| 0/0 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
flow |
repro-c |
15m
Results: map[EquivalenceAnalysis:The reproduction attempt successfully triggered the target crash. The crash signature and call trace exactly match the expected bug, confirming that the reproducer is correct and effective. OtherCrashReports:<nil> ReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
Reproduced:true ReproducedBugTitle:WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader ReproducedCrashReport:------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#1: syz-executor152/5857
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5857 Comm: syz-executor152 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: 89 f0 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 bf 40 fc ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 70 f7 ff ff e8 b1 40 fc ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3a ff ff ff e8 33 eb fb 09 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003727d20 EFLAGS: 00010093
RAX: ffffffff81c9b84f RBX: ffff8881000a50b0 RCX: ffff8881f961cb00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003727e78 R08: ffff8881000aa00f R09: 1ffff11020015401
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1020015402 R12: 1ffff920006e4fbc
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881000a5000 R15: 0000000000000ff0
FS: 00007f87e60ec6c0(0000) GS:ffff8882e8473000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f87e60ec148 CR3: 000000018b57c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x258/0x300 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f87e6921cab
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1c 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f87e60ec130 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87e60eccdc RCX: 00007f87e6921cab
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f87e60ec6c0
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffec1c24ba0 R15: 00007ffec1c24c88
</TASK>
]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
0m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/297d41c12fba07000f4cde269f3580a719860dd9]
|
| 2/1 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
action |
kernel-builder |
0m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/9011d17c7e9067b0246a98528ec14a126164b380]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
0m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
agent |
initial-researcher |
7m
Model:
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to analyze a Linux kernel bug description and propose a strategy to reproduce it
with a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive purpose of verifying a bugfix.
=== TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES ===
- When looking up C function or struct definitions, prefer codesearch-definition-source
and codesearch-struct-layout first.
- Fall back to read-file or grepper only if symbol lookup fails or when inspecting macros,
headers, or non-C files.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT propose an exploit. Focus solely on minimal technical reproduction of the bug state.
- Do NOT write long explanations. Keep your analysis and strategy proposal concise.
- Do NOT assume that the target bug has already been fixed just because a git commit title
or description mentions a similar bug or fix. Commit messages often reference related issues
or partial fixes. Proceed with proposing a reproduction strategy regardless of historical fix commits.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader
Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match
------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#0: syz.2.1764/13608
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13608 Comm: syz.2.1764 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e 21 fe ff 48 89 c5 e8 46 8b fb ff 48 85 ed 0f 85 9f fc ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 58 4c 8b 7c 24 60 e8 2e 8b fb ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 25 8b fb ff 49 8d bf d0 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b57d98 EFLAGS: 00010087
RAX: 000000000000086c RBX: ffff88801c0e5000 RCX: ffffc90024800000
RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: ffffffff821064e2 RDI: ffff888027852580
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88801c0e50b0 R12: ffff88801c0e50b8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88801c0e5198 R15: ffff88801c0ab800
FS: 00007fa41bfdb6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5b61000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f60453c8ff8 CR3: 0000000035d0b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x2e6/0x3d0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa41b19e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa41bfdb028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa41b425fa0 RCX: 00007fa41b19e159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fa41b235024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa41b426038 R14: 00007fa41b425fa0 R15: 00007ffd22388a08
</TASK>
Reply: An analysis of the bug and a C reproducer to trigger the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` is triggered when `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL`.
By tracing the paths in `__rb_get_reader_page()`, it can return `NULL` without triggering any internal `RB_WARN_ON` in two specific cases:
1. `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`
2. `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`
The root cause is a race condition between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU.
When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page.
1. **Writer (CPU 0)**: Starts writing an event that requires moving to a new page. It increments `entries` (making `rb_per_cpu_empty()` return false for the reader). It then calls `rb_set_commit_to_write()`, which advances `commit_page` to the new page via `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page)`.
2. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. It sees the buffer is not empty and calls `rb_get_reader_page()`.
3. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Swaps the `head_page` (which happens to be the new `commit_page` the writer just moved to). The reader page is now the `commit_page`.
4. **Reader (CPU 1)**: In the `again` loop, it checks `rb_page_size(reader)`. Because the writer was preempted/delayed exactly before updating the page's `commit` field, the size is `0`.
5. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Since the size is `0`, it falls through and checks `if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)`. This evaluates to **true**, causing it to return `NULL`.
6. **Reader (CPU 1)**: `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` receives `NULL` and triggers `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this race condition, we need to keep the ring buffer mostly empty so that the reader and writer constantly interact on the same page, and hit the tiny race window:
1. Open the `trace_pipe_raw` file for a specific CPU (e.g., `cpu0`) with `O_NONBLOCK`.
2. `mmap` at least one page of the file to set `cpu_buffer->user_mapped = 1`, which is required for the ioctl to proceed.
3. Spawn a **Writer Thread** pinned to CPU 0 that continuously writes small payloads to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker`.
4. Spawn a **Reader Thread** pinned to CPU 1 that continuously calls `ioctl(fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on the raw pipe.
### C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, "A", 1);
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 5/2 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 4134
output: 50
thoughts: 237
Thoughts: **Investigating the `WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader`**
Alright, I've got this bug report about a `WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. My first step is always to pinpoint the exact location, and here, it's explicitly stated as `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927`. The function involved is `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
The call trace is crucial for understanding the context. It shows a clear path leading to this warning: `tracing_buffers_ioctl` calls `vfs_ioctl`, which then goes through `__do_sys_ioctl`, `__se_sys_ioctl`, and finally `__x64_sys_ioctl`. This tells me the issue is originating from a user-space `ioctl` call that's making its way into the kernel tracing subsystem.
The specific `ioctl` command is `0x5220`, which I've identified from the RSI register. This is a key piece of information. Now, my immediate next step is to dive into the code for both `tracing_buffers_ioctl` and `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. I need to understand what `0x5220` corresponds to within the tracing subsystem, and then analyze how `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is being invoked by `tracing_buffers_ioctl` in that specific scenario. The warning itself, "WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader," suggests that something unexpected is happening within that function, likely related to the state or contents of the ring buffer map it's trying to access.
|
| 6/2 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_map_get_reader]
Results: map[SourceCode:7891: int ring_buffer_map_get_reader(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
7892: {
7893: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
7894: struct buffer_page *reader;
7895: unsigned long missed_events;
7896: unsigned long reader_size;
7897: unsigned long flags;
7898:
7899: cpu_buffer = rb_get_mapped_buffer(buffer, cpu);
7900: if (IS_ERR(cpu_buffer))
7901: return (int)PTR_ERR(cpu_buffer);
7902:
7903: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7904:
7905: consume:
7906: if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer))
7907: goto out;
7908:
7909: reader_size = rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page);
7910:
7911: /*
7912: * There are data to be read on the current reader page, we can
7913: * return to the caller. But before that, we assume the latter will read
7914: * everything. Let's update the kernel reader accordingly.
7915: */
7916: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size) {
7917: while (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size)
7918: rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
7919: goto out;
7920: }
7921:
7922: /* Did the reader catch up with the writer? */
7923: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page)
7924: goto out;
7925:
7926: reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
7927: if (WARN_ON(!reader))
7928: goto out;
7929:
7930: /* Check if any events were dropped */
7931: missed_events = cpu_buffer->lost_events;
7932:
7933: if (missed_events) {
7934: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page != cpu_buffer->commit_page) {
7935: struct buffer_data_page *dpage = reader->page;
7936: unsigned int commit;
7937: /*
7938: * Use the real_end for the data size,
7939: * This gives us a chance to store the lost events
7940: * on the page.
7941: */
7942: if (reader->real_end)
7943: local_set(&dpage->commit, reader->real_end);
7944: /*
7945: * If there is room at the end of the page to save the
7946: * missed events, then record it there.
7947: */
7948: commit = rb_page_size(reader);
7949: if (rb_page_capacity(reader) - commit >= sizeof(missed_events)) {
7950: memcpy(&dpage->data[commit], &missed_events,
7951: sizeof(missed_events));
7952: local_add(RB_MISSED_STORED, &dpage->commit);
7953: }
7954: local_add(RB_MISSED_EVENTS, &dpage->commit);
7955: } else if (!WARN_ONCE(cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->tail_page,
7956: "Reader on commit with %ld missed events",
7957: missed_events)) {
7958: /*
7959: * There shouldn't be any missed events if the tail_page
7960: * is on the reader page. But if the tail page is not on the
7961: * reader page and the commit_page is, that would mean that
7962: * there's a commit_overrun (an interrupt preempted an
7963: * addition of an event and then filled the buffer
7964: * with new events). In this case it's not an
7965: * error, but it should still be reported.
7966: *
7967: * TODO: Add missed events to the page for user space to know.
7968: */
7969: pr_info("Ring buffer [%d] commit overrun lost %ld events at timestamp:%lld\n",
7970: cpu, missed_events, cpu_buffer->reader_page->page->time_stamp);
7971: }
7972: }
7973:
7974: cpu_buffer->lost_events = 0;
7975:
7976: goto consume;
7977:
7978: out:
7979: /* Some archs do not have data cache coherency between kernel and user-space */
7980: flush_kernel_vmap_range(cpu_buffer->reader_page->page,
7981: rb_subbuf_size(buffer));
7982:
7983: rb_update_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7984:
7985: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7986: rb_put_mapped_buffer(cpu_buffer);
7987:
7988: return 0;
7989: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 7/2 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:tracing_buffers_ioctl]
Results: map[SourceCode:7376: static long tracing_buffers_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
7377: {
7378: struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = file->private_data;
7379: struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
7380: int err;
7381:
7382: if (cmd == TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER) {
7383: if (!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
7384: err = ring_buffer_wait(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7385: iter->cpu_file,
7386: iter->tr->buffer_percent,
7387: NULL, NULL);
7388: if (err)
7389: return err;
7390: }
7391:
7392: return ring_buffer_map_get_reader(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7393: iter->cpu_file);
7394: } else if (cmd) {
7395: return -ENOTTY;
7396: }
7397:
7398: /*
7399: * An ioctl call with cmd 0 to the ring buffer file will wake up all
7400: * waiters
7401: */
7402: guard(mutex)(&trace_types_lock);
7403:
7404: /* Make sure the waiters see the new wait_index */
7405: (void)atomic_fetch_inc_release(&iter->wait_index);
7406:
7407: ring_buffer_wake_waiters(iter->array_buffer->buffer, iter->cpu_file);
7408:
7409: return 0;
7410: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c]
|
| 8/2 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6491
output: 25
thoughts: 165
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacking `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` and its Associated Warning**
Right, so I'm digging into this `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` ioctl, and my first step is always to pin down the exact command code. I see it's defined as `_IO('R', 0x20)`. My immediate thought is to resolve this macro. I know `_IO` is for read-only ioctls, and it typically combines a magic number (here, 'R') with a sequence number. So, 'R' likely gets shifted left by 8 bits, and then the sequence number `0x20` is OR-ed in. That makes the command code `(0x52 << 8) | 0x20`, which correctly evaluates to `0x5220`. Okay, so when I see `cmd == 0x5220`, I know I'm dealing with `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER`.
Now, I've encountered a warning: `WARN_ON(!reader)` within the `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` function. This immediately tells me that the `reader` variable is unexpectedly `NULL` in this context. My next logical step is to trace where this `reader` variable is coming from. The code shows it's assigned the result of `rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);`. This is the crucial point: the function `rb_get_reader_page` is returning `NULL`.
Therefore, my current focus is on understanding *why* `rb_get_reader_page` might return `NULL`. I need to examine its implementation to figure out the conditions under which it fails to acquire or provide a valid reader page.
|
| 9/2 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_get_reader_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:6034: static struct buffer_page *
6035: rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
6036: {
6037: return cpu_buffer->remote ? __rb_get_reader_page_from_remote(cpu_buffer) :
6038: __rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
6039: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 10/2 |
2026/09/07 11:45 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6807
output: 26
thoughts: 14
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Decoding `__rb_get_reader_page`**
Alright, so the very first thing that pops into my head when I see `__rb_get_reader_page` is a strong sense of a specific, internal operation. The double underscores, `__`, immediately signal to me that this isn't part of a public API. This is likely an internal helper function, a private method, or a low-level utility within the `rb` (Ruby?) codebase, or perhaps a library heavily influenced by Ruby conventions, judging by the naming. The `rb_` prefix reinforces this, suggesting a C extension or a core component of the Ruby interpreter itself.
My immediate internal question is: **"What is this `__rb_get_reader_page` *doing*?"** The name itself provides a good starting point, but it's still quite abstract.
* **`get`**: This clearly indicates a retrieval operation. It's not setting, modifying, or deleting anything; it's fetching some data.
* **`reader`**: This is the key qualifier. It implies that the data being retrieved is intended for reading, not necessarily for writing or direct manipulation by the caller. This could mean it's fetching a page from a larger data structure, perhaps for iteration, display, or analysis.
* **`page`**: This is the unit of retrieval. It strongly suggests pagination. I'm picturing a scenario where a large dataset is divided into manageable chunks or "pages" to improve performance, reduce memory footprint, or facilitate streaming.
So, my initial hypothesis is that this function is responsible for fetching a specific page of data from some underlying reader object or mechanism.
My next line of inquiry would be to consider the context in which this function would be used and the potential arguments it might take.
* **Arguments:** What information does `__rb_get_reader_page` need to know to fulfill its request? It's highly probable that it would need:
* An identifier for the reader itself (if there are multiple readers).
* The page number or an offset to determine *which* page to retrieve.
* Potentially, a size parameter for the page, though that might be implicit in the reader's configuration.
* Perhaps some sort of context or state object.
* **Return Value:** What does it return? Given the "reader" aspect, it's likely returning:
* A collection of items for that specific page (e.g., an array, a list, a buffer).
* Potentially, a status code or an error indicator if the page cannot be retrieved (e.g., page out of bounds, reader closed).
* It might also return a special value to indicate the end of the data if a page number beyond the last available page is requested.
* **Underlying Mechanism:** What is this "reader" actually reading from? This is where the expertise comes in. I'd be thinking about common patterns:
* **File I/O:** Is it reading from a file, and "page" refers to a block of bytes or lines?
* **Network Stream:** Is it fetching data from a network socket, and "page" is a chunk of received data?
* **In-memory Data Structure:** Is it retrieving a segment from a large array, list, or buffer already in memory?
* **Database Cursor/Result Set:** Is it fetching a batch of records from a database query?
* **Performance Implications:** The very existence of a "page" retrieval function points towards a need to manage performance. This function is likely designed to avoid loading the entire dataset into memory at once. I'd be considering:
* Efficiency of the page calculation/retrieval.
* Potential for buffering or caching.
* How it interacts with other parts of the system that might be consuming these pages.
In essence, `__rb_get_reader_page` is a functional unit within a larger system, and my immediate internal thought process is to dissect its purpose, its inputs and outputs, and its likely role in managing data retrieval efficiently, especially when dealing with potentially large volumes of information. It's a clue to a more complex data handling strategy.
|
| 11/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:__rb_get_reader_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:5853: static struct buffer_page *
5854: __rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5855: {
5856: int max_loops = cpu_buffer->ring_meta ? cpu_buffer->nr_pages : 3;
5857: struct buffer_page *reader = NULL;
5858: unsigned long overwrite;
5859: unsigned long flags;
5860: int missed_events = 0;
5861: int nr_loops = 0;
5862: bool ret;
5863:
5864: local_irq_save(flags);
5865: arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5866:
5867: again:
5868: /*
5869: * This should normally only loop twice. But because the
5870: * start of the reader inserts an empty page, it causes a
5871: * case where we will loop three times. There should be no
5872: * reason to loop four times unless the ring buffer is a
5873: * recovered persistent ring buffer. For persistent ring buffers,
5874: * invalid pages are reset during recovery, so there may be more
5875: * than 3 contiguous pages can be empty, but less than nr_pages.
5876: */
5877: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > max_loops)) {
5878: reader = NULL;
5879: goto out;
5880: }
5881:
5882: reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
5883:
5884: /* If there's more to read, return this page */
5885: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))
5886: goto out;
5887:
5888: /* Never should we have an index greater than the size */
5889: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
5890: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read > rb_page_size(reader)))
5891: goto out;
5892:
5893: /* check if we caught up to the tail */
5894: reader = NULL;
5895: if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
5896: goto out;
5897:
5898: /* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
5899: if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
5900: goto out;
5901:
5902: /*
5903: * Reset the reader page to size zero.
5904: */
5905: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0);
5906: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0);
5907: rb_init_data_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page->page);
5908: cpu_buffer->reader_page->real_end = 0;
5909:
5910: spin:
5911: /*
5912: * Splice the empty reader page into the list around the head.
5913: */
5914: reader = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
5915: if (!reader)
5916: goto out;
5917: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.next = rb_list_head(reader->list.next);
5918: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.prev = reader->list.prev;
5919:
5920: /*
5921: * cpu_buffer->pages just needs to point to the buffer, it
5922: * has no specific buffer page to point to. Lets move it out
5923: * of our way so we don't accidentally swap it.
5924: */
5925: cpu_buffer->pages = reader->list.prev;
5926:
5927: /* The reader page will be pointing to the new head */
5928: rb_set_list_to_head(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
5929:
5930: /*
5931: * We want to make sure we read the overruns after we set up our
5932: * pointers to the next object. The writer side does a
5933: * cmpxchg to cross pages which acts as the mb on the writer
5934: * side. Note, the reader will constantly fail the swap
5935: * while the writer is updating the pointers, so this
5936: * guarantees that the overwrite recorded here is the one we
5937: * want to compare with the last_overrun.
5938: */
5939: smp_mb();
5940: overwrite = local_read(&(cpu_buffer->overrun));
5941:
5942: /*
5943: * Here's the tricky part.
5944: *
5945: * We need to move the pointer past the header page.
5946: * But we can only do that if a writer is not currently
5947: * moving it. The page before the header page has the
5948: * flag bit '1' set if it is pointing to the page we want.
5949: * but if the writer is in the process of moving it
5950: * then it will be '2' or already moved '0'.
5951: */
5952:
5953: ret = rb_head_page_replace(reader, cpu_buffer->reader_page);
5954:
5955: /*
5956: * If we did not convert it, then we must try again.
5957: */
5958: if (!ret)
5959: goto spin;
5960:
5961: if (rb_page_commit(reader) & RB_MISSED_EVENTS)
5962: missed_events = -1;
5963:
5964: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta)
5965: rb_update_meta_reader(cpu_buffer, reader);
5966:
5967: /*
5968: * Yay! We succeeded in replacing the page.
5969: *
5970: * Now make the new head point back to the reader page.
5971: */
5972: rb_list_head(reader->list.next)->prev = &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list;
5973: rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->head_page);
5974:
5975: cpu_buffer->cnt++;
5976: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->pages_read);
5977:
5978: /* Finally update the reader page to the new head */
5979: cpu_buffer->reader_page = reader;
5980: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
5981:
5982: if (overwrite != cpu_buffer->last_overrun) {
5983: cpu_buffer->lost_events = overwrite - cpu_buffer->last_overrun;
5984: cpu_buffer->last_overrun = overwrite;
5985: }
5986:
5987: goto again;
5988:
5989: out:
5990: /* Update the read_stamp on the first event */
5991: if (reader && reader->read == 0)
5992: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = reader->page->time_stamp;
5993:
5994: arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5995: local_irq_restore(flags);
5996:
5997: /*
5998: * The writer has preempt disable, wait for it. But not forever
5999: * Although, 1 second is pretty much "forever"
6000: */
6001: #define USECS_WAIT 1000000
6002: for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
6003: /* If the write is past the end of page, a writer is still updating it */
6004: if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= rb_page_capacity(reader)))
6005: break;
6006:
6007: udelay(1);
6008:
6009: /* Get the latest version of the reader write value */
6010: smp_rmb();
6011: }
6012:
6013: /* The writer is not moving forward? Something is wrong */
6014: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))
6015: reader = NULL;
6016:
6017: /*
6018: * Make sure we see any padding after the write update
6019: * (see rb_reset_tail()).
6020: *
6021: * In addition, a writer may be writing on the reader page
6022: * if the page has not been fully filled, so the read barrier
6023: * is also needed to make sure we see the content of what is
6024: * committed by the writer (see rb_set_commit_to_write()).
6025: */
6026: smp_rmb();
6027:
6028: if (!cpu_buffer->lost_events)
6029: cpu_buffer->lost_events = missed_events;
6030:
6031: return reader;
6032: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 12/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 9568
output: 25
thoughts: 802
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the Ring Buffer Reader Issue**
I'm trying to debug a situation where `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is triggering a `WARN_ON(!reader)` when `rb_get_reader_page` returns NULL. My immediate thought is to trace the conditions under which `rb_get_reader_page` can return NULL.
My initial understanding is that `__rb_get_reader_page` (which `rb_get_reader_page` uses) can return NULL for several reasons:
* The `RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > max_loops)` condition is met.
* `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)` is 0.
* `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`.
* `rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer)` returns NULL.
* The `RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT)` condition is met.
However, this doesn't quite fit the observed warning. The warning in the bug description is `WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930`, which corresponds to `WARN_ON(!reader)` inside `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. This implies that `rb_get_reader_page` returned NULL *without* triggering one of its own internal `RB_WARN_ON`s.
So, I need to re-examine how `rb_get_reader_page` returns NULL, specifically focusing on the paths that *don't* involve its internal `RB_WARN_ON`.
Looking at the relevant snippet in `rb_get_reader_page`:
```c
/* check if we caught up to the tail */
reader = NULL; // This initialization is key
if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
goto out; // If this is true, reader remains NULL and goto out
/* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
goto out; // If this is true, reader remains NULL and goto out
```
If `rb_get_reader_page` returns NULL precisely because one of these two conditions (`cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page` or `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`) is met, and *then* `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` calls `rb_get_reader_page`, the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` would indeed be triggered.
But this leads to a deeper question: how could `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` proceed to call `rb_get_reader_page` if those conditions *should* have prevented it? Let me look at the code flow in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` more closely.
In `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`:
```c
consume:
if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer)) // Check 1
goto out;
reader_size = rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page);
/*
* There are data to be read on the current reader page, we can
* return to the caller. But before that, we assume the latter will read
* everything. Let's update the kernel reader accordingly.
*/
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size) { // Check 2
while (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size)
rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
goto out;
}
/* Did the reader catch up with the writer? */
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page) // Check 3
goto out;
reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer); // The call in question
if (WARN_ON(!reader)) // The warning happens here
goto out;
```
So, `rb_get_reader_page` is called *after* checking `cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page`. If this condition is true, it should `goto out` *before* calling `rb_get_reader_page`.
This suggests a race condition. Could it be that `cpu_buffer->commit_page` changes *between* the check `if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and the actual call to `rb_get_reader_page`?
Let's consider the locking involved. `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` holds `raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);`. Meanwhile, `__rb_get_reader_page` (called by `rb_get_reader_page`) acquires `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);`. This difference in locks is crucial. The `reader_lock` protects the reader's view, while the `lock` protects the overall buffer state, including the writer's `commit_page`.
The problem might be that the writer can modify `commit_page` (and potentially trigger a state where `rb_num_of_entries` becomes 0 or `commit_page` becomes equal to `reader_page`) *after* `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` checks the condition `cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page`, but *before* `rb_get_reader_page` is executed. If this happens, `rb_get_reader_page` will correctly return NULL based on the updated state (e.g., `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`), and the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` will then fire.
This brings me back to the `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0` condition. Could this be the real culprit? `rb_get_reader_page` returns NULL if this is true. So, if the buffer *becomes* empty between the `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` checks and the `rb_get_reader_page` call, that could explain it. I need to investigate how `rb_num_of_entries` is calculated and how its value can change due to concurrent operations.
|
| 13/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_num_of_entries]
Results: map[SourceCode:5206: /*
5207: * The total entries in the ring buffer is the running counter
5208: * of entries entered into the ring buffer, minus the sum of
5209: * the entries read from the ring buffer and the number of
5210: * entries that were overwritten.
5211: */
5212: static inline unsigned long
5213: rb_num_of_entries(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5214: {
5215: return local_read(&cpu_buffer->entries) -
5216: (local_read(&cpu_buffer->overrun) + cpu_buffer->read);
5217: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 14/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10598
output: 30
thoughts: 33
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Diagnosing the `cpu_buffer->remote` Condition**
Alright, I'm delving into this specific scenario, and my immediate suspicion, given the context, is centered around the state of `cpu_buffer->remote`. I need to get a clear understanding of whether that flag is actually set to true. To do that, the most logical next step is to trace the execution flow directly into the `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote` function. This function is precisely where the logic related to retrieving reader pages from a remote source would reside, and by examining its behavior when `cpu_buffer->remote` is true, I should be able to confirm or deny my initial hypothesis and understand the implications of that condition.
|
| 15/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote]
Results: map[SourceCode:5791: static struct buffer_page *
5792: __rb_get_reader_page_from_remote(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5793: {
5794: struct buffer_page *new_reader, *prev_reader, *prev_head, *new_head, *last;
5795:
5796: if (!rb_read_remote_meta_page(cpu_buffer))
5797: return NULL;
5798:
5799: /* More to read on the reader page */
5800: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page)) {
5801: if (!cpu_buffer->reader_page->read)
5802: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = cpu_buffer->reader_page->page->time_stamp;
5803: return cpu_buffer->reader_page;
5804: }
5805:
5806: prev_reader = cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id];
5807:
5808: if (cpu_buffer->remote->swap_reader_page(cpu_buffer->cpu,
5809: cpu_buffer->remote->priv)) {
5810: pr_warn_ratelimited("Remote reader page swap failed\n");
5811: return NULL;
5812: }
5813: /* nr_pages doesn't include the reader page */
5814: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id > cpu_buffer->nr_pages))
5815: return NULL;
5816:
5817: new_reader = cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id];
5818:
5819: WARN_ON_ONCE(prev_reader == new_reader);
5820:
5821: prev_head = new_reader; /* New reader was also the previous head */
5822: new_head = prev_head;
5823: rb_inc_page(&new_head);
5824: last = prev_head;
5825: rb_dec_page(&last);
5826:
5827: /* Clear the old HEAD flag */
5828: rb_list_head_clear(cpu_buffer->head_page->list.prev);
5829:
5830: prev_reader->list.next = prev_head->list.next;
5831: prev_reader->list.prev = prev_head->list.prev;
5832:
5833: /* Swap prev_reader with new_reader */
5834: last->list.next = &prev_reader->list;
5835: new_head->list.prev = &prev_reader->list;
5836:
5837: new_reader->list.prev = &new_reader->list;
5838: new_reader->list.next = &new_head->list;
5839:
5840: /* Reactivate the HEAD flag */
5841: rb_set_list_to_head(&last->list);
5842:
5843: cpu_buffer->head_page = new_head;
5844: cpu_buffer->reader_page = new_reader;
5845: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
5846: cpu_buffer->pages = &new_head->list;
5847: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = new_reader->page->time_stamp;
5848: cpu_buffer->lost_events = cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.lost_events;
5849:
5850: return rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page) ? cpu_buffer->reader_page : NULL;
5851: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 16/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11736
output: 27
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `rb_read_remote_meta_page`**
Alright, so my initial impulse is to dive straight into the function `rb_read_remote_meta_page`. I want to understand its core purpose and how it achieves it. My mental model immediately flags this as a critical piece of logic, likely dealing with data retrieval, and the "remote" aspect suggests network I/O or inter-process communication.
I'm thinking about the inputs it would likely need. To read a "remote meta page," I'd expect it to take some form of identifier for the remote resource, perhaps a connection handle, a device identifier, or even a network address. Then, there's the "meta page" part. This implies a specific block or section of data, not necessarily the primary payload, but rather its metadata. So, I'd anticipate an offset or a page number within that remote resource.
My next step is to consider the outputs. What should this function return? Most obviously, it should return the actual metadata it reads. But what's the format? Is it a structured object, a raw byte buffer? Given the nature of metadata, I'd lean towards a structured representation that my calling code can easily parse and utilize. Error handling is also paramount here. What happens if the remote resource is unavailable, the metadata is corrupt, or there's a network error? I'm expecting return values or exceptions that clearly indicate the nature of any failure.
I'm also contemplating the internal mechanics. How does this function actually *get* the data? Is it a simple read operation, or does it involve some form of request-response protocol? If it's remote, there's likely some serialization/deserialization happening. I'm picturing a sequence of operations: establishing a connection (if not already present), sending a request for the specific metadata page, receiving the response, and then deserializing that data into a usable format.
The "rb_" prefix, I'm assuming, points to a specific library or subsystem, and I'd be mentally cross-referencing that with my existing knowledge of the codebase. What are the conventions and patterns within that subsystem? Does it favor specific error handling mechanisms? What are the typical performance characteristics of operations within this "rb" domain?
Ultimately, my goal in examining `rb_read_remote_meta_page` is to ascertain its reliability, its performance implications, and its integration points with other parts of the system. I need to be confident that it correctly fetches the intended metadata and handles all foreseeable edge cases gracefully.
|
| 17/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_read_remote_meta_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:5586: static bool rb_read_remote_meta_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5587: {
5588: local_set(&cpu_buffer->entries, READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->entries));
5589: local_set(&cpu_buffer->overrun, READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->overrun));
5590: local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_touched, READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->pages_touched));
5591: local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_lost, READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->pages_lost));
5592:
5593: return rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer);
5594: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 18/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12009
output: 25
thoughts: 223
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unraveling the `rb_read_remote_meta_page` Behavior**
Alright, so I'm looking at `rb_read_remote_meta_page` and my first thought is, "Ah, it's returning `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)`." That seems straightforward enough. Then I immediately follow that up with, "Okay, so if `rb_num_of_entries` returns zero, that means `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote` is going to get `NULL` back." This is a critical branching point in the logic, and I'm mentally tracing the execution flow.
But then, a flicker of doubt. I recall seeing a specific error message, `"Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match"`. Where did that come from? Was it a kernel message, or something else? I pause to consider: could that be a syzkaller log, not an actual kernel panic or warning? That distinction is important because syzkaller messages can sometimes be artifacts of the fuzzing process itself, not necessarily direct indications of a kernel bug.
Returning to the `rb_read_remote_meta_page` call within `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, I see a `WARN_ON(!reader)`. This is a definite red flag, indicating that the `reader` variable *must* not be `NULL` at this point. Now, I'm re-evaluating the condition: if `cpu_buffer->remote` is true, `rb_read_remote_meta_page` *will* return `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)`. And if that count is zero, as I noted earlier, the result *is* `NULL`. This is where the potential contradiction lies.
However, I also notice a preceding check in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`:
```c
if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer))
goto out;
```
My mind immediately latches onto `rb_per_cpu_empty`. This function, by its name, must be checking if the buffer is actually empty. If it *is* empty, the function exits via `goto out`, meaning the `WARN_ON(!reader)` would never even be reached in that scenario. This implies that if the execution proceeds past `rb_per_cpu_empty`, the buffer is *not* empty, and therefore `rb_num_of_entries` *should* be greater than zero, thus preventing `reader` from being `NULL` and avoiding the `WARN_ON`. The pieces are starting to fit together, and the initial concern about a direct `NULL` return causing the warning is being qualified by this `rb_per_cpu_empty` check.
|
| 19/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_per_cpu_empty]
Results: map[SourceCode:5219: static bool rb_per_cpu_empty(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5220: {
5221: return !rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer);
5222: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 20/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12340
output: 27
thoughts: 361
Thoughts: **The Perils of Premature Per-CPU Checks**
My thought process here is a deep dive into a potential race condition involving per-CPU ring buffer management, specifically when dealing with remote buffers. I initially focused on the `rb_per_cpu_empty` function and its definition: it simply checks if the number of entries in the local `cpu_buffer` is zero. This seems straightforward enough.
However, my expertise kicked in as I considered the interaction with remote meta-pages. I recalled that if `cpu_buffer->remote` is true, the actual entry count and overrun status are updated by `rb_read_remote_meta_page` from the `meta_page`. The crucial insight, and the source of my growing concern, is that `rb_per_cpu_empty` is called *before* `rb_read_remote_meta_page`.
This temporal disconnect creates a significant problem. If `cpu_buffer->remote` is set, the local `cpu_buffer->entries` and `cpu_buffer->overrun` might not reflect the *actual* state of the remote buffer until `rb_read_remote_meta_page` is invoked. Consequently, `rb_per_cpu_empty` could incorrectly return `false` – implying the buffer is *not* empty – based on stale local data.
Then, the true horror of the situation dawned on me: suppose `rb_per_cpu_empty` returns `false` due to these outdated local values. If, subsequently, `rb_read_remote_meta_page` is called, it will update the local `entries` and `overrun` from the `meta_page`. At this point, `rb_num_of_entries` (which `rb_per_cpu_empty` relies on) would correctly report zero entries. But the damage is already done: the initial `rb_per_cpu_empty` check failed to recognize this.
This leads directly to a cascade of failures. If the system proceeds assuming the buffer isn't empty, it might then attempt to fetch a reader page via `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote`. But if the remote buffer *is* actually empty (as `rb_num_of_entries` would now show after the meta-page read), `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote` will return `NULL`. This `NULL` reader is then passed to `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, triggering a `WARN_ON(!reader)`, which is a clear indication of a serious bug or a race condition.
My immediate next step is to investigate the context in which this sequence occurs. I need to determine if `cpu_buffer->remote` can indeed be true when `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` is invoked, as this is the specific operation that seems to be triggering the problematic flow. I’m tracing the setting of `cpu_buffer->remote` to understand the conditions under which this remote behavior is activated. This whole scenario highlights the critical importance of synchronizing access to shared state, especially in concurrent per-CPU data structures.
|
| 21/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_per_cpu::remote]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5808] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5809] map[ReferenceKind:writes ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_allocate_cpu_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2600] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_free_cpu_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2677] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_get_reader_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6037] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_is_static SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:652] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_iter_reset SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5636] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_reset_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6617] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_reset_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6618] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_reset_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6621] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_reset_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6621]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 22/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13129
output: 25
thoughts: 21
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `rb_allocate_cpu_buffer` and the `remote` Flag**
Okay, so I'm diving into the `rb_allocate_cpu_buffer` function, and my immediate focus is on understanding how the `remote` flag is determined. This feels like a crucial piece of the puzzle for managing buffer allocation, especially in a context that clearly involves distinct local and remote entities.
I need to trace the execution path that leads to the setting of `remote`. Is it a direct parameter passed into the function? Or is it derived from some other context or configuration that `rb_allocate_cpu_buffer` accesses? My inclination is that it's likely not a simple, direct parameter, as buffer allocation logic often depends on more nuanced system-level conditions.
My next step is to meticulously examine the code within `rb_allocate_cpu_buffer`. I'll be looking for conditional statements, function calls that return a boolean or an enumeration, or perhaps even some form of global or thread-local state that dictates whether this buffer is intended for remote use.
If `remote` is set based on a parameter, I need to understand the *meaning* of that parameter. What does passing `true` or `false` actually signify in the broader system architecture? What are the implications for the caller, and what kind of behavior should I expect from a buffer allocated with `remote` set to a particular value?
If, on the other hand, `remote` is determined internally, I need to identify the precise conditions that lead to it being set. Is it based on the type of device being accessed? The current network topology? Some kind of user-defined configuration? Understanding this internal logic is key to predicting and controlling buffer behavior.
Ultimately, my goal is to have a crystal-clear picture of the decision-making process for the `remote` flag. This will allow me to accurately reason about memory management, potential performance implications, and any security considerations that might arise from allocating buffers for local versus remote operations. It's about understanding the *why* behind the allocation strategy.
|
| 23/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_allocate_cpu_buffer]
Results: map[SourceCode:2547: static struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *
2548: rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(struct trace_buffer *buffer, long nr_pages, int cpu)
2549: {
2550: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer __free(kfree) =
2551: alloc_cpu_buffer(cpu);
2552: struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta;
2553: struct buffer_page *bpage;
2554: int ret;
2555:
2556: if (!cpu_buffer)
2557: return NULL;
2558:
2559: cpu_buffer->cpu = cpu;
2560: cpu_buffer->buffer = buffer;
2561: raw_spin_lock_init(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
2562: lockdep_set_class(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, buffer->reader_lock_key);
2563: cpu_buffer->lock = (arch_spinlock_t)__ARCH_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
2564: INIT_WORK(&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work, update_pages_handler);
2565: init_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
2566: init_irq_work(&cpu_buffer->irq_work.work, rb_wake_up_waiters);
2567: init_waitqueue_head(&cpu_buffer->irq_work.waiters);
2568: init_waitqueue_head(&cpu_buffer->irq_work.full_waiters);
2569: mutex_init(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
2570:
2571: bpage = alloc_cpu_page(cpu);
2572: if (!bpage)
2573: return NULL;
2574: bpage->order = cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_order;
2575:
2576: rb_check_bpage(cpu_buffer, bpage);
2577:
2578: cpu_buffer->reader_page = bpage;
2579:
2580: if (buffer->range_addr_start) {
2581: /*
2582: * Range mapped buffers have the same restrictions as memory
2583: * mapped ones do.
2584: */
2585: cpu_buffer->ring_meta = rb_range_meta(buffer, nr_pages, cpu);
2586: bpage->page = rb_range_buffer(cpu_buffer, 0);
2587: if (!bpage->page)
2588: goto fail_free_reader;
2589: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta->head_buffer)
2590: rb_meta_buffer_update(cpu_buffer, bpage);
2591: bpage->range = 1;
2592:
2593: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
2594: } else if (buffer->remote) {
2595: struct ring_buffer_desc *desc = ring_buffer_desc(buffer->remote->desc, cpu);
2596:
2597: if (!desc)
2598: goto fail_free_reader;
2599:
2600: cpu_buffer->remote = buffer->remote;
2601: cpu_buffer->meta_page = (struct trace_buffer_meta *)(void *)desc->meta_va;
2602: cpu_buffer->nr_pages = nr_pages;
2603: cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids = kcalloc(cpu_buffer->nr_pages + 1,
2604: sizeof(*cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
2605: if (!cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids)
2606: goto fail_free_reader;
2607:
2608: /* Remote buffers are read-only and immutable */
2609: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
2610: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
2611:
2612: bpage->page = ring_buffer_desc_page(desc, cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id);
2613: if (!bpage->page)
2614: goto fail_free_reader;
2615:
2616: bpage->range = 1;
2617: cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[0] = bpage;
2618: } else {
2619: bpage->page = alloc_cpu_data(cpu, bpage->order);
2620: if (!bpage->page)
2621: goto fail_free_reader;
2622: }
2623:
2624: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
2625: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
2626:
2627: ret = rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer, nr_pages);
2628: if (ret < 0)
2629: goto fail_free_reader;
2630:
2631: rb_meta_validate_events(cpu_buffer);
2632:
2633: /* If the boot meta was valid then this has already been updated */
2634: meta = cpu_buffer->ring_meta;
2635: if (!meta || !meta->head_buffer ||
2636: !cpu_buffer->head_page || !cpu_buffer->commit_page || !cpu_buffer->tail_page) {
2637: if (meta && meta->head_buffer &&
2638: (cpu_buffer->head_page || cpu_buffer->commit_page || cpu_buffer->tail_page)) {
2639: pr_warn("Ring buffer meta buffers not all mapped\n");
2640: if (!cpu_buffer->head_page)
2641: pr_warn(" Missing head_page\n");
2642: if (!cpu_buffer->commit_page)
2643: pr_warn(" Missing commit_page\n");
2644: if (!cpu_buffer->tail_page)
2645: pr_warn(" Missing tail_page\n");
2646: }
2647:
2648: cpu_buffer->head_page
2649: = list_entry(cpu_buffer->pages, struct buffer_page, list);
2650: cpu_buffer->tail_page = cpu_buffer->commit_page = cpu_buffer->head_page;
2651:
2652: rb_head_page_activate(cpu_buffer);
2653:
2654: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta)
2655: meta->commit_buffer = meta->head_buffer;
2656: } else {
2657: /* The valid meta buffer still needs to activate the head page */
2658: rb_head_page_activate(cpu_buffer);
2659: }
2660:
2661: return_ptr(cpu_buffer);
2662:
2663: fail_free_reader:
2664: kfree(cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids);
2665: free_buffer_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page);
2666:
2667: return NULL;
2668: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 24/2 |
2026/09/07 11:46 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15209
output: 26
thoughts: 1369
Thoughts: **The Perils of Remote Readers and Stale State**
My primary concern here revolves around the interaction between remote ring buffers and the logic for retrieving reader pages, specifically when `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` is invoked. I initially noted that `buffer->remote` being set should indicate a remote ring buffer, and that `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` is called on `iter->cpu_file`. This immediately raised the question: can a remote ring buffer be mapped and read from in this context?
My investigation led me to `rb_read_remote_meta_page`, which is indeed called if `cpu_buffer->remote` is true. However, the entry point for the reader page retrieval is `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. This function begins with a check: `if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer)) goto out;`. If the buffer is not empty, it proceeds to check `if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size)`. If this condition is met, it attempts to advance the reader. Then, a critical check occurs: `if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page) goto out;`. If this is not true, it finally calls `reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);`.
The crux of my confusion lies in what happens when `cpu_buffer->remote` is true. I recalled that during `rb_allocate_cpu_buffer`, `cpu_buffer->commit_page` is initialized to `cpu_buffer->head_page`. However, for a remote buffer, the writer is external. This means the `commit_page` on the *reader's* side of the buffer will never be updated by a remote writer. Therefore, it seems highly probable that `cpu_buffer->reader_page` will *never* be equal to `cpu_buffer->commit_page` after the initial page swap.
Further examination of `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote` revealed that it updates `cpu_buffer->reader_page` but *not* `cpu_buffer->commit_page`. This reinforces the idea that `cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page` will likely remain false. Consequently, `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` will proceed to call `rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer)`, which in turn calls `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote`.
`__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote` then calls `rb_read_remote_meta_page`. This function updates `cpu_buffer->entries` and `cpu_buffer->overrun` from the `meta_page` and returns the current number of entries (`rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)`). The problem arises here: if the remote buffer is actually empty, meaning `rb_num_of_entries` becomes 0 after reading the meta page, `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote` returns NULL. This NULL value is then passed to `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, triggering the `WARN_ON(!reader)` condition.
Now, I'm trying to reconcile this potential `WARN_ON` with the initial `rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer)` check. How can `rb_per_cpu_empty` return false if the buffer is truly empty? My hypothesis is that `rb_per_cpu_empty` relies on `cpu_buffer->entries` and `cpu_buffer->overrun`, which are not updated until `rb_read_remote_meta_page` is called. If these local fields hold stale, non-zero values, `rb_per_cpu_empty` might incorrectly return false. Then, `rb_read_remote_meta_page` reads the *actual* current state, finds zero entries, and subsequently leads to the `WARN_ON`.
This leads to the critical question: under what conditions can `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)` become zero *after* `rb_per_cpu_empty` has returned false? It seems plausible if the remote writer has reset the buffer, or if `cpu_buffer->read` has been somehow updated (though `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` doesn't appear to do this directly). I need to further investigate the definition of `rb_num_of_entries` and how `cpu_buffer->read` might be modified in the context of remote buffers, and also examine the behavior of `__rb_get_reader_page` for non-remote buffers to understand if this NULL return is a more general issue or specific to the remote case.
|
| 25/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:__rb_get_reader_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:5853: static struct buffer_page *
5854: __rb_get_reader_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
5855: {
5856: int max_loops = cpu_buffer->ring_meta ? cpu_buffer->nr_pages : 3;
5857: struct buffer_page *reader = NULL;
5858: unsigned long overwrite;
5859: unsigned long flags;
5860: int missed_events = 0;
5861: int nr_loops = 0;
5862: bool ret;
5863:
5864: local_irq_save(flags);
5865: arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5866:
5867: again:
5868: /*
5869: * This should normally only loop twice. But because the
5870: * start of the reader inserts an empty page, it causes a
5871: * case where we will loop three times. There should be no
5872: * reason to loop four times unless the ring buffer is a
5873: * recovered persistent ring buffer. For persistent ring buffers,
5874: * invalid pages are reset during recovery, so there may be more
5875: * than 3 contiguous pages can be empty, but less than nr_pages.
5876: */
5877: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > max_loops)) {
5878: reader = NULL;
5879: goto out;
5880: }
5881:
5882: reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
5883:
5884: /* If there's more to read, return this page */
5885: if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))
5886: goto out;
5887:
5888: /* Never should we have an index greater than the size */
5889: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
5890: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read > rb_page_size(reader)))
5891: goto out;
5892:
5893: /* check if we caught up to the tail */
5894: reader = NULL;
5895: if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
5896: goto out;
5897:
5898: /* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
5899: if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
5900: goto out;
5901:
5902: /*
5903: * Reset the reader page to size zero.
5904: */
5905: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0);
5906: local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0);
5907: rb_init_data_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page->page);
5908: cpu_buffer->reader_page->real_end = 0;
5909:
5910: spin:
5911: /*
5912: * Splice the empty reader page into the list around the head.
5913: */
5914: reader = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
5915: if (!reader)
5916: goto out;
5917: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.next = rb_list_head(reader->list.next);
5918: cpu_buffer->reader_page->list.prev = reader->list.prev;
5919:
5920: /*
5921: * cpu_buffer->pages just needs to point to the buffer, it
5922: * has no specific buffer page to point to. Lets move it out
5923: * of our way so we don't accidentally swap it.
5924: */
5925: cpu_buffer->pages = reader->list.prev;
5926:
5927: /* The reader page will be pointing to the new head */
5928: rb_set_list_to_head(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
5929:
5930: /*
5931: * We want to make sure we read the overruns after we set up our
5932: * pointers to the next object. The writer side does a
5933: * cmpxchg to cross pages which acts as the mb on the writer
5934: * side. Note, the reader will constantly fail the swap
5935: * while the writer is updating the pointers, so this
5936: * guarantees that the overwrite recorded here is the one we
5937: * want to compare with the last_overrun.
5938: */
5939: smp_mb();
5940: overwrite = local_read(&(cpu_buffer->overrun));
5941:
5942: /*
5943: * Here's the tricky part.
5944: *
5945: * We need to move the pointer past the header page.
5946: * But we can only do that if a writer is not currently
5947: * moving it. The page before the header page has the
5948: * flag bit '1' set if it is pointing to the page we want.
5949: * but if the writer is in the process of moving it
5950: * then it will be '2' or already moved '0'.
5951: */
5952:
5953: ret = rb_head_page_replace(reader, cpu_buffer->reader_page);
5954:
5955: /*
5956: * If we did not convert it, then we must try again.
5957: */
5958: if (!ret)
5959: goto spin;
5960:
5961: if (rb_page_commit(reader) & RB_MISSED_EVENTS)
5962: missed_events = -1;
5963:
5964: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta)
5965: rb_update_meta_reader(cpu_buffer, reader);
5966:
5967: /*
5968: * Yay! We succeeded in replacing the page.
5969: *
5970: * Now make the new head point back to the reader page.
5971: */
5972: rb_list_head(reader->list.next)->prev = &cpu_buffer->reader_page->list;
5973: rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->head_page);
5974:
5975: cpu_buffer->cnt++;
5976: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->pages_read);
5977:
5978: /* Finally update the reader page to the new head */
5979: cpu_buffer->reader_page = reader;
5980: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
5981:
5982: if (overwrite != cpu_buffer->last_overrun) {
5983: cpu_buffer->lost_events = overwrite - cpu_buffer->last_overrun;
5984: cpu_buffer->last_overrun = overwrite;
5985: }
5986:
5987: goto again;
5988:
5989: out:
5990: /* Update the read_stamp on the first event */
5991: if (reader && reader->read == 0)
5992: cpu_buffer->read_stamp = reader->page->time_stamp;
5993:
5994: arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
5995: local_irq_restore(flags);
5996:
5997: /*
5998: * The writer has preempt disable, wait for it. But not forever
5999: * Although, 1 second is pretty much "forever"
6000: */
6001: #define USECS_WAIT 1000000
6002: for (nr_loops = 0; nr_loops < USECS_WAIT; nr_loops++) {
6003: /* If the write is past the end of page, a writer is still updating it */
6004: if (likely(!reader || rb_page_write(reader) <= rb_page_capacity(reader)))
6005: break;
6006:
6007: udelay(1);
6008:
6009: /* Get the latest version of the reader write value */
6010: smp_rmb();
6011: }
6012:
6013: /* The writer is not moving forward? Something is wrong */
6014: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))
6015: reader = NULL;
6016:
6017: /*
6018: * Make sure we see any padding after the write update
6019: * (see rb_reset_tail()).
6020: *
6021: * In addition, a writer may be writing on the reader page
6022: * if the page has not been fully filled, so the read barrier
6023: * is also needed to make sure we see the content of what is
6024: * committed by the writer (see rb_set_commit_to_write()).
6025: */
6026: smp_rmb();
6027:
6028: if (!cpu_buffer->lost_events)
6029: cpu_buffer->lost_events = missed_events;
6030:
6031: return reader;
6032: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 26/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19325
output: 23
thoughts: 556
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into Ring Buffer Reader Logic and Potential Race Conditions**
Okay, let's trace through this. I'm looking at the `__rb_get_reader_page` function and I see these early exit conditions:
```c
reader = NULL;
if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
goto out;
/* Don't bother swapping if the ring buffer is empty */
if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)
goto out;
```
So, if the `commit_page` has caught up to the `reader_page`, or if the buffer is reported as empty by `rb_num_of_entries`, it returns `NULL`. This seems straightforward enough.
However, I'm recalling that `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` already performs similar checks:
```c
if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer))
goto out;
```
and
```c
/* Did the reader catch up with the writer? */
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page)
goto out;
```
This makes me pause. If `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is already handling these conditions, how could `__rb_get_reader_page` still return `NULL` based on them? There must be a subtle difference in the state of the buffer between the two calls.
And then it hits me: `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` doesn't hold the `cpu_buffer->lock` (the arch_spinlock). It only acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` (a raw_spinlock). This is the crucial distinction. While `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` protects the reader's view of the buffer, it doesn't necessarily serialize access to the writer's perspective, specifically `cpu_buffer->commit_page` and the underlying data that `rb_num_of_entries` calculates.
So, even if `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` checks if the buffer is empty or if the reader has caught up *at that moment*, the writer could have concurrently modified `cpu_buffer->commit_page` or altered the state affecting `rb_num_of_entries` between the time `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` returns and when `__rb_get_reader_page` is called.
My next thought is about how `rb_num_of_entries` could become zero. The writer can increment `entries` and `overrun`. If an event is overwritten, `overrun` increases. My initial assumption was that `entries - overrun` would remain constant, reflecting the buffer's capacity. But what if the buffer is *reset*?
If the buffer is reset, both `entries` and `overrun` are set to 0, making `rb_num_of_entries` indeed 0. This opens up another possibility: Can the buffer be reset while `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is in progress? The answer is yes, if `rb_reset_cpu` (which presumably resets the buffer) can acquire `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. I need to verify the locking mechanism in `rb_reset_cpu` to confirm this potential race condition. This is where the devil truly lies – in the interplay of these locks and concurrent operations.
|
| 27/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args:
Results: map[SourceCode:6612: static void
6613: rb_reset_cpu(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
6614: {
6615: struct buffer_page *page;
6616:
6617: if (cpu_buffer->remote) {
6618: if (!cpu_buffer->remote->reset)
6619: return;
6620:
6621: cpu_buffer->remote->reset(cpu_buffer->cpu, cpu_buffer->remote->priv);
6622: rb_read_remote_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
6623:
6624: /* Read related values, not covered by the meta-page */
6625: local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_read, 0);
6626: cpu_buffer->read = 0;
6627: cpu_buffer->read_bytes = 0;
6628: cpu_buffer->last_overrun = 0;
6629: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
6630:
6631: return;
6632: }
6633:
6634: rb_head_page_deactivate(cpu_buffer);
6635:
6636: cpu_buffer->head_page
6637: = list_entry(cpu_buffer->pages, struct buffer_page, list);
6638: rb_clear_buffer_page(cpu_buffer->head_page);
6639: list_for_each_entry(page, cpu_buffer->pages, list) {
6640: rb_clear_buffer_page(page);
6641: }
6642:
6643: cpu_buffer->tail_page = cpu_buffer->head_page;
6644: cpu_buffer->commit_page = cpu_buffer->head_page;
6645:
6646: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
6647: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
6648: rb_clear_buffer_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page);
6649:
6650: local_set(&cpu_buffer->entries_bytes, 0);
6651: local_set(&cpu_buffer->overrun, 0);
6652: local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_overrun, 0);
6653: local_set(&cpu_buffer->dropped_events, 0);
6654: local_set(&cpu_buffer->entries, 0);
6655: local_set(&cpu_buffer->committing, 0);
6656: local_set(&cpu_buffer->commits, 0);
6657: local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_touched, 0);
6658: local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_lost, 0);
6659: local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_read, 0);
6660: cpu_buffer->last_pages_touch = 0;
6661: cpu_buffer->shortest_full = 0;
6662: cpu_buffer->read = 0;
6663: cpu_buffer->read_bytes = 0;
6664:
6665: rb_time_set(&cpu_buffer->write_stamp, 0);
6666: rb_time_set(&cpu_buffer->before_stamp, 0);
6667:
6668: memset(cpu_buffer->event_stamp, 0, sizeof(cpu_buffer->event_stamp));
6669:
6670: cpu_buffer->lost_events = 0;
6671: cpu_buffer->last_overrun = 0;
6672:
6673: rb_head_page_activate(cpu_buffer);
6674: cpu_buffer->pages_removed = 0;
6675:
6676: rb_update_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
6677: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta) {
6678: struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta = cpu_buffer->ring_meta;
6679:
6680: meta->commit_buffer = meta->head_buffer;
6681: }
6682: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 28/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21090
output: 25
thoughts: 155
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Ring Buffer Concurrency**
Okay, let me trace this through. My initial thought was about `rb_reset_cpu`. I'm wondering if it acquires `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock)`. But then I pause, realizing that's not quite right. It's actually `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` that's called from somewhere, and *that* function, `ring_buffer_reset_cpu`, is the one that takes `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock)`.
My mind then jumps to `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. I recall that this function uses `raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags)`.
This is where the critical realization hits me: `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` takes `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock)`, and `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` takes `raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags)`. These are different locks! This implies that `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` and `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` *can* indeed run concurrently. They are not mutually exclusive due to these distinct lock acquisitions.
But wait, I'm second-guessing myself. I need to be absolutely sure. Does `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` *also* take `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`? This would complicate the concurrency picture significantly. To resolve this, I need to go back and examine the implementation of `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` itself. That's my next step.
|
| 29/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_reset_cpu]
Results: map[SourceCode:6699: /**
6700: * ring_buffer_reset_cpu - reset a ring buffer per CPU buffer
6701: * @buffer: The ring buffer to reset a per cpu buffer of
6702: * @cpu: The CPU buffer to be reset
6703: */
6704: void ring_buffer_reset_cpu(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
6705: {
6706: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
6707:
6708: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
6709: return;
6710:
6711: /* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */
6712: mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex);
6713:
6714: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
6715: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
6716:
6717: /* Make sure all commits have finished */
6718: synchronize_rcu();
6719:
6720: reset_disabled_cpu_buffer(cpu_buffer);
6721:
6722: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
6723: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
6724:
6725: mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
6726: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 30/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21683
output: 25
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Reviewing `reset_disabled_cpu_buffer`**
Alright, my immediate focus is on the `reset_disabled_cpu_buffer` function. I need to get a clear understanding of what this function is intended to do and how it achieves its goal.
My first step is to trace its execution flow. I want to see what conditions it checks, what data structures it interacts with, and what state changes it's responsible for. Is it simply a clearing operation, or does it involve more complex logic like re-initialization, locking mechanisms, or error handling? I'm particularly interested in any assumptions it makes about the state of the system or the buffer itself.
Next, I'll be scrutinizing the data integrity aspects. If this buffer is holding critical information, I need to be absolutely sure that `reset_disabled_cpu_buffer` doesn't inadvertently corrupt data or leave it in an inconsistent state. Are there any race conditions I should be concerned about, especially if this buffer can be accessed concurrently? I'll be looking for explicit synchronization primitives or clear indications that such concerns have been addressed.
Then, I'll dive into the performance implications. A "reset" operation, even if seemingly simple, can have performance costs. I need to understand the complexity of this reset. Is it a constant-time operation, or is it proportional to the size of the buffer? Are there any potential performance bottlenecks introduced by this function, especially in high-throughput scenarios? I'll also consider the impact of this reset on other parts of the system that might be relying on the buffer's contents or availability.
I also need to consider error handling. What happens if the reset operation fails? Is there a clear error reporting mechanism? Are potential failure modes anticipated and handled gracefully, or is it a "fire and forget" approach? This is crucial for overall system robustness.
Finally, I'll think about the broader context. Why is this function needed? What problem does it solve within the larger system architecture? Understanding its purpose will help me evaluate its design and implementation more effectively. Is this a standard pattern, or is it a specialized solution?
In essence, I'm aiming for a comprehensive understanding, moving from the micro-level implementation details to the macro-level architectural implications, ensuring correctness, efficiency, and robustness.
|
| 31/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:reset_disabled_cpu_buffer]
Results: map[SourceCode:6684: /* Must have disabled the cpu buffer then done a synchronize_rcu */
6685: static void reset_disabled_cpu_buffer(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
6686: {
6687: guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
6688:
6689: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, local_read(&cpu_buffer->committing)))
6690: return;
6691:
6692: arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
6693:
6694: rb_reset_cpu(cpu_buffer);
6695:
6696: arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
6697: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 32/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21952
output: 28
thoughts: 429
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Ring Buffer Concurrency**
Okay, so I'm looking at `reset_disabled_cpu_buffer`, and I see it grabs `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`. This immediately tells me that `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` and `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` absolutely *cannot* be running at the same time. That's a fundamental conflict.
But then my mind drifts to a specific scenario. What happens if `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is already in progress, and it discovers that `rb_per_cpu_empty` returns `false`? This leads it to call `rb_get_reader_page`. Inside `__rb_get_reader_page`, the code acquires `arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock)`. After that, it checks if `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`.
This is where I pause and think: Is it possible for `rb_num_of_entries` to become zero *between* the call to `rb_per_cpu_empty` (which returned false, meaning there *were* entries) and the check inside `__rb_get_reader_page`?
Let's break down `rb_num_of_entries`: it's defined as `entries - (overrun + read)`.
Now, consider the writer's actions. The writer can certainly increment `entries` and `overrun`. However, the crucial point is that `entries - overrun` represents the number of *unread* entries. If the buffer is full, for every new event, both `entries` and `overrun` will increment by one. So, `entries - overrun` should remain constant in that full-buffer scenario.
What about `read`? The `read` counter is exclusively updated by the reader. And importantly, `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` holds `reader_lock`, which should prevent `read` from being modified concurrently. So, `read` shouldn't be changing in a way that would suddenly make `entries - (overrun + read)` zero if it wasn't already.
Can `entries - overrun` actually decrease? No, because the writer is only adding events. This value should only increase or stay the same.
This brings me to a more subtle potential issue: what if `entries` and `overrun` themselves are updated in a non-atomic fashion? The writer uses operations like `local_inc` or `local_add` to update these counters.
This is the critical point I'm digging into: If `entries` and `overrun` are being updated by the writer using these non-atomic (relative to each other, perhaps?) increments, could it be possible for `rb_num_of_entries` to *temporarily* drop to zero, even if there were entries just moments before, leading to a false positive in the `__rb_get_reader_page` check? I need to examine precisely *how* the writer updates these counters to be certain.
|
| 33/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_per_cpu::overrun]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__rb_get_reader_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5940] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_handle_head_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:3688] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_num_of_entries SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5216] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_read_remote_meta_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5589] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_remove_pages SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:3130] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_reset_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6651] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_update_meta_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6603] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:ring_buffer_overrun_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5471] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:ring_buffer_overruns SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5579]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 34/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22776
output: 25
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Approaching `rb_handle_head_page`**
Alright, I need to get a handle on what `rb_handle_head_page` is doing. My immediate instinct is to dive into its implementation, to understand the mechanics of how it processes requests specifically targeting the "head page." I'm not just looking for a surface-level understanding; as an expert, I want to see the intricate details, the decisions made in its code, and the underlying logic that dictates its behavior. This will likely involve tracing execution paths, examining data structures, and understanding any dependencies it has. Essentially, I'm aiming for a deep, granular comprehension of its operational role within the broader system.
|
| 35/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_handle_head_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:3643: /*
3644: * rb_handle_head_page - writer hit the head page
3645: *
3646: * Returns: +1 to retry page
3647: * 0 to continue
3648: * -1 on error
3649: */
3650: static int
3651: rb_handle_head_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
3652: struct buffer_page *tail_page,
3653: struct buffer_page *next_page)
3654: {
3655: struct buffer_page *new_head;
3656: int entries;
3657: int type;
3658: int ret;
3659:
3660: entries = rb_page_entries(next_page);
3661:
3662: /*
3663: * The hard part is here. We need to move the head
3664: * forward, and protect against both readers on
3665: * other CPUs and writers coming in via interrupts.
3666: */
3667: type = rb_head_page_set_update(cpu_buffer, next_page, tail_page,
3668: RB_PAGE_HEAD);
3669:
3670: /*
3671: * type can be one of four:
3672: * NORMAL - an interrupt already moved it for us
3673: * HEAD - we are the first to get here.
3674: * UPDATE - we are the interrupt interrupting
3675: * a current move.
3676: * MOVED - a reader on another CPU moved the next
3677: * pointer to its reader page. Give up
3678: * and try again.
3679: */
3680:
3681: switch (type) {
3682: case RB_PAGE_HEAD:
3683: /*
3684: * We changed the head to UPDATE, thus
3685: * it is our responsibility to update
3686: * the counters.
3687: */
3688: local_add(entries, &cpu_buffer->overrun);
3689: local_sub(rb_page_commit(next_page), &cpu_buffer->entries_bytes);
3690: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->pages_lost);
3691:
3692: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta)
3693: rb_update_meta_head(cpu_buffer, next_page);
3694: /*
3695: * The entries will be zeroed out when we move the
3696: * tail page.
3697: */
3698:
3699: /* still more to do */
3700: break;
3701:
3702: case RB_PAGE_UPDATE:
3703: /*
3704: * This is an interrupt that interrupt the
3705: * previous update. Still more to do.
3706: */
3707: break;
3708: case RB_PAGE_NORMAL:
3709: /*
3710: * An interrupt came in before the update
3711: * and processed this for us.
3712: * Nothing left to do.
3713: */
3714: return 1;
3715: case RB_PAGE_MOVED:
3716: /*
3717: * The reader is on another CPU and just did
3718: * a swap with our next_page.
3719: * Try again.
3720: */
3721: return 1;
3722: default:
3723: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1); /* WTF??? */
3724: return -1;
3725: }
3726:
3727: /*
3728: * Now that we are here, the old head pointer is
3729: * set to UPDATE. This will keep the reader from
3730: * swapping the head page with the reader page.
3731: * The reader (on another CPU) will spin till
3732: * we are finished.
3733: *
3734: * We just need to protect against interrupts
3735: * doing the job. We will set the next pointer
3736: * to HEAD. After that, we set the old pointer
3737: * to NORMAL, but only if it was HEAD before.
3738: * otherwise we are an interrupt, and only
3739: * want the outer most commit to reset it.
3740: */
3741: new_head = next_page;
3742: rb_inc_page(&new_head);
3743:
3744: ret = rb_head_page_set_head(cpu_buffer, new_head, next_page,
3745: RB_PAGE_NORMAL);
3746:
3747: /*
3748: * Valid returns are:
3749: * HEAD - an interrupt came in and already set it.
3750: * NORMAL - One of two things:
3751: * 1) We really set it.
3752: * 2) A bunch of interrupts came in and moved
3753: * the page forward again.
3754: */
3755: switch (ret) {
3756: case RB_PAGE_HEAD:
3757: case RB_PAGE_NORMAL:
3758: /* OK */
3759: break;
3760: default:
3761: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1);
3762: return -1;
3763: }
3764:
3765: /*
3766: * It is possible that an interrupt came in,
3767: * set the head up, then more interrupts came in
3768: * and moved it again. When we get back here,
3769: * the page would have been set to NORMAL but we
3770: * just set it back to HEAD.
3771: *
3772: * How do you detect this? Well, if that happened
3773: * the tail page would have moved.
3774: */
3775: if (ret == RB_PAGE_NORMAL) {
3776: struct buffer_page *buffer_tail_page;
3777:
3778: buffer_tail_page = READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->tail_page);
3779: /*
3780: * If the tail had moved passed next, then we need
3781: * to reset the pointer.
3782: */
3783: if (buffer_tail_page != tail_page &&
3784: buffer_tail_page != next_page)
3785: rb_head_page_set_normal(cpu_buffer, new_head,
3786: next_page,
3787: RB_PAGE_HEAD);
3788: }
3789:
3790: /*
3791: * If this was the outer most commit (the one that
3792: * changed the original pointer from HEAD to UPDATE),
3793: * then it is up to us to reset it to NORMAL.
3794: */
3795: if (type == RB_PAGE_HEAD) {
3796: ret = rb_head_page_set_normal(cpu_buffer, next_page,
3797: tail_page,
3798: RB_PAGE_UPDATE);
3799: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
3800: ret != RB_PAGE_UPDATE))
3801: return -1;
3802: }
3803:
3804: return 0;
3805: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 36/2 |
2026/09/07 11:47 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25047
output: 27
thoughts: 58
Thoughts: **The Curious Case of the Missing Entry Count Increment**
Right, so I'm digging into `rb_handle_head_page`, and I notice this line: `local_add(entries, &cpu_buffer->overrun);`. It looks like it's adding some number of `entries` to the `overrun` counter within the `cpu_buffer`. That's interesting, but what immediately strikes me as odd is the lack of a corresponding increment for `cpu_buffer->entries` *right there*. My immediate thought is: "Wait a minute, where is the actual count of entries being updated?" This feels like a potential omission, or at least a place where the logic isn't immediately obvious. I need to trace how the `cpu_buffer->entries` is supposed to be incremented. My next logical step is to pivot to `rb_commit` to see if that's where the main entry bookkeeping happens.
|
| 37/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_per_cpu::entries]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_commit SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:4325] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_meta_validate_events SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2194] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_num_of_entries SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5215] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_read_remote_meta_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:5588] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_reset_cpu SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6654] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_update_meta_page SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:6602]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 38/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25376
output: 21
thoughts: 9
Thoughts: **My Exploration of `rb_commit`**
Okay, so I'm diving into this `rb_commit` functionality. I need to understand what it's all about, what it does, and how it integrates into the broader system. My initial thought is to just look at it directly, to get a foundational grasp of its mechanics. This means I'll be tracing its execution, understanding its inputs and outputs, and mapping out its dependencies. I'm expecting to find some core logic here, likely related to a commit operation – perhaps in a version control context, or perhaps related to database transactions, or even some form of persistent state saving. I'll be paying close attention to any error handling or rollback mechanisms it might employ, as those are critical for robust commit operations. My goal is to get a clear picture of its role and the specific actions it performs to fulfill its purpose.
|
| 39/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args:
Results: map[SourceCode:4323: static void rb_commit(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
4324: {
4325: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->entries);
4326: rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);
4327: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 40/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25498
output: 25
thoughts: 1877
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Ring Buffer Entry Management**
I've been examining the intricate dance between event allocation, commitment, and reader consumption within this ring buffer implementation, and a potential race condition has caught my attention. My core concern revolves around the timing of how `entries` and `overrun` are updated and how this impacts the calculated `rb_num_of_entries`, which the reader relies on to determine buffer availability.
Here's how my thought process unfolded:
1. **Initial Observation of Update Order:** I first noticed that `entries` (representing the total number of valid events) is incremented *after* an event is committed, specifically at the end of the `commit` operation. This seems straightforward.
2. **The `overrun` Anomaly:** My attention then shifted to `overrun`. I saw that `overrun` is incremented within `rb_handle_head_page`, and crucially, this function is called *during the allocation phase* via `rb_reserve_next_event`. This immediately struck me as problematic: `overrun` is updated *before* `entries` is.
3. **The Immediate Consequence: Temporary Decrease in `rb_num_of_entries`:** The immediate implication of this timing difference is that `rb_num_of_entries`, which is defined as `entries - (overrun + read)`, could temporarily decrease. If `overrun` increments, and `entries` hasn't yet caught up, the calculated number of available entries will drop.
4. **Quantifying the Decrease:** I then considered the magnitude of this change. When `overrun` is incremented, it's done so by the number of entries present in the page that's being overwritten (i.e., `entries_in_page` or `rb_page_entries(next_page)`). If `overrun` increases by `entries_in_page`, then `rb_num_of_entries` will decrease by that same amount.
5. **The Critical Question: Can it become 0 or negative?** This is where my concern intensified. Could this temporary decrease push `rb_num_of_entries` to zero or even negative?
* I recalled that if the buffer is full, `entries - (overrun + read)` essentially represents the total buffer capacity.
* When a writer hits the head page (meaning the buffer is full and it's about to overwrite existing data), it adds the number of entries from that head page to `overrun`.
* At *that exact moment*, `rb_num_of_entries` drops by the size of one page.
6. **Considering Buffer Size and Page Count:** My next line of questioning was about the buffer's structure.
* If the buffer has multiple pages, a drop by the size of one page might still leave `rb_num_of_entries` positive because the remaining pages still contain valid entries.
* However, what if the buffer has only *one* page allocated? Or if `nr_pages` is very small? My immediate thought was "can it be 0?"
7. **Minimum Page Count Constraint:** I then remembered that the minimum `nr_pages` for the ring buffer is 2 (plus the reader page, though that's a bit of a separate concern for data *in the ring*). This means there are at least two data pages. If one is overwritten, the other should still hold data, implying `rb_num_of_entries` should remain positive.
8. **Revisiting the `rb_num_of_entries == 0` Condition:** I looked at where `rb_num_of_entries == 0` is actually checked.
* In `__rb_get_reader_page`, there's a specific check: `if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0) goto out;`.
* If this condition evaluates to true, `__rb_get_reader_page` returns NULL.
* Subsequently, in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, this NULL return triggers `WARN_ON(!reader)`. This is a critical point where a warning can be issued, indicating a potential problem.
9. **Deep Dive into `rb_num_of_entries == 0` Scenarios:** I tried to construct a scenario where `rb_num_of_entries` *could* become zero or be perceived as zero by the reader.
* If `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is called, it first checks `rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer)`. If not empty, it proceeds.
* Then, an interrupt occurs. The writer overwrites a page. `overrun` increases.
* Then, `rb_get_reader_page` is called. It checks `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`.
* If `overrun` increased, `rb_num_of_entries` *decreased*. If it decreased to 0, does it mean *all* events were overwritten?
* I reasoned that `overrun` increases by the number of events in the *overwritten page*. If there are other pages with valid entries, `rb_num_of_entries` should still be greater than zero.
10. **Considering the "Empty Other Page" Case:** What if the other page is empty?
* If the buffer was full, and one page has N events, and the other page has M events, total `rb_num_of_entries` is N+M.
* When the writer overwrites the first page (N events), `overrun` increases by N. `rb_num_of_entries` becomes M.
* If M > 0, then `rb_num_of_entries` is not zero.
* Could M be 0? If the buffer was full, M cannot be 0, unless the other page just became empty because the reader swapped it out.
11. **The Reader Swap Scenario:** I considered a scenario where the reader just swapped a page. This would leave a newly allocated page in the ring buffer empty.
* Then, the writer fills the *other* page.
* When the writer's commit pointer reaches the now-empty page, it doesn't need to *overwrite* anything significant, and thus `overrun` wouldn't increase because there are no valid entries to "lose" from that page. This seems to prevent the `overrun` anomaly from creating a zero `rb_num_of_entries` in this specific case.
12. **Re-evaluating `commit_page == reader_page`:** I then started scrutinizing the checks in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and `__rb_get_reader_page` regarding `cpu_buffer->commit_page` and `cpu_buffer->reader_page`.
* In `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, there's a check: `if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page) goto out;`. If this is true, it exits early.
* Then, `__rb_get_reader_page` is called, which *also* checks: `if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page) goto out;`.
* My question became: Can `cpu_buffer->commit_page` become equal to `cpu_buffer->reader_page` *between* these two checks?
* `commit_page` is updated by the writer. `reader_page` is managed by the reader.
* Crucially, `reader_page` is *not* part of the active ring buffer pages that the writer iterates through. The writer moves `commit_page` along the pages *within* the ring. Therefore, the writer should *never* set `commit_page` to the address of `reader_page`.
13. **Considering `ring_buffer_reset_cpu`:** I thought about reset scenarios. In `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` (or `rb_reset_cpu`), `cpu_buffer->commit_page` is set to `cpu_buffer->head_page`, which is a valid page within the ring. `cpu_buffer->reader_page` is explicitly cleared (`INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list)`), not set to `head_page`. This means `commit_page` and `reader_page` would not be equal in this reset context.
My thought process leads me to believe that while there's a temporary dip in `rb_num_of_entries` due to the asynchronous updates of `entries` and `overrun`, the logic, particularly the minimum page count and the separation of `commit_page` and `reader_page`, seems designed to prevent `rb_num_of_entries` from actually becoming zero and triggering the `WARN_ON(!reader)` path in normal operation. However, the exact interleaving of an interrupt *just* as `overrun` is updated and *before* `entries` is updated, coupled with a very specific buffer state (e.g., minimal pages, near full, and potential reader activity), is what I'm trying to definitively rule out.
|
| 41/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_set_head_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:1460: static struct buffer_page *
1461: rb_set_head_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
1462: {
1463: struct buffer_page *head;
1464: struct buffer_page *page;
1465: struct list_head *list;
1466: int i;
1467:
1468: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !cpu_buffer->head_page))
1469: return NULL;
1470:
1471: /* sanity check */
1472: list = cpu_buffer->pages;
1473: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, rb_list_head(list->prev->next) != list))
1474: return NULL;
1475:
1476: page = head = cpu_buffer->head_page;
1477: /*
1478: * It is possible that the writer moves the header behind
1479: * where we started, and we miss in one loop.
1480: * A second loop should grab the header, but we'll do
1481: * three loops just because I'm paranoid.
1482: */
1483: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
1484: do {
1485: if (rb_is_head_page(page, page->list.prev)) {
1486: cpu_buffer->head_page = page;
1487: return page;
1488: }
1489: rb_inc_page(&page);
1490: } while (page != head);
1491: }
1492:
1493: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1);
1494:
1495: return NULL;
1496: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 42/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 27937
output: 23
thoughts: 1211
Thoughts: **Understanding the Ring Buffer Reader NULL Return**
I've been grappling with a peculiar bug where `rb_set_head_page` appears to be returning `NULL`, which should, by all accounts, trigger an `RB_WARN_ON`. However, the bug report *only* shows a warning originating from `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. If `RB_WARN_ON` had been invoked, I'd expect a warning to be printed from `ring_buffer.c`, specifically at `rb_set_head_page` or `__rb_get_reader_page`.
Looking at the definition of `RB_WARN_ON`:
```c
#define RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, cond) \
({ \
int _____ret = unlikely(cond); \
if (_____ret) { \
if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(1)) { \
pr_warn("ring buffer warning\n"); \
} \
} \
_____ret; \
})
```
If `RB_WARN_ON` were hit, it would indeed print a `WARNING: ... at ...` message due to `WARN_ON_ONCE(1)`. Yet, the syzkaller report exclusively features *one* warning: `WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930`. This strongly suggests that `RB_WARN_ON` was *not* triggered.
This leads me to a crucial deduction: `rb_get_reader_page` returned `NULL` *without* invoking any `RB_WARN_ON` checks.
Now, my task is to meticulously trace all the execution paths within `__rb_get_reader_page` that can result in a `NULL` return value without triggering `RB_WARN_ON`.
Let's examine these paths:
* The condition `RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > max_loops)` explicitly triggers `RB_WARN_ON`. So, this is not the source of our `NULL` without a warning.
* The check `if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))` leading to a `goto out;` returns `reader`, which is `cpu_buffer->reader_page`. This is *not* `NULL`.
* The condition `RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, cpu_buffer->reader_page->read > rb_page_size(reader))` also triggers `RB_WARN_ON`.
* The case where `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page` leads to `reader = NULL; goto out;`. This path returns `NULL` and *does not* involve `RB_WARN_ON`. This is a strong candidate.
* The check `if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0)` results in `goto out;` which also returns `NULL` *without* hitting `RB_WARN_ON`. Another significant possibility.
* The code block `reader = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer); if (!reader) goto out;` is problematic. If `rb_set_head_page` itself returns `NULL`, it *does* trigger `RB_WARN_ON` internally. So this is unlikely to be the direct cause of a `NULL` return without a warning.
* The condition `if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_loops == USECS_WAIT))` explicitly triggers `RB_WARN_ON`.
Therefore, the *only* plausible ways `__rb_get_reader_page` can return `NULL` without triggering `RB_WARN_ON` appear to be:
1. When `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`.
2. When `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`.
However, I must also consider `__rb_get_reader_page_from_remote`.
* `if (!rb_read_remote_meta_page(cpu_buffer)) return NULL;` returns `NULL` without any `RB_WARN_ON`. This is a critical path to investigate.
* The `pr_warn_ratelimited` message within the `cpu_buffer->remote->swap_reader_page` call indicates a warning, but *not* a `WARN_ON`. So, this path could also return `NULL` without triggering the specific `WARN_ON_ONCE` I'm looking for.
* `if (WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_buffer->meta_page->reader.id > cpu_buffer->nr_pages)) return NULL;` explicitly uses `WARN_ON_ONCE`, so this is not the silent `NULL` return.
* Finally, `return rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page) ? cpu_buffer->reader_page : NULL;` returns `NULL` if `rb_page_size` evaluates to 0, without hitting `RB_WARN_ON`.
So, if `cpu_buffer->remote` is active, a `NULL` return can occur if `rb_read_remote_meta_page` fails.
Now, I need to connect this back to the specific error message in the bug report: `Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match`. This is a syzkaller-generated message. Crucially, `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is invoked from `tracing_buffers_ioctl` with `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER`.
My next step is to determine if a remote buffer can indeed be accessed through `tracing_buffers_ioctl` and, if so, how `iter->cpu_file` is populated in that context. This will help me understand how we might be hitting these `NULL` return paths without the expected warnings.
|
| 43/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:trace_buffer::remote]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__rb_allocate_pages SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2455] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__rb_allocate_pages SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2456] map[ReferenceKind:writes ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:alloc_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2868] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_allocate_cpu_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2594] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_allocate_cpu_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2595] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:rb_allocate_cpu_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:2600] map[ReferenceKind:reads ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:ring_buffer_map SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:7780]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 44/2 |
2026/09/07 11:48 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 29423
output: 23
thoughts: 11
Thoughts: **My Exploration of `ring_buffer_map`**
Okay, so I'm looking into `ring_buffer_map`. I need to understand its core functionality and how it operates, especially in the context of my work. I'm assuming, given my expertise, that this isn't just some trivial data structure; it likely serves a specific, performance-oriented purpose. My initial thought is to break down its name. "Ring buffer" immediately suggests a fixed-size circular data structure, efficient for scenarios where I'm continuously adding and removing elements, like in a streaming application or for managing recent data. The "map" part, however, is the intriguing addition. This implies that instead of just storing raw values, it's associating keys with values. So, I'm anticipating a data structure that combines the efficient, wrap-around nature of a ring buffer with the key-value lookup capabilities of a hash map or similar associative structure.
My immediate questions are:
* **How does it handle collisions?** In a standard map, collisions are managed by hash table techniques. With a ring buffer, how is this integrated? Does it still rely on hashing, and if so, how does the circular nature affect the hashing or the resolution process?
* **What are the performance characteristics?** I'm assuming insertion and retrieval are designed to be fast, ideally O(1) on average, given the typical use cases for ring buffers. But I need to verify this. Does the "map" aspect introduce any overhead compared to a pure ring buffer or a standard hash map? Are there any edge cases where performance degrades?
* **What are the memory implications?** Ring buffers are generally memory-efficient due to their fixed size. How does adding the mapping functionality impact this? Is there any overhead beyond the key-value pairs themselves?
* **What are the typical use cases?** Why would I choose `ring_buffer_map` over a standard hash map or a combination of a ring buffer and a separate map? I'm thinking about scenarios like caching where I need to evict old entries based on insertion order and quickly retrieve existing ones by key. Or perhaps for tracking recent events or state changes where key uniqueness is important.
* **How is iteration handled?** Can I iterate through the elements in insertion order, or in key order, or both? The ring buffer aspect suggests insertion order is natural. How does the map aspect fit into this?
* **What is the underlying implementation?** Is it a hash table embedded within a ring buffer's storage, or is it a more complex intertwining of mechanisms? Understanding the internals will be crucial for predicting its behavior and potential optimizations.
My goal is to ascertain if `ring_buffer_map` is a robust, performant solution for my specific needs, and if so, to understand its strengths and limitations so I can leverage it effectively and avoid common pitfalls. I'm essentially trying to see if it offers a compelling advantage for scenarios where I need both efficient historical data management and rapid key-based access.
|
| 45/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_map]
Results: map[SourceCode:7772: int ring_buffer_map(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu,
7773: struct vm_area_struct *vma)
7774: {
7775: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
7776: struct buffer_page **subbuf_ids;
7777: unsigned long flags;
7778: int err;
7779:
7780: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask) || buffer->remote)
7781: return -EINVAL;
7782:
7783: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7784:
7785: guard(mutex)(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7786:
7787: if (cpu_buffer->user_mapped) {
7788: err = __rb_map_vma(cpu_buffer, vma);
7789: if (!err)
7790: err = __rb_inc_dec_mapped(cpu_buffer, true);
7791: return err;
7792: }
7793:
7794: /* prevent another thread from changing buffer/sub-buffer sizes */
7795: guard(mutex)(&buffer->mutex);
7796:
7797: err = rb_alloc_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7798: if (err)
7799: return err;
7800:
7801: /* subbuf_ids includes the reader while nr_pages does not */
7802: subbuf_ids = kcalloc(cpu_buffer->nr_pages + 1, sizeof(*subbuf_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
7803: if (!subbuf_ids) {
7804: rb_free_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7805: return -ENOMEM;
7806: }
7807:
7808: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
7809:
7810: /*
7811: * Lock all readers to block any subbuf swap until the subbuf IDs are
7812: * assigned.
7813: */
7814: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7815: rb_setup_ids_meta_page(cpu_buffer, subbuf_ids);
7816:
7817: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7818:
7819: err = __rb_map_vma(cpu_buffer, vma);
7820: if (!err) {
7821: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7822: /* This is the first time it is mapped by user */
7823: cpu_buffer->user_mapped = 1;
7824: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7825: } else {
7826: kfree(cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids);
7827: cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids = NULL;
7828: rb_free_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7829: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
7830: }
7831:
7832: return err;
7833: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 46/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30416
output: 23
thoughts: 114
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Remote Buffers and Tracing**
My initial observation, and a rather significant one, is that the `ring_buffer_map` function explicitly returns `-EINVAL` when `buffer->remote` is true. This immediately tells me, quite definitively, that a *remote buffer cannot be mapped*. This is a critical constraint that I need to keep in mind.
Following this realization, a question arises: if a remote buffer cannot be mapped, then it logically follows that `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` cannot be called on it. However, I need to be precise here. My current understanding is that `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` is an *ioctl call made on the `trace_pipe_raw` file*. This distinction is important.
This leads me to a crucial point of investigation: does the `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` ioctl itself perform a check to determine if the underlying buffer is actually mapped? Or does it assume the buffer *is* mapped and proceed accordingly? To answer this, I must delve into the implementation of `tracing_buffers_ioctl` to understand its internal logic and any preconditions or checks it might impose related to buffer mapping status.
|
| 47/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:tracing_buffers_ioctl]
Results: map[SourceCode:7376: static long tracing_buffers_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
7377: {
7378: struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = file->private_data;
7379: struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
7380: int err;
7381:
7382: if (cmd == TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER) {
7383: if (!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
7384: err = ring_buffer_wait(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7385: iter->cpu_file,
7386: iter->tr->buffer_percent,
7387: NULL, NULL);
7388: if (err)
7389: return err;
7390: }
7391:
7392: return ring_buffer_map_get_reader(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
7393: iter->cpu_file);
7394: } else if (cmd) {
7395: return -ENOTTY;
7396: }
7397:
7398: /*
7399: * An ioctl call with cmd 0 to the ring buffer file will wake up all
7400: * waiters
7401: */
7402: guard(mutex)(&trace_types_lock);
7403:
7404: /* Make sure the waiters see the new wait_index */
7405: (void)atomic_fetch_inc_release(&iter->wait_index);
7406:
7407: ring_buffer_wake_waiters(iter->array_buffer->buffer, iter->cpu_file);
7408:
7409: return 0;
7410: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c]
|
| 48/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31071
output: 25
thoughts: 55
Thoughts: **A Moment of Revelation Regarding Buffer Mapping in `tracing_buffers_ioctl`**
I was just reviewing the `tracing_buffers_ioctl` implementation, and a rather critical oversight struck me. I realized that `tracing_buffers_ioctl` itself, as it stands, doesn't explicitly verify whether the buffer it's operating on has actually been mapped. It appears to directly proceed to call `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` without this crucial preliminary check. However, upon closer inspection of `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, I discovered that this function *does* indeed internally call `rb_get_mapped_buffer`. So, while the initial entry point might seem to lack the explicit mapping check, the underlying machinery ensures that the buffer *is* mapped before proceeding. This is a subtle but important point – the check isn't absent from the overall operation, just not immediately at the `tracing_buffers_ioctl` level. It's a good thing the subsequent function handles it.
|
| 49/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_get_mapped_buffer]
Results: map[SourceCode:7602: static struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *
7603: rb_get_mapped_buffer(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
7604: {
7605: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
7606:
7607: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7608: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
7609:
7610: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7611:
7612: mutex_lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7613:
7614: if (!cpu_buffer->user_mapped) {
7615: mutex_unlock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7616: return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
7617: }
7618:
7619: return cpu_buffer;
7620: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 50/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31429
output: 23
thoughts: 1689
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Ring Buffer Reader Behavior**
Okay, so I've been digging into how this ring buffer reader mechanism works, and I've hit a point where I need to be absolutely certain about the states I'm observing.
My initial focus was on `rb_get_mapped_buffer`. I noticed it checks `cpu_buffer->user_mapped`. If that's not set, it correctly returns `-ENODEV`. This immediately tells me that if `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is called and the buffer isn't mapped, it'll also return `-ENODEV`.
Then I started thinking about remote buffers. I looked at the `ring_buffer_map` function itself, specifically this check:
```c
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask) || buffer->remote)
return -EINVAL;
```
This clearly indicates that `ring_buffer_map` will return `-EINVAL` for remote buffers. This is a crucial insight: it means `cpu_buffer->user_mapped` can *never* be true for a remote buffer. Consequently, `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` *must* return `-ENODEV` for remote buffers. Therefore, I can confidently assert that `cpu_buffer->remote` *must* be false within the context of `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
Moving on, assuming `cpu_buffer->remote` is indeed false, the next step is `rb_get_reader_page` calling `__rb_get_reader_page`. I know `__rb_get_reader_page` will return `NULL` without triggering a `RB_WARN_ON` only under two specific conditions:
1. `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`
2. `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`
Now, this is where things get interesting. I re-examined `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and saw this:
```c
if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer))
goto out;
```
This condition, `rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer)`, is essentially `!rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)`. If the buffer is empty, it jumps to `out`. Then, it checks:
```c
/* Did the reader catch up with the writer? */
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page)
goto out;
```
If the reader has caught up, it also jumps to `out`. It's only *after* these checks that it calls `rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer)`. This implies that if `__rb_get_reader_page` returns `NULL` due to either of the conditions I just mentioned, it signifies a race condition – the state must have changed between the checks in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and the actual call to `__rb_get_reader_page`.
So, I'm asking myself: how could `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)` become zero *after* being non-zero? I've analyzed `rb_num_of_entries` as `entries - (overrun + read)`. The writer increments `overrun` in `rb_handle_head_page` and `entries` in `rb_commit`. If a writer is interrupted between these two operations, `rb_num_of_entries` can temporarily decrease. Could it hit zero? Yes, potentially if the buffer has the minimum of two pages. If one page is the `reader_page`, the ring effectively has two pages. When the writer fills both, `rb_num_of_entries` is initially high. When it hits the head page (overwriting it), `overrun` increases by `entries_per_page`, and `rb_num_of_entries` would then be `entries_per_page`, which is still greater than zero.
However, I'm considering the impact of nested interrupts. Imagine Interrupt 1 hits the head page and increments `overrun` by `entries_per_page`. Then, an Interrupt 2 occurs, which also hits a head page and increments `overrun` by another `entries_per_page`. In this scenario, `rb_num_of_entries` could indeed decrease by `2 * entries_per_page`, potentially becoming zero. This implies that the entire buffer might have been overwritten, with no new events having reached the `rb_commit` stage yet. If `rb_num_of_entries` becomes zero, `__rb_get_reader_page` returns `NULL`, and subsequently, `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` would trigger the `WARN_ON(!reader)` condition.
I also pondered if `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` could lead to `rb_num_of_entries` becoming zero. But then I recalled that `ring_buffer_reset_cpu` acquires `cpu_buffer->reader_lock`, which means it cannot execute concurrently with `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` that also attempts to acquire locks.
Now, let's revisit the other condition for `__rb_get_reader_page` returning `NULL`: `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`. Can `commit_page` become equal to `reader_page`? My understanding is that `reader_page` is an auxiliary page, swapped out of the main ring. The writer only advances `commit_page` along the ring's actual pages. So, `commit_page` should never equal `reader_page` unless they were already equal from the start, which `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` would have already caught.
But then I had a thought: what if `rb_get_reader_page` itself, when called, swaps a page into the ring and takes a *new* `reader_page` out? If that new `reader_page` happens to be the *same* page as `commit_page`, could that be a possibility? I double-checked the logic of `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and confirmed that `rb_get_reader_page` is called only once per iteration, and crucially, it holds the `reader_lock`. This prevents any other reader from simultaneously manipulating `reader_page` in a way that could lead to this specific state.
Looking again at `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and the `consume:` loop:
```c
consume:
if (rb_per_cpu_empty(cpu_buffer))
goto out;
reader_size = rb_page_size(cpu_buffer->reader_page);
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size) {
while (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < reader_size)
rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
goto out;
}
/* Did the reader catch up with the writer? */
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page)
goto out;
reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
if (WARN_ON(!reader))
goto out;
```
I noticed that `rb_advance_reader` increments `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read`. The question is, does `rb_advance_reader` also update `cpu_buffer->read`? I need to investigate the implementation of `rb_advance_reader` to confirm its exact behavior.
|
| 51/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_advance_reader]
Results: map[SourceCode:6041: static void rb_advance_reader(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
6042: {
6043: struct ring_buffer_event *event;
6044: struct buffer_page *reader;
6045: unsigned length;
6046:
6047: reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
6048:
6049: /* This function should not be called when buffer is empty */
6050: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !reader))
6051: return;
6052:
6053: event = rb_reader_event(cpu_buffer);
6054:
6055: if (event->type_len <= RINGBUF_TYPE_DATA_TYPE_LEN_MAX)
6056: cpu_buffer->read++;
6057:
6058: rb_update_read_stamp(cpu_buffer, event);
6059:
6060: length = rb_event_length(event);
6061: cpu_buffer->reader_page->read += length;
6062: cpu_buffer->read_bytes += length;
6063: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 52/2 |
2026/09/07 11:49 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33488
output: 25
thoughts: 4230
Thoughts: **The Elusive Null Pointer in the Ring Buffer Reader**
My thought process has been a deep dive into a particularly tricky bug involving the ring buffer reader. It all started when I noticed the `rb_advance_reader` function being called, and I initially suspected it was the culprit for returning a NULL pointer. However, by carefully tracing the execution flow, I realized that `rb_advance_reader` itself doesn't seem to be the direct source of the NULL return that triggers the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
My initial confusion stemmed from how `rb_advance_reader` interacts with the buffer's state. I saw that it increments `cpu_buffer->read`, which in turn decreases `rb_num_of_entries`. This seemed like a potential area where the buffer's state could be altered in a way that leads to problems.
Then I examined the logic within `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, specifically the `consume` block. I noticed that if `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read` was less than the `reader_size`, `rb_advance_reader` would be called in a loop. Crucially, after this loop, the function would `goto out;`, meaning it wouldn't proceed to call `rb_get_reader_page` immediately. This confirmed my suspicion that `rb_advance_reader` itself, when called within this specific `if` block, wasn't the path leading to the NULL return.
This led me to consider the scenario where `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read` is *exactly* equal to `reader_size`. In this case, the `if` block is skipped, and the code proceeds to fetch the next reader page. It's here that the potential for a NULL return becomes significant. My immediate thought was, "What if `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)` is zero at this point?"
I reasoned that if `rb_num_of_entries` were zero, the `rb_per_cpu_empty` check at the beginning of the `consume` block should have caught it and `goto out;` would have been executed. So, if the code reached the point of calling `rb_get_reader_page`, `rb_num_of_entries` *shouldn't* have been zero. This created a paradox: how could `rb_num_of_entries` become zero between the `rb_per_cpu_empty` check and the call to `__rb_get_reader_page`?
I explored potential race conditions, particularly how the writer might increment `overrun` without incrementing `entries` when interrupted. However, my analysis suggested that this typically wouldn't lead to `rb_num_of_entries` becoming exactly zero.
Then, a critical insight struck me: the wrap-around behavior of `unsigned long`. I considered the possibility that `overrun + read` could somehow become greater than `entries`. If this happened, `rb_num_of_entries` would wrap around to a very large positive number. In this scenario, `rb_per_cpu_empty` would return `false` (as the number wouldn't be zero), and `__rb_get_reader_page` would also see a large positive number, preventing it from returning NULL due to an empty buffer. This seemed to rule out a simple wrap-around as the cause for a zero count leading to a NULL.
I then scrutinized `__rb_get_reader_page` for other reasons it might return NULL. I examined the check `if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)`. My initial thought was that this condition should never be met because `reader_page` is distinct from the pages in the ring buffer. I delved into how `reader_page` is allocated and how `commit_page` is managed, concluding that `commit_page` would never naturally equal `reader_page`. This made that specific check seem like dead code, or at least not the source of the bug in question.
My next focus shifted to the `rb_set_head_page` call within `__rb_get_reader_page`. If this returned NULL, it would lead to a `RB_WARN_ON`. However, the syzkaller report only showed a single warning from `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, not from `RB_WARN_ON` within `rb_advance_reader` or `__rb_get_reader_page`. This led me to believe that the `RB_WARN_ON` macro, possibly due to `WARN_ON_ONCE` having already been triggered, wasn't producing the expected warning in this specific instance.
Finally, I returned to the `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` function, focusing on the direct call to `rb_get_reader_page` and the subsequent `WARN_ON(!reader)`. This is the exact point where the bug is reported. My lingering question is: under what precise circumstances does `rb_get_reader_page` return NULL? I had previously considered the `cpu_buffer->remote` flag and its implications for mapped buffers, but I needed to re-verify the exact sequence of checks that would lead to `rb_get_reader_page` returning NULL *without* triggering an earlier `RB_WARN_ON`. The fact that the syzkaller report only shows the warning at `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is the key constraint, suggesting that any potential NULL return from underlying functions must be handled in a way that *doesn't* issue its own more specific warning.
|
| 53/2 |
2026/09/07 11:50 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_get_mapped_buffer]
Results: map[SourceCode:7602: static struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *
7603: rb_get_mapped_buffer(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
7604: {
7605: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
7606:
7607: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
7608: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
7609:
7610: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7611:
7612: mutex_lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7613:
7614: if (!cpu_buffer->user_mapped) {
7615: mutex_unlock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7616: return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
7617: }
7618:
7619: return cpu_buffer;
7620: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 54/2 |
2026/09/07 11:50 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38021
output: 25
thoughts: 2779
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into Ring Buffer Reader Logic and Potential Race Conditions**
I've been really wrestling with how a particular race condition might be manifesting in the ring buffer's reader logic, specifically around `cpu_buffer->user_mapped` and the implications of `buffer->remote`. My initial thought was: how could `cpu_buffer->user_mapped` ever be set to 1 if the buffer is marked as `remote`? Looking at `ring_buffer_map`, it explicitly returns `-EINVAL` if `buffer->remote` is true. Since `cpu_buffer->remote` is initialized directly from `buffer->remote`, this means that if `buffer->remote` is true, `ring_buffer_map` will fail before `user_mapped` could ever be set to 1. Consequently, `rb_get_mapped_buffer` would return `-ENODEV`, leading `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` to also return `-ENODEV` and crucially, *not* reach the `WARN_ON(!reader)` call. This line of reasoning strongly suggests that `cpu_buffer->remote` *must* be false in scenarios where `user_mapped` is non-zero.
This led me to consider another potential failure point: what if `rb_get_reader_page` returns `NULL` because `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer)` is 0? My previous understanding was that `rb_num_of_entries` could become 0 if the writer was interrupted between `rb_handle_head_page` and `rb_commit`. However, I realized that if `rb_num_of_entries` were indeed 0, `rb_per_cpu_empty` would return `true`, and `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` would immediately `goto out` at the start of the `consume` section. If it *doesn't* go to `out`, it implies `rb_num_of_entries` was *not* 0.
Then, I examined the subsequent logic within `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. If the code skips the checks involving `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read` and `cpu_buffer->reader_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page`, it eventually calls `rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer)`. Inside `__rb_get_reader_page`, there's another check: `if (rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0) goto out;`. If `rb_num_of_entries` *did* somehow become 0 between the earlier checks and this point, `__rb_get_reader_page` would return `NULL`.
The question then became: how could `rb_num_of_entries` become 0 *after* `rb_per_cpu_empty` returned `false`? I revisited the scenario where the writer is interrupted between `rb_handle_head_page` and `rb_commit`. I initially thought that incrementing `overrun` here could drop `rb_num_of_entries` to 0, but I realized that since `nr_pages` is at least 2, and the buffer wouldn't be hitting the head page unless it was full (meaning other pages have data), `rb_num_of_entries` shouldn't drop to zero in this specific interruption window. Furthermore, if the buffer *was* truly empty, the writer wouldn't hit the head page in the first place. I also considered if the reader's advancement (`rb_advance_reader`) could cause this, but that happens in a different control flow path that exits before `rb_get_reader_page` is called.
However, a crucial insight emerged when I re-examined the interrupt handling. `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` uses `raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags)`, which *disables* interrupts. This means the writer on the *same CPU* cannot interrupt the reader. But what if the reader is on CPU 1 and the writer is on CPU 0, operating on the same `cpu_buffer`? The writer on CPU 0 *can* run concurrently. If the writer on CPU 0 updates `overrun` (e.g., via `rb_handle_head_page`) and `rb_num_of_entries` *temporarily* drops to 0 due to this concurrent write, then `__rb_get_reader_page` on CPU 1 could indeed see `rb_num_of_entries == 0` and return `NULL`. This seemed like a strong possibility.
But then, I had a breakthrough when looking at the `WARN_ON` calls. I remembered that `WARN_ON_ONCE(1)` only triggers the warning once per boot. My hypothesis is that syzkaller, in a previous test run, might have triggered the `RB_WARN_ON` inside `rb_set_head_page` (which is an `RB_WARN_ON`), and because it was `_ONCE`, it won't print again. If `rb_set_head_page` returns `NULL` (which it does when `rb_num_of_entries` is 0), and the `RB_WARN_ON` didn't print, then `__rb_get_reader_page` would return `NULL`. This `NULL` would then propagate to `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, which *does* have a regular `WARN_ON(!reader)`. This `WARN_ON` *would* print every time! This perfectly explains why the warning is consistently seen in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and *not* in `__rb_get_reader_page` itself – the earlier, one-time warning was suppressed. Therefore, the most plausible explanation for `__rb_get_reader_page` returning `NULL` is that `rb_set_head_page` is returning `NULL` due to `rb_num_of_entries` being 0, and the potential for concurrent writes from another CPU is what could cause `rb_num_of_entries` to transiently hit zero in a way that isn't immediately obvious from a single-threaded perspective.
|
| 55/2 |
2026/09/07 11:51 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_set_head_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:1460: static struct buffer_page *
1461: rb_set_head_page(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
1462: {
1463: struct buffer_page *head;
1464: struct buffer_page *page;
1465: struct list_head *list;
1466: int i;
1467:
1468: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !cpu_buffer->head_page))
1469: return NULL;
1470:
1471: /* sanity check */
1472: list = cpu_buffer->pages;
1473: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, rb_list_head(list->prev->next) != list))
1474: return NULL;
1475:
1476: page = head = cpu_buffer->head_page;
1477: /*
1478: * It is possible that the writer moves the header behind
1479: * where we started, and we miss in one loop.
1480: * A second loop should grab the header, but we'll do
1481: * three loops just because I'm paranoid.
1482: */
1483: for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
1484: do {
1485: if (rb_is_head_page(page, page->list.prev)) {
1486: cpu_buffer->head_page = page;
1487: return page;
1488: }
1489: rb_inc_page(&page);
1490: } while (page != head);
1491: }
1492:
1493: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1);
1494:
1495: return NULL;
1496: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 56/2 |
2026/09/07 11:51 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 41362
output: 27
thoughts: 1432
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `rb_set_head_page` and Reader Page Handling**
Okay, so I'm trying to understand the conditions under which `rb_set_head_page` might return `NULL`. My initial understanding was that it fails if:
1. `cpu_buffer->head_page` is not set.
2. There's some list manipulation inconsistency where `rb_list_head(list->prev->next)` doesn't match `list`.
3. It goes through three attempts without finding the head page.
Then, I started digging into `__rb_get_reader_page` and its loop mechanism. I noticed this critical part:
```c
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > max_loops)) {
reader = NULL;
goto out;
}
```
This `RB_WARN_ON` triggers if the loop runs more than `max_loops` times. `max_loops` is determined by `cpu_buffer->ring_meta ? cpu_buffer->nr_pages : 3`. The question immediately becomes: why would this loop run multiple times in the first place?
I traced the flow. The loop in `__rb_get_reader_page` seems to be driven by a potential failure in `rb_head_page_replace`. However, if `rb_head_page_replace` fails (returns `!ret`), the code jumps to `spin`, *not* `again`. This means `nr_loops` wouldn't be incremented in that failure scenario.
So, when *does* `nr_loops` get incremented? I found the `goto again;` statement, and it's placed *after* a successful page swap:
```c
/* Finally update the reader page to the new head */
cpu_buffer->reader_page = reader;
cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
if (overwrite != cpu_buffer->last_overrun) {
cpu_buffer->lost_events = overwrite - cpu_buffer->last_overrun;
cpu_buffer->last_overrun = overwrite;
}
goto again;
```
This implies that after a successful page swap, the code *always* goes back to the `again` label.
Now, let's examine what happens at the `again` label:
```c
reader = cpu_buffer->reader_page;
/* If there's more to read, return this page */
if (cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader))
goto out;
```
Since `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read` was just set to `0` after the swap, it *should* always be less than `rb_page_size(reader)`, unless `rb_page_size(reader)` is also `0`!
If `rb_page_size(reader)` is 0, the condition `cpu_buffer->reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader)` fails, and the code proceeds to check:
```c
if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
goto out;
```
If the `commit_page` *is* the same as the `reader_page`, it jumps to `out`, sets `reader` to `NULL`, and returns `NULL`. This happens *before* the `RB_WARN_ON` condition is even checked.
This leads to a specific scenario: if `rb_head_page_replace` succeeds, and the newly swapped-in `reader_page` is empty (`rb_page_size(reader) == 0`), and critically, if this empty page is *also* the `commit_page`, then `rb_set_head_page` returns `NULL`.
The question then is, can `rb_page_size(reader)` be 0? Yes, if the page is empty – meaning the writer hasn't written anything to it yet. But if the writer hasn't written anything, shouldn't the `commit_page` be either on that page, or before it?
If `commit_page` is on that page, and the page is empty (`commit == 0`), then the buffer *should* have no unread events. However, if `rb_per_cpu_empty` returned `FALSE` earlier in the process, this creates a contradiction. How can the buffer have unread entries if the `commit_page` is on an empty head page?
This could happen if `entries` was incremented, but the event was written to the *previous* page, and then `commit_page` was moved to the *current* head page, which is empty.
Let's refine: `rb_page_size(reader)` returns `local_read(&page->page->commit)`. If `commit` is 0, the page is indeed empty. Can `commit_page` be pointing to a page where `commit` is 0? Yes, this happens when the writer moves to a *new* page for writing. It sets `commit_page` to this new page, and `commit` is initially 0. However, the writer then *immediately* writes an event and updates `commit`.
The only way this specific `NULL` return scenario could occur, leading to `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, is if the reader interrupts the writer *exactly* after the writer has moved `commit_page` to a new, empty page, but *before* the writer has actually written the event and updated the `commit` count on that new page.
I need to go back and examine `rb_set_commit_to_write` to see if there's a window where this precise interleaving is possible. This is where the real complexity lies – the race condition between the writer and the reader.
|
| 57/2 |
2026/09/07 11:51 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:rb_set_commit_to_write]
Results: map[SourceCode:4218: static __always_inline void
4219: rb_set_commit_to_write(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
4220: {
4221: unsigned long max_count;
4222:
4223: /*
4224: * We only race with interrupts and NMIs on this CPU.
4225: * If we own the commit event, then we can commit
4226: * all others that interrupted us, since the interruptions
4227: * are in stack format (they finish before they come
4228: * back to us). This allows us to do a simple loop to
4229: * assign the commit to the tail.
4230: */
4231: again:
4232: max_count = cpu_buffer->nr_pages * 100;
4233:
4234: while (cpu_buffer->commit_page != READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->tail_page)) {
4235: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, !(--max_count)))
4236: return;
4237: if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
4238: rb_is_reader_page(cpu_buffer->tail_page)))
4239: return;
4240: /*
4241: * No need for a memory barrier here, as the update
4242: * of the tail_page did it for this page.
4243: */
4244: local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit,
4245: rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page));
4246: rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page);
4247: if (cpu_buffer->ring_meta) {
4248: struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta = cpu_buffer->ring_meta;
4249: meta->commit_buffer = (unsigned long)cpu_buffer->commit_page->page;
4250: }
4251: /* add barrier to keep gcc from optimizing too much */
4252: barrier();
4253: }
4254: while (rb_commit_index(cpu_buffer) !=
4255: rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page)) {
4256:
4257: /* Make sure the readers see the content of what is committed. */
4258: smp_wmb();
4259: local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit,
4260: rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page));
4261: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
4262: rb_page_commit(cpu_buffer->commit_page) & ~RB_WRITE_MASK);
4263: barrier();
4264: }
4265:
4266: /* again, keep gcc from optimizing */
4267: barrier();
4268:
4269: /*
4270: * If an interrupt came in just after the first while loop
4271: * and pushed the tail page forward, we will be left with
4272: * a dangling commit that will never go forward.
4273: */
4274: if (unlikely(cpu_buffer->commit_page != READ_ONCE(cpu_buffer->tail_page)))
4275: goto again;
4276: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 58/2 |
2026/09/07 11:51 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 43779
output: 23
thoughts: 4258
Thoughts: **The Critical Race in `rb_set_commit_to_write` and `rb_get_reader_page`**
My investigation has uncovered a rather insidious race condition that can manifest within the ring buffer's commit and reader mechanisms, specifically between the `rb_set_commit_to_write` function and the `rb_get_reader_page` logic. I've been meticulously tracing the execution flow, particularly around how the `commit` field of a page is updated and how the reader acquires pages.
The core of the issue seems to lie in the window of vulnerability that exists *after* a writer has logically moved to a new page (or is preparing to commit to the current one) but *before* it has signaled that the page is ready by updating its `commit` field.
Let me walk you through my thought process:
It starts with `rb_set_commit_to_write`. When the writer enters this function, it's typically intending to finalize a batch of writes. The sequence I observed is:
1. `local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit, rb_page_write(cpu_buffer->commit_page));`
2. `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page);`
My initial interpretation was that the `commit` of the *old* page was updated, and *then* `commit_page` was advanced to the *new* page. This implies that `commit_page` always points to a page that has had its commit value updated.
However, the problem arises if the reader interrupts *precisely* after `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page)` but *before* the writer gets to update the `commit` field of this *new* `commit_page`. At this point, `commit_page` points to the new page, but its `commit` value is still 0, as the update hasn't occurred.
Now, let's consider what happens on the reader's side. If the `entries` counter has been incremented (which happens *before* `rb_set_commit_to_write` in `rb_commit`), then `rb_num_of_entries` will be greater than 0, and `rb_per_cpu_empty` will correctly return `false`. This prompts the reader to call `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` and subsequently `rb_get_reader_page`.
The `__rb_get_reader_page` function then attempts to swap the `head_page` with the `reader_page`. The crucial question is: which page is `head_page` at this moment?
If the buffer isn't full, `head_page` and `tail_page` might be the same. If the writer just moved to a new page, `tail_page` is the new page. But `head_page` is the *oldest* page in the ring. The writer is at `tail_page`, and `head_page` is at the opposite end. So, the page the reader swaps (`head_page`) is supposed to be a *full* page, with a `commit` value greater than 0.
However, my analysis leads me to a critical scenario: what if the buffer has only one page's worth of events, or the reader has already consumed the previous page?
If the reader has already read and effectively "consumed" the old page, it would have swapped it out. The *new* `head_page` would then become the page the writer is currently operating on. If the reader then swaps this `head_page` (which is also the page the writer is working on and where `commit` is still 0 because of the preemption), it acquires a page with a `commit` value of 0.
Let's trace this specific race:
1. The buffer is initially empty, meaning `head_page == tail_page == commit_page`.
2. The writer begins writing the *first* event onto `head_page`.
3. The writer writes the event and increments `entries` (in `rb_commit`). Now `rb_num_of_entries` > 0.
4. The writer calls `rb_set_commit_to_write`. It then executes `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page)`, so `commit_page` now points to the *next* page (or the same page if it's the first event on a page and no new page was allocated yet, but let's assume a new page for clarity in this race).
5. Critically, the writer is preempted *before* it can execute `local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit, ...)` for this new page.
6. The reader, running on another CPU, calls `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. `rb_per_cpu_empty` is `false`.
7. The reader calls `rb_get_reader_page`. Inside `__rb_get_reader_page`, it checks `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`. This condition is likely `false` initially.
8. The `head_page` is swapped with `reader_page`. Since the writer might have just "moved" to a new page, or the buffer was very small, the `head_page` that is swapped out *could* be the very page the writer is currently working on and hasn't committed yet. If so, the new `reader_page` becomes the page where `commit` is still 0.
9. The execution proceeds to the `again` label within `__rb_get_reader_page`.
10. The reader checks `reader_page->read < rb_page_size(reader)`. `reader_page->read` is 0 (since it's a new page for the reader). `rb_page_size(reader)` is determined by `reader_page->page->commit`, which is still 0 because the writer was preempted.
11. Therefore, the condition `0 < 0` is `false`.
12. The reader then checks `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`. In this specific race scenario, `commit_page` points to the page the writer is working on, and `reader_page` has just been set to that *same* page due to the swap. So, this condition is `true`.
13. The function returns `NULL`.
14. `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` then hits `WARN_ON(!reader)`, indicating that it received an invalid page (NULL).
This race condition is extremely tight. It requires the reader to interject precisely in the small window between the writer advancing its internal page pointers and updating the `commit` status of the newly active page. The fact that `entries` is incremented *before* the commit update is key here, as it allows the reader to proceed even though the page isn't truly ready.
To reproduce this, I envision a scenario with a writer thread continuously writing to `trace_marker` (which keeps the writer on CPU 0 and attempts to commit frequently) and a reader thread continuously calling `ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` (running on CPU 1). The `mmap` operation is crucial as it sets the `user_mapped` flag, enabling the `rb_get_mapped_buffer` check. The tight loop of reader calls, combined with the writer's frequent attempts to commit, should eventually expose this narrow window.
|
| 59/2 |
2026/09/07 11:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_map]
Results: map[SourceCode:7772: int ring_buffer_map(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu,
7773: struct vm_area_struct *vma)
7774: {
7775: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
7776: struct buffer_page **subbuf_ids;
7777: unsigned long flags;
7778: int err;
7779:
7780: if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask) || buffer->remote)
7781: return -EINVAL;
7782:
7783: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
7784:
7785: guard(mutex)(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7786:
7787: if (cpu_buffer->user_mapped) {
7788: err = __rb_map_vma(cpu_buffer, vma);
7789: if (!err)
7790: err = __rb_inc_dec_mapped(cpu_buffer, true);
7791: return err;
7792: }
7793:
7794: /* prevent another thread from changing buffer/sub-buffer sizes */
7795: guard(mutex)(&buffer->mutex);
7796:
7797: err = rb_alloc_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7798: if (err)
7799: return err;
7800:
7801: /* subbuf_ids includes the reader while nr_pages does not */
7802: subbuf_ids = kcalloc(cpu_buffer->nr_pages + 1, sizeof(*subbuf_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
7803: if (!subbuf_ids) {
7804: rb_free_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7805: return -ENOMEM;
7806: }
7807:
7808: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
7809:
7810: /*
7811: * Lock all readers to block any subbuf swap until the subbuf IDs are
7812: * assigned.
7813: */
7814: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7815: rb_setup_ids_meta_page(cpu_buffer, subbuf_ids);
7816:
7817: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7818:
7819: err = __rb_map_vma(cpu_buffer, vma);
7820: if (!err) {
7821: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7822: /* This is the first time it is mapped by user */
7823: cpu_buffer->user_mapped = 1;
7824: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
7825: } else {
7826: kfree(cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids);
7827: cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids = NULL;
7828: rb_free_meta_page(cpu_buffer);
7829: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
7830: }
7831:
7832: return err;
7833: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 60/2 |
2026/09/07 11:52 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 49019
output: 25
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `__rb_map_vma`'s Size Check**
Ah, so when I'm looking at `__rb_map_vma`, the very first thing that catches my attention is its size. I mean, before I even delve into the intricacies of how it maps virtual memory areas, I need to understand its footprint. Is this going to be a lean, efficient operation, or is it a heavy-duty process that might introduce significant overhead? This initial size assessment is crucial for me; it sets the stage for everything else. It dictates how I'll think about its potential impact on memory usage and performance. If it's large, I'll immediately start considering implications for cache locality, potential page faults, and the overall system resource consumption. If it's small, I can breathe a little easier, assuming other factors are in play, and focus on the logical flow of the mapping itself. Essentially, the size check is my initial sanity check, a fundamental step in grasping the operational characteristics of `__rb_map_vma`.
|
| 61/2 |
2026/09/07 11:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args:
Results: map[SourceCode:7670: static int __rb_map_vma(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
7671: struct vm_area_struct *vma)
7672: {
7673: unsigned long nr_subbufs, nr_pages, nr_vma_pages;
7674: pgoff_t pgoff = vma_start_pgoff(vma);
7675: unsigned int subbuf_pages, subbuf_order;
7676: struct page **pages __free(kfree) = NULL;
7677: int p = 0, s = 0;
7678: int err;
7679:
7680: /* Refuse MP_PRIVATE or writable mappings */
7681: if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE || vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ||
7682: !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE))
7683: return -EPERM;
7684:
7685: subbuf_order = cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_order;
7686: subbuf_pages = 1 << subbuf_order;
7687:
7688: if (subbuf_order && pgoff % subbuf_pages)
7689: return -EINVAL;
7690:
7691: /*
7692: * Make sure the mapping cannot become writable later. Also tell the VM
7693: * to not touch these pages (VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND).
7694: */
7695: vm_flags_mod(vma, VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP,
7696: VM_MAYWRITE);
7697:
7698: lockdep_assert_held(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
7699:
7700: nr_subbufs = cpu_buffer->nr_pages + 1; /* + reader-subbuf */
7701: nr_pages = ((nr_subbufs + 1) << subbuf_order); /* + meta-page */
7702: if (nr_pages <= pgoff)
7703: return -EINVAL;
7704:
7705: nr_pages -= pgoff;
7706:
7707: nr_vma_pages = vma_pages(vma);
7708: if (!nr_vma_pages || nr_vma_pages > nr_pages)
7709: return -EINVAL;
7710:
7711: nr_pages = nr_vma_pages;
7712:
7713: pages = kzalloc_objs(*pages, nr_pages);
7714: if (!pages)
7715: return -ENOMEM;
7716:
7717: if (!pgoff) {
7718: unsigned long meta_page_padding;
7719:
7720: pages[p++] = virt_to_page(cpu_buffer->meta_page);
7721:
7722: /*
7723: * Pad with the zero-page to align the meta-page with the
7724: * sub-buffers.
7725: */
7726: meta_page_padding = subbuf_pages - 1;
7727: while (meta_page_padding-- && p < nr_pages) {
7728: unsigned long __maybe_unused zero_addr =
7729: vma->vm_start + (PAGE_SIZE * p);
7730:
7731: pages[p++] = ZERO_PAGE(zero_addr);
7732: }
7733: } else {
7734: /* Skip the meta-page */
7735: pgoff -= subbuf_pages;
7736:
7737: s += pgoff / subbuf_pages;
7738: }
7739:
7740: while (p < nr_pages) {
7741: struct buffer_page *subbuf;
7742: struct page *page;
7743: int off = 0;
7744:
7745: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s >= nr_subbufs))
7746: return -EINVAL;
7747:
7748: subbuf = cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[s];
7749: page = virt_to_page((void *)subbuf->page);
7750:
7751: for (; off < (1 << (subbuf_order)); off++, page++) {
7752: if (p >= nr_pages)
7753: break;
7754:
7755: pages[p++] = page;
7756: }
7757: s++;
7758: }
7759:
7760: err = vm_insert_pages(vma, vma->vm_start, pages, &nr_pages);
7761:
7762: return err;
7763: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 62/2 |
2026/09/07 11:52 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 50474
output: 1373
thoughts: 2000
Thoughts: **Understanding the Race Condition and Crafting a Reproducer**
I've been dissecting this kernel bug related to the tracing ring buffer, and it boils down to a rather subtle race condition. The core issue lies in how the `trace_pipe_raw`'s ring buffer is managed for readers, specifically within the `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` function.
My initial thought process was to understand the `__rb_map_vma` function and its constraints. I noted that it allows mapping a subset of pages, provided the number of virtual memory area pages (`nr_vma_pages`) doesn't exceed the total available pages (`nr_pages`). This immediately made me think, "What if I just map one page?" The constraint `nr_vma_pages <= nr_pages` is key. If `nr_vma_pages` is 1, this condition is easily met. The error `-EINVAL` is returned only if `nr_vma_pages > nr_pages`. This means that `mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0)` is a perfectly valid operation, and importantly, it will signal to the kernel that a user has mapped this buffer, setting `user_mapped = 1`.
This insight formed the basis of my reproducer strategy. The plan is to set up two threads, one writing to the trace buffer and another constantly trying to read from it, creating contention.
Here's how I've outlined the steps for reproduction:
1. **Setting up the channels:** I need to open `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` for writing to inject events into the buffer. Simultaneously, I'll open `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` for reading, but with `O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK` flags to ensure the reader doesn't block if no data is immediately available.
2. **Marking the buffer:** The crucial first step after opening `trace_pipe_raw` is to `mmap` a single page of it. As established, this is valid and sets the `user_mapped` flag. This prepares the buffer for the race.
3. **The Writer:** I'll create a dedicated writer thread pinned to CPU 0. This thread's sole purpose is to continuously write a small amount of data (like a single byte "A") to `trace_marker`. This ensures a constant stream of events is being pushed into the ring buffer.
4. **The Reader:** Concurrently, I'll set up a reader thread pinned to CPU 1. This thread will incessantly call `ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. This `ioctl` is the key operation that attempts to acquire a reader page from the ring buffer and is where the race is most likely to manifest.
5. **The Race Condition:** The heart of the problem lies in the timing between the writer updating internal ring buffer pointers and the reader acquiring a page. Specifically, the writer is responsible for updating `commit_page` and the `commit` pointer within the `rb_set_commit_to_write` function. The reader, through the `ioctl`, calls `__rb_get_reader_page`, which swaps the `head_page` and then checks if `commit_page == reader_page`.
The bug triggers when the reader swaps the `head_page` at precisely the moment it becomes the new `commit_page` from the writer's perspective, but *before* the writer has updated its `commit` pointer to reflect this change. In this scenario, `reader_page` (the newly swapped `head_page`) will be identical to `commit_page`. This equality check, `commit_page == reader_page`, will then evaluate to true. This should not happen in a correctly functioning scenario where the reader has successfully acquired a distinct page.
6. **The Trigger:** When this exact timing occurs, `__rb_get_reader_page` will attempt to get the next reader page, find that `commit_page == reader_page` (meaning there are no new events for the reader to consume on that page, or the page has just been committed and not yet updated), and subsequently return `NULL` because `rb_page_size(reader)` will effectively be zero. This `NULL` return value is then passed to `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`, which triggers the `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
I had to consider a few nuances for this to work:
* **`trace_pipe_raw` setup:** I realized that simply opening `trace_pipe_raw` is sufficient; no complex prior setup is required.
* **Buffer state:** Initially, I pondered if the buffer needed to be empty or full. However, I deduced that the critical factor is keeping the buffer *almost* empty. If the reader is consuming events as fast as they are written, the `head_page` will frequently catch up to the `commit_page`. The `ioctl` call ensures this rapid consumption.
* **Page synchronization:** My thought process then went to how `head_page` and `commit_page` relate. If the buffer is small or the reader is fast, `head_page` will often equal `commit_page`. The writer moves `tail_page` and `commit_page` to the *next* page. `head_page`, however, only moves when the reader swaps it. If the reader constantly swaps, the writer will keep moving to new pages. The race occurs when the writer moves `commit_page` to a new page, and *before* it updates `commit`, the reader swaps *that same page*. If the reader swaps the page that just became the `commit_page`, then the *new* `head_page` becomes the *old* `commit_page`. The writer then moves its `commit_page` to this *new* `head_page`. This creates a situation where `head_page` and `commit_page` are constantly synchronized on the same page. This constant synchronization is precisely what makes the race condition so probable.
Regarding the `ioctl` command, I confirmed `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` is defined as `_IO('R', 0x20)`, which is correct. No other `ioctl` seems necessary for this specific race.
I've also considered the privilege requirements, noting that `trace_pipe_raw` needs root access, which syzkaller will provide. The ring buffer size itself doesn't seem to be a bottleneck; we just need the reader to keep the buffer sufficiently empty for `head_page` to equal `commit_page` often.
Finally, I've drafted the C program, ensuring it reflects these threads and operations. The `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` is directly aligned with the observed warning message and call trace, confirming my understanding of the bug's manifestation. The root cause is indeed this precise race between `rb_set_commit_to_write` and `__rb_get_reader_page`. The strategy is to ensure the reader constantly swaps the `head_page` so that it frequently aligns with the `commit_page` just as the writer is about to update it, leading to the `WARN_ON`.
|
| 63/1 |
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loop |
|
6m
|
| 64/2 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
iteration |
0 |
3m
|
| 65/3 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 66/3 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
action |
merge-strategy |
0m
Results: map[CurrentReproStrategy:An analysis of the bug and a C reproducer to trigger the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` is triggered when `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL`.
By tracing the paths in `__rb_get_reader_page()`, it can return `NULL` without triggering any internal `RB_WARN_ON` in two specific cases:
1. `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`
2. `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`
The root cause is a race condition between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU.
When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page.
1. **Writer (CPU 0)**: Starts writing an event that requires moving to a new page. It increments `entries` (making `rb_per_cpu_empty()` return false for the reader). It then calls `rb_set_commit_to_write()`, which advances `commit_page` to the new page via `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page)`.
2. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. It sees the buffer is not empty and calls `rb_get_reader_page()`.
3. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Swaps the `head_page` (which happens to be the new `commit_page` the writer just moved to). The reader page is now the `commit_page`.
4. **Reader (CPU 1)**: In the `again` loop, it checks `rb_page_size(reader)`. Because the writer was preempted/delayed exactly before updating the page's `commit` field, the size is `0`.
5. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Since the size is `0`, it falls through and checks `if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)`. This evaluates to **true**, causing it to return `NULL`.
6. **Reader (CPU 1)**: `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` receives `NULL` and triggers `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this race condition, we need to keep the ring buffer mostly empty so that the reader and writer constantly interact on the same page, and hit the tiny race window:
1. Open the `trace_pipe_raw` file for a specific CPU (e.g., `cpu0`) with `O_NONBLOCK`.
2. `mmap` at least one page of the file to set `cpu_buffer->user_mapped = 1`, which is required for the ioctl to proceed.
3. Spawn a **Writer Thread** pinned to CPU 0 that continuously writes small payloads to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker`.
4. Spawn a **Reader Thread** pinned to CPU 1 that continuously calls `ioctl(fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on the raw pipe.
### C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, "A", 1);
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```]
|
| 67/3 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
agent |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Results: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
int fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
close(fd_marker);
close(fd_raw);
printf("[+] All probes passed.\n");
return 0;
}
]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to generate a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive
purpose of verifying a bugfix in an isolated environment.
To ensure that we can diagnose why a program might fail to run on the test environment,
you MUST include detailed logging and error checking in the generated C program:
1. Use 'printf(...)' for all progress messages and error logs.
2. Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value.
3. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name
and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status.
4. The program must print a message after every successful major step.
5. Generate code that follows this pattern for all operations:
int res = do_something();
if (res < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to do_something: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] do_something successful.\n");
6. The compilation and development environment (including compilers, build
systems, makefiles, and kernel build/header directories) is NOT available
on the target test VM guest. Do NOT check for, build, or reference any
compilation tools, build files, or kernel development directories.
7. Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries (e.g. by using
functions like 'system()', 'popen()', or the 'exec' family such as
'execve()'). All environment checks, capability probings, and reproduction
steps must be performed directly using standard Linux system calls (such
as 'open', 'socket', 'ioctl', 'stat', etc.).
8. When reproducing asynchronous kernel timeouts or warnings, always
include a sufficient delay (using sleep or similar) after deleting
or unregistering the device to allow the kernel's asynchronous
timeout to trigger before program exit.
=== PHASE 1: CAPABILITY PROBING (GENERATION) ===
You MUST start by generating a simple 'probe' program first. This is a strict, non-negotiable requirement
to verify that the test environment has the necessary kernel capabilities and privileges.
This program's sole purpose is to verify subsystem availability and privileges by probing specific
device files, subsystems, or syscalls (for example: opening /dev/vhci to check if the virtual
Bluetooth controller is accessible, loading a minimal dummy BPF program, or making a specific
socket/ioctl call).
Print clear messages indicating success or failure of these probes, and exit with 0 only if
all checks pass.
Do NOT attempt complex logic, and do NOT try to trigger the actual bug/crash in this first version,
regardless of how simple the reproducer seems. You must wait until a successful probe run has been
confirmed in the environment (i.e., when CapabilitiesVerified becomes true).
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader
Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match
------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#0: syz.2.1764/13608
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13608 Comm: syz.2.1764 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e 21 fe ff 48 89 c5 e8 46 8b fb ff 48 85 ed 0f 85 9f fc ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 58 4c 8b 7c 24 60 e8 2e 8b fb ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 25 8b fb ff 49 8d bf d0 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b57d98 EFLAGS: 00010087
RAX: 000000000000086c RBX: ffff88801c0e5000 RCX: ffffc90024800000
RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: ffffffff821064e2 RDI: ffff888027852580
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88801c0e50b0 R12: ffff88801c0e50b8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88801c0e5198 R15: ffff88801c0ab800
FS: 00007fa41bfdb6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5b61000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f60453c8ff8 CR3: 0000000035d0b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x2e6/0x3d0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa41b19e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa41bfdb028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa41b425fa0 RCX: 00007fa41b19e159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fa41b235024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa41b426038 R14: 00007fa41b425fa0 R15: 00007ffd22388a08
</TASK>
Strategy: An analysis of the bug and a C reproducer to trigger the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` is triggered when `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL`.
By tracing the paths in `__rb_get_reader_page()`, it can return `NULL` without triggering any internal `RB_WARN_ON` in two specific cases:
1. `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`
2. `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`
The root cause is a race condition between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU.
When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page.
1. **Writer (CPU 0)**: Starts writing an event that requires moving to a new page. It increments `entries` (making `rb_per_cpu_empty()` return false for the reader). It then calls `rb_set_commit_to_write()`, which advances `commit_page` to the new page via `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page)`.
2. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. It sees the buffer is not empty and calls `rb_get_reader_page()`.
3. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Swaps the `head_page` (which happens to be the new `commit_page` the writer just moved to). The reader page is now the `commit_page`.
4. **Reader (CPU 1)**: In the `again` loop, it checks `rb_page_size(reader)`. Because the writer was preempted/delayed exactly before updating the page's `commit` field, the size is `0`.
5. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Since the size is `0`, it falls through and checks `if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)`. This evaluates to **true**, causing it to return `NULL`.
6. **Reader (CPU 1)**: `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` receives `NULL` and triggers `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this race condition, we need to keep the ring buffer mostly empty so that the reader and writer constantly interact on the same page, and hit the tiny race window:
1. Open the `trace_pipe_raw` file for a specific CPU (e.g., `cpu0`) with `O_NONBLOCK`.
2. `mmap` at least one page of the file to set `cpu_buffer->user_mapped = 1`, which is required for the ioctl to proceed.
3. Spawn a **Writer Thread** pinned to CPU 0 that continuously writes small payloads to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker`.
4. Spawn a **Reader Thread** pinned to CPU 1 that continuously calls `ioctl(fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on the raw pipe.
### C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, "A", 1);
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 68/4 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6063
output: 488
thoughts: 1365
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Developing the Probe Program**
Alright, so the ultimate goal here is to verify a bugfix for `WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. The user has already provided a detailed analysis and a C reproducer for the actual bug. However, there's a very strict, non-negotiable requirement: I *must* start by generating a simple "probe" program. This probe's sole purpose is to confirm that the testing environment has the necessary kernel capabilities and privileges before I even *think* about trying to trigger the bug. This probe needs to be minimal, standalone, and it has to confirm subsystem availability and privileges by probing specific device files, subsystems, or syscalls. It should print clear success/failure messages and exit with zero *only* if all checks pass. No complex logic, no bug triggering in this first pass, no matter how simple the reproducer looks. I have to wait for confirmation that the environment is ready, indicated by `CapabilitiesVerified` becoming true.
So, the immediate task is to craft this probe. What does the original reproducer require?
1. It needs write access to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker`.
2. It needs read access to `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`.
3. It needs to `mmap` that raw pipe.
4. Finally, it needs to perform an `ioctl` with `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` on the raw pipe file descriptor.
My probe should verify if these operations are possible.
Now, a crucial detail: the tracing files might not always be at `/sys/kernel/tracing`. They could be mounted under `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing`. Therefore, my probe should be robust enough to check both paths. I'll try to open `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` first, and if that fails, I'll try `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker`. The same logic will apply to the `trace_pipe_raw` file.
Let's outline the probe's actions:
* Attempt to open `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` or `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker` for writing.
* Attempt to open `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` or `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw` for reading (with `O_NONBLOCK` seems reasonable for a probe).
* Attempt to `mmap` the opened `trace_pipe_raw` file.
* The instructions also state: "Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status." This implies I should check the `ioctl` as well.
Initially, I thought about implementing the `ioctl` call. However, upon reflection, the core requirement is to verify *capabilities* and *privileges*. Opening the files and successfully `mmap`ing the `trace_pipe_raw` should be sufficient to demonstrate that the necessary kernel tracing infrastructure is accessible and that the process has the permissions to interact with it. The `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` call itself might fail for reasons unrelated to permissions, such as the buffer being empty, which could lead to a false negative for a simple probe. I need to be careful not to confuse "feature not supported" (like an `ENOTTY` error, which *would* indicate a capability issue) with temporary operational failures.
Given the strict "no complex logic, no bug triggering" rule for the probe, and the focus on verifying *availability* and *privileges*, I'll stick to the `open` and `mmap` operations. These are sufficient to confirm that the tracing subsystem is accessible and that the process can set up the memory mapping needed for reading trace data. If these fundamental operations succeed, it strongly suggests the environment is ready for the next step, which will be attempting to trigger the actual bug.
Also, I recall that there's a `set-results` tool available, which can be used to provide this probe program. I'll make sure to format my probe code correctly for that.
|
| 69/4 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
int fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
close(fd_marker);
close(fd_raw);
printf("[+] All probes passed.\n");
return 0;
}
]
Results: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
int fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
close(fd_marker);
close(fd_raw);
printf("[+] All probes passed.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 70/3 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
loop |
|
0m
|
| 71/4 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
iteration |
0 |
0m
|
| 72/5 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
action |
merge-repro-c |
0m
Results: map[CurrentCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
int fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
close(fd_marker);
close(fd_raw);
printf("[+] All probes passed.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 73/5 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
action |
compile-c-prog |
0m
Results: map[CompilerError: FormattedReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
int fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
close(fd_marker);
close(fd_raw);
printf("[+] All probes passed.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 74/5 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 75/3 |
2026/09/07 11:53 |
action |
run-c-repro |
2m
Results: map[CandidateBugTitle: CandidateCrashReport: CandidateReproduced:false ConsoleOutput:[ 60.636867][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 60.636937][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:202): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5831 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638582][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:203): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5831 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:204): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5831 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638614][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:205): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5831 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 63.180992][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782095.569:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.221419][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782095.609:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:53645' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 63.843063][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:208): avc: denied { search } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] All probes passed.
[ 63.843152][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3753 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 63.845538][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:210): avc: denied { open } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3753 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 63.845570][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:211): avc: denied { search } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.053964][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 14 callbacks suppressed
[ 66.054177][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782098.439:226): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.089041][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782098.479:227): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.425952][ T1380] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.426058][ T1380] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.898384][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782099.289:228): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.931359][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782099.319:229): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
OtherCrashReports:<nil> StraceOutput:/strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor552085699
<...>
[ 59.706233][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 59.706294][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:200): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5824 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.706538][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:201): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5824 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.706993][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:202): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5824 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.707082][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:203): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5824 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.922795][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.033:204): avc: denied { write } for pid=5832 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 62.965874][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.073:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5835 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.719569][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.833:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.760389][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.873:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.826083][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.933:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.865028][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.973:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:34741' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor552085699", ["/syz-executor552085699"], 0x7ffefd09cd10 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5555803ba000
brk(0x5555803bad80) = 0x5555803bad80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x5555803ba400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x5555803ba6d0) = 5881
set_robust_list(0x5555803ba6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor552085699", 4096) = 22
getrandom("\x24\x96\xe8\x07\x52\x6c\xe7\xe0", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x5555803bad80
brk(0x5555803dbd80) = 0x5555803dbd80
brk(0x5555803dc000) = 0x5555803dc000
mprotect(0x7fe829f09000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
[ 65.523254][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 6 callbacks suppressed
[ 65.523362][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.633:216): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.523382][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.633:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3617 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 65.542191][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.653:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5882 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.542787][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.653:219): avc: denied { open } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3617 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY) = 3
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
[ 65.563537][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:220): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.563591][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=3603 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 4
[ 65.564388][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:222): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="cpu0" dev="tracefs" ino=3604 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 4, 0) = 0x7fe829e58000
close(3) = 0
close(4) = 0
write(1, "[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n[+] mmap successful.\n["..., 122) = 122
exit_group(0) = ?
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] All probes passed.
[ 65.564405][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:223): avc: denied { read } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="trace_pipe_raw" dev="tracefs" ino=3607 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 65.578275][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.693:224): avc: denied { map } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw" dev="tracefs" ino=3607 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
+++ exited with 0 +++
[ 65.598309][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.713:225): avc: denied { write } for pid=5885 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.427842][ T1382] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.430302][ T1382] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
TestError:]
|
| 76/3 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
action |
truncate-log |
0m
Results: map[TruncatedConsoleOutput:[ 60.636867][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 60.636937][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:202): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5831 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638582][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:203): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5831 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:204): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5831 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638614][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:205): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5831 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 63.180992][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782095.569:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.221419][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782095.609:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:53645' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 63.843063][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:208): avc: denied { search } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] All probes passed.
[ 63.843152][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3753 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 63.845538][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:210): avc: denied { open } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3753 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 63.845570][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:211): avc: denied { search } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.053964][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 14 callbacks suppressed
[ 66.054177][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782098.439:226): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.089041][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782098.479:227): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.425952][ T1380] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.426058][ T1380] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.898384][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782099.289:228): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.931359][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782099.319:229): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
TruncatedCrashReport: TruncatedStraceOutput:/strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor552085699
<...>
[ 59.706233][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 59.706294][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:200): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5824 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.706538][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:201): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5824 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.706993][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:202): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5824 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.707082][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:203): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5824 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.922795][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.033:204): avc: denied { write } for pid=5832 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 62.965874][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.073:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5835 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.719569][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.833:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.760389][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.873:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.826083][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.933:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.865028][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.973:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:34741' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor552085699", ["/syz-executor552085699"], 0x7ffefd09cd10 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5555803ba000
brk(0x5555803bad80) = 0x5555803bad80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x5555803ba400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x5555803ba6d0) = 5881
set_robust_list(0x5555803ba6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor552085699", 4096) = 22
getrandom("\x24\x96\xe8\x07\x52\x6c\xe7\xe0", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x5555803bad80
brk(0x5555803dbd80) = 0x5555803dbd80
brk(0x5555803dc000) = 0x5555803dc000
mprotect(0x7fe829f09000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
[ 65.523254][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 6 callbacks suppressed
[ 65.523362][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.633:216): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.523382][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.633:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3617 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 65.542191][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.653:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5882 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.542787][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.653:219): avc: denied { open } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3617 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY) = 3
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
[ 65.563537][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:220): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.563591][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=3603 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 4
[ 65.564388][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:222): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="cpu0" dev="tracefs" ino=3604 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 4, 0) = 0x7fe829e58000
close(3) = 0
close(4) = 0
write(1, "[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n[+] mmap successful.\n["..., 122) = 122
exit_group(0) = ?
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] All probes passed.
[ 65.564405][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:223): avc: denied { read } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="trace_pipe_raw" dev="tracefs" ino=3607 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 65.578275][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.693:224): avc: denied { map } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw" dev="tracefs" ino=3607 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
+++ exited with 0 +++
[ 65.598309][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.713:225): avc: denied { write } for pid=5885 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.427842][ T1382] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.430302][ T1382] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
]
|
| 77/3 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
agent |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Results: map[Feedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Analyze the results of running the generated program.
=== CRITICAL ENVIRONMENT & TARGET CLASSIFICATION ===
Set 'TerminalError' to a descriptive error message ONLY if:
1. The execution failed due to missing hardware device nodes, subsystems, kernel modules, or privilege limits
that cannot be loaded, created, or bypassed by user-space C code edits in the VM guest.
2. The target source files or functions described in the bug description do not exist in the checked-out codebase,
meaning the codebase version is mismatched and the target code is absent.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT classify a run as a terminal failure or assume a bug is fixed based on git log entries, commit titles,
or commit messages. Reproducibility can ONLY be determined by executing reproducer candidates in the VM.
- Do NOT suggest C code strategies, repairs, or namespace bypasses when setting 'TerminalError'.
=== PHASE 1: CAPABILITY PROBING (EVALUATION) ===
The executed program was a simple environment probe.
Use this to guide your classification and feedback:
1. If the execution was successful (all environment/subsystem probes passed and program exited with 0),
set the field 'ProbePassed' to true and provide feedback explicitly indicating that the environment
is ready and the agent should now proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
2. If the probe failed (e.g., missing permissions, missing devices, or sandbox restrictions),
set the field 'ProbePassed' to false, and explain what failed in the 'Feedback'
field so the generator can adjust its setups.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader
Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match
------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#0: syz.2.1764/13608
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13608 Comm: syz.2.1764 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e 21 fe ff 48 89 c5 e8 46 8b fb ff 48 85 ed 0f 85 9f fc ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 58 4c 8b 7c 24 60 e8 2e 8b fb ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 25 8b fb ff 49 8d bf d0 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b57d98 EFLAGS: 00010087
RAX: 000000000000086c RBX: ffff88801c0e5000 RCX: ffffc90024800000
RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: ffffffff821064e2 RDI: ffff888027852580
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88801c0e50b0 R12: ffff88801c0e50b8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88801c0e5198 R15: ffff88801c0ab800
FS: 00007fa41bfdb6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5b61000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f60453c8ff8 CR3: 0000000035d0b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x2e6/0x3d0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa41b19e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa41bfdb028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa41b425fa0 RCX: 00007fa41b19e159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fa41b235024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa41b426038 R14: 00007fa41b425fa0 R15: 00007ffd22388a08
</TASK>
IsProbe: true
Reproduced: false
Console Output: [ 60.636867][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 60.636937][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:202): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5831 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638582][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:203): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5831 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:204): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5831 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 60.638614][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782093.029:205): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5831 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 63.180992][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782095.569:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5839 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.221419][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782095.609:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:53645' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 63.843063][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:208): avc: denied { search } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] All probes passed.
[ 63.843152][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3753 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 63.845538][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:210): avc: denied { open } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3753 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 63.845570][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782096.229:211): avc: denied { search } for pid=5852 comm="syz-executor551" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.053964][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 14 callbacks suppressed
[ 66.054177][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782098.439:226): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.089041][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782098.479:227): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.425952][ T1380] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.426058][ T1380] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.898384][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782099.289:228): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.931359][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782099.319:229): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Strace Output: /strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor552085699
<...>
[ 59.706233][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 59.706294][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:200): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5824 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.706538][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:201): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5824 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.706993][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:202): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5824 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 59.707082][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782171.823:203): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5824 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.922795][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.033:204): avc: denied { write } for pid=5832 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 62.965874][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.073:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5835 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.719569][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.833:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.760389][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.873:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.826083][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.933:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 63.865028][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782175.973:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:34741' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor552085699", ["/syz-executor552085699"], 0x7ffefd09cd10 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5555803ba000
brk(0x5555803bad80) = 0x5555803bad80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x5555803ba400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x5555803ba6d0) = 5881
set_robust_list(0x5555803ba6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor552085699", 4096) = 22
getrandom("\x24\x96\xe8\x07\x52\x6c\xe7\xe0", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x5555803bad80
brk(0x5555803dbd80) = 0x5555803dbd80
brk(0x5555803dc000) = 0x5555803dc000
mprotect(0x7fe829f09000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
[ 65.523254][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 6 callbacks suppressed
[ 65.523362][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.633:216): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.523382][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.633:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3617 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 65.542191][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.653:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5882 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.542787][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.653:219): avc: denied { open } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=3617 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY) = 3
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
[ 65.563537][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:220): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.563591][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="per_cpu" dev="tracefs" ino=3603 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 4
[ 65.564388][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:222): avc: denied { search } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="cpu0" dev="tracefs" ino=3604 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 4, 0) = 0x7fe829e58000
close(3) = 0
close(4) = 0
write(1, "[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n[+] mmap successful.\n["..., 122) = 122
exit_group(0) = ?
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] All probes passed.
[ 65.564405][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.673:223): avc: denied { read } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" name="trace_pipe_raw" dev="tracefs" ino=3607 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 65.578275][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.693:224): avc: denied { map } for pid=5881 comm="syz-executor552" path="/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw" dev="tracefs" ino=3607 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
+++ exited with 0 +++
[ 65.598309][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782177.713:225): avc: denied { write } for pid=5885 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 66.427842][ T1382] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.430302][ T1382] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
Crash Report:
|
| 78/4 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
llm |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10069
output: 66
thoughts: 373
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the Capability Probe Execution**
I've just finished examining the output from the executed capability probe, and I'm confident in my assessment. The program successfully interacted with the kernel's tracing facilities. Looking at the console output, I see clear confirmations: `trace_marker` was opened, `trace_pipe_raw` was opened, `mmap` was successful, and crucially, "All probes passed." This indicates a healthy environment for further testing.
Diving into the `strace` output corroborates these findings. I can see the explicit `openat` calls to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker` and `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`, followed by a successful `mmap` of the `trace_pipe_raw`. The subsequent `close` calls and the `write` to standard output for the success messages all align perfectly. The process terminated with an `exit_group(0)`, which is the standard indicator of a successful, clean exit.
Given this evidence, I can definitively conclude that the `ProbePassed` flag should be set to `true`. There were no unexpected errors, so `TerminalError` should remain empty. Since no crash or kernel panic occurred, `TitleMatches` should be `false`. Finally, my `Feedback` should clearly communicate that the environment is ready and the agent should proceed with generating the full reproducer. Now, I'll proceed to call `set-results` with these conclusions.
|
| 79/4 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[Feedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
Results: map[Feedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
|
| 80/3 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
action |
loop-controller |
0m
Results: map[CapabilitiesVerified:true ContinueSignal:continue EquivalenceAnalysis: OracleFeedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ReproC: Reproduced:false ReproducedBugTitle: ReproducedCrashReport:]
|
| 81/2 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
iteration |
1 |
3m
|
| 82/3 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
action |
If |
0m
Args: map[OracleFeedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.]
|
| 83/4 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
agent |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Instruction: You are an expert in Linux kernel debugging.
Refine the reproduction strategy based on feedback from previous attempts.
Analyze the technical diagnosis provided in the oracle feedback and translate it into concrete,
step-by-step instructions for the repro-generator on how to modify the code structure, alignments,
offsets, or parameters of the candidate program.
=== TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES ===
- Prefer codesearch-definition-source and codesearch-struct-layout first for symbol lookups.
- Fall back to read-file or grepper for macros, headers, or if symbol lookup fails.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT repeat searches for the same symbols or files. Use information you have already gathered.
- Do NOT write long explanations. Keep your reasoning short and focused on actionable changes.
- Do NOT assume a bug is fixed based on git commit history.
- If you are stuck, try a different approach or proceed to generate a candidate reproducer.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader
Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match
------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#0: syz.2.1764/13608
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13608 Comm: syz.2.1764 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e 21 fe ff 48 89 c5 e8 46 8b fb ff 48 85 ed 0f 85 9f fc ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 58 4c 8b 7c 24 60 e8 2e 8b fb ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 25 8b fb ff 49 8d bf d0 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b57d98 EFLAGS: 00010087
RAX: 000000000000086c RBX: ffff88801c0e5000 RCX: ffffc90024800000
RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: ffffffff821064e2 RDI: ffff888027852580
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88801c0e50b0 R12: ffff88801c0e50b8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88801c0e5198 R15: ffff88801c0ab800
FS: 00007fa41bfdb6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5b61000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f60453c8ff8 CR3: 0000000035d0b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x2e6/0x3d0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa41b19e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa41bfdb028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa41b425fa0 RCX: 00007fa41b19e159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fa41b235024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa41b426038 R14: 00007fa41b425fa0 R15: 00007ffd22388a08
</TASK>
Current Strategy: An analysis of the bug and a C reproducer to trigger the `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`.
### Bug Analysis
The warning `WARN_ON(!reader)` in `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` is triggered when `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL`.
By tracing the paths in `__rb_get_reader_page()`, it can return `NULL` without triggering any internal `RB_WARN_ON` in two specific cases:
1. `rb_num_of_entries(cpu_buffer) == 0`
2. `cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page`
The root cause is a race condition between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU.
When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page.
1. **Writer (CPU 0)**: Starts writing an event that requires moving to a new page. It increments `entries` (making `rb_per_cpu_empty()` return false for the reader). It then calls `rb_set_commit_to_write()`, which advances `commit_page` to the new page via `rb_inc_page(&cpu_buffer->commit_page)`.
2. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. It sees the buffer is not empty and calls `rb_get_reader_page()`.
3. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Swaps the `head_page` (which happens to be the new `commit_page` the writer just moved to). The reader page is now the `commit_page`.
4. **Reader (CPU 1)**: In the `again` loop, it checks `rb_page_size(reader)`. Because the writer was preempted/delayed exactly before updating the page's `commit` field, the size is `0`.
5. **Reader (CPU 1)**: Since the size is `0`, it falls through and checks `if (cpu_buffer->commit_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)`. This evaluates to **true**, causing it to return `NULL`.
6. **Reader (CPU 1)**: `ring_buffer_map_get_reader()` receives `NULL` and triggers `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
### Reproduction Strategy
To reproduce this race condition, we need to keep the ring buffer mostly empty so that the reader and writer constantly interact on the same page, and hit the tiny race window:
1. Open the `trace_pipe_raw` file for a specific CPU (e.g., `cpu0`) with `O_NONBLOCK`.
2. `mmap` at least one page of the file to set `cpu_buffer->user_mapped = 1`, which is required for the ioctl to proceed.
3. Spawn a **Writer Thread** pinned to CPU 0 that continuously writes small payloads to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker`.
4. Spawn a **Reader Thread** pinned to CPU 1 that continuously calls `ioctl(fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on the raw pipe.
### C Reproducer
```c
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
write(fd_marker, "A", 1);
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set);
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
Feedback: The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
Reply: An analysis of the bug and the provided strategy indicates that the race condition occurs between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU. When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page, leading to a situation where `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL` and triggers the `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
The provided C reproducer correctly sets up this scenario by:
1. Pinning a writer thread to CPU 0, which continuously writes to `trace_marker` (advancing the `commit_page` on CPU 0's ring buffer).
2. Pinning a reader thread to CPU 1, which continuously calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on CPU 0's `trace_pipe_raw`.
3. Ensuring the buffer is marked as `user_mapped` by `mmap`ing the meta-page.
I have refined the reproducer slightly to include fallback paths for `debugfs` (in case `tracefs` is mounted there instead) and added basic error handling for the thread affinity setup.
```c
// autogenerated
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
perror("sched_setaffinity writer");
}
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, just keep writing to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
perror("sched_setaffinity reader");
}
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
|
| 84/5 |
2026/09/07 11:56 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 5538
output: 25
thoughts: 987
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the Ring Buffer Map Get Reader Bug**
I've been reviewing a bug report concerning `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` that's triggering a `WARN_ON(!reader)`. The user has provided a detailed bug description, their current strategy for reproducing it, and a C reproducer. The feedback I received stated that the "capability probe executed successfully" and that "the environment is ready" and I should "proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration."
Initially, I looked at the C reproducer the user provided, and it struck me as almost complete. It includes the necessary headers, defines the `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` ioctl, sets up a writer thread to continuously write to the `trace_marker` (which should advance the commit page), and a reader thread to repeatedly call `ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. This setup is clearly designed to create a race condition between the writer updating the commit page and the reader attempting to retrieve a reader for that page. The threads are pinned to different CPUs (0 and 1) to further facilitate concurrency.
My immediate next step was to verify the definition of the `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` ioctl. The user has defined it as `_IO('R', 0x20)`. I need to confirm this is the correct definition within the kernel. I'll likely use a tool like `grepper` to search for this specific ioctl definition in relevant kernel headers, such as `include/uapi/linux/trace_mmap.h` or within `kernel/trace/trace.c`.
The core of the bug appears to be a race condition. To increase the likelihood of hitting this race, the user's strategy of having continuously running threads seems appropriate. Running the reproducer for an extended period or potentially increasing the number of reader/writer threads could also be options, but for now, the provided structure seems robust.
Given the feedback, my primary task now is to ensure the provided C reproducer is indeed the "full reproducer" they are looking for. I will ensure it compiles and runs without errors, confirming that it correctly sets up the tracing environment and triggers the intended race. The feedback explicitly directs me to *generate* the reproducer, not to perform further debugging actions like calling external tools. Therefore, I will focus on presenting this C code as the final output, formatted appropriately.
In summary, I've analyzed the provided information, confirmed the apparent intent and structure of the reproducer, and identified the next logical verification step (confirming the ioctl definition). My focus is now on packaging this C code as the complete reproducer, as per the instructions.
|
| 85/5 |
2026/09/07 11:57 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER]
Results: map[Output:Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst=32=When the application is done with the current reader, it can get a new one using
Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst:33:the trace_pipe_raw ioctl() TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER. This ioctl also updates
Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst-34-the meta-page fields.
--
Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst=48=Example
--
Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst-92-
Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst:93: if (ioctl(fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER) < 0)
Documentation/trace/ring-buffer-map.rst-94- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
--
include/uapi/linux/trace_mmap.h=24=struct trace_buffer_meta {
--
include/uapi/linux/trace_mmap.h-46-
include/uapi/linux/trace_mmap.h:47:#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
include/uapi/linux/trace_mmap.h-48-
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=7376=static long tracing_buffers_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-7381-
kernel/trace/trace.c:7382: if (cmd == TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER) {
kernel/trace/trace.c-7383- if (!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
--
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c=183=TEST_F(map, meta_page_check)
--
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c-194-
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c:195: ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(desc->cpu_fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER), 0);
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c-196- ASSERT_EQ(desc->meta->reader.id, 0);
--
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c-201-again:
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c:202: ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(desc->cpu_fd, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER), 0);
tools/testing/selftests/ring-buffer/map_test.c-203-
]
|
| 86/5 |
2026/09/07 11:57 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7226
output: 1064
thoughts: 1032
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Crafting the `ioctl` Reproducer**
Okay, so I've been diving into this `ioctl` definition, and I'm confident it's correct. My next step is to translate this understanding into a working C reproducer.
As I started building it, I realized the core of the bug lies in the scenario where `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL`. To trigger this, I need to simulate a specific interaction pattern. The reproducer needs to ensure that the writer thread is pinned to CPU 0 and the reader thread is pinned to CPU 1.
Here's the logic: the writer will be writing to `/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker`. Critically, `trace_marker` writes to the ring buffer associated with the *current CPU* where the write operation occurs. So, by pinning the writer to CPU 0, I guarantee that its writes land in CPU 0's tracing buffer.
Now, for the reader. It's responsible for reading from `/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw`. This file represents CPU 0's tracing buffer, which is exactly where the writer is depositing its data. The reader is pinned to CPU 1, which is crucial because it ensures the reader thread runs concurrently with the writer thread, simulating a more realistic, potentially racy, environment. This setup perfectly mirrors the condition where the reader might encounter an issue while the writer is actively populating the buffer.
I also considered the lifecycle of the reproducer. I want it to run continuously, or at least until the crash occurs. The `pthread_join` in the provided code snippet is a good approach for this, as it will keep the main thread alive while waiting for the worker threads to finish (though in this case, they are designed to run indefinitely or until an error).
A minor but important detail: I've added fallback paths to open the `trace_marker` and `trace_pipe_raw` files. Syzkaller typically runs within a virtual machine, and while CPU 0 and CPU 1 are usually available, the tracing filesystem (`tracefs`) might not always be mounted at `/sys/kernel/tracing`. It's common for it to be at `/sys/kernel/debug/tracing` as well, so including this fallback makes the reproducer more robust.
With these considerations in mind, the reproducer feels solid and ready to be presented.
|
| 87/3 |
2026/09/07 11:57 |
action |
merge-strategy |
0m
Results: map[CurrentReproStrategy:An analysis of the bug and the provided strategy indicates that the race condition occurs between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU. When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page, leading to a situation where `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL` and triggers the `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
The provided C reproducer correctly sets up this scenario by:
1. Pinning a writer thread to CPU 0, which continuously writes to `trace_marker` (advancing the `commit_page` on CPU 0's ring buffer).
2. Pinning a reader thread to CPU 1, which continuously calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on CPU 0's `trace_pipe_raw`.
3. Ensuring the buffer is marked as `user_mapped` by `mmap`ing the meta-page.
I have refined the reproducer slightly to include fallback paths for `debugfs` (in case `tracefs` is mounted there instead) and added basic error handling for the thread affinity setup.
```c
// autogenerated
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
perror("sched_setaffinity writer");
}
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, just keep writing to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
perror("sched_setaffinity reader");
}
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```]
|
| 88/3 |
2026/09/07 11:57 |
agent |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Results: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to generate a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive
purpose of verifying a bugfix in an isolated environment.
To ensure that we can diagnose why a program might fail to run on the test environment,
you MUST include detailed logging and error checking in the generated C program:
1. Use 'printf(...)' for all progress messages and error logs.
2. Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value.
3. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name
and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status.
4. The program must print a message after every successful major step.
5. Generate code that follows this pattern for all operations:
int res = do_something();
if (res < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to do_something: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] do_something successful.\n");
6. The compilation and development environment (including compilers, build
systems, makefiles, and kernel build/header directories) is NOT available
on the target test VM guest. Do NOT check for, build, or reference any
compilation tools, build files, or kernel development directories.
7. Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries (e.g. by using
functions like 'system()', 'popen()', or the 'exec' family such as
'execve()'). All environment checks, capability probings, and reproduction
steps must be performed directly using standard Linux system calls (such
as 'open', 'socket', 'ioctl', 'stat', etc.).
8. When reproducing asynchronous kernel timeouts or warnings, always
include a sufficient delay (using sleep or similar) after deleting
or unregistering the device to allow the kernel's asynchronous
timeout to trigger before program exit.
=== PHASE 2: BUG REPRODUCTION (GENERATION) ===
You must now generate a full reproducer candidate attempting to trigger the target bug/crash.
Do NOT generate a probe program. Focus directly on triggering the bug/crash described in the description.
You can assume that all necessary kernel capabilities and privileges (e.g., access to /dev/vhci,
ability to load BPF programs, etc.) have already been verified and are available in the environment.
Do not spend too much time analyzing or trying to generate a perfect one-shot reproducer.
Instead, follow an iterative approach: generate a simple candidate, execute it, analyze the results,
and improve it. Keep your reasoning steps short and focused on the next logical experiment.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader
Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match
------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#0: syz.2.1764/13608
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13608 Comm: syz.2.1764 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e 21 fe ff 48 89 c5 e8 46 8b fb ff 48 85 ed 0f 85 9f fc ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 58 4c 8b 7c 24 60 e8 2e 8b fb ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 25 8b fb ff 49 8d bf d0 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b57d98 EFLAGS: 00010087
RAX: 000000000000086c RBX: ffff88801c0e5000 RCX: ffffc90024800000
RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: ffffffff821064e2 RDI: ffff888027852580
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88801c0e50b0 R12: ffff88801c0e50b8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88801c0e5198 R15: ffff88801c0ab800
FS: 00007fa41bfdb6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5b61000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f60453c8ff8 CR3: 0000000035d0b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x2e6/0x3d0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa41b19e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa41bfdb028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa41b425fa0 RCX: 00007fa41b19e159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fa41b235024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa41b426038 R14: 00007fa41b425fa0 R15: 00007ffd22388a08
</TASK>
Strategy: An analysis of the bug and the provided strategy indicates that the race condition occurs between a writer committing an event on one CPU and a reader mapping the ring buffer on another CPU. When the ring buffer is nearly empty, the `head_page` and `commit_page` can point to the same page, leading to a situation where `rb_get_reader_page()` returns `NULL` and triggers the `WARN_ON(!reader)`.
The provided C reproducer correctly sets up this scenario by:
1. Pinning a writer thread to CPU 0, which continuously writes to `trace_marker` (advancing the `commit_page` on CPU 0's ring buffer).
2. Pinning a reader thread to CPU 1, which continuously calls `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)` on CPU 0's `trace_pipe_raw`.
3. Ensuring the buffer is marked as `user_mapped` by `mmap`ing the meta-page.
I have refined the reproducer slightly to include fallback paths for `debugfs` (in case `tracefs` is mounted there instead) and added basic error handling for the thread affinity setup.
```c
// autogenerated
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
// ioctl command for TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
perror("sched_setaffinity writer");
}
// Constantly write to the ring buffer to advance the commit_page
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore errors, just keep writing to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
perror("sched_setaffinity reader");
}
// Constantly consume the buffer to race with the writer's commit update
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
// Open trace_marker for writing events
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
perror("open trace_marker");
return 1;
}
}
// Open trace_pipe_raw for CPU 0
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
perror("open trace_pipe_raw");
return 1;
}
}
// mmap 1 page (meta-page) to mark the buffer as user_mapped
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
pthread_t writer, reader;
pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(writer, NULL);
pthread_join(reader, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
Previous Reproducer Attempt:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
int fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
close(fd_marker);
close(fd_raw);
printf("[+] All probes passed.\n");
return 0;
}
Execution Results & Debugging Feedback:
The capability probe executed successfully. The environment is ready, trace files can be opened and mmap'd. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
|
| 89/4 |
2026/09/07 11:57 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6222
output: 981
thoughts: 1275
Thoughts: **My Thoughts on Replicating the `ring_buffer_map_get_reader` Warning**
It's become clear that my primary objective right now is to create a robust, fully reproducible test case for that troublesome `WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader` message. The previous attempts have given me a solid foundation, but they weren't quite hitting the mark. I've identified the core of the problem: it's a race condition. Specifically, it occurs when a writer thread is busy committing an event on one CPU, and simultaneously, a reader thread is trying to map the ring buffer on a different CPU. The critical scenario seems to arise when the ring buffer is almost depleted. In this state, the `head_page` and `commit_page` pointers can end up pointing to the exact same memory page. This, in turn, causes `rb_get_reader_page()` to incorrectly return `NULL`, which then triggers that `WARN_ON(!reader)` condition I'm trying to hit.
My refined strategy for the reproducer involves a few key steps:
1. **Writer Thread Isolation:** I'll dedicate a writer thread to CPU 0. Its sole purpose will be to continuously write to the `trace_marker` facility. This ensures consistent CPU pinning for the writing side of the race.
2. **Reader Thread Isolation and Operation:** Conversely, I'll pin a reader thread to CPU 1. This thread will repeatedly call `ioctl(TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER)`. Crucially, this call will be directed at the `trace_pipe_raw` associated with CPU 0, which is where the writer is actively pushing data.
3. **Buffer State Management:** To make sure the ring buffer is in a state where the race is likely to occur, I need to ensure it's marked as `user_mapped`. The way to achieve this, according to my understanding, is by explicitly `mmap`ing the meta-page of the ring buffer.
With this strategy in mind, I've drafted the C code. I've included all the necessary headers and defined the `TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER` ioctl. I've implemented the `writer_thread` and `reader_thread` functions, ensuring they handle CPU affinity using `sched_setaffinity` and exit gracefully (or rather, attempt to fail gracefully with informative messages) if affinity setting fails. The `main` function is responsible for opening the necessary file descriptors for `trace_marker` and `trace_pipe_raw`, falling back to debugfs paths if needed. It then performs the critical `mmap` of the meta-page. Finally, it creates the two threads and lets them run.
I've added a `sleep(5)` in the `main` function. Initially, I thought this was just to give the threads some time. However, I realized that if `main` exits, the entire process will terminate. This means the warning, which is expected to go to `dmesg`, might not even be observable if the process dies too quickly. So, while the threads are designed to run infinitely, the main thread's `sleep` and subsequent exit are intentional to observe the kernel's reaction in `dmesg` before the process is cleanly shut down.
The reproducer seems to cover all the requirements I've identified. I'll be using `set-results` to deliver this fully formed reproducer.
|
| 90/4 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
]
Results: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 91/3 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
loop |
|
0m
|
| 92/4 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
iteration |
0 |
0m
|
| 93/5 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
action |
merge-repro-c |
0m
Results: map[CurrentCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 94/5 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
action |
compile-c-prog |
0m
Results: map[CompilerError: FormattedReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 95/5 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 96/3 |
2026/09/07 11:58 |
action |
run-c-repro |
1m
Results: map[CandidateBugTitle:WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader CandidateCrashReport:------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#1: syz-executor152/5857
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5857 Comm: syz-executor152 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: 89 f0 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 bf 40 fc ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 70 f7 ff ff e8 b1 40 fc ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3a ff ff ff e8 33 eb fb 09 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003727d20 EFLAGS: 00010093
RAX: ffffffff81c9b84f RBX: ffff8881000a50b0 RCX: ffff8881f961cb00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003727e78 R08: ffff8881000aa00f R09: 1ffff11020015401
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1020015402 R12: 1ffff920006e4fbc
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881000a5000 R15: 0000000000000ff0
FS: 00007f87e60ec6c0(0000) GS:ffff8882e8473000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f87e60ec148 CR3: 000000018b57c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x258/0x300 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f87e6921cab
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1c 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f87e60ec130 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87e60eccdc RCX: 00007f87e6921cab
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f87e60ec6c0
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffec1c24ba0 R15: 00007ffec1c24c88
</TASK>
CandidateReproduced:true ConsoleOutput:[ 62.539444][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 62.541189][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5827 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541213][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5827 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541225][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5827 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541237][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5827 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 65.283334][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782367.877:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5834 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.319030][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782367.917:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5837 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.464442][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.057:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.505299][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.107:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:1041' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 65.749279][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.347:209): avc: denied { search } for pid=5853 comm="syz-executor242" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.757687][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.347:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="syz-executor242" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=1167 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 66.416553][ T1382] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.416620][ T1382] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
[ 67.601230][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 13 callbacks suppressed
[ 67.601333][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.197:224): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.690706][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.287:225): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.846663][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.447:226): avc: denied { write } for pid=5880 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.928493][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.527:227): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 68.821744][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782371.417:228): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 68.907973][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782371.507:229): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.
[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.
[+] Reproducer finished.
[ 76.655945][ T25] cfg80211: failed to load regulatory.db
OtherCrashReports:<nil> StraceOutput: TestError:]
|
| 97/3 |
2026/09/07 11:59 |
action |
truncate-log |
0m
Results: map[TruncatedConsoleOutput:[ 62.539444][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 62.541189][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5827 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541213][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5827 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541225][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5827 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541237][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5827 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 65.283334][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782367.877:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5834 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.319030][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782367.917:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5837 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.464442][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.057:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.505299][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.107:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:1041' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 65.749279][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.347:209): avc: denied { search } for pid=5853 comm="syz-executor242" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.757687][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.347:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="syz-executor242" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=1167 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 66.416553][ T1382] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.416620][ T1382] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
[ 67.601230][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 13 callbacks suppressed
[ 67.601333][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.197:224): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.690706][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.287:225): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.846663][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.447:226): avc: denied { write } for pid=5880 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.928493][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.527:227): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 68.821744][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782371.417:228): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 68.907973][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782371.507:229): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.
[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.
[+] Reproducer finished.
[ 76.655945][ T25] cfg80211: failed to load regulatory.db
TruncatedCrashReport:------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#1: syz-executor152/5857
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5857 Comm: syz-executor152 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: 89 f0 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 bf 40 fc ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 70 f7 ff ff e8 b1 40 fc ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3a ff ff ff e8 33 eb fb 09 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003727d20 EFLAGS: 00010093
RAX: ffffffff81c9b84f RBX: ffff8881000a50b0 RCX: ffff8881f961cb00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003727e78 R08: ffff8881000aa00f R09: 1ffff11020015401
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1020015402 R12: 1ffff920006e4fbc
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881000a5000 R15: 0000000000000ff0
FS: 00007f87e60ec6c0(0000) GS:ffff8882e8473000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f87e60ec148 CR3: 000000018b57c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x258/0x300 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f87e6921cab
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1c 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f87e60ec130 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87e60eccdc RCX: 00007f87e6921cab
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f87e60ec6c0
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffec1c24ba0 R15: 00007ffec1c24c88
</TASK>
TruncatedStraceOutput:]
|
| 98/3 |
2026/09/07 11:59 |
agent |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Results: map[Feedback:The reproduction attempt successfully triggered the target crash. The crash signature and call trace exactly match the expected bug, confirming that the reproducer is correct and effective. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Analyze the results of running the generated program.
=== CRITICAL ENVIRONMENT & TARGET CLASSIFICATION ===
Set 'TerminalError' to a descriptive error message ONLY if:
1. The execution failed due to missing hardware device nodes, subsystems, kernel modules, or privilege limits
that cannot be loaded, created, or bypassed by user-space C code edits in the VM guest.
2. The target source files or functions described in the bug description do not exist in the checked-out codebase,
meaning the codebase version is mismatched and the target code is absent.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT classify a run as a terminal failure or assume a bug is fixed based on git log entries, commit titles,
or commit messages. Reproducibility can ONLY be determined by executing reproducer candidates in the VM.
- Do NOT suggest C code strategies, repairs, or namespace bypasses when setting 'TerminalError'.
=== PHASE 2: BUG REPRODUCTION (EVALUATION) ===
The executed program was a full reproducer candidate attempting to trigger the target bug/crash.
Use this to guide your classification and feedback:
1. If a crash was triggered (Reproduced is true):
- Determine if the triggered crash matches the expected bug.
- If you conclude they represent the same underlying bug (the same root cause)
despite different titles, crash signatures, or call traces, set TitleMatches
to true and provide a detailed, technical, and verbose explanation of the
equivalence in the 'Feedback' field.
- If they do not represent the same bug (a completely unrelated crash/collision),
set TitleMatches to false and explain the collision in 'Feedback'.
- If they match exactly, set TitleMatches to true and provide a brief confirmation in 'Feedback'.
2. If the execution was successful (exit 0) WITHOUT a crash (Reproduced is false):
- The reproduction attempt failed to trigger the bug. Analyze the console/strace output
to understand why the bug did not trigger (e.g., timing, input arguments, environment setup)
and provide feedback on how to improve the reproducer logic to trigger the crash.
Critical Diagnostic Rule for Reproduction Failures:
If the reproduction attempt fails (e.g., a system call returns an error, or a
warning/error message appears in the console log), you MUST:
1. Identify the failing system call from the execution trace or strace output.
2. Identify any corresponding warning or error messages in the console log.
3. Immediately search the kernel source tree for the warning message strings or
the code of the failing system call/subsystem to locate the validation logic.
4. Trace the kernel's validation logic to diagnose the exact constraint violation
or input mismatch in the generated program.
5. Provide a technical diagnosis in the feedback explaining the exact kernel constraint that was violated and why.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader
Cannot find set identified by id 0 to match
------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#0: syz.2.1764/13608
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13608 Comm: syz.2.1764 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x5f3/0x930 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: ff 48 89 df e8 2e 21 fe ff 48 89 c5 e8 46 8b fb ff 48 85 ed 0f 85 9f fc ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 58 4c 8b 7c 24 60 e8 2e 8b fb ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e8 25 8b fb ff 49 8d bf d0 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006b57d98 EFLAGS: 00010087
RAX: 000000000000086c RBX: ffff88801c0e5000 RCX: ffffc90024800000
RDX: 0000000000080000 RSI: ffffffff821064e2 RDI: ffff888027852580
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88801c0e50b0 R12: ffff88801c0e50b8
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88801c0e5198 R15: ffff88801c0ab800
FS: 00007fa41bfdb6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d5b61000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f60453c8ff8 CR3: 0000000035d0b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x2e6/0x3d0 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa41b19e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa41bfdb028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa41b425fa0 RCX: 00007fa41b19e159
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007fa41b235024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fa41b426038 R14: 00007fa41b425fa0 R15: 00007ffd22388a08
</TASK>
IsProbe: false
Reproduced: true
Console Output: [ 62.539444][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 62.541189][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5827 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541213][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5827 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541225][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5827 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 62.541237][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782365.137:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5827 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 65.283334][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782367.877:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5834 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.319030][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782367.917:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5837 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.464442][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.057:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.505299][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.107:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:1041' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 65.749279][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.347:209): avc: denied { search } for pid=5853 comm="syz-executor242" name="/" dev="tracefs" ino=1 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 65.757687][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782368.347:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="syz-executor242" name="trace_marker" dev="tracefs" ino=1167 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t tclass=file permissive=1
[ 66.416553][ T1382] ieee802154 phy0 wpan0: encryption failed: -22
[ 66.416620][ T1382] ieee802154 phy1 wpan1: encryption failed: -22
[ 67.601230][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 13 callbacks suppressed
[ 67.601333][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.197:224): avc: denied { write } for pid=5874 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.690706][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.287:225): avc: denied { write } for pid=5877 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.846663][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.447:226): avc: denied { write } for pid=5880 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 67.928493][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782370.527:227): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 68.821744][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782371.417:228): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 68.907973][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1788782371.507:229): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[+] trace_marker opened successfully.
[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.
[+] mmap successful.
[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.
[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.
[+] Reproducer finished.
[ 76.655945][ T25] cfg80211: failed to load regulatory.db
Strace Output:
Crash Report: ------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#1: syz-executor152/5857
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5857 Comm: syz-executor152 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: 89 f0 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 bf 40 fc ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 70 f7 ff ff e8 b1 40 fc ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3a ff ff ff e8 33 eb fb 09 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003727d20 EFLAGS: 00010093
RAX: ffffffff81c9b84f RBX: ffff8881000a50b0 RCX: ffff8881f961cb00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003727e78 R08: ffff8881000aa00f R09: 1ffff11020015401
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1020015402 R12: 1ffff920006e4fbc
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881000a5000 R15: 0000000000000ff0
FS: 00007f87e60ec6c0(0000) GS:ffff8882e8473000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f87e60ec148 CR3: 000000018b57c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x258/0x300 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f87e6921cab
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1c 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f87e60ec130 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87e60eccdc RCX: 00007f87e6921cab
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f87e60ec6c0
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffec1c24ba0 R15: 00007ffec1c24c88
</TASK>
|
| 99/4 |
2026/09/07 11:59 |
llm |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 8701
output: 62
thoughts: 628
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the Generated Program's Results**
So, I've just gone through the output from the generated program, and I'm pleased to report that the crash we were expecting has indeed been reproduced. The `Reproduced` flag is set to `true`, which is the first confirmation. Looking at the crash report itself, I see a `WARNING` originating from `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c` at `ring_buffer_map_get_reader`. The call trace shows the execution path leading to this warning: it goes through `tracing_buffers_ioctl` and then `vfs_ioctl`.
This is precisely what I anticipated. I compared this crash report to the expected bug signature, and the call traces align perfectly. Specifically, the `ring_buffer.c` warning and the sequence of `ioctl` calls are identical. This level of match gives me high confidence that the reproducer worked exactly as intended and hit the target bug.
Given this exact match, I'm going to set `TitleMatches` to `true`. Now, regarding `ProbePassed`, I need to be careful here. The instructions state it should be `true` *only* if the program was a "minimal capability probe" and all checks succeeded. Since what we've executed here is a *full reproducer* and not a minimal probe, `ProbePassed` should be `false`. This distinction is important for how the system categorizes the results.
So, to summarize my feedback for the system: the reproduction attempt was successful in triggering the target crash, the crash signature and call trace are an exact match to the expected bug, confirming the reproducer's effectiveness.
Therefore, my final settings will be:
* `TitleMatches: true`
* `ProbePassed: false`
* `TerminalError: ""` (as there's no unexpected terminal error, just the reproduced crash).
I'm now ready to call `set-results`.
|
| 100/4 |
2026/09/07 12:00 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[Feedback:The reproduction attempt successfully triggered the target crash. The crash signature and call trace exactly match the expected bug, confirming that the reproducer is correct and effective. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
Results: map[Feedback:The reproduction attempt successfully triggered the target crash. The crash signature and call trace exactly match the expected bug, confirming that the reproducer is correct and effective. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
|
| 101/3 |
2026/09/07 12:00 |
action |
loop-controller |
0m
Results: map[CapabilitiesVerified:true ContinueSignal: EquivalenceAnalysis:The reproduction attempt successfully triggered the target crash. The crash signature and call trace exactly match the expected bug, confirming that the reproducer is correct and effective. OracleFeedback:The reproduction attempt successfully triggered the target crash. The crash signature and call trace exactly match the expected bug, confirming that the reproducer is correct and effective. ReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER _IO('R', 0x20)
int fd_raw;
int fd_marker;
void *writer_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(0, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity writer failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Writer thread pinned to CPU 0.\n");
while (1) {
if (write(fd_marker, "A", 1) < 0) {
// Ignore write errors to maintain pressure
}
}
return NULL;
}
void *reader_thread(void *arg) {
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(1, &set);
if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(set), &set) < 0) {
printf("[-] sched_setaffinity reader failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] Reader thread pinned to CPU 1.\n");
while (1) {
ioctl(fd_raw, TRACE_MMAP_IOCTL_GET_READER);
}
return NULL;
}
int main() {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
fd_marker = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker", O_WRONLY);
if (fd_marker < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_marker: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_marker opened successfully.\n");
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
fd_raw = open("/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd_raw < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
printf("[+] trace_pipe_raw opened successfully.\n");
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd_raw, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("[-] Failed to mmap trace_pipe_raw: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] mmap successful.\n");
pthread_t writer, reader;
int res = pthread_create(&writer, NULL, writer_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create writer thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
res = pthread_create(&reader, NULL, reader_thread, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to create reader thread: %s\n", strerror(res));
exit(1);
}
// Let it run for a while to trigger the race
sleep(5);
printf("[+] Reproducer finished.\n");
return 0;
}
Reproduced:true ReproducedBugTitle:WARNING in ring_buffer_map_get_reader ReproducedCrashReport:------------[ cut here ]------------
!reader
WARNING: kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927 at ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927, CPU#1: syz-executor152/5857
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5857 Comm: syz-executor152 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_map_get_reader+0x940/0x9d0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7927
Code: 89 f0 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 bf 40 fc ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 70 f7 ff ff e8 b1 40 fc ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3a ff ff ff e8 33 eb fb 09 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003727d20 EFLAGS: 00010093
RAX: ffffffff81c9b84f RBX: ffff8881000a50b0 RCX: ffff8881f961cb00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003727e78 R08: ffff8881000aa00f R09: 1ffff11020015401
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1020015402 R12: 1ffff920006e4fbc
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8881000a5000 R15: 0000000000000ff0
FS: 00007f87e60ec6c0(0000) GS:ffff8882e8473000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f87e60ec148 CR3: 000000018b57c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tracing_buffers_ioctl+0x258/0x300 kernel/trace/trace.c:7392
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f87e6921cab
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c2 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1c 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f87e60ec130 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87e60eccdc RCX: 00007f87e6921cab
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000005220 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000021 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f87e60ec6c0
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffd0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffec1c24ba0 R15: 00007ffec1c24c88
</TASK>
]
|
| 102/1 |
2026/09/07 12:00 |
action |
save-repro-c |
0m
Results:
|