148: info->read = 0;
7149: read:
7150: size = page_size - info->read;
7151: if (size > count)
7152: size = count;
7153: trace_data = ring_buffer_read_page_data(info->spare);
7154: ret = copy_to_user(ubuf, trace_data + info->read, size);
7155: if (ret == size)
7156: return -EFAULT;
7157:
7158: size -= ret;
7159:
7160: *ppos += size;
7161: info->read += size;
7162:
7163: return size;
7164: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c]
|
| 45/2 |
2026/08/12 02:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37083
output: 36
thoughts: 2869
Thoughts: **The Ring Buffer Size Swap Race Condition**
I've been digging into a peculiar race condition I've identified within the tracing ring buffer implementation, and I think I've finally pieced together the exact sequence of events leading to a warning in `__rb_get_reader_page`.
My initial thought was that `tracing_buffers_read` and `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` couldn't run concurrently. However, I've realized that `tracing_buffers_read` *doesn't* acquire the ring buffer's mutex. It only locks the `trace_access_lock` associated with the trace file being iterated. This means these two operations *can* indeed run in parallel, and that's precisely where the problem lies.
Here's how I see the race unfolding:
1. `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is called, likely initiated by a user writing to `/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb`.
2. Inside `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`, the `buffer->subbuf_order` and `buffer->subbuf_size` are updated to reflect the new, smaller size. For example, if it's changed from 8KB to 4KB, `buffer->subbuf_size` will become 4096 bytes.
3. Crucially, `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` then proceeds to reallocate pages for each CPU buffer using `__rb_allocate_pages`. This memory allocation process can take a significant amount of time, especially for larger buffer sizes.
4. *During this window*, while `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is busy allocating new pages, `tracing_buffers_read` is invoked (e.g., by a user reading from `trace_pipe_raw`).
5. `tracing_buffers_read` calls `ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get` to fetch the current page size. Because `buffer->subbuf_size` has already been updated, it retrieves the *new, smaller* size (e.g., 4096 bytes).
6. It then compares this `page_size` with its `info->spare_size`. If they differ (which they will, as it's allocating a new spare page for the new size), it frees the old spare page and allocates a *new* spare page matching the *new, smaller* size.
7. Next, `tracing_buffers_read` calls `ring_buffer_read_page`, passing in this newly allocated, smaller spare page.
8. Inside `ring_buffer_read_page`, there's a check: `if (data_page->order != buffer->subbuf_order) return -1;`. Since `buffer->subbuf_order` was also updated by `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`, this check passes.
9. The critical part then occurs in `rb_get_reader_page` (called from `ring_buffer_read_page`). It reads the current `cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size` (which is the *new, smaller* size). Let's call this `bsize`.
10. Then, it swaps the current reader page with the head page. However, the head page is still the *old, larger* page because `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` hasn't finished its page swapping/allocation process for the buffer's main pages yet.
11. So, the `reader_page` now points to the *old, larger* page.
12. When it finally checks `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize` (where `rb_page_write` is the amount of data written to the reader page, and `bsize` is the *new, smaller* expected size), the condition fails. The *old, larger* page contains more data than the *new, smaller* `bsize` can accommodate. This triggers the warning: "WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page".
The real corruption happens because `ring_buffer_read_page` then proceeds to swap pages. The *old, larger* page that was previously the reader page is swapped with the *new, smaller* page that was just allocated as spare. This means the ring buffer's internal page list now contains a mix of pages of different sizes (the old larger ones and the new smaller ones). This is a fundamental corruption of the ring buffer's structure, as it now expects pages of one size but has others.
To reliably reproduce this, I've devised a test case:
* Set `buffer_size_kb` to a large value (e.g., 10000 KB or 10 MB) to make the `__rb_allocate_pages` call take longer, thus widening the race window.
* Ensure enough data is written to the ring buffer to fill at least one page, and that this page contains more data than the smaller target `subbuf_size`. I plan to achieve this by writing continuously to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` or enabling high-frequency trace events.
* Start a thread that continuously reads from a per-CPU trace pipe (e.g., `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`). This thread will be `tracing_buffers_read`.
* Simultaneously, start another thread that repeatedly writes to `/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, alternating between small values (like 4) and larger values (like 8). This thread triggers `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`.
My C reproducer code is designed to orchestrate these threads and sysfs interactions. I've also considered binding threads to specific CPUs and ensuring the write thread targets the same CPU as the read pipe to guarantee the race occurs on the intended buffer. The availability of `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` is key, and it's a relatively recent addition, aligning with the bug report.
|
| 46/2 |
2026/08/12 02:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/trace.c Name:tracing_stop_tr]
Results: map[SourceCode:1657: static void tracing_stop_tr(struct trace_array *tr)
1658: {
1659: struct trace_buffer *buffer;
1660:
1661: guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&tr->start_lock);
1662: if (tr->stop_count++)
1663: return;
1664:
1665: /* Prevent the buffers from switching */
1666: arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
1667:
1668: buffer = tr->array_buffer.buffer;
1669: if (buffer)
1670: ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
1671:
1672: #ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_SNAPSHOT
1673: buffer = tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer;
1674: if (buffer)
1675: ring_buffer_record_disable(buffer);
1676: #endif
1677:
1678: arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
1679: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c]
|
| 47/2 |
2026/08/12 02:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 40299
output: 42
thoughts: 467
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Tracing Buffer Concurrency**
Okay, let me walk through my current understanding and the specific points I'm wrestling with regarding the interaction between `tracing_stop_tr` and `tracing_buffers_read`, and the potential locking issues.
First, I need to be absolutely clear about what `tracing_stop_tr` *actually* does. My initial assessment is that it *only* disables recording. The crucial point here is that it *doesn't* acquire any locks that `tracing_buffers_read` might depend on. This is a significant observation because if they don't share locks, they *could* potentially run concurrently without blocking each other.
Then, I started to question the locking behavior of `buffer_subbuf_size_write`. My initial thought was, "Does it grab `trace_access_lock`?" I quickly checked, and no, it doesn't. That simplifies things. My next question was, "What about `trace_types_lock`?" I've gone back to re-examine `buffer_subbuf_size_write` specifically.
Upon re-review, I can confirm that `buffer_subbuf_size_write` *does not* explicitly take any locks. It's invoked from the VFS write path, which suggests it's designed to operate within that context and not necessarily contend with the tracing infrastructure's core locks. Therefore, based on this, I'm fairly confident that `tracing_buffers_read` and `buffer_subbuf_size_write` *can* run concurrently without issue.
However, a new concern has emerged. What if `tracing_buffers_read` itself gets blocked *while* it's trying to read a page? Specifically, what if it's blocked by `ring_buffer_read_page`?
I know that `ring_buffer_read_page` acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. Now, let's consider `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set`. My understanding is that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` *only* takes `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` at the very end, when it's performing the page swap operation. This means that *during* the page allocation phase within `ring_buffer_read_page`, it can indeed acquire `reader_lock`. This is a potential point of contention if `tracing_buffers_read` also needs to interact with those pages.
Let me delve deeper into `ring_buffer_read_page`'s logic. I'm looking at the condition:
```c
if (data_page->order != buffer->subbuf_order)
return -1;
```
This check is critical. Now, let's consider what happens when `tracing_buffers_read` allocates a new spare page. It uses `page_size = ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get(iter->array_buffer->buffer)`. The `ring_buffer_subbuf_size_get` function returns `buffer->subbuf_size + BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE`. Consequently, `info->spare_size` will be set to this new, larger size (e.g., 4096). Then, it allocates `info->spare` with this new size.
The key point is that this newly allocated `spare` page *will have* `order = buffer->subbuf_order`. Therefore, the condition `data_page->order == buffer->subbuf_order` will evaluate to `TRUE`! This means that `ring_buffer_read_page` will *not* return early due to an order mismatch and will proceed to `rb_get_reader_page`.
So, my latest line of inquiry is to carefully scrutinize `ring_buffer_alloc_read_page`. I need to understand precisely what it does and what locks it might be acquiring or contending for during the page allocation process itself. This seems to be the next crucial piece of the puzzle for me.
|
| 48/2 |
2026/08/12 02:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:ring_buffer_alloc_read_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:6927: /**
6928: * ring_buffer_alloc_read_page - allocate a page to read from buffer
6929: * @buffer: the buffer to allocate for.
6930: * @cpu: the cpu buffer to allocate.
6931: *
6932: * This function is used in conjunction with ring_buffer_read_page.
6933: * When reading a full page from the ring buffer, these functions
6934: * can be used to speed up the process. The calling function should
6935: * allocate a few pages first with this function. Then when it
6936: * needs to get pages from the ring buffer, it passes the result
6937: * of this function into ring_buffer_read_page, which will swap
6938: * the page that was allocated, with the read page of the buffer.
6939: *
6940: * Returns:
6941: * The page allocated, or ERR_PTR
6942: */
6943: struct buffer_data_read_page *
6944: ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
6945: {
6946: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
6947: struct buffer_data_read_page *bpage = NULL;
6948: unsigned long flags;
6949:
6950: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
6951: return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
6952:
6953: bpage = kzalloc_obj(*bpage);
6954: if (!bpage)
6955: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
6956:
6957: bpage->order = buffer->subbuf_order;
6958: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
6959: local_irq_save(flags);
6960: arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
6961:
6962: if (cpu_buffer->free_page) {
6963: bpage->data = cpu_buffer->free_page;
6964: cpu_buffer->free_page = NULL;
6965: }
6966:
6967: arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
6968: local_irq_restore(flags);
6969:
6970: if (bpage->data) {
6971: rb_init_data_page(bpage->data);
6972: } else {
6973: bpage->data = alloc_cpu_data(cpu, cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_order);
6974: if (!bpage->data) {
6975: kfree(bpage);
6976: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
6977: }
6978: }
6979:
6980: return bpage;
6981: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 49/2 |
2026/08/12 02:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 41651
output: 22
thoughts: 1633
Thoughts: **The Root of the Page Order Mismatch and the Resulting Warning**
My current line of thinking is that I've identified a subtle but reproducible bug within the ring buffer implementation, specifically concerning how page orders are handled during dynamic resizing of sub-buffers. The core of the issue lies in the interaction between `ring_buffer_alloc_read_page`, the `buffer->subbuf_order` setting, and the `__rb_get_reader_page` function.
When `ring_buffer_alloc_read_page` is invoked, it's supposed to allocate a new page for reading based on the current `buffer->subbuf_order`. If this `subbuf_order` has recently been updated to a smaller value, the newly allocated page (`bpage`) will correctly have this new, smaller order. This leads to `ring_buffer_read_page` seeing that the newly allocated page's order matches the `buffer->subbuf_order`, and it proceeds to swap this *new, smaller* page into the ring buffer.
The problem arises because the page that is *taken out* of the ring buffer is the *old, larger* page. Subsequently, when `__rb_get_reader_page` is called, it receives this *old, larger* page. The warning, `rb_page_write(reader) > new_smaller_size`, is triggered because the `reader` (which is the old, larger page) now contains more data than the *newly established* `new_smaller_size` (derived from the updated `buffer->subbuf_order`) can accommodate.
I've also considered a potential variation of this race. What if `ring_buffer_alloc_read_page` ends up using a page from `cpu_buffer->free_page`? This `free_page` might be an older, larger page that hasn't been updated yet if `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` hasn't completed its critical section. The key here is that the `cpu_buffer->free_page` update happens *after* the allocation phase, within a lock. So, during the allocation, `cpu_buffer->free_page` could indeed be an old, larger page.
If `ring_buffer_alloc_read_page` picks up this old, larger page, it will assign it the *new, smaller* order (`bpage->order = buffer->subbuf_order`). Then, `ring_buffer_read_page` will again see a match (`data_page->order == buffer->subbuf_order`). The swap will occur: the *old, larger* page is placed into the ring buffer. While this is technically fine for the ring buffer itself (it's getting a page larger than needed), the `reader_page` returned is also this same *old, larger* page. And predictably, `__rb_get_reader_page` will still trigger the warning because this *old, larger* page is being compared against the *new, smaller* expected size.
Therefore, the bug appears to be robust and reproducible under these specific race conditions.
To demonstrate this, I've been outlining the structure of a reproducer. The core idea is to create a race between three threads:
1. **A size-setting thread:** This thread will continuously toggle the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` file between "4" and "8" to force the dynamic resizing of sub-buffers.
2. **A reader thread:** This thread will continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`, creating the demand for pages and triggering the allocation/deallocation logic.
3. **A writer thread:** This thread will constantly write data to `trace_marker`, ensuring that the trace pipe remains active and preventing the reader from blocking indefinitely.
I've considered using `sched_yield()` or `usleep()` for finer synchronization, but a tight loop is likely sufficient to hit the race condition quickly. I've also noted that `trace_pipe_raw` might block, but the continuous writing from thread 3 should mitigate this. I've also made a mental note to use `O_NONBLOCK` for `trace_pipe_raw` and `read()` instead of `pread()` for better stream handling, as `pread` with offset 0 on a stream might not behave as intuitively as a simple `read`. The `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` file name also appears correct, as confirmed by its creation in `init_tracer_tracefs`.
|
| 50/2 |
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tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:buffer_subbuf_size_kb]
Results: map[Output:Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst=90=of ftrace. Here is a list of some of the key files:
--
Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst-220-
Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst:221: buffer_subbuf_size_kb:
Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst-222-
--
Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst-230-
Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst:231: Note, the buffer_subbuf_size_kb is a way for the user to specify the
Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst-232- minimum size of the subbuffer. The kernel may make it bigger due to the
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=8876=init_tracer_tracefs(struct trace_array *tr, struct dentry *d_tracer)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-8916-
kernel/trace/trace.c:8917: trace_create_file("buffer_subbuf_size_kb", writable_mode, d_tracer,
kernel/trace/trace.c-8918- tr, &buffer_subbuf_size_fops);
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-3-# description: Change the ringbuffer sub-buffer size
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc:4:# requires: buffer_subbuf_size_kb
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-5-# flags: instance
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc=54=test_buffer() {
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-84-
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc:85:ORIG=`cat buffer_subbuf_size_kb`
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-86-
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc=89=for a in 4 8 16 32 ; do
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc:90: echo $a > buffer_subbuf_size_kb
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-91- test_buffer $a
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc=92=done
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-93-
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc:94:echo $ORIG > buffer_subbuf_size_kb
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/00basic/ringbuffer_subbuf_size.tc-95-
--
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c=137=FIXTURE_SETUP(map)
--
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c-160-
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c:161: tracefs_write_int(TRACEFS_ROOT"/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", variant->subbuf_size);
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c-162-
]
|
| 51/2 |
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44278
output: 1529
thoughts: 3571
Thoughts: **My Thought Process in Reproducing the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` Warning**
Alright, let's get this summary down. I've been digging into this `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` issue, and it seems I've figured out how to consistently trigger that warning. It boils down to a very specific race condition between changing the subbuffer size and reading from the ring buffer.
First off, yes, `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` is indeed the file we need to interact with. My initial thought was to confirm this was the correct target for manipulating the ring buffer's subbuffer size.
Now, let's trace the warning itself:
```c
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))
reader = NULL;
```
This `RB_WARN_ON` macro triggers when `nr_loops` reaches `USECS_WAIT`, which is a full second (1,000,000 microseconds). This condition is met inside a loop:
```c
for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
/* If the write is past the end of page, a writer is still updating it */
if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize))
break;
udelay(1);
/* Get the latest version of the reader write value */
smp_rmb();
}
```
The loop breaks if `rb_page_write(reader)` is less than or equal to `bsize`. If it stays *greater* than `bsize` for the entire second, the warning fires.
My immediate suspicion was that `rb_page_write(reader)` would never change under certain conditions, leading to the loop running to completion. And indeed, that's exactly what happens. The critical part is what `rb_page_write(reader)` represents and who updates it.
The key insight is that `rb_page_write(reader)` refers to the size of data written into the *current reader page*. When a reader is about to consume a page, that page is swapped out from the active ring buffer and becomes the `reader_page`. Crucially, the writer is *not* writing to this `reader_page`. It's writing to new pages that are being added to the ring buffer. Therefore, `rb_page_write(reader)` will remain static – it won't be updated by the writer.
This leads to a guaranteed 1-second delay if the condition `rb_page_write(reader) > bsize` is met.
Then I started thinking about *why* `rb_page_write(reader)` would be greater than `bsize`. This happens when the ring buffer has been filled up to its current (larger) subbuffer size, but `bsize` (which is `cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size`) has just been reduced to a smaller value. The `reader_page` still contains data corresponding to the old, larger size.
The question then became: could the process of allocating new pages (which happens when `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is called, typically by writing to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`) finish *before* this 1-second loop in `__rb_get_reader_page` completes?
I reasoned that if `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` were to finish allocating pages and try to swap them, it would need to acquire `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. However, `ring_buffer_read_page` (which is where `__rb_get_reader_page` is called) is already holding `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. This creates a deadlock scenario where `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` would block indefinitely, waiting for the lock that `ring_buffer_read_page` holds. Consequently, the page swap wouldn't happen until `ring_buffer_read_page` finishes, which it won't because it's stuck in that 1-second loop.
So, this confirms it: a guaranteed 1-second delay followed by the warning. It's a solid race condition.
To reproduce this, I devised a strategy involving multiple threads:
1. **File Handles:** I'll need to open the relevant file descriptors:
* `/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb` for writing to change the size.
* `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` for reading, which will trigger the problematic `ring_buffer_read_page` path.
* `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` for generating data to fill the buffer.
2. **Threads:**
* **Thread 1 (Size Changer):** This thread will continuously write "4" and "8" to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`. This rapid toggling of the size is key to creating the window for the race.
* **Thread 2 (Reader):** This thread will continuously read from `trace_pipe_raw`. This is the thread that will eventually call the problematic `ring_buffer_read_page` function.
* **Thread 3 (Writer):** This thread will continuously write data to `trace_marker`. This ensures that the ring buffer gets filled, specifically the pages that the reader will eventually try to consume.
3. **Concurrency and Affinity:** The core of the exploit is getting Thread 2 and Thread 3 to run concurrently on CPU 0, while Thread 1 can operate somewhat independently. By binding Threads 2 and 3 to CPU 0, we ensure that the writes (Thread 3) and reads (Thread 2) are targeting and consuming from the *same* CPU's ring buffer. Thread 1, the size changer, can run on any CPU. This setup increases the likelihood of the race: Thread 3 fills the buffer, Thread 2 reads, and concurrently Thread 1 changes the size, causing `ring_buffer_read_page` to encounter the old, larger page with a new, smaller `bsize`.
I also refined the reproducer C code, ensuring it handles potential path variations (`/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/`) and uses `pthread_setaffinity_np` to control thread placement. The logic needs to ensure that the `trace_pipe_raw` reader (Thread 2) sees a `bsize` that is smaller than the data present in the `reader_page`, which happens when the buffer is filled while it's configured for a larger subbuffer size, and then the size is reduced. Thread 3 writing 1024 bytes repeatedly is sufficient to fill an 8192-byte page well beyond the 4080-byte threshold mentioned in the context of the race.
In essence, the reproducer works by:
* Configuring the ring buffer with a larger subbuffer size (e.g., 8KB).
* Filling up a page within that larger subbuffer size using `trace_marker` writes.
* Quickly changing the subbuffer size to a smaller value (e.g., 4KB) using `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`.
* Immediately thereafter, a reader thread attempts to read from `trace_pipe_raw`. This reader thread will pick up the previously filled page (which is still from the 8KB configuration), but it will be working with the *new*, smaller `bsize` of 4KB. Since the page contains more data than 4KB, the `rb_page_write(reader) > bsize` condition holds true, and the loop waits for a second, triggering the warning. The fact that `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set` is blocked by `ring_buffer_read_page` ensures the old page is held as the `reader_page` for the full second.
This thought process leads directly to the provided C code reproducer, which aims to synchronize these operations just right to consistently hit that 1-second delay and the resulting warning.
|
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loop |
|
8m
|
| 53/2 |
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iteration |
0 |
5m
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action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 55/3 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
action |
merge-strategy |
0m
Results: map[CurrentReproStrategy:### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page` at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` is triggered when `__rb_get_reader_page()` waits for a writer to finish updating the reader page, but the writer appears to be stuck for 1 second (`USECS_WAIT`).
This happens due to a race condition between reading from the ring buffer and resizing its sub-buffers via `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`:
1. **Thread A** writes a smaller size (e.g., `4` KB) to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`. `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set()` updates `buffer->subbuf_order` and `buffer->subbuf_size` to the new smaller size *before* allocating and swapping the actual ring buffer pages. The allocation phase (`__rb_allocate_pages`) can take some time.
2. **Thread B** concurrently reads from `trace_pipe_raw`. `tracing_buffers_read()` sees the new smaller `subbuf_size`, allocates a new `spare` page of this smaller size, and calls `ring_buffer_read_page()`.
3. `ring_buffer_read_page()` verifies that `data_page->order == buffer->subbuf_order` (which passes, as both are the new smaller order) and proceeds to call `__rb_get_reader_page()`.
4. `__rb_get_reader_page()` reads `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)` (the new smaller size) and swaps the reader page with the head page.
5. Because Thread A hasn't swapped the ring buffer pages yet, the head page is still an **old larger page** (e.g., 8 KB) that was previously filled with data by a writer (so `rb_page_write(reader) > 4096`).
6. `__rb_get_reader_page()` then checks if `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. Since the old page has more data written to it than the new `bsize`, this condition is false.
7. The function loops for 1 second waiting for the condition to become true, which never happens, and finally triggers the `RB_WARN_ON`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this bug, we need to hit the race window where `buffer->subbuf_size` is updated but the pages haven't been swapped yet.
1. Continuously write data to the ring buffer (via `trace_marker`) to ensure pages are filled with data.
2. Continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between a larger size (8 KB) and a smaller size (4 KB).
3. Continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer.
### Minimal C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = '\0';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 1;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_join(t1, NULL);
return 0;
}
```]
|
| 56/3 |
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agent |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Results: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to generate a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive
purpose of verifying a bugfix in an isolated environment.
To ensure that we can diagnose why a program might fail to run on the test environment,
you MUST include detailed logging and error checking in the generated C program:
1. Use 'printf(...)' for all progress messages and error logs.
2. Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value.
3. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name
and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status.
4. The program must print a message after every successful major step.
5. Generate code that follows this pattern for all operations:
int res = do_something();
if (res < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to do_something: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] do_something successful.\n");
6. The compilation and development environment (including compilers, build
systems, makefiles, and kernel build/header directories) is NOT available
on the target test VM guest. Do NOT check for, build, or reference any
compilation tools, build files, or kernel development directories.
7. Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries (e.g. by using
functions like 'system()', 'popen()', or the 'exec' family such as
'execve()'). All environment checks, capability probings, and reproduction
steps must be performed directly using standard Linux system calls (such
as 'open', 'socket', 'ioctl', 'stat', etc.).
8. When reproducing asynchronous kernel timeouts or warnings, always
include a sufficient delay (using sleep or similar) after deleting
or unregistering the device to allow the kernel's asynchronous
timeout to trigger before program exit.
=== PHASE 1: CAPABILITY PROBING (GENERATION) ===
You MUST start by generating a simple 'probe' program first. This is a strict, non-negotiable requirement
to verify that the test environment has the necessary kernel capabilities and privileges.
This program's sole purpose is to verify subsystem availability and privileges by probing specific
device files, subsystems, or syscalls (for example: opening /dev/vhci to check if the virtual
Bluetooth controller is accessible, loading a minimal dummy BPF program, or making a specific
socket/ioctl call).
Print clear messages indicating success or failure of these probes, and exit with 0 only if
all checks pass.
Do NOT attempt complex logic, and do NOT try to trigger the actual bug/crash in this first version,
regardless of how simple the reproducer seems. You must wait until a successful probe run has been
confirmed in the environment (i.e., when CapabilitiesVerified becomes true).
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957, CPU#1: syz-executor422/6023
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 12 04 00 00 48 8b 43 10 be 04 00 00 00 48 8d 68 08 48 89 ef e8 75 ea 6b 00 f0 ff 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1c f9 ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 60 e8 1e 65 fc ff 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000370fa20 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88801cade000 RCX: ffffffff820c7a2b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88813fe62008
RBP: ffff88813fe62008 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1027fcc401
R10: ffff88813fe6200b R11: ffff88801cade0a8 R12: ffff88801f75d980
R13: ffffed1003eebb32 R14: 0000000000000ff0 R15: ffff88801f75d990
FS: 00007effc71086c0(0000) GS:ffff888123fe4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effc7106000 CR3: 0000000076748000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981 [inline]
ring_buffer_read_page+0x8ed/0x1710 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x2bf/0xaf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x10b/0x830 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7effc8166cde
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007effc7104198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effc71086c0 RCX: 00007effc8166cde
RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007effc7104200 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007effc7104200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007effc81e0b20
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdeadf5850 R15: 00007ffdeadf5938
</TASK>
Strategy: ### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page` at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` is triggered when `__rb_get_reader_page()` waits for a writer to finish updating the reader page, but the writer appears to be stuck for 1 second (`USECS_WAIT`).
This happens due to a race condition between reading from the ring buffer and resizing its sub-buffers via `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`:
1. **Thread A** writes a smaller size (e.g., `4` KB) to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`. `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set()` updates `buffer->subbuf_order` and `buffer->subbuf_size` to the new smaller size *before* allocating and swapping the actual ring buffer pages. The allocation phase (`__rb_allocate_pages`) can take some time.
2. **Thread B** concurrently reads from `trace_pipe_raw`. `tracing_buffers_read()` sees the new smaller `subbuf_size`, allocates a new `spare` page of this smaller size, and calls `ring_buffer_read_page()`.
3. `ring_buffer_read_page()` verifies that `data_page->order == buffer->subbuf_order` (which passes, as both are the new smaller order) and proceeds to call `__rb_get_reader_page()`.
4. `__rb_get_reader_page()` reads `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)` (the new smaller size) and swaps the reader page with the head page.
5. Because Thread A hasn't swapped the ring buffer pages yet, the head page is still an **old larger page** (e.g., 8 KB) that was previously filled with data by a writer (so `rb_page_write(reader) > 4096`).
6. `__rb_get_reader_page()` then checks if `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. Since the old page has more data written to it than the new `bsize`, this condition is false.
7. The function loops for 1 second waiting for the condition to become true, which never happens, and finally triggers the `RB_WARN_ON`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this bug, we need to hit the race window where `buffer->subbuf_size` is updated but the pages haven't been swapped yet.
1. Continuously write data to the ring buffer (via `trace_marker`) to ensure pages are filled with data.
2. Continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between a larger size (8 KB) and a smaller size (4 KB).
3. Continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer.
### Minimal C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = '\0';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 1;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_join(t1, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 57/4 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6051
output: 530
thoughts: 757
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Creating a Minimal C Program to Verify a Bugfix in the Kernel Tracing Subsystem**
My primary objective is to craft a minimal, self-contained C program. This program is crucial for a singular purpose: to definitively verify a specific bugfix related to the kernel's tracing functionality. The bug in question manifests as a `WARNING` within the `ring_buffer_read_page` function, specifically located at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957`.
I understand from the provided strategy that this warning stems from a race condition. The core of this race involves the simultaneous operations of reading from `trace_pipe_raw` and resizing the sub-buffers, an action controlled by the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` parameter.
Before I can even think about reproducing this race condition and verifying the fix, I need to establish a baseline. My immediate priority, therefore, is to ensure that the test environment where this C program will eventually run possesses the necessary capabilities to interact with the tracing subsystem. To achieve this, I'll develop a "probe" program.
This probe program's sole responsibility is to confirm the accessibility of the critical tracing components that are involved in the bug. Specifically, I need to verify that I can interact with the following:
* The file responsible for configuring the sub-buffer size, which can be found at either `/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb` or `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb`.
* The raw trace pipe for CPU 0, accessible via `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` or `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
* The trace marker, which is located at `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` or `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker`.
My approach to writing this probe program is straightforward: I will attempt to open each of these files. If all of them can be opened successfully, the probe will exit with a status code of 0, signaling that the environment is ready. If any of these attempts fail, the program will print an informative error message indicating which file could not be accessed and why (using `strerror(errno)`), and then exit with a non-zero status code.
The C code for this probe program is as follows:
```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
// Attempt to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
// Attempt to open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
// Attempt to open trace_marker
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0; // Success!
}
```
This program effectively serves as a prerequisite check. Once I have this probe working, I'll know the environment is set up correctly. The next step, which I haven't detailed here but is implied by the overall goal, would be to use this validated environment to construct the actual minimal C program designed to expose and verify the race condition itself. For now, I'm focusing on getting this essential probe program into the necessary format. I plan to use the `set-results` tool to manage the output of this probe program.
|
| 58/4 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
]
Results: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
]
|
| 59/3 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
loop |
|
0m
|
| 60/4 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
iteration |
0 |
0m
|
| 61/5 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
action |
merge-repro-c |
0m
Results: map[CurrentCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
]
|
| 62/5 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
action |
compile-c-prog |
0m
Results: map[CompilerError: FormattedReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
]
|
| 63/5 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 64/3 |
2026/08/12 02:50 |
action |
run-c-repro |
4m
Results: map[CandidateBugTitle: CandidateCrashReport: CandidateReproduced:false ConsoleOutput:[ 110.615216][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 110.615231][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5836 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.630985][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5836 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.645477][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5836 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.656662][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5836 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 111.954163][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503132.744:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5840 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.037802][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503132.824:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5843 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.714649][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503134.504:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5847 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.794175][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503134.584:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5850 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.388185][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503135.174:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.525591][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503135.314:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5856 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.639510][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 5 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.639524][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.434:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.979340][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.764:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.079085][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.864:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5881 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.728095][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503137.524:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5888 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.913300][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503137.704:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5891 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:32647' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 117.983527][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.
[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.
[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.
[ 117.999824][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=12 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 118.024218][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:223): avc: denied { open } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=12 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 118.040013][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.054442][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:225): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=43 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
OtherCrashReports:<nil> StraceOutput:/strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor1755287503
<...>
[ 109.320424][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 2 callbacks suppressed
[ 109.320439][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:203): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5830 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.339351][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:204): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5830 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.352290][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:205): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5830 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.364550][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:206): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5830 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 112.329703][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503274.509:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5835 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.423818][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503274.599:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.873659][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.049:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5846 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.955419][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.139:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5849 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.076927][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.259:211): avc: denied { write } for pid=5852 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.155207][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.339:212): avc: denied { write } for pid=5855 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.284525][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.284571][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.459:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.382730][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.559:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.524964][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.699:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5880 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.629004][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.809:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.850598][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503278.029:221): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.938227][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503278.119:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5890 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:39777' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor1755287503", ["/syz-executor1755287503"], 0x7fff0ad33240 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x55559403e000
brk(0x55559403ed80) = 0x55559403ed80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x55559403e400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x55559403e6d0) = 5905
set_robust_list(0x55559403e6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor1755287503", 4096) = 23
getrandom("\x9a\x76\xcc\x84\xde\xbb\x56\x80", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x55559403ed80
brk(0x55559405fd80) = 0x55559405fd80
brk(0x555594060000) = 0x555594060000
mprotect(0x7fc098914000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
[ 119.648265][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.819:223): avc: denied { search } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY) = 3
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
close(3) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 3
close(3) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY) = 3
close(3) = 0
[ 119.691123][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.849:224): avc: denied { write } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=1062 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.
[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.
[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.
write(1, "[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n[+] Opened tr"..., 125) = 125
exit_group(0) = ?
+++ exited with 0 +++
[ 119.720602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.849:225): avc: denied { open } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=1062 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 119.747321][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.859:226): avc: denied { search } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
TestError:]
|
| 65/3 |
2026/08/12 02:54 |
action |
truncate-log |
0m
Results: map[TruncatedConsoleOutput:[ 110.615216][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 110.615231][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5836 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.630985][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5836 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.645477][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5836 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.656662][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5836 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 111.954163][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503132.744:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5840 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.037802][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503132.824:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5843 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.714649][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503134.504:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5847 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.794175][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503134.584:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5850 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.388185][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503135.174:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.525591][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503135.314:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5856 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.639510][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 5 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.639524][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.434:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.979340][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.764:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.079085][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.864:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5881 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.728095][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503137.524:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5888 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.913300][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503137.704:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5891 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:32647' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 117.983527][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.
[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.
[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.
[ 117.999824][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=12 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 118.024218][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:223): avc: denied { open } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=12 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 118.040013][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.054442][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:225): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=43 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
TruncatedCrashReport: TruncatedStraceOutput:/strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor1755287503
<...>
[ 109.320424][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 2 callbacks suppressed
[ 109.320439][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:203): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5830 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.339351][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:204): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5830 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.352290][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:205): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5830 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.364550][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:206): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5830 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 112.329703][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503274.509:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5835 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.423818][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503274.599:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.873659][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.049:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5846 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.955419][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.139:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5849 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.076927][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.259:211): avc: denied { write } for pid=5852 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.155207][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.339:212): avc: denied { write } for pid=5855 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.284525][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.284571][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.459:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.382730][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.559:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.524964][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.699:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5880 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.629004][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.809:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.850598][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503278.029:221): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.938227][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503278.119:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5890 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:39777' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor1755287503", ["/syz-executor1755287503"], 0x7fff0ad33240 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x55559403e000
brk(0x55559403ed80) = 0x55559403ed80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x55559403e400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x55559403e6d0) = 5905
set_robust_list(0x55559403e6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor1755287503", 4096) = 23
getrandom("\x9a\x76\xcc\x84\xde\xbb\x56\x80", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x55559403ed80
brk(0x55559405fd80) = 0x55559405fd80
brk(0x555594060000) = 0x555594060000
mprotect(0x7fc098914000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
[ 119.648265][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.819:223): avc: denied { search } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY) = 3
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
close(3) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 3
close(3) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY) = 3
close(3) = 0
[ 119.691123][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.849:224): avc: denied { write } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=1062 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.
[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.
[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.
write(1, "[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n[+] Opened tr"..., 125) = 125
exit_group(0) = ?
+++ exited with 0 +++
[ 119.720602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.849:225): avc: denied { open } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=1062 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 119.747321][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.859:226): avc: denied { search } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
]
|
| 66/3 |
2026/08/12 02:54 |
agent |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Results: map[Feedback:The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Analyze the results of running the generated program.
=== CRITICAL ENVIRONMENT & TARGET CLASSIFICATION ===
Set 'TerminalError' to a descriptive error message ONLY if:
1. The execution failed due to missing hardware device nodes, subsystems, kernel modules, or privilege limits
that cannot be loaded, created, or bypassed by user-space C code edits in the VM guest.
2. The target source files or functions described in the bug description do not exist in the checked-out codebase,
meaning the codebase version is mismatched and the target code is absent.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT classify a run as a terminal failure or assume a bug is fixed based on git log entries, commit titles,
or commit messages. Reproducibility can ONLY be determined by executing reproducer candidates in the VM.
- Do NOT suggest C code strategies, repairs, or namespace bypasses when setting 'TerminalError'.
=== PHASE 1: CAPABILITY PROBING (EVALUATION) ===
The executed program was a simple environment probe.
Use this to guide your classification and feedback:
1. If the execution was successful (all environment/subsystem probes passed and program exited with 0),
set the field 'ProbePassed' to true and provide feedback explicitly indicating that the environment
is ready and the agent should now proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
2. If the probe failed (e.g., missing permissions, missing devices, or sandbox restrictions),
set the field 'ProbePassed' to false, and explain what failed in the 'Feedback'
field so the generator can adjust its setups.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957, CPU#1: syz-executor422/6023
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 12 04 00 00 48 8b 43 10 be 04 00 00 00 48 8d 68 08 48 89 ef e8 75 ea 6b 00 f0 ff 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1c f9 ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 60 e8 1e 65 fc ff 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000370fa20 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88801cade000 RCX: ffffffff820c7a2b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88813fe62008
RBP: ffff88813fe62008 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1027fcc401
R10: ffff88813fe6200b R11: ffff88801cade0a8 R12: ffff88801f75d980
R13: ffffed1003eebb32 R14: 0000000000000ff0 R15: ffff88801f75d990
FS: 00007effc71086c0(0000) GS:ffff888123fe4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effc7106000 CR3: 0000000076748000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981 [inline]
ring_buffer_read_page+0x8ed/0x1710 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x2bf/0xaf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x10b/0x830 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7effc8166cde
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007effc7104198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effc71086c0 RCX: 00007effc8166cde
RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007effc7104200 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007effc7104200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007effc81e0b20
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdeadf5850 R15: 00007ffdeadf5938
</TASK>
IsProbe: true
Reproduced: false
Console Output: [ 110.615216][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 110.615231][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5836 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.630985][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5836 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.645477][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5836 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.656662][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503131.404:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5836 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 111.954163][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503132.744:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5840 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.037802][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503132.824:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5843 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.714649][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503134.504:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5847 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.794175][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503134.584:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5850 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.388185][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503135.174:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.525591][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503135.314:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5856 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.639510][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 5 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.639524][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.434:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.979340][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.764:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.079085][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503136.864:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5881 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.728095][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503137.524:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5888 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.913300][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503137.704:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5891 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:32647' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 117.983527][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.
[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.
[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.
[ 117.999824][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=12 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 118.024218][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:223): avc: denied { open } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=12 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 118.040013][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.054442][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503138.774:225): avc: denied { search } for pid=5901 comm="syz-executor243" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=43 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Strace Output: /strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor1755287503
<...>
[ 109.320424][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 2 callbacks suppressed
[ 109.320439][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:203): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5830 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.339351][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:204): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5830 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.352290][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:205): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5830 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.364550][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503271.499:206): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5830 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 112.329703][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503274.509:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5835 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.423818][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503274.599:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.873659][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.049:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5846 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.955419][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.139:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5849 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.076927][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.259:211): avc: denied { write } for pid=5852 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.155207][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503275.339:212): avc: denied { write } for pid=5855 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.284525][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.284571][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.459:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.382730][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.559:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.524964][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.699:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5880 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.629004][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503277.809:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.850598][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503278.029:221): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.938227][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503278.119:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5890 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:39777' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor1755287503", ["/syz-executor1755287503"], 0x7fff0ad33240 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x55559403e000
brk(0x55559403ed80) = 0x55559403ed80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x55559403e400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x55559403e6d0) = 5905
set_robust_list(0x55559403e6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor1755287503", 4096) = 23
getrandom("\x9a\x76\xcc\x84\xde\xbb\x56\x80", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x55559403ed80
brk(0x55559405fd80) = 0x55559405fd80
brk(0x555594060000) = 0x555594060000
mprotect(0x7fc098914000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
[ 119.648265][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.819:223): avc: denied { search } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY) = 3
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
close(3) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 3
close(3) = 0
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY) = 3
close(3) = 0
[ 119.691123][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.849:224): avc: denied { write } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=1062 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.
[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.
[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.
write(1, "[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n[+] Opened tr"..., 125) = 125
exit_group(0) = ?
+++ exited with 0 +++
[ 119.720602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.849:225): avc: denied { open } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=1062 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 119.747321][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503281.859:226): avc: denied { search } for pid=5905 comm="syz-executor175" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Crash Report:
|
| 67/4 |
2026/08/12 02:54 |
llm |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10557
output: 87
thoughts: 161
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the Environment Probe Results**
Alright, let's break down what I'm seeing here from the generated program's execution. The request is to analyze the output of this simple environment probe I generated and then determine the appropriate results to report back.
Looking at the console output and the `strace` logs, the probe appears to have executed without a hitch. It successfully opened the necessary files: `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, and `trace_marker`. These are the key components I expected it to interact with to confirm the tracing environment is configured correctly. Crucially, the program exited cleanly with a status code of 0, indicating no unexpected errors or crashes.
This successful execution tells me that the environment is indeed ready for me to proceed with generating the full reproducer. Therefore, I need to translate these findings into the structured results.
First and foremost, `ProbePassed` should be set to `true`. This is the definitive indicator that the probe's objective was met.
Next, `TerminalError`. Since the probe exited cleanly and there were no apparent issues preventing it from completing its task, this field should be left empty. There's no terminal error to report.
Then there's `TitleMatches`. This probe is specifically designed to *probe* the environment, not to trigger a specific crash condition or match any particular title. Its purpose is to confirm readiness. Therefore, `TitleMatches` should be `false`. There was no crash, and thus no title to match.
Finally, `Feedback`. I need to clearly communicate the outcome. The feedback should state that the environment is ready and that the agent can now proceed with the next step – generating the full reproducer. This provides a clear directive for subsequent actions.
With these conclusions in mind, I will now execute the `set-results` function with these precise values: `ProbePassed: true`, `TerminalError: ""`, `TitleMatches: false`, and the appropriate `Feedback` message.
|
| 68/4 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[Feedback:The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
Results: map[Feedback:The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
|
| 69/3 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
loop-controller |
0m
Results: map[CapabilitiesVerified:true ContinueSignal:continue EquivalenceAnalysis: OracleFeedback:The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ReproC: Reproduced:false ReproducedBugTitle: ReproducedCrashReport:]
|
| 70/2 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
iteration |
1 |
3m
|
| 71/3 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
If |
0m
Args: map[OracleFeedback:The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.]
|
| 72/4 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
agent |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Instruction: You are an expert in Linux kernel debugging.
Refine the reproduction strategy based on feedback from previous attempts.
Analyze the technical diagnosis provided in the oracle feedback and translate it into concrete,
step-by-step instructions for the repro-generator on how to modify the code structure, alignments,
offsets, or parameters of the candidate program.
=== TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES ===
- Prefer codesearch-definition-source and codesearch-struct-layout first for symbol lookups.
- Fall back to read-file or grepper for macros, headers, or if symbol lookup fails.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT repeat searches for the same symbols or files. Use information you have already gathered.
- Do NOT write long explanations. Keep your reasoning short and focused on actionable changes.
- Do NOT assume a bug is fixed based on git commit history.
- If you are stuck, try a different approach or proceed to generate a candidate reproducer.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957, CPU#1: syz-executor422/6023
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 12 04 00 00 48 8b 43 10 be 04 00 00 00 48 8d 68 08 48 89 ef e8 75 ea 6b 00 f0 ff 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1c f9 ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 60 e8 1e 65 fc ff 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000370fa20 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88801cade000 RCX: ffffffff820c7a2b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88813fe62008
RBP: ffff88813fe62008 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1027fcc401
R10: ffff88813fe6200b R11: ffff88801cade0a8 R12: ffff88801f75d980
R13: ffffed1003eebb32 R14: 0000000000000ff0 R15: ffff88801f75d990
FS: 00007effc71086c0(0000) GS:ffff888123fe4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effc7106000 CR3: 0000000076748000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981 [inline]
ring_buffer_read_page+0x8ed/0x1710 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x2bf/0xaf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x10b/0x830 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7effc8166cde
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007effc7104198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effc71086c0 RCX: 00007effc8166cde
RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007effc7104200 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007effc7104200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007effc81e0b20
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdeadf5850 R15: 00007ffdeadf5938
</TASK>
Current Strategy: ### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page` at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` is triggered when `__rb_get_reader_page()` waits for a writer to finish updating the reader page, but the writer appears to be stuck for 1 second (`USECS_WAIT`).
This happens due to a race condition between reading from the ring buffer and resizing its sub-buffers via `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`:
1. **Thread A** writes a smaller size (e.g., `4` KB) to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`. `ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set()` updates `buffer->subbuf_order` and `buffer->subbuf_size` to the new smaller size *before* allocating and swapping the actual ring buffer pages. The allocation phase (`__rb_allocate_pages`) can take some time.
2. **Thread B** concurrently reads from `trace_pipe_raw`. `tracing_buffers_read()` sees the new smaller `subbuf_size`, allocates a new `spare` page of this smaller size, and calls `ring_buffer_read_page()`.
3. `ring_buffer_read_page()` verifies that `data_page->order == buffer->subbuf_order` (which passes, as both are the new smaller order) and proceeds to call `__rb_get_reader_page()`.
4. `__rb_get_reader_page()` reads `bsize = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_size)` (the new smaller size) and swaps the reader page with the head page.
5. Because Thread A hasn't swapped the ring buffer pages yet, the head page is still an **old larger page** (e.g., 8 KB) that was previously filled with data by a writer (so `rb_page_write(reader) > 4096`).
6. `__rb_get_reader_page()` then checks if `rb_page_write(reader) <= bsize`. Since the old page has more data written to it than the new `bsize`, this condition is false.
7. The function loops for 1 second waiting for the condition to become true, which never happens, and finally triggers the `RB_WARN_ON`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this bug, we need to hit the race window where `buffer->subbuf_size` is updated but the pages haven't been swapped yet.
1. Continuously write data to the ring buffer (via `trace_marker`) to ensure pages are filled with data.
2. Continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between a larger size (8 KB) and a smaller size (4 KB).
3. Continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer.
### Minimal C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8", 1, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf)-1] = '\0';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 1;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_join(t1, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
Feedback: The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
Reply: Based on the successful capability probe, the environment is fully capable of triggering the race condition. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) are accessible.
We will now generate the final C reproducer. The reproducer will:
1. Spawn a thread to continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between 4 and 8.
2. Spawn a thread to continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
3. Spawn a thread to continuously write to `trace_marker` to fill the ring buffer.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer, maximizing the chance of hitting the race window.
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 0;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 0;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 0;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
// The warning triggers after a 1-second timeout in __rb_get_reader_page.
// Running for a few seconds should be enough to hit the race and trigger the warning.
sleep(10);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 73/5 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 5547
output: 1107
thoughts: 1590
Thoughts: **Refining the Ring Buffer Read Page Reproduction Strategy**
Alright, let's recap where I'm at with this `WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page` bug. The feedback from the previous iteration was actually quite positive, indicating that my capability probe was successful. It confirmed that all the necessary tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were accessible and that the environment was properly set up. This means the next step is to generate the final C reproducer based on the strategy we've developed.
My current strategy revolves around three threads, all orchestrated to create a race condition within the kernel's tracing buffer mechanism.
* **Thread 1** is responsible for rapidly toggling the `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` setting between 4 and 8.
* **Thread 2** is designed to continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
* **Thread 3** is tasked with writing data to the `trace_marker` file.
Crucially, I'm ensuring that Threads 2 and 3 are bound to CPU 0, as the bug report specifically mentioned `CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422`, suggesting a CPU-specific interaction. While the bug mentioned CPU 1, the current setup binding to CPU 0 and accessing `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` is perfectly aligned with how per-CPU tracing works and should be sufficient to trigger the issue.
Now, for robustness, I'm making a few adjustments. I've already incorporated `O_NONBLOCK` for the `trace_pipe_raw` file to prevent blocking reads. The reproducer needs to run for a sufficient duration to reliably trigger the race, so I'm planning to have it run for a few seconds. I'll stick with the single thread for each function for now, as it simplifies the reproducer while still targeting the core race.
A minor but important detail is the format of the writes. While writing "4" and "8" to `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` might work, appending a newline character – `"4\n"` and `"8\n"` – is a safer and more standard approach for interacting with such sysfs entries. The capability probe already confirmed that `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` is present, so I don't need to worry about kernel version compatibility there.
With these refinements in mind, I've constructed the following C code. This should be a self-contained and robust reproducer that targets the `ring_buffer_read_page` race condition by constantly modifying the buffer size while simultaneously reading from and writing to the trace infrastructure. The `sleep(10)` in `main` ensures it runs long enough to hit the potential crash condition.
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
// Attempt to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb, trying both common paths
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
// If still not opened, we can't proceed
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 1;
}
// Attempt to open trace_pipe_raw with O_NONBLOCK
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
// If still not opened, we can't proceed
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
close(fd_size); // Clean up previous file descriptor
return 1;
}
// Attempt to open trace_marker
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
// If still not opened, we can't proceed
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
close(fd_size); // Clean up previous file descriptors
close(fd_raw);
return 1;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
// Create the threads
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
perror("Failed to create size thread");
return 1;
}
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
perror("Failed to create read thread");
return 1;
}
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
perror("Failed to create write thread");
return 1;
}
// Bind read and write threads to CPU 0
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
perror("Failed to set affinity for read thread");
return 1;
}
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
perror("Failed to set affinity for write thread");
return 1;
}
// Let the threads run for a substantial period to trigger the race condition
printf("Running reproducer for 10 seconds...\n");
sleep(10);
printf("Reproducer finished.\n");
// In a real scenario, syzkaller would kill this process if it doesn't crash
// or time out internally. For a standalone reproducer, we might add logic
// to detect a crash or signal an issue, but for now, a simple exit is fine.
// Clean up file descriptors (though a crash would prevent this)
close(fd_size);
close(fd_raw);
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 74/3 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
merge-strategy |
0m
Results: map[CurrentReproStrategy:Based on the successful capability probe, the environment is fully capable of triggering the race condition. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) are accessible.
We will now generate the final C reproducer. The reproducer will:
1. Spawn a thread to continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between 4 and 8.
2. Spawn a thread to continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
3. Spawn a thread to continuously write to `trace_marker` to fill the ring buffer.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer, maximizing the chance of hitting the race window.
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 0;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 0;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 0;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
// The warning triggers after a 1-second timeout in __rb_get_reader_page.
// Running for a few seconds should be enough to hit the race and trigger the warning.
sleep(10);
return 0;
}
```]
|
| 75/3 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
agent |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Results: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
}]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to generate a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive
purpose of verifying a bugfix in an isolated environment.
To ensure that we can diagnose why a program might fail to run on the test environment,
you MUST include detailed logging and error checking in the generated C program:
1. Use 'printf(...)' for all progress messages and error logs.
2. Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value.
3. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name
and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status.
4. The program must print a message after every successful major step.
5. Generate code that follows this pattern for all operations:
int res = do_something();
if (res < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to do_something: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] do_something successful.\n");
6. The compilation and development environment (including compilers, build
systems, makefiles, and kernel build/header directories) is NOT available
on the target test VM guest. Do NOT check for, build, or reference any
compilation tools, build files, or kernel development directories.
7. Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries (e.g. by using
functions like 'system()', 'popen()', or the 'exec' family such as
'execve()'). All environment checks, capability probings, and reproduction
steps must be performed directly using standard Linux system calls (such
as 'open', 'socket', 'ioctl', 'stat', etc.).
8. When reproducing asynchronous kernel timeouts or warnings, always
include a sufficient delay (using sleep or similar) after deleting
or unregistering the device to allow the kernel's asynchronous
timeout to trigger before program exit.
=== PHASE 2: BUG REPRODUCTION (GENERATION) ===
You must now generate a full reproducer candidate attempting to trigger the target bug/crash.
Do NOT generate a probe program. Focus directly on triggering the bug/crash described in the description.
You can assume that all necessary kernel capabilities and privileges (e.g., access to /dev/vhci,
ability to load BPF programs, etc.) have already been verified and are available in the environment.
Do not spend too much time analyzing or trying to generate a perfect one-shot reproducer.
Instead, follow an iterative approach: generate a simple candidate, execute it, analyze the results,
and improve it. Keep your reasoning steps short and focused on the next logical experiment.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957, CPU#1: syz-executor422/6023
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 12 04 00 00 48 8b 43 10 be 04 00 00 00 48 8d 68 08 48 89 ef e8 75 ea 6b 00 f0 ff 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1c f9 ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 60 e8 1e 65 fc ff 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000370fa20 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88801cade000 RCX: ffffffff820c7a2b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88813fe62008
RBP: ffff88813fe62008 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1027fcc401
R10: ffff88813fe6200b R11: ffff88801cade0a8 R12: ffff88801f75d980
R13: ffffed1003eebb32 R14: 0000000000000ff0 R15: ffff88801f75d990
FS: 00007effc71086c0(0000) GS:ffff888123fe4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effc7106000 CR3: 0000000076748000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981 [inline]
ring_buffer_read_page+0x8ed/0x1710 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x2bf/0xaf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x10b/0x830 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7effc8166cde
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007effc7104198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effc71086c0 RCX: 00007effc8166cde
RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007effc7104200 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007effc7104200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007effc81e0b20
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdeadf5850 R15: 00007ffdeadf5938
</TASK>
Strategy: Based on the successful capability probe, the environment is fully capable of triggering the race condition. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) are accessible.
We will now generate the final C reproducer. The reproducer will:
1. Spawn a thread to continuously toggle `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` between 4 and 8.
2. Spawn a thread to continuously read from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
3. Spawn a thread to continuously write to `trace_marker` to fill the ring buffer.
4. Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they operate on the same per-CPU ring buffer, maximizing the chance of hitting the race window.
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
// Thread 1: Continuously toggle the sub-buffer size to trigger the race window
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0);
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 2: Continuously read from the raw trace pipe
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
// Thread 3: Continuously write to the trace marker to fill the ring buffer pages
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
perror("Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb");
return 0;
}
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_pipe_raw");
return 0;
}
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("Failed to open trace_marker");
return 0;
}
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL);
// Bind the reader and writer threads to CPU 0 to ensure they hit cpu0's ring buffer
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set);
pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set);
// The warning triggers after a 1-second timeout in __rb_get_reader_page.
// Running for a few seconds should be enough to hit the race and trigger the warning.
sleep(10);
return 0;
}
```
Previous Reproducer Attempt:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
int fd_size, fd_raw, fd_marker;
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
close(fd_size);
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
close(fd_raw);
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
close(fd_marker);
return 0;
}
Execution Results & Debugging Feedback:
The capability probe passed successfully. The required tracefs files (`buffer_subbuf_size_kb`, `trace_pipe_raw`, `trace_marker`) were opened without issues. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
|
| 76/4 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6160
output: 1268
thoughts: 1628
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Generating the Ring Buffer Reproducer**
My primary objective here is to craft a robust C reproducer for a specific kernel bug, identified as `WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page`. I understand that this bug manifests within the `__rb_get_reader_page` function, located at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957`. The user has already provided a foundational strategy and a C code snippet, which I need to refine and validate against specific requirements.
The core of the user's proposed strategy is to induce a race condition. This involves concurrently:
1. **Modifying `buffer_subbuf_size_kb`**: I need to rapidly toggle this kernel parameter between two values, specifically 4 and 8. This dynamic change is expected to stress the ring buffer's internal state.
2. **Reading from `per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`**: This action directly interacts with the ring buffer's reading mechanism, attempting to consume data that might be affected by the size changes.
3. **Writing to `trace_marker`**: This injects data into the tracing system, potentially causing writes and updates to the ring buffer that can conflict with the reads and size changes.
I've examined the user's provided C code snippet. It appears to be a good starting point, but I need to ensure it strictly adheres to the following quality and functionality standards:
* **Informative Output**: All progress messages and error logs must be clearly communicated using `printf(...)`. This is crucial for understanding the reproducer's execution flow and diagnosing any issues.
* **Robust System Call Handling**: Every single system call invoked must be meticulously checked for failure. A negative return value indicates an error, and I must handle it appropriately.
* **Clear Success Indicators**: After each major operational step (like opening a file or creating a thread), a distinct success message should be printed.
* **Correct Exit Behavior**: On encountering any error, the program must terminate with a non-zero exit status to signal failure to the calling environment.
With these refinements in mind, I've reviewed the provided code. I noticed a potential concern: `trace_pipe_raw` might block if not opened with the `O_NONBLOCK` flag. Fortunately, the user's code *does* use `O_NONBLOCK`, which is good. This prevents the read thread from halting unexpectedly.
I've also considered the bug's context: it occurs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, called by `tracing_buffers_read`, which in turn reads from `per_cpu/cpuX/trace_pipe_raw`. The warning itself, likely a `WARN_ON` or `WARN_ON_ONCE` in `__rb_get_reader_page`, is precisely what we aim to trigger. The proposed race condition—changing `buffer_subbuf_size_kb` while reading `trace_pipe_raw`—is the established method for triggering this specific warning.
The C code itself, after my internal validation against the requirements, seems to be a solid implementation of the intended race. The use of threads to manage the concurrent operations, the careful opening of file descriptors, and the adherence to basic error checking are all present. The strategy of setting CPU affinity for the read and write threads to CPU 0 is a sensible addition to ensure predictable interaction on that core.
My next step is to prepare this refined code for submission. I'll use the `set-results` mechanism, as it's the standard way to deliver such artifacts, ensuring it's properly formatted and integrated.
|
| 77/4 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
}]
Results: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
}]
|
| 78/3 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
loop |
|
0m
|
| 79/4 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
iteration |
0 |
0m
|
| 80/5 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
merge-repro-c |
0m
Results: map[CurrentCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
}]
|
| 81/5 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
compile-c-prog |
0m
Results: map[CompilerError: FormattedReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
}]
|
| 82/5 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 83/3 |
2026/08/12 02:55 |
action |
run-c-repro |
2m
Results: map[CandidateBugTitle:KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ring_buffer_read_page CandidateCrashReport:==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff88810fa51c6c by task syz-executor135/5899
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5899 Comm: syz-executor135 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f62b8bb4c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f62b835c1a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f62b835e6c0 RCX: 00007f62b8bb4c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f62b835c210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdf21b0c00 R15: 00007ffdf21b0ce8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10fa51
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5898, tgid 5897 (syz-executor135), ts 121914026690, free_ts 121911882170
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5898 tgid 5897 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline]
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0xeaa/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7441
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810fa51f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88810fa51f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88810fa52000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810fa52080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810fa52100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
CandidateReproduced:true ConsoleOutput:[ 107.845771][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 107.845786][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.062:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5834 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.862910][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5834 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.874537][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5834 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.886835][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5834 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.253556][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.472:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.324977][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.542:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.764662][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.982:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.859391][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.072:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.564213][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.782:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.686829][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.892:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.989067][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 6 callbacks suppressed
[ 112.989082][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.202:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5875 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.083788][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.302:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.262524][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.482:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.356457][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.572:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5887 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:22684' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 114.804648][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.022:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.819999][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=3442 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 114.844618][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:223): avc: denied { open } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=3442 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 114.860957][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.874445][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:225): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=3473 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.888672][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:226): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="cpu0" dev="tracefs" ino=3474 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.083072][ T5901] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 116.086669][ T5901] 1
[ 116.086683][ T5901] WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0, CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
[ 116.094641][ T5901] Modules linked in:
[ 116.097308][ T5901] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 116.103139][ T5901] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 116.109122][ T5901] RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.111889][ T5901] Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
[ 116.122951][ T5901] RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 116.126542][ T5901] RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
[ 116.131874][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
[ 116.136165][ T5901] RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
[ 116.140502][ T5901] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
[ 116.144716][ T5901] R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
[ 116.147364][ T5901] FS: 00007fa66e0826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a50ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 116.152389][ T5901] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 116.154692][ T5901] CR2: 00007fa66d880ff8 CR3: 000000018c874000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
[ 116.157929][ T5901] Call Trace:
[ 116.159143][ T5901] <TASK>
[ 116.160835][ T5901] ? __pfx_rb_get_reader_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.163051][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.165070][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.166859][ T5901] ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0
[ 116.169484][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.171758][ T5901] ? __pfx_ring_buffer_read_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.173915][ T5901] ? down_read+0x2be/0x330
[ 116.175626][ T5901] ? trace_empty+0x245/0x2c0
[ 116.178089][ T5901] ? tracing_buffers_read+0x6ae/0xcf0
[ 116.180144][ T5901] tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0
[ 116.182118][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.184291][ T5901] ? rw_verify_area+0x24a/0x4c0
[ 116.187369][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.190916][ T5901] vfs_read+0x213/0xa80
[ 116.192616][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.194918][ T5901] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.196915][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.199113][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x3a2/0x420
[ 116.200863][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.203463][ T5901] ksys_read+0x150/0x270
[ 116.205873][ T5901] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.208618][ T5901] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.211345][ T5901] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 116.213845][ T5901] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x70/0xc0
[ 116.215420][ T5901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.218359][ T5901] RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.220819][ T5901] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
[ 116.229972][ T5901] RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 116.234439][ T5901] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.238592][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 116.241666][ T5901] RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 116.245896][ T5901] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
[ 116.250156][ T5901] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
[ 116.252955][ T5901] </TASK>
[ 116.254029][ T5901] Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
[ 116.257239][ T5901] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 116.260556][ T5901] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 116.264238][ T5901] Call Trace:
[ 116.265375][ T5901] <TASK>
[ 116.266371][ T5901] vpanic+0x56c/0xa60
[ 116.268681][ T5901] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
[ 116.271178][ T5901] ? __pfx_vpanic+0x10/0x10
[ 116.273675][ T5901] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x292/0x2b0
[ 116.276546][ T5901] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x26/0x2b0
[ 116.279868][ T5901] panic+0xc5/0xd0
[ 116.282140][ T5901] ? __pfx_panic+0x10/0x10
[ 116.284809][ T5901] __warn+0x315/0x4c0
[ 116.287232][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.290274][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.293354][ T5901] __report_bug+0x276/0x570
[ 116.295242][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.298454][ T5901] ? __pfx___report_bug+0x10/0x10
[ 116.301419][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.304684][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.306515][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x3c3/0x430
[ 116.309884][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.312745][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.315797][ T5901] report_bug+0x16a/0x220
[ 116.318378][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.321518][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbf/0x1cc0
[ 116.323945][ T5901] handle_bug+0x9c/0x200
[ 116.326449][ T5901] exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[ 116.329165][ T5901] asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 116.331062][ T5901] RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.334668][ T5901] Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
[ 116.346082][ T5901] RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 116.349372][ T5901] RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
[ 116.353531][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
[ 116.357733][ T5901] RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
[ 116.360759][ T5901] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
[ 116.364851][ T5901] R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
[ 116.368658][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bb8/0x1cc0
[ 116.370752][ T5901] ? __pfx_rb_get_reader_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.373877][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.376962][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.380021][ T5901] ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0
[ 116.383053][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.385341][ T5901] ? __pfx_ring_buffer_read_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.389046][ T5901] ? down_read+0x2be/0x330
[ 116.391890][ T5901] ? trace_empty+0x245/0x2c0
[ 116.394891][ T5901] ? tracing_buffers_read+0x6ae/0xcf0
[ 116.397666][ T5901] tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0
[ 116.400531][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.404196][ T5901] ? rw_verify_area+0x24a/0x4c0
[ 116.407084][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.409263][ T5901] vfs_read+0x213/0xa80
[ 116.411835][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.413987][ T5901] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.417046][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.420001][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x3a2/0x420
[ 116.423015][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.425905][ T5901] ksys_read+0x150/0x270
[ 116.428076][ T5901] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.430967][ T5901] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.433187][ T5901] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 116.435011][ T5901] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x70/0xc0
[ 116.437169][ T5901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.440798][ T5901] RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.443691][ T5901] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
[ 116.454431][ T5901] RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 116.459853][ T5901] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.464687][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 116.469513][ T5901] RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 116.474165][ T5901] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
[ 116.480932][ T5901] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
[ 116.485538][ T5901] </TASK>
[ 117.630006][ T5901] Shutting down cpus with NMI
[ 117.634446][ T5901] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 117.637347][ T5901] Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
OtherCrashReports:[==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff888114e41c6c by task syz-executor350/5895
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5895 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f27d2c6cc1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f27d24141a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f27d24166c0 RCX: 00007f27d2c6cc1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f27d2414210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8fe741f0 R15: 00007ffc8fe742d8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888114e41c80 pfn:0x114e41
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: ffff888114e41c80 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5894, tgid 5893 (syz-executor350), ts 119962012130, free_ts 119863468231
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5892 tgid 5892 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
__tlb_remove_table_free mm/mmu_gather.c:228 [inline]
tlb_remove_table_rcu+0x85/0x100 mm/mmu_gather.c:291
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 [inline]
rcu_core+0x78b/0x10a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897
handle_softirqs+0x225/0x840 kernel/softirq.c:622
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:496 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x220 kernel/softirq.c:735
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:752
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888114e41f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888114e41f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888114e42000: fa fb fb fb fb fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fa fb
^
ffff888114e42080: fb fb fb fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00
ffff888114e42100: 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fc
==================================================================
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 [inline], CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981, CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981
Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
FS: 00007fa66e0826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a50ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa66d880ff8 CR3: 000000018c874000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
</TASK>
] StraceOutput: TestError:]
|
| 84/3 |
2026/08/12 02:58 |
action |
truncate-log |
0m
Results: map[TruncatedConsoleOutput:[ 107.845771][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 107.845786][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.062:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5834 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.862910][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5834 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.874537][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5834 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.886835][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5834 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.253556][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.472:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.324977][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.542:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.764662][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.982:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.859391][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.072:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.564213][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.782:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.686829][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.892:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.989067][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 6 callbacks suppressed
[ 112.989082][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.202:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5875 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.083788][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.302:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.262524][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.482:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.356457][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.572:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5887 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:22684' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 114.804648][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.022:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.819999][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=3442 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 114.844618][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:223): avc: denied { open } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=3442 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 114.860957][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.874445][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:225): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=3473 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.888672][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:226): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="cpu0" dev="tracefs" ino=3474 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.083072][ T5901] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 116.086669][ T5901] 1
[ 116.086683][ T5901] WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0, CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
[ 116.094641][ T5901] Modules linked in:
[ 116.097308][ T5901] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 116.103139][ T5901] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 116.109122][ T5901] RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.111889][ T5901] Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
[ 116.122951][ T5901] RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 116.126542][ T5901] RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
[ 116.131874][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
[ 116.136165][ T5901] RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
[ 116.140502][ T5901] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
[ 116.144716][ T5901] R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
[ 116.147364][ T5901] FS: 00007fa66e0826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a50ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 116.152389][ T5901] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 116.154692][ T5901] CR2: 00007fa66d880ff8 CR3: 000000018c874000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
[ 116.157929][ T5901] Call Trace:
[ 116.159143][ T5901] <TASK>
[ 116.160835][ T5901] ? __pfx_rb_get_reader_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.163051][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.165070][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.166859][ T5901] ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0
[ 116.169484][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.171758][ T5901] ? __pfx_ring_buffer_read_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.173915][ T5901] ? down_read+0x2be/0x330
[ 116.175626][ T5901] ? trace_empty+0x245/0x2c0
[ 116.178089][ T5901] ? tracing_buffers_read+0x6ae/0xcf0
[ 116.180144][ T5901] tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0
[ 116.182118][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.184291][ T5901] ? rw_verify_area+0x24a/0x4c0
[ 116.187369][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.190916][ T5901] vfs_read+0x213/0xa80
[ 116.192616][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.194918][ T5901] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.196915][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.199113][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x3a2/0x420
[ 116.200863][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.203463][ T5901] ksys_read+0x150/0x270
[ 116.205873][ T5901] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.208618][ T5901] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.211345][ T5901] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 116.213845][ T5901] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x70/0xc0
[ 116.215420][ T5901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.218359][ T5901] RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.220819][ T5901] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
[ 116.229972][ T5901] RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 116.234439][ T5901] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.238592][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 116.241666][ T5901] RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 116.245896][ T5901] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
[ 116.250156][ T5901] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
[ 116.252955][ T5901] </TASK>
[ 116.254029][ T5901] Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
[ 116.257239][ T5901] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 116.260556][ T5901] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 116.264238][ T5901] Call Trace:
[ 116.265375][ T5901] <TASK>
[ 116.266371][ T5901] vpanic+0x56c/0xa60
[ 116.268681][ T5901] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
[ 116.271178][ T5901] ? __pfx_vpanic+0x10/0x10
[ 116.273675][ T5901] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x292/0x2b0
[ 116.276546][ T5901] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x26/0x2b0
[ 116.279868][ T5901] panic+0xc5/0xd0
[ 116.282140][ T5901] ? __pfx_panic+0x10/0x10
[ 116.284809][ T5901] __warn+0x315/0x4c0
[ 116.287232][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.290274][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.293354][ T5901] __report_bug+0x276/0x570
[ 116.295242][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.298454][ T5901] ? __pfx___report_bug+0x10/0x10
[ 116.301419][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.304684][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.306515][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x3c3/0x430
[ 116.309884][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.312745][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.315797][ T5901] report_bug+0x16a/0x220
[ 116.318378][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.321518][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbf/0x1cc0
[ 116.323945][ T5901] handle_bug+0x9c/0x200
[ 116.326449][ T5901] exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[ 116.329165][ T5901] asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 116.331062][ T5901] RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.334668][ T5901] Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
[ 116.346082][ T5901] RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 116.349372][ T5901] RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
[ 116.353531][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
[ 116.357733][ T5901] RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
[ 116.360759][ T5901] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
[ 116.364851][ T5901] R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
[ 116.368658][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bb8/0x1cc0
[ 116.370752][ T5901] ? __pfx_rb_get_reader_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.373877][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.376962][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.380021][ T5901] ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0
[ 116.383053][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.385341][ T5901] ? __pfx_ring_buffer_read_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.389046][ T5901] ? down_read+0x2be/0x330
[ 116.391890][ T5901] ? trace_empty+0x245/0x2c0
[ 116.394891][ T5901] ? tracing_buffers_read+0x6ae/0xcf0
[ 116.397666][ T5901] tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0
[ 116.400531][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.404196][ T5901] ? rw_verify_area+0x24a/0x4c0
[ 116.407084][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.409263][ T5901] vfs_read+0x213/0xa80
[ 116.411835][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.413987][ T5901] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.417046][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.420001][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x3a2/0x420
[ 116.423015][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.425905][ T5901] ksys_read+0x150/0x270
[ 116.428076][ T5901] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.430967][ T5901] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.433187][ T5901] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 116.435011][ T5901] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x70/0xc0
[ 116.437169][ T5901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.440798][ T5901] RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.443691][ T5901] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
[ 116.454431][ T5901] RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 116.459853][ T5901] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.464687][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 116.469513][ T5901] RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 116.474165][ T5901] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
[ 116.480932][ T5901] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
[ 116.485538][ T5901] </TASK>
[ 117.630006][ T5901] Shutting down cpus with NMI
[ 117.634446][ T5901] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 117.637347][ T5901] Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
TruncatedCrashReport:==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff88810fa51c6c by task syz-executor135/5899
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5899 Comm: syz-executor135 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f62b8bb4c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f62b835c1a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f62b835e6c0 RCX: 00007f62b8bb4c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f62b835c210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdf21b0c00 R15: 00007ffdf21b0ce8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10fa51
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5898, tgid 5897 (syz-executor135), ts 121914026690, free_ts 121911882170
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5898 tgid 5897 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline]
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0xeaa/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7441
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810fa51f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88810fa51f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88810fa52000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810fa52080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810fa52100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
TruncatedStraceOutput:]
|
| 85/3 |
2026/08/12 02:58 |
agent |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Results: map[Feedback:The reproducer successfully triggered the exact same WARNING in `__rb_get_reader_page` (inlined into `rb_get_reader_page`) at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` as described in the original bug report. The call trace matches perfectly, originating from `ring_buffer_read_page` via `tracing_buffers_read` and `vfs_read`. Additionally, the reproducer also triggered related KASAN slab-out-of-bounds and slab-use-after-free bugs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, which confirms memory corruption in the ring buffer handling logic, likely due to a race condition between reading and resizing the buffer. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Analyze the results of running the generated program.
=== CRITICAL ENVIRONMENT & TARGET CLASSIFICATION ===
Set 'TerminalError' to a descriptive error message ONLY if:
1. The execution failed due to missing hardware device nodes, subsystems, kernel modules, or privilege limits
that cannot be loaded, created, or bypassed by user-space C code edits in the VM guest.
2. The target source files or functions described in the bug description do not exist in the checked-out codebase,
meaning the codebase version is mismatched and the target code is absent.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT classify a run as a terminal failure or assume a bug is fixed based on git log entries, commit titles,
or commit messages. Reproducibility can ONLY be determined by executing reproducer candidates in the VM.
- Do NOT suggest C code strategies, repairs, or namespace bypasses when setting 'TerminalError'.
=== PHASE 2: BUG REPRODUCTION (EVALUATION) ===
The executed program was a full reproducer candidate attempting to trigger the target bug/crash.
Use this to guide your classification and feedback:
1. If a crash was triggered (Reproduced is true):
- Determine if the triggered crash matches the expected bug.
- If you conclude they represent the same underlying bug (the same root cause)
despite different titles, crash signatures, or call traces, set TitleMatches
to true and provide a detailed, technical, and verbose explanation of the
equivalence in the 'Feedback' field.
- If they do not represent the same bug (a completely unrelated crash/collision),
set TitleMatches to false and explain the collision in 'Feedback'.
- If they match exactly, set TitleMatches to true and provide a brief confirmation in 'Feedback'.
2. If the execution was successful (exit 0) WITHOUT a crash (Reproduced is false):
- The reproduction attempt failed to trigger the bug. Analyze the console/strace output
to understand why the bug did not trigger (e.g., timing, input arguments, environment setup)
and provide feedback on how to improve the reproducer logic to trigger the crash.
Critical Diagnostic Rule for Reproduction Failures:
If the reproduction attempt fails (e.g., a system call returns an error, or a
warning/error message appears in the console log), you MUST:
1. Identify the failing system call from the execution trace or strace output.
2. Identify any corresponding warning or error messages in the console log.
3. Immediately search the kernel source tree for the warning message strings or
the code of the failing system call/subsystem to locate the validation logic.
4. Trace the kernel's validation logic to diagnose the exact constraint violation
or input mismatch in the generated program.
5. Provide a technical diagnosis in the feedback explaining the exact kernel constraint that was violated and why.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_read_page
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957, CPU#1: syz-executor422/6023
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6023 Comm: syz-executor422 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page+0xe70/0x1450 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957
Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 12 04 00 00 48 8b 43 10 be 04 00 00 00 48 8d 68 08 48 89 ef e8 75 ea 6b 00 f0 ff 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 1c f9 ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 60 e8 1e 65 fc ff 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000370fa20 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88801cade000 RCX: ffffffff820c7a2b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88813fe62008
RBP: ffff88813fe62008 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1027fcc401
R10: ffff88813fe6200b R11: ffff88801cade0a8 R12: ffff88801f75d980
R13: ffffed1003eebb32 R14: 0000000000000ff0 R15: ffff88801f75d990
FS: 00007effc71086c0(0000) GS:ffff888123fe4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007effc7106000 CR3: 0000000076748000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981 [inline]
ring_buffer_read_page+0x8ed/0x1710 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x2bf/0xaf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x1e4/0xb40 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x10b/0x830 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7effc8166cde
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007effc7104198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effc71086c0 RCX: 00007effc8166cde
RDX: 0000000000004000 RSI: 00007effc7104200 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007effc7104200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007effc81e0b20
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdeadf5850 R15: 00007ffdeadf5938
</TASK>
IsProbe: false
Reproduced: true
Console Output: [ 107.845771][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 107.845786][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.062:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5834 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.862910][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5834 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.874537][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5834 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 107.886835][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503463.072:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5834 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.253556][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.472:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.324977][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.542:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.764662][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503465.982:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.859391][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.072:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.564213][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.782:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.686829][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503466.892:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.989067][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 6 callbacks suppressed
[ 112.989082][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.202:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5875 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.083788][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.302:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.262524][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.482:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.356457][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503468.572:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5887 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:22684' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 114.804648][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.022:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.819999][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:222): avc: denied { write } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=3442 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 114.844618][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:223): avc: denied { open } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb" dev="tracefs" ino=3442 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 114.860957][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.874445][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:225): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=3473 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.888672][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786503470.032:226): avc: denied { search } for pid=5899 comm="syz-executor214" name="cpu0" dev="tracefs" ino=3474 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.083072][ T5901] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 116.086669][ T5901] 1
[ 116.086683][ T5901] WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0, CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
[ 116.094641][ T5901] Modules linked in:
[ 116.097308][ T5901] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 116.103139][ T5901] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 116.109122][ T5901] RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.111889][ T5901] Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
[ 116.122951][ T5901] RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 116.126542][ T5901] RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
[ 116.131874][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
[ 116.136165][ T5901] RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
[ 116.140502][ T5901] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
[ 116.144716][ T5901] R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
[ 116.147364][ T5901] FS: 00007fa66e0826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a50ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 116.152389][ T5901] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 116.154692][ T5901] CR2: 00007fa66d880ff8 CR3: 000000018c874000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
[ 116.157929][ T5901] Call Trace:
[ 116.159143][ T5901] <TASK>
[ 116.160835][ T5901] ? __pfx_rb_get_reader_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.163051][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.165070][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.166859][ T5901] ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0
[ 116.169484][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.171758][ T5901] ? __pfx_ring_buffer_read_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.173915][ T5901] ? down_read+0x2be/0x330
[ 116.175626][ T5901] ? trace_empty+0x245/0x2c0
[ 116.178089][ T5901] ? tracing_buffers_read+0x6ae/0xcf0
[ 116.180144][ T5901] tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0
[ 116.182118][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.184291][ T5901] ? rw_verify_area+0x24a/0x4c0
[ 116.187369][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.190916][ T5901] vfs_read+0x213/0xa80
[ 116.192616][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.194918][ T5901] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.196915][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.199113][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x3a2/0x420
[ 116.200863][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.203463][ T5901] ksys_read+0x150/0x270
[ 116.205873][ T5901] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.208618][ T5901] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.211345][ T5901] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 116.213845][ T5901] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x70/0xc0
[ 116.215420][ T5901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.218359][ T5901] RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.220819][ T5901] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
[ 116.229972][ T5901] RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 116.234439][ T5901] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.238592][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 116.241666][ T5901] RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 116.245896][ T5901] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
[ 116.250156][ T5901] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
[ 116.252955][ T5901] </TASK>
[ 116.254029][ T5901] Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
[ 116.257239][ T5901] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 116.260556][ T5901] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 116.264238][ T5901] Call Trace:
[ 116.265375][ T5901] <TASK>
[ 116.266371][ T5901] vpanic+0x56c/0xa60
[ 116.268681][ T5901] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10
[ 116.271178][ T5901] ? __pfx_vpanic+0x10/0x10
[ 116.273675][ T5901] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x292/0x2b0
[ 116.276546][ T5901] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x26/0x2b0
[ 116.279868][ T5901] panic+0xc5/0xd0
[ 116.282140][ T5901] ? __pfx_panic+0x10/0x10
[ 116.284809][ T5901] __warn+0x315/0x4c0
[ 116.287232][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.290274][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.293354][ T5901] __report_bug+0x276/0x570
[ 116.295242][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.298454][ T5901] ? __pfx___report_bug+0x10/0x10
[ 116.301419][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.304684][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.306515][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x3c3/0x430
[ 116.309884][ T5901] ? __page_table_check_zero+0x6c/0x430
[ 116.312745][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.315797][ T5901] report_bug+0x16a/0x220
[ 116.318378][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.321518][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbf/0x1cc0
[ 116.323945][ T5901] handle_bug+0x9c/0x200
[ 116.326449][ T5901] exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50
[ 116.329165][ T5901] asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 116.331062][ T5901] RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0
[ 116.334668][ T5901] Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
[ 116.346082][ T5901] RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
[ 116.349372][ T5901] RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
[ 116.353531][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
[ 116.357733][ T5901] RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
[ 116.360759][ T5901] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
[ 116.364851][ T5901] R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
[ 116.368658][ T5901] ? rb_get_reader_page+0x1bb8/0x1cc0
[ 116.370752][ T5901] ? __pfx_rb_get_reader_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.373877][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.376962][ T5901] ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
[ 116.380021][ T5901] ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0
[ 116.383053][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.385341][ T5901] ? __pfx_ring_buffer_read_page+0x10/0x10
[ 116.389046][ T5901] ? down_read+0x2be/0x330
[ 116.391890][ T5901] ? trace_empty+0x245/0x2c0
[ 116.394891][ T5901] ? tracing_buffers_read+0x6ae/0xcf0
[ 116.397666][ T5901] tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0
[ 116.400531][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.404196][ T5901] ? rw_verify_area+0x24a/0x4c0
[ 116.407084][ T5901] ? __pfx_tracing_buffers_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.409263][ T5901] vfs_read+0x213/0xa80
[ 116.411835][ T5901] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 116.413987][ T5901] ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.417046][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.420001][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x3a2/0x420
[ 116.423015][ T5901] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x420
[ 116.425905][ T5901] ksys_read+0x150/0x270
[ 116.428076][ T5901] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 116.430967][ T5901] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.433187][ T5901] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 116.435011][ T5901] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x70/0xc0
[ 116.437169][ T5901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 116.440798][ T5901] RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.443691][ T5901] Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
[ 116.454431][ T5901] RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 116.459853][ T5901] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
[ 116.464687][ T5901] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
[ 116.469513][ T5901] RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 116.474165][ T5901] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
[ 116.480932][ T5901] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
[ 116.485538][ T5901] </TASK>
[ 117.630006][ T5901] Shutting down cpus with NMI
[ 117.634446][ T5901] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 117.637347][ T5901] Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
Strace Output:
Crash Report: ==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff88810fa51c6c by task syz-executor135/5899
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5899 Comm: syz-executor135 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f62b8bb4c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f62b835c1a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f62b835e6c0 RCX: 00007f62b8bb4c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f62b835c210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdf21b0c00 R15: 00007ffdf21b0ce8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10fa51
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5898, tgid 5897 (syz-executor135), ts 121914026690, free_ts 121911882170
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5898 tgid 5897 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline]
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0xeaa/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7441
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810fa51f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88810fa51f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88810fa52000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810fa52080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810fa52100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Other crashes triggered:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff888114e41c6c by task syz-executor350/5895
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5895 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f27d2c6cc1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f27d24141a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f27d24166c0 RCX: 00007f27d2c6cc1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f27d2414210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8fe741f0 R15: 00007ffc8fe742d8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888114e41c80 pfn:0x114e41
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: ffff888114e41c80 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5894, tgid 5893 (syz-executor350), ts 119962012130, free_ts 119863468231
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5892 tgid 5892 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
__tlb_remove_table_free mm/mmu_gather.c:228 [inline]
tlb_remove_table_rcu+0x85/0x100 mm/mmu_gather.c:291
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 [inline]
rcu_core+0x78b/0x10a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897
handle_softirqs+0x225/0x840 kernel/softirq.c:622
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:496 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x220 kernel/softirq.c:735
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:752
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888114e41f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888114e41f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888114e42000: fa fb fb fb fb fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fa fb
^
ffff888114e42080: fb fb fb fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00
ffff888114e42100: 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fc
==================================================================
------------[ cut here ]------------
1
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 [inline], CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981, CPU#0: syz-executor214/5901
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5901 Comm: syz-executor214 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__rb_get_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rb_get_reader_page+0x1bbd/0x1cc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5981
Code: 3c 01 00 74 0a 48 8b 7c 24 30 e8 4e 9d 69 00 48 8b 44 24 30 48 8b 18 48 8d 7b 08 be 04 00 00 00 e8 d8 9f 69 00 f0 ff 43 08 90 <0f> 0b 90 45 31 ff e9 ec fc ff ff e8 83 15 ea 09 44 89 f9 80 e1 07
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038af860 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8881000a5001 RBX: ffff888100066000 RCX: ffffffff81c8beb8
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100066008
RBP: ffffc900038af9f0 R08: ffff88810006600b R09: 1ffff1102000cc01
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed102000cc02 R12: 0000000000001ff0
R13: 1ffff110225909d2 R14: ffff888112c84e90 R15: ffff888112c84e80
FS: 00007fa66e0826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881a50ea000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa66d880ff8 CR3: 000000018c874000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ring_buffer_read_page+0x223/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7103
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa66e8d8c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fa66e0801a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa66e0826c0 RCX: 00007fa66e8d8c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007fa66e080210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc4a4d9ad0 R15: 00007ffc4a4d9bb8
</TASK>
|
| 86/4 |
2026/08/12 02:58 |
llm |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21029
output: 182
thoughts: 914
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Analyzing the Bug Report and Crash Output**
Alright, my primary task here is to definitively determine if the bug we're investigating has been successfully reproduced and, crucially, if the reproduced issue aligns precisely with the original bug description. This means a meticulous comparison of the provided crash reports and the initial bug details.
Looking at the original bug description, the core of the problem is a `WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page`. The call trace clearly shows the path: `rb_get_reader_page` (which is where `__rb_get_reader_page` is located, as indicated by the inline marker) leading up to `ring_buffer_read_page`, then `tracing_buffers_read`, and finally the user-space interaction via `vfs_read` and `ksys_read`. This gives me a very specific signature to look for.
Now, I turn my attention to the reproduced crash report. My immediate scan focuses on that exact warning message and the call stack. I see it: `WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957 at __rb_get_reader_page` (and also a more specific call to `rb_get_reader_page` at a slightly different offset, but clearly originating from the same problematic line and function). The call trace from the reproduction also mirrors the original: `ring_buffer_read_page` -> `tracing_buffers_read` -> `vfs_read` -> `ksys_read`. The CPU numbers and executor names are different, as expected, but the *essence* of the crash – the function, the line number, and the sequence of calls – is identical. This is a strong indicator of a successful reproduction.
Beyond the primary warning, I also notice other crashes reported: `KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ring_buffer_read_page` and `KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ring_buffer_read_page`. While these are different *types* of errors, their occurrence within `ring_buffer_read_page` strongly suggests they stem from the same underlying issue. My expertise tells me that memory corruption, such as slab-out-of-bounds or use-after-free, is often the root cause of seemingly disparate errors when dealing with complex data structures like ring buffers, especially in concurrent environments. The fact that these KASAN errors are also happening within the context of ring buffer reads points towards a potential race condition involving concurrent reads, writes, or resizes of the ring buffer itself.
Based on this comprehensive analysis:
* The primary `WARNING` message and call trace match exactly. This allows me to confidently set `TitleMatches` to `true`.
* Since this is a reproduced bug and not an attempt to test a fix or a specific probe, `ProbePassed` should be `false`.
* There's no obvious "terminal error" or explicit failure state described in the reproduction output that fits a specific predefined category, so `TerminalError` remains empty for now.
Now, I need to synthesize this into a clear and concise feedback statement, ensuring it's technical enough for an expert audience while being precise about the findings.
My feedback statement will articulate that the reproducer successfully triggered the *exact same* `WARNING` as documented in the original bug. I'll specify the function (`__rb_get_reader_page`/`rb_get_reader_page`), the file and line (`kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957`), and the call stack progression, confirming the precise alignment. I'll also highlight the occurrence of the related KASAN errors as supporting evidence of the underlying memory corruption in the ring buffer handling, likely due to race conditions, which strengthens the conclusion that the reproduction is valid and points towards the root cause.
|
| 87/4 |
2026/08/12 02:58 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[Feedback:The reproducer successfully triggered the exact same WARNING in `__rb_get_reader_page` (inlined into `rb_get_reader_page`) at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` as described in the original bug report. The call trace matches perfectly, originating from `ring_buffer_read_page` via `tracing_buffers_read` and `vfs_read`. Additionally, the reproducer also triggered related KASAN slab-out-of-bounds and slab-use-after-free bugs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, which confirms memory corruption in the ring buffer handling logic, likely due to a race condition between reading and resizing the buffer. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
Results: map[Feedback:The reproducer successfully triggered the exact same WARNING in `__rb_get_reader_page` (inlined into `rb_get_reader_page`) at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` as described in the original bug report. The call trace matches perfectly, originating from `ring_buffer_read_page` via `tracing_buffers_read` and `vfs_read`. Additionally, the reproducer also triggered related KASAN slab-out-of-bounds and slab-use-after-free bugs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, which confirms memory corruption in the ring buffer handling logic, likely due to a race condition between reading and resizing the buffer. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
|
| 88/3 |
2026/08/12 02:58 |
action |
loop-controller |
0m
Results: map[CapabilitiesVerified:true ContinueSignal: EquivalenceAnalysis:The reproducer successfully triggered the exact same WARNING in `__rb_get_reader_page` (inlined into `rb_get_reader_page`) at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` as described in the original bug report. The call trace matches perfectly, originating from `ring_buffer_read_page` via `tracing_buffers_read` and `vfs_read`. Additionally, the reproducer also triggered related KASAN slab-out-of-bounds and slab-use-after-free bugs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, which confirms memory corruption in the ring buffer handling logic, likely due to a race condition between reading and resizing the buffer. OracleFeedback:The reproducer successfully triggered the exact same WARNING in `__rb_get_reader_page` (inlined into `rb_get_reader_page`) at `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5957` as described in the original bug report. The call trace matches perfectly, originating from `ring_buffer_read_page` via `tracing_buffers_read` and `vfs_read`. Additionally, the reproducer also triggered related KASAN slab-out-of-bounds and slab-use-after-free bugs in `ring_buffer_read_page`, which confirms memory corruption in the ring buffer handling logic, likely due to a race condition between reading and resizing the buffer. ReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
int fd_size;
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *size_thread(void *arg)
{
while (1) {
if (pwrite(fd_size, "4\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors as it might fail if busy
}
usleep(1000);
if (pwrite(fd_size, "8\n", 2, 0) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
usleep(1000);
}
return NULL;
}
void *read_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[8192];
while (1) {
if (read(fd_raw, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, especially EAGAIN due to O_NONBLOCK
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *write_thread(void *arg)
{
char buf[1024];
memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf) - 1);
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\n';
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
// Ignore errors
}
}
return NULL;
}
int main()
{
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_size < 0) {
fd_size = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_subbuf_size_kb", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_size < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open buffer_subbuf_size_kb: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened buffer_subbuf_size_kb successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
}
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_pipe_raw successfully.\n");
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
}
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Opened trace_marker successfully.\n");
pthread_t t1, t2, t3;
if (pthread_create(&t1, NULL, size_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create size_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created size_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_create(&t3, NULL, write_thread, NULL) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Created write_thread successfully.\n");
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t2, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for read_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for read_thread successfully.\n");
if (pthread_setaffinity_np(t3, sizeof(set), &set) != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to set affinity for write_thread: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Set affinity for write_thread successfully.\n");
sleep(10);
printf("[+] Finished sleeping. Exiting.\n");
return 0;
} Reproduced:true ReproducedBugTitle:KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ring_buffer_read_page ReproducedCrashReport:==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
Write of size 5012 at addr ffff88810fa51c6c by task syz-executor135/5899
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5899 Comm: syz-executor135 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__asan_memset+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/shadow.c:84
ring_buffer_read_page+0xe60/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7249
tracing_buffers_read+0x611/0xcf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7125
vfs_read+0x213/0xa80 fs/read_write.c:572
ksys_read+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:716
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f62b8bb4c1e
Code: 08 0f 85 f5 e2 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 90 41 57 41 56 4d 89 c6 41 55 4d 89 cd 41 54 55 53 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007f62b835c1a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f62b835e6c0 RCX: 00007f62b8bb4c1e
RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007f62b835c210 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdf21b0c00 R15: 00007ffdf21b0ce8
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10fa51
flags: 0x17ff00000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 017ff00000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x44dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO|__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL|__GFP_COMP), pid 5898, tgid 5897 (syz-executor135), ts 121914026690, free_ts 121911882170
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1859
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1867 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x21fa/0x2270 mm/page_alloc.c:3946
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18d/0x380 mm/page_alloc.c:5304
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x10/0x100 mm/page_alloc.c:5338
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:291 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:318 [inline]
alloc_cpu_data kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:427 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x9f7/0x1330 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2436
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x45d/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7381
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5898 tgid 5897 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xbdb/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:2950
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline]
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0xeaa/0x14b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7441
buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x1b3/0x250 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:794 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:802 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:799 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x196/0x220 fs/read_write.c:799
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810fa51f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88810fa51f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88810fa52000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810fa52080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810fa52100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
]
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| 89/1 |
2026/08/12 02:58 |
action |
save-repro-c |
0m
Results:
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