| 0/0 |
2026/08/11 22:53 |
flow |
repro-c |
27m
Results: map[EquivalenceAnalysis:The reproducer successfully triggered a circular locking dependency warning that matches the underlying root cause of the original bug report.
The original report describes a lockdep cycle:
`&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (from `configfs_write_iter`).
The reproducer triggered a shorter cycle in the same dependency graph:
`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `configfs_rmdir` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`).
Both crashes demonstrate the same fundamental lock ordering violation between the USB gadget subsystem lock (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`) and configfs/VFS locks (`i_mutex_key`, `frag_sem`). The reproducer is valid and successfully demonstrates the lock inversion. OtherCrashReports:<nil> ReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
Reproduced:true ReproducedBugTitle:possible deadlock in configfs_rmdir ReproducedCrashReport:======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x1a8/0x360 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&opts->dep_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
#0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:494
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1069 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __start_dirop fs/namei.c:2918 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: start_dirop fs/namei.c:2942 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520 fs/namei.c:5431
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
</TASK>
]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/08/11 22:53 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
0m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/9d4bc8dbb37da7464722132cca9f0756f97b7cb8]
|
| 2/1 |
2026/08/11 22:53 |
action |
kernel-builder |
0m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/9cdc858ce78d3a6fc0fc790ce6204dd1d92bb1e7]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/08/11 22:53 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
0m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
agent |
initial-researcher |
11m
Model:
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to analyze a Linux kernel bug description and propose a strategy to reproduce it
with a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive purpose of verifying a bugfix.
=== TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES ===
- When looking up C function or struct definitions, prefer codesearch-definition-source
and codesearch-struct-layout first.
- Fall back to read-file or grepper only if symbol lookup fails or when inspecting macros,
headers, or non-C files.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT propose an exploit. Focus solely on minimal technical reproduction of the bug state.
- Do NOT write long explanations. Keep your analysis and strategy proposal concise.
- Do NOT assume that the target bug has already been fixed just because a git commit title
or description mentions a similar bug or fix. Commit messages often reference related issues
or partial fixes. Proceed with proposing a reproduction strategy regardless of historical fix commits.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: Bug Description: possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.470/7146 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff901d0fe8 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write_killable+0x93/0x250 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643
configfs_rmdir+0x3fa/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1534
vfs_rmdir fs/namei.c:5381 [inline]
vfs_rmdir+0x328/0x8a0 fs/namei.c:5354
filename_rmdir+0x31a/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5458 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x46/0x70 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write+0x8b/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 --> &p->frag_sem
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by syz.0.470/7146:
#0: ffff88802c3c9270 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0x2aa/0x380 fs/file.c:1259
#1: ffff8880237ce450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
#2: ffff888048879080 (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x76/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:226
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7146 Comm: syz.0.470 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1c7 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab6139e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab621bd028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab61625fa0 RCX: 00007fab6139e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fab61435024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fab61626038 R14: 00007fab61625fa0 R15: 00007fff23ac2e08
</TASK>
Reply: To reproduce the circular locking dependency, we need to trigger the exact sequence of lock acquisitions described in the lockdep report. The cycle involves four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
Here is the step-by-step breakdown of how the dependencies are established:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
By executing these operations sequentially, lockdep will observe the full cycle and emit the warning.
### C Reproducer
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```
|
| 5/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 6127
output: 52
thoughts: 811
Thoughts: **My Thoughts on the Lockdep Warning**
This lockdep warning is pointing to a potential circular locking dependency, which is obviously a serious issue I need to get to the bottom of. The chain it's showing me is:
`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` --> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` --> `&p->frag_sem`
Let me break down what I'm seeing here. The task is attempting to acquire `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` within the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function. However, it's *already* holding `&p->frag_sem` when it tries to do this, with that acquisition happening in `flush_write_buffer`.
Now, I need to trace how this dependency chain is actually formed. The lockdep output is giving me a hint:
* **#3 (&p->frag_sem):** This lock is acquired during `configfs_rmdir`, which in turn calls `vfs_rmdir` and so on.
* **#2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24):** This is `inode_lock`. It's acquired in `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`, which seems to be reached through a path involving `usbg_make_tpg`, `target_fabric_make_tpg`, `configfs_mkdir`, and `vfs_mkdir`.
* **#1 (&opts->dep_lock):** This lock appears to be involved in `tcm_set_name`, which is called by `function_make`, which is then called by `configfs_mkdir`.
* **#0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex):** This is the one the task is trying to acquire in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`, which ultimately leads to `flush_write_buffer` and `configfs_write_iter` before hitting the VFS layer.
Okay, let me re-evaluate the chain as lockdep presents it:
* **#0:** `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` (the target acquisition)
* **#1:** `opts->dep_lock`
* **#2:** `sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
* **#3:** `p->frag_sem` (the currently held lock)
So, the task holds `&p->frag_sem` (acquired in `configfs_write_iter` -> `flush_write_buffer`) and is trying to get `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`.
Let's go back to tracing the established dependency:
1. **`configfs_rmdir` acquires `&p->frag_sem`:** I see `configfs_rmdir` uses `down_write_killable` on `&p->frag_sem`. This is happening *after* `vfs_rmdir` has acquired the `inode_lock` (`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`). This means I have a dependency: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` --> `&p->frag_sem`. This aligns with the #2 and #3 in the lockdep chain.
2. **`configfs_mkdir` acquires `inode_lock` (`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`):** This seems to be acquired by `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`, which is called via `usbg_make_tpg` and `target_fabric_make_tpg` from `configfs_mkdir` (and `vfs_mkdir`). So, `configfs_mkdir` holds `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`.
3. **The `opts->dep_lock` link:** Now I need to connect `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` to `opts->dep_lock` and then to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. I see that `tcm_set_name` (located in `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c`) acquires `&opts->dep_lock`. This `tcm_set_name` function is called by `function_make`, which is called from `configfs_mkdir`. This looks like the connection: `configfs_mkdir` acquires `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`, and then through the call chain (`function_make` -> `tcm_set_name`), it acquires `&opts->dep_lock`. This gives me `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` --> `&opts->dep_lock`. This matches #2 and #1.
4. **The final link:** The final step is to understand how `&opts->dep_lock` relates to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. The lockdep chain shows #1 --> #0. I need to examine `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` in `drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c` to see where it attempts to acquire `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` and under what conditions, and how that relates to holding `&opts->dep_lock`.
My immediate focus is now on the interaction points between `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` and the functions that acquire `&opts->dep_lock` and `&p->frag_sem`. I need to meticulously follow the call stacks and lock acquisition patterns in `uvc_configfs.c` and the `configfs` framework, paying close attention to the specific conditions under which these locks are taken.
|
| 6/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store]
Results: map[SourceCode: 818: static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
819: const char *page, size_t len)
820: {
821: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item->ci_parent);
822: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
823: struct uvcg_extension *xu = to_uvcg_extension(item);
824: struct config_item *opts_item;
825: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
826: int ret;
827: u8 num;
828:
829: ret = kstrtou8(page, 0, &num);
830: if (ret)
831: return ret;
832:
833: mutex_lock(su_mutex);
834:
835: opts_item = item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent;
836: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
837:
838: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
839: xu->desc.bNumControls = num;
840: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
841:
842: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
843:
844: return len;
845: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 7/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7425
output: 45
thoughts: 190
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Mutex Dependencies**
Okay, let me trace my thinking here. I've been analyzing a potential deadlock situation, and my current focus is on the interaction between `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` and a mutex I'll call `su_mutex`, which is part of `gadget_subsys`.
My first observation is that `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` directly acquires `su_mutex`. This is straightforward enough.
However, the critical piece is *where* `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` is being called from. I've identified that it's invoked by `configfs_write_iter`. Now, `configfs_write_iter` holds a semaphore, which I'll refer to as `&p->frag_sem`.
So, at this point, I see a new potential dependency chain emerging: `&p->frag_sem` appears to be acquired *before* `su_mutex`. This leads me to the tentative ordering: `&p->frag_sem` -> `su_mutex`.
But this is where my concern really kicks in. I have an *existing* established dependency chain that I need to reconcile with this new one. The existing chain is more complex: `su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`.
The existing chain clearly shows `su_mutex` being acquired *before* `&p->frag_sem`. My new observation, however, suggests the reverse order is occurring in the call path I'm currently examining. This is a direct contradiction.
To resolve this, I need to carefully re-examine the existing chain. Specifically, I'm asking myself: "Where exactly does the dependency `su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` originate?" My immediate thought is to look into the `tcm_set_name` function, as this seems like a plausible place where such a high-level subsystem mutex would lead into more specific configuration locks.
My overall goal here is to ensure there are no circular dependencies or incorrect locking orders that could lead to a deadlock, especially given the intricate nature of these subsystems. This meticulous tracing of mutex acquisitions is crucial.
|
| 8/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_set_name]
Results: map[SourceCode:2663: static int tcm_set_name(struct usb_function_instance *f, const char *name)
2664: {
2665: struct f_tcm_opts *opts = container_of(f, struct f_tcm_opts, func_inst);
2666:
2667: pr_debug("tcm: Activating %s\n", name);
2668:
2669: mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock);
2670: opts->ready = true;
2671: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
2672:
2673: return 0;
2674: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 9/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7861
output: 38
thoughts: 74
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacking the Locking Mechanism**
Okay, so I'm looking at this code, and my immediate thought is about the locking. I see that `tcm_set_name` is acquiring `opts->dep_lock`. This immediately triggers a question in my mind: where is `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` being acquired *before* `tcm_set_name` is called? This is crucial for understanding the potential for deadlocks or race conditions. My next step in tracing this is to identify the call site for `tcm_set_name`. I've found it – it's being called from `function_make` within `drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c`. Now I need to go and examine the locking behavior in `function_make` to see how `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` is handled in relation to the call to `tcm_set_name` and its acquisition of `opts->dep_lock`.
|
| 10/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c Name:function_make]
Results: map[SourceCode: 601: static struct config_group *function_make(
602: struct config_group *group,
603: const char *name)
604: {
605: struct gadget_info *gi;
606: struct usb_function_instance *fi;
607: char buf[MAX_NAME_LEN];
608: char *func_name;
609: char *instance_name;
610: int ret;
611:
612: if (strlen(name) >= MAX_NAME_LEN)
613: return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
614:
615: scnprintf(buf, MAX_NAME_LEN, "%s", name);
616:
617: func_name = buf;
618: instance_name = strchr(func_name, '.');
619: if (!instance_name) {
620: pr_err("Unable to locate . in FUNC.INSTANCE\n");
621: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
622: }
623: *instance_name = '\0';
624: instance_name++;
625:
626: fi = usb_get_function_instance(func_name);
627: if (IS_ERR(fi))
628: return ERR_CAST(fi);
629:
630: ret = config_item_set_name(&fi->group.cg_item, "%s", name);
631: if (ret) {
632: usb_put_function_instance(fi);
633: return ERR_PTR(ret);
634: }
635: if (fi->set_inst_name) {
636: ret = fi->set_inst_name(fi, instance_name);
637: if (ret) {
638: usb_put_function_instance(fi);
639: return ERR_PTR(ret);
640: }
641: }
642:
643: gi = container_of(group, struct gadget_info, functions_group);
644:
645: mutex_lock(&gi->lock);
646: list_add_tail(&fi->cfs_list, &gi->available_func);
647: mutex_unlock(&gi->lock);
648: return &fi->group;
649: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c]
|
| 11/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 8681
output: 36
thoughts: 60
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Configfs `function_make` and Mutex Behavior**
Okay, so I've been digging into the intricacies of configfs, specifically around how the `function_make` callback operates within the context of `make_item` or `make_group`. My current understanding is that `function_make` is essentially the hook that gets invoked when a new item or group is being created within configfs.
Now, what's really catching my attention is the locking mechanism employed during the `configfs_mkdir` operation. I've observed that `configfs_mkdir` is acquiring the `su_mutex`. This is a critical piece of information because it implies a specific synchronization strategy is in place for directory creation within configfs. I need to confirm this by directly examining the source code. My next step, therefore, is to dive into `fs/configfs/dir.c` and meticulously review the implementation of `configfs_mkdir` to verify this mutex acquisition. This will allow me to fully grasp the implications of this locking behavior on concurrent access and potential race conditions within the configfs filesystem.
|
| 12/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_mkdir]
Results: map[SourceCode:1289: static struct dentry *configfs_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
1290: struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
1291: {
1292: int ret = 0;
1293: int module_got = 0;
1294: struct config_group *group = NULL;
1295: struct config_item *item = NULL;
1296: struct config_item *parent_item;
1297: struct configfs_subsystem *subsys;
1298: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
1299: const struct config_item_type *type;
1300: struct module *subsys_owner = NULL, *new_item_owner = NULL;
1301: struct configfs_fragment *frag;
1302: struct name_snapshot n;
1303: const char *name;
1304:
1305: take_dentry_name_snapshot(&n, dentry);
1306: name = n.name.name;
1307:
1308: sd = dentry->d_parent->d_fsdata;
1309:
1310: /*
1311: * Fake invisibility if dir belongs to a group/default groups hierarchy
1312: * being attached
1313: */
1314: if (!configfs_dirent_is_ready(sd)) {
1315: ret = -ENOENT;
1316: goto out;
1317: }
1318:
1319: if (!(sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DIR)) {
1320: ret = -EPERM;
1321: goto out;
1322: }
1323:
1324: frag = new_fragment();
1325: if (!frag) {
1326: ret = -ENOMEM;
1327: goto out;
1328: }
1329:
1330: /* Get a working ref for the duration of this function */
1331: parent_item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry->d_parent);
1332: type = parent_item->ci_type;
1333: subsys = to_config_group(parent_item)->cg_subsys;
1334: BUG_ON(!subsys);
1335:
1336: if (!type || !type->ct_group_ops ||
1337: (!type->ct_group_ops->make_group &&
1338: !type->ct_group_ops->make_item)) {
1339: ret = -EPERM; /* Lack-of-mkdir returns -EPERM */
1340: goto out_put;
1341: }
1342:
1343: /*
1344: * The subsystem may belong to a different module than the item
1345: * being created. We don't want to safely pin the new item but
1346: * fail to pin the subsystem it sits under.
1347: */
1348: if (!subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_type) {
1349: ret = -EINVAL;
1350: goto out_put;
1351: }
1352: subsys_owner = subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_type->ct_owner;
1353: if (!try_module_get(subsys_owner)) {
1354: ret = -EINVAL;
1355: goto out_put;
1356: }
1357:
1358: mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1359: if (type->ct_group_ops->make_group) {
1360: group = type->ct_group_ops->make_group(to_config_group(parent_item), name);
1361: if (!group)
1362: group = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1363: if (!IS_ERR(group)) {
1364: link_group(to_config_group(parent_item), group);
1365: item = &group->cg_item;
1366: } else
1367: ret = PTR_ERR(group);
1368: } else {
1369: item = type->ct_group_ops->make_item(to_config_group(parent_item), name);
1370: if (!item)
1371: item = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1372: if (!IS_ERR(item))
1373: link_obj(parent_item, item);
1374: else
1375: ret = PTR_ERR(item);
1376: }
1377: mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1378:
1379: if (ret) {
1380: /*
1381: * If ret != 0, then link_obj() was never called.
1382: * There are no extra references to clean up.
1383: */
1384: goto out_subsys_put;
1385: }
1386:
1387: /*
1388: * link_obj() has been called (via link_group() for groups).
1389: * From here on out, errors must clean that up.
1390: */
1391:
1392: type = item->ci_type;
1393: if (!type) {
1394: ret = -EINVAL;
1395: goto out_unlink;
1396: }
1397:
1398: new_item_owner = type->ct_owner;
1399: if (!try_module_get(new_item_owner)) {
1400: ret = -EINVAL;
1401: goto out_unlink;
1402: }
1403:
1404: /*
1405: * I hate doing it this way, but if there is
1406: * an error, module_put() probably should
1407: * happen after any cleanup.
1408: */
1409: module_got = 1;
1410:
1411: /*
1412: * Make racing rmdir() fail if it did not tag parent with
1413: * CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING
1414: * Note: if CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING is already set, attach_group() will
1415: * fail and let rmdir() terminate correctly
1416: */
1417: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1418: /* This will make configfs_detach_prep() fail */
1419: sd->s_type |= CONFIGFS_USET_IN_MKDIR;
1420: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1421:
1422: if (group)
1423: ret = configfs_attach_group(item, dentry, frag);
1424: else
1425: ret = configfs_attach_item(item, dentry, frag);
1426:
1427: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1428: sd->s_type &= ~CONFIGFS_USET_IN_MKDIR;
1429: if (!ret)
1430: configfs_dir_set_ready(dentry->d_fsdata);
1431: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1432:
1433: out_unlink:
1434: if (ret) {
1435: /* Tear down everything we built up */
1436: mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1437:
1438: client_disconnect_notify(parent_item, item);
1439: if (group)
1440: unlink_group(group);
1441: else
1442: unlink_obj(item);
1443: client_drop_item(parent_item, item);
1444:
1445: mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1446:
1447: if (module_got)
1448: module_put(new_item_owner);
1449: }
1450:
1451: out_subsys_put:
1452: if (ret)
1453: module_put(subsys_owner);
1454:
1455: out_put:
1456: /*
1457: * link_obj()/link_group() took a reference from child->parent,
1458: * so the parent is safely pinned. We can drop our working
1459: * reference.
1460: */
1461: config_item_put(parent_item);
1462: put_fragment(frag);
1463:
1464: out:
1465: release_dentry_name_snapshot(&n);
1466: return ERR_PTR(ret);
1467: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 13/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11348
output: 46
thoughts: 691
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Lock Ordering in ConfigFS**
Okay, let me trace this lock acquisition sequence in my head. It seems like there's a potential deadlock situation I need to untangle here.
So, I'm looking at `configfs_mkdir`. The first thing it does is acquire `subsys->su_mutex`. This is critical, as it's the top-level lock for the target subsystem in this context. Then, it proceeds to call a `make_group` callback. In this specific scenario, that callback is `function_make`, which in turn calls `tcm_set_name`. And `tcm_set_name` is where it acquires `opts->dep_lock`. This immediately establishes a dependency: `subsys->su_mutex` is held, then `opts->dep_lock` is acquired. So, the sequence so far is `subsys->su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`.
Now, I need to look at the next lock in the potential chain. The lockdep report points to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. The report explicitly states the order of acquisition here: `opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This is where it gets interesting, because the lockdep report is detailing the *reverse* order of how I initially understood the call chain. Let me re-examine the call stack provided by lockdep:
The report shows:
`-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:`
`configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259`
`usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686`
`target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939`
`configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360`
This call stack is what's making me question my initial assumption. I see `configfs_mkdir` directly calling `target_fabric_make_tpg`. Ah, I see it now! `target_fabric_make_tpg` *is* indeed a `make_group` callback. This means my initial understanding of the path through `configfs_mkdir` -> `make_group` -> `function_make` -> `tcm_set_name` was a bit simplified. The `target_fabric_make_tpg` function is the actual `make_group` implementation for the target fabric.
So, the true chain of calls from `configfs_mkdir` is:
`configfs_mkdir` acquires `subsys->su_mutex`.
Then, `configfs_mkdir` calls `target_fabric_make_tpg` (the `make_group` callback).
`target_fabric_make_tpg` then calls `usbg_make_tpg`.
And `usbg_make_tpg` is the one that calls `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`.
Now, let's look at what `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` does. It acquires the `inode_lock`, which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`.
So, the sequence is:
1. `configfs_mkdir` acquires `subsys->su_mutex` (let's call this `LockA`).
2. `target_fabric_make_tpg` is called.
3. `usbg_make_tpg` is called.
4. `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` is called and acquires `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (let's call this `LockC`).
But where does `&opts->dep_lock` (let's call this `LockB`) fit in? The lockdep report states:
`-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:`
`...`
`-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock)`
`...`
`-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex)`
This report is showing the lock hierarchy in reverse order of acquisition *from the perspective of lockdep tracking*. It's telling me that `LockC` (`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`) is acquired *after* `LockB` (`&opts->dep_lock`), and `LockB` is acquired *after* `LockA` (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`).
Therefore, the actual lock acquisition order is:
1. `configfs_mkdir` acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` (`LockA`).
2. Then, *some function within the call chain from `configfs_mkdir` to `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`* acquires `opts->dep_lock` (`LockB`). This is where `tcm_set_name` (called by `function_make`, which is called by the generic `make_group` infrastructure when `target_fabric_make_tpg` isn't directly invoked by `configfs_mkdir` itself, or perhaps an alternative path within the `make_group` logic) would fit in.
3. Finally, `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (`LockC`).
The critical question I'm wrestling with is: Does `usbg_make_tpg` or something it calls hold `&opts->dep_lock` before acquiring `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`? The lockdep report explicitly lists `&opts->dep_lock` as `#1` and `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` as `#2`. This strongly suggests that `&opts->dep_lock` *is* held before `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` is acquired. This confirms the lock ordering: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This ordering appears to be correct and avoids a deadlock. My initial suspicion was based on a slightly incomplete understanding of how `target_fabric_make_tpg` was integrated into the broader `configfs_mkdir` flow, but the lockdep report clarifies the actual sequence of lock acquisitions.
|
| 14/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_make_tpg]
Results: map[SourceCode:1653: static struct se_portal_group *usbg_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
1654: const char *name)
1655: {
1656: struct usbg_tport *tport = container_of(wwn, struct usbg_tport,
1657: tport_wwn);
1658: struct usbg_tpg *tpg;
1659: u16 tpgt;
1660: int ret;
1661: struct f_tcm_opts *opts;
1662: unsigned i;
1663:
1664: if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
1665: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1666: if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 0, &tpgt))
1667: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1668: ret = -ENODEV;
1669: mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1670: for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
1671: if (tpg_instances[i].func_inst && !tpg_instances[i].tpg)
1672: break;
1673: if (i == TPG_INSTANCES)
1674: goto unlock_inst;
1675:
1676: opts = container_of(tpg_instances[i].func_inst, struct f_tcm_opts,
1677: func_inst);
1678: mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock);
1679: if (!opts->ready)
1680: goto unlock_dep;
1681:
1682: if (opts->has_dep) {
1683: if (!try_module_get(opts->dependent))
1684: goto unlock_dep;
1685: } else {
1686: ret = configfs_depend_item_unlocked(
1687: wwn->wwn_group.cg_subsys,
1688: &opts->func_inst.group.cg_item);
1689: if (ret)
1690: goto unlock_dep;
1691: }
1692:
1693: tpg = kzalloc_obj(struct usbg_tpg);
1694: ret = -ENOMEM;
1695: if (!tpg)
1696: goto unref_dep;
1697: mutex_init(&tpg->tpg_mutex);
1698: atomic_set(&tpg->tpg_port_count, 0);
1699: tpg->workqueue = alloc_workqueue("tcm_usb_gadget",
1700: WQ_UNBOUND, WQ_UNBOUND_MAX_ACTIVE);
1701: if (!tpg->workqueue)
1702: goto free_tpg;
1703:
1704: tpg->tport = tport;
1705: tpg->tport_tpgt = tpgt;
1706:
1707: /*
1708: * SPC doesn't assign a protocol identifier for USB-SCSI, so we
1709: * pretend to be SAS..
1710: */
1711: ret = core_tpg_register(wwn, &tpg->se_tpg, SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS);
1712: if (ret < 0)
1713: goto free_workqueue;
1714:
1715: tpg_instances[i].tpg = tpg;
1716: tpg->fi = tpg_instances[i].func_inst;
1717: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
1718: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1719: return &tpg->se_tpg;
1720:
1721: free_workqueue:
1722: destroy_workqueue(tpg->workqueue);
1723: free_tpg:
1724: kfree(tpg);
1725: unref_dep:
1726: if (opts->has_dep)
1727: module_put(opts->dependent);
1728: else
1729: configfs_undepend_item_unlocked(&opts->func_inst.group.cg_item);
1730: unlock_dep:
1731: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
1732: unlock_inst:
1733: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1734:
1735: return ERR_PTR(ret);
1736: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 15/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13410
output: 37
thoughts: 164
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding USBG and ConfigFS Dependencies**
My investigation into the `usbg_make_tpg` function has revealed a critical locking sequence that I need to fully grasp. I've observed that at line 1678 of `usbg_make_tpg`, the `&opts->dep_lock` is acquired. Following this, at line 1686, a call is made to `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. It's within this `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` function that the `inode_lock`, specifically identified as `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`, is subsequently acquired. This establishes a clear lock dependency: `&opts->dep_lock` must be held before `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` can be acquired.
The next piece of this puzzle is understanding how `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` relates to other locks. I've traced this dependency further, and it appears that `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` can, in turn, lead to the acquisition of `&p->frag_sem`. My initial understanding is that this particular transition originates from the `configfs_rmdir` function. To solidify this understanding and confirm the complete lock ordering, I intend to thoroughly examine the implementation of `configfs_rmdir`. This will allow me to verify the path that leads from holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` to acquiring `&p->frag_sem`.
|
| 16/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_rmdir]
Results: map[SourceCode:1469: static int configfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1470: {
1471: struct config_item *parent_item;
1472: struct config_item *item;
1473: struct configfs_subsystem *subsys;
1474: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
1475: struct configfs_fragment *frag;
1476: struct module *subsys_owner = NULL, *dead_item_owner = NULL;
1477: int ret;
1478:
1479: sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
1480: if (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT)
1481: return -EPERM;
1482:
1483: /* Get a working ref until we have the child */
1484: parent_item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry->d_parent);
1485: subsys = to_config_group(parent_item)->cg_subsys;
1486: BUG_ON(!subsys);
1487:
1488: if (!parent_item->ci_type) {
1489: config_item_put(parent_item);
1490: return -EINVAL;
1491: }
1492:
1493: /* configfs_mkdir() shouldn't have allowed this */
1494: BUG_ON(!subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_type);
1495: subsys_owner = subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_type->ct_owner;
1496:
1497: /*
1498: * Ensure that no racing symlink() will make detach_prep() fail while
1499: * the new link is temporarily attached
1500: */
1501: do {
1502: struct dentry *wait;
1503:
1504: mutex_lock(&configfs_symlink_mutex);
1505: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1506: /*
1507: * Here's where we check for dependents. We're protected by
1508: * configfs_dirent_lock.
1509: * If no dependent, atomically tag the item as dropping.
1510: */
1511: ret = sd->s_dependent_count ? -EBUSY : 0;
1512: if (!ret) {
1513: ret = configfs_detach_prep(sd, &wait);
1514: if (ret)
1515: configfs_detach_rollback(sd);
1516: }
1517: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1518: mutex_unlock(&configfs_symlink_mutex);
1519:
1520: if (ret) {
1521: if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1522: config_item_put(parent_item);
1523: return ret;
1524: }
1525:
1526: /* Wait until the racing operation terminates */
1527: inode_lock(d_inode(wait));
1528: inode_unlock(d_inode(wait));
1529: dput(wait);
1530: }
1531: } while (ret == -EAGAIN);
1532:
1533: frag = sd->s_frag;
1534: if (down_write_killable(&frag->frag_sem)) {
1535: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1536: configfs_detach_rollback(sd);
1537: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1538: config_item_put(parent_item);
1539: return -EINTR;
1540: }
1541: frag->frag_dead = true;
1542: up_write(&frag->frag_sem);
1543:
1544: /* Get a working ref for the duration of this function */
1545: item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry);
1546:
1547: /* Drop reference from above, item already holds one. */
1548: config_item_put(parent_item);
1549:
1550: if (item->ci_type)
1551: dead_item_owner = item->ci_type->ct_owner;
1552:
1553: if (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DIR) {
1554: configfs_detach_group(dentry);
1555:
1556: mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1557: client_disconnect_notify(parent_item, item);
1558: unlink_group(to_config_group(item));
1559: } else {
1560: configfs_detach_item(dentry);
1561:
1562: mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1563: client_disconnect_notify(parent_item, item);
1564: unlink_obj(item);
1565: }
1566:
1567: client_drop_item(parent_item, item);
1568: mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1569:
1570: /* Drop our reference from above */
1571: config_item_put(item);
1572:
1573: module_put(dead_item_owner);
1574: module_put(subsys_owner);
1575:
1576: return 0;
1577: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 17/2 |
2026/08/11 22:54 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15216
output: 46
thoughts: 522
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unraveling a Potential Lock Dependency Cycle**
My current focus is on understanding a peculiar lock dependency chain that lockdep has flagged, and I'm piecing together the steps to either reproduce it or simply understand the full scope of the dependencies.
It all starts with `configfs_rmdir`. I know that `configfs_rmdir` is invoked by `vfs_rmdir`, and critically, `vfs_rmdir` holds the `inode_lock` associated with the superblock's type. This is my first anchor point: `inode_lock`.
From `configfs_rmdir`, the execution flow then proceeds to call `down_write_killable(&frag->frag_sem)`. This directly establishes a dependency: the `inode_lock` leads to acquiring `frag_sem`. So, `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (which I'm interpreting as the `inode_lock` here) is dependent on `&p->frag_sem`.
Now, I'm looking at the *complete* picture, the full sequence of locks involved. I've identified a potential cycle: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
However, I've just realized a crucial detail about the *last* link in that proposed cycle. The dependency from `&p->frag_sem` back to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` isn't as direct as I initially thought. It occurs within the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function.
Here's how that final link is formed: `configfs_write_iter` first acquires `&p->frag_sem` (using `down_read`). Then, it calls `flush_write_buffer`, which in turn invokes the `store` method of the specific item. The `store` method in this context is `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`. This `store` function, when called, actually performs a `mutex_lock(su_mutex)`. This is the missing piece that connects `&p->frag_sem` to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
So, the path to reproducing this, or at least triggering the lockdep warning, is to execute the sequences that establish these dependencies in the correct order. The good news is that lockdep doesn't require an actual deadlock to report a violation; it just needs to observe the dependencies being established.
Therefore, the key actions to verify this are:
1. **Triggering the `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` dependency:** This is achieved by calling `configfs_rmdir` on a configfs directory.
2. **Triggering the `su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` dependency:** My initial thought was that `configfs_mkdir` on a `target/core/...` path would do this. However, I need to re-examine the trace. The trace indicates `configfs_mkdir` leads to `target_fabric_make_tpg`, which then calls `usbg_make_tpg`, and finally `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. I need to investigate where `target_fabric_make_tpg` is actually called from. It appears to be a `make_group` callback within the target core fabric subsystem. I'll need to delve into the specifics of `target_fabric_make_tpg` to confirm this intermediate link.
My current objective is to fully confirm the path that leads from `configfs_mkdir` to the `inode_lock` and `opts->dep_lock`, and then integrate that with the known dependencies stemming from `configfs_rmdir` and the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function to understand the complete lock cycle.
|
| 18/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c Name:target_fabric_make_tpg]
Results: map[SourceCode: 926: static struct config_group *target_fabric_make_tpg(
927: struct config_group *group,
928: const char *name)
929: {
930: struct se_wwn *wwn = container_of(group, struct se_wwn, wwn_group);
931: struct target_fabric_configfs *tf = wwn->wwn_tf;
932: struct se_portal_group *se_tpg;
933:
934: if (!tf->tf_ops->fabric_make_tpg) {
935: pr_err("tf->tf_ops->fabric_make_tpg is NULL\n");
936: return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
937: }
938:
939: se_tpg = tf->tf_ops->fabric_make_tpg(wwn, name);
940: if (!se_tpg || IS_ERR(se_tpg))
941: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
942:
943: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_group, name,
944: &tf->tf_tpg_base_cit);
945:
946: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_lun_group, "lun",
947: &tf->tf_tpg_lun_cit);
948: configfs_add_default_group(&se_tpg->tpg_lun_group,
949: &se_tpg->tpg_group);
950:
951: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_np_group, "np",
952: &tf->tf_tpg_np_cit);
953: configfs_add_default_group(&se_tpg->tpg_np_group,
954: &se_tpg->tpg_group);
955:
956: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_acl_group, "acls",
957: &tf->tf_tpg_nacl_cit);
958: configfs_add_default_group(&se_tpg->tpg_acl_group,
959: &se_tpg->tpg_group);
960:
961: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_attrib_group, "attrib",
962: &tf->tf_tpg_attrib_cit);
963: configfs_add_default_group(&se_tpg->tpg_attrib_group,
964: &se_tpg->tpg_group);
965:
966: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_auth_group, "auth",
967: &tf->tf_tpg_auth_cit);
968: configfs_add_default_group(&se_tpg->tpg_auth_group,
969: &se_tpg->tpg_group);
970:
971: config_group_init_type_name(&se_tpg->tpg_param_group, "param",
972: &tf->tf_tpg_param_cit);
973: configfs_add_default_group(&se_tpg->tpg_param_group,
974: &se_tpg->tpg_group);
975:
976: return &se_tpg->tpg_group;
977: }
SourceFile:drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c]
|
| 19/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16806
output: 45
thoughts: 305
Thoughts: **Understanding the TPG Creation Process**
So, I'm trying to get a handle on how a Target Portal Group (TPG) gets created within the `configfs` framework, specifically when dealing with the `usb_gadget` fabric. It seems like the trigger is a `mkdir` operation, and the path looks something like this: `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/<WWN>/tpgt_<number>`. The key function involved here, based on the fabric being `usb_gadget`, is `usbg_make_tpg`.
Now, looking at `usbg_make_tpg`, I see a requirement that the name of the TPG directory *must* start with `tpgt_`. That's a crucial detail.
Digging into `usbg_make_tpg` further, I encountered this loop:
```c
mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
if (tpg_instances[i].func_inst && !tpg_instances[i].tpg)
break;
```
This code appears to be searching for an available entry in a global array, `tpg_instances`. Specifically, it's looking for an element where `func_inst` is populated but `tpg` is not yet assigned. This leads me to the next logical question: where does `tpg_instances[i].func_inst` get its value? My current hypothesis is that it's populated when a `tcm` (Target Core Module) USB function is created. I need to dive into `tcm_alloc_inst` within `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c` to confirm this.
|
| 20/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_alloc_inst]
Results: map[SourceCode:2676: static struct usb_function_instance *tcm_alloc_inst(void)
2677: {
2678: struct f_tcm_opts *opts;
2679: int i;
2680:
2681:
2682: opts = kzalloc_obj(*opts);
2683: if (!opts)
2684: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
2685:
2686: mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2687: for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
2688: if (!tpg_instances[i].func_inst)
2689: break;
2690:
2691: if (i == TPG_INSTANCES) {
2692: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2693: kfree(opts);
2694: return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
2695: }
2696: tpg_instances[i].func_inst = &opts->func_inst;
2697: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2698:
2699: mutex_init(&opts->dep_lock);
2700: opts->func_inst.set_inst_name = tcm_set_name;
2701: opts->func_inst.free_func_inst = tcm_free_inst;
2702: opts->tcm_register_callback = tcm_register_callback;
2703: opts->tcm_unregister_callback = tcm_unregister_callback;
2704:
2705: config_group_init_type_name(&opts->func_inst.group, "",
2706: &tcm_func_type);
2707:
2708: return &opts->func_inst;
2709: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 21/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17691
output: 46
thoughts: 1032
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unraveling a Lock Dependency Cycle**
I've been analyzing a lock dependency issue and finally feel like I'm piecing it together. It all started when I observed `tcm_alloc_inst` being called during a `mkdir` operation under `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/` for a `tcm` function, specifically `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. My understanding is that this `mkdir` action effectively creates a function instance and places it within the `tpg_instances` array. Following this, `tcm_set_name` is invoked. This function, crucially, acquires `opts->dep_lock` and then sets an `opts->ready` flag to `true`.
I needed to understand how these locks were being acquired in sequence. So, I decided to trace the `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0` operation more deeply. I found that `configfs_mkdir` initially acquires the `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. Subsequently, it calls `function_make` (which, for the `functions` group, is essentially `make_group`). `function_make` then proceeds to call `usb_get_function_instance("tcm")`, which, as I noted, leads to `tcm_alloc_inst`. After that, `function_make` calls `fi->set_inst_name`, which we know points to `tcm_set_name`. And as established, `tcm_set_name` acquires `opts->dep_lock`. This chain of events clearly establishes the dependency: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`.
My next step was to examine the `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234/tpgt_1` operation. I was a bit confused initially about which subsystem's mutex would be acquired here. However, I realized that `configfs_mkdir` acquires the `su_mutex` of the subsystem to which the directory belongs. Since this path starts with `/sys/kernel/config/target/`, it's the `target_core_subsys.su_mutex` that gets acquired, not `gadget_subsys`.
Now, looking at the lockdep report, it stated:
`-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24)`
`-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock)`
`-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex)`
This seemed to contradict my understanding of the second `mkdir` operation. If `configfs_mkdir` on `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234/tpgt_1` acquires `target_core_subsys.su_mutex`, then the subsequent acquisition of `opts->dep_lock` (within `usbg_make_tpg`) and then `inode_lock` (within `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`) would establish `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`. This sequence *doesn't* involve `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` at all.
So, my current hypothesis for the lock acquisition chain that leads to the cycle is:
1. **`mkdir .../functions/tcm.0`**: This operation acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` because it's under the `usb_gadget` hierarchy. It then acquires `opts->dep_lock` when `tcm_set_name` is called. This establishes `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`.
2. **`mkdir .../target/usb_gadget/naa.1234/tpgt_1`**: This operation acquires `target_core_subsys.su_mutex` (which, while relevant for other reasons, doesn't seem to be part of the problematic cycle). Then, `usbg_make_tpg` acquires `opts->dep_lock`. Following that, `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires `inode_lock`. This establishes `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`.
3. **`rmdir` on some configfs directory**: When a directory is removed, `vfs_rmdir` acquires the `inode_lock`. Subsequently, `configfs_rmdir` acquires the `frag_sem`. This establishes `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`.
4. **Writing to `bNumControls` in a `uvc` function**: This action involves acquiring `frag_sem` within `configfs_write_iter`. Then, in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`, the `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` is acquired. This establishes `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
This sequence of four steps appears to perfectly replicate the lock dependency cycle reported by lockdep! The cycle is: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
My next logical step is to confirm step 4. I need to pinpoint exactly where `bNumControls` is located and how it's associated with a UVC extension unit. I'll be diving into `uvc_configfs.c` to understand how extension units are created and how writes to `bNumControls` are handled to verify this final piece of the puzzle.
|
| 22/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_make]
Results: map[SourceCode:1267: static struct config_item *uvcg_extension_make(struct config_group *group, const char *name)
1268: {
1269: struct config_item *opts_item;
1270: struct uvcg_extension *xu;
1271: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
1272:
1273: opts_item = group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_parent;
1274: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
1275:
1276: xu = kzalloc_obj(*xu);
1277: if (!xu)
1278: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1279:
1280: xu->desc.bLength = UVC_DT_EXTENSION_UNIT_SIZE(0, 0);
1281: xu->desc.bDescriptorType = USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE;
1282: xu->desc.bDescriptorSubType = UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT;
1283: xu->desc.bNumControls = 0;
1284: xu->desc.bNrInPins = 0;
1285: xu->desc.baSourceID = NULL;
1286: xu->desc.bControlSize = 0;
1287: xu->desc.bmControls = NULL;
1288:
1289: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
1290:
1291: xu->desc.bUnitID = ++opts->last_unit_id;
1292:
1293: config_item_init_type_name(&xu->item, name, &uvcg_extension_type);
1294: list_add_tail(&xu->list, &opts->extension_units);
1295:
1296: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
1297:
1298: return &xu->item;
1299: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 23/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19318
output: 46
thoughts: 41
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `uvcg_extension_make` and UVC Configfs**
Ah, I see. So, the trigger for the `uvcg_extension_make` function appears to be quite specific: it's invoked precisely when I, as the user or system, issue a `mkdir` command within the `control/extensions` directory structure that belongs to a UVC (USB Video Class) function. This tells me that this particular function is tightly coupled to the creation of new extension points for UVC functionality through the configfs mechanism.
To fully grasp this, I need to visualize the underlying architecture of UVC configuration within the configfs framework. I'm mentally tracing the hierarchy. Configfs, as I understand it, provides a dynamic way to represent and manage devices and their attributes in a filesystem-like structure. In this context, UVC functions are being represented within this structure. The `control` directory likely houses general control-related aspects of the UVC device. And within that, `extensions` seems to be a dedicated namespace for introducing custom or extended functionalities.
Therefore, when I create a directory under `control/extensions`, the system is signaling its intent to define a new extension. `uvcg_extension_make` is the handler that gets activated to process this request, presumably to allocate resources, set up necessary data structures, and register this new extension with the UVC driver or the relevant kernel subsystem. It's essentially the factory function for these extensions, brought to life by the simple act of directory creation in the configfs. This confirms my understanding that configfs is being used here as a declarative interface for device configuration.
|
| 24/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvc_func_type]
Results: map[SourceCode:3808: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvc_func_type = {
3809: .type = {
3810: .ct_item_ops = &uvc_func_item_ops,
3811: .ct_attrs = uvc_attrs,
3812: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
3813: },
3814: .name = "",
3815: .children = (const struct uvcg_config_group_type*[]) {
3816: &uvcg_control_grp_type,
3817: &uvcg_streaming_grp_type,
3818: NULL,
3819: },
3820: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 25/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19625
output: 48
thoughts: 14
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding UVC Functionality**
Right, so when I'm thinking about the Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation (UVC) function, the first thing that jumps out at me is its inherent modularity. It's not just one monolithic block of code or functionality; it's clearly broken down into two distinct, yet related, operational spheres. I see these as `control` and `streaming`.
From my perspective, `control` represents the **actuation and management** of the UVC system. This is where I'd expect to find the mechanisms for initiating, stopping, monitoring, and potentially regulating the UVC emitters themselves. It’s about the direct interaction with the hardware – turning it on, ensuring it’s at the correct intensity (if applicable), setting exposure times, and handling any safety interlocks or status reporting. It's the brain of the operation, dictating *when* and *how* the UVC is active.
Then there's the `streaming` aspect. This, to me, implies the **data flow and continuous output** associated with the UVC process. This could manifest in a couple of ways. On one hand, it might refer to the real-time transmission of data *from* the UVC system, such as sensor readings (like UV intensity, temperature, or operational status) that need to be fed back to the control unit or an external monitoring system. On the other hand, it could also refer to the *delivery* of the UVC itself if the system is designed for dynamic, continuous application rather than discrete on/off cycles. However, given the typical use cases for UVC, I'm leaning more towards the former – the continuous flow of operational data and status.
So, in essence, my mental model breaks down like this: the `control` group is all about the **"doing" and "managing"** of the UVC, while the `streaming` group is focused on the **"reporting" and "continuous feedback"** related to that action. They are inextricably linked; the `streaming` data informs and validates the actions taken by `control`, and `control` dictates what data needs to be streamed. It's a very logical division that allows for robust system design and clear separation of concerns.
|
| 26/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_control_grp_type]
Results: map[SourceCode:1550: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_control_grp_type = {
1551: .type = {
1552: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
1553: .ct_attrs = uvcg_default_control_attrs,
1554: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1555: },
1556: .name = "control",
1557: .children = (const struct uvcg_config_group_type*[]) {
1558: &uvcg_control_header_grp_type,
1559: &uvcg_processing_grp_type,
1560: &uvcg_terminal_grp_type,
1561: &uvcg_control_class_grp_type,
1562: &uvcg_extensions_grp_type,
1563: NULL,
1564: },
1565: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 27/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19972
output: 48
thoughts: 7
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the `extensions` Group**
Ah, so the core of this is that I've identified the presence of an `extensions` group within the data or system I'm analyzing. This immediately flags a specific area of interest for me as an expert. My mind goes straight to the implications of such a group. What *kind* of extensions are we talking about? Are these user-defined extensions, system-level extensions, or perhaps extensions related to a specific framework or platform?
My initial thought is to probe further into the *purpose* of these extensions. Are they for adding new functionality, customizing existing behavior, or perhaps for integrating with external services? Understanding their role is crucial to grasping the overall architecture and potential extensibility of whatever I'm looking at.
I'm also considering the *management* of these extensions. How are they installed, configured, and updated? Is there a centralized mechanism, or is it more distributed? This speaks to the maintainability and scalability of the system. Furthermore, the presence of an `extensions` group hints at a design that prioritizes modularity and adaptability. This is generally a positive indicator, suggesting the system isn't rigidly monolithic and can evolve over time.
My expertise tells me that extensions can be a double-edged sword. While they offer great flexibility, they can also introduce complexities, potential security vulnerabilities, and compatibility issues if not managed properly. Therefore, I'm already thinking about the potential risks and how they might be mitigated. Are there sandboxing mechanisms in place? Is there a rigorous vetting process for extensions?
Ultimately, recognizing the `extensions` group is like spotting a key feature on a technical blueprint. It's a prompt for deeper investigation, a signal that this is a component deserving of focused attention to understand its function, impact, and how it contributes to the system's overall design and operational characteristics.
|
| 28/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extensions_grp_type]
Results: map[SourceCode:1306: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {
1307: .type = {
1308: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
1309: .ct_group_ops = &uvcg_extensions_grp_ops,
1310: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1311: },
1312: .name = "extensions",
1313: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 29/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20183
output: 43
thoughts: 482
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding USB Gadget Configuration and Lockdep Warnings**
Okay, so I'm digging into this USB gadget configuration, specifically looking at how extension units work within the UVC (USB Video Class) function. I see that `uvcg_extensions_grp_ops` is tied to `uvcg_extension_make`, which means creating a new extension unit for a UVC function is as simple as creating a directory. The path `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1` seems to be the key here. If I `mkdir` that, I've successfully created an extension unit, and then I can start configuring it, for instance, by writing to the `bNumControls` attribute within that extension's directory.
Now, the more pressing matter is this lockdep warning I've been seeing. I need to systematically reproduce it to understand the root cause. Here's how I'm planning to go about it:
First, I need to ensure `configfs` is mounted, so that's `mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config`.
Next, I'll establish a basic USB gadget instance, which I'll call `g1`: `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`.
The critical part for triggering the warning appears to involve the TCM (Target Core Module) function. I'll create this function for my gadget: `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. My understanding is that this step is where the lock dependency chain starts to form, specifically establishing a lock from `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` down to `opts->dep_lock`.
Following that, I need to create the necessary structures for the TCM function. This involves creating a target core WWN and a TPG (Target Portal Group): `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456`. This second `mkdir` command is where I suspect the next link in the lock chain is formed: `opts->dep_lock` to `inode_lock`.
However, I'm having a moment of doubt. Does `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` actually exist by default, or is it created when I need it? This makes me wonder about module dependencies. Do I need to `modprobe target_core_mod` and `modprobe tcm_usb_gadget` (or is it `usb_f_tcm`?) beforehand?
Let me refine that thought. I believe that when I execute `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`, the `usb_f_tcm` module will be automatically loaded if it's not already. Similarly, the creation of the target core structures under `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` likely requires the `tcm_usb_gadget` module to be registered. The question remains: is `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` automatically created when `usb_f_tcm` is loaded, or do I need to explicitly create that parent directory as well? I should probably check the source code in `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c` to clarify this specific point and confirm the exact sequence of events that leads to the lock dependency I'm trying to trace.
|
| 30/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_init]
Results: map[SourceCode:2768: static int __init tcm_init(void)
2769: {
2770: int ret;
2771:
2772: ret = usb_function_register(&tcmusb_func);
2773: if (ret)
2774: return ret;
2775:
2776: ret = target_register_template(&usbg_ops);
2777: if (ret)
2778: usb_function_unregister(&tcmusb_func);
2779:
2780: return ret;
2781: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 31/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20893
output: 46
thoughts: 157
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding USB Gadget Fabric Registration**
Ah, so that's what `target_register_template(&usbg_ops)` is doing. It's the key that unlocks the `usb_gadget` fabric within the target core. This registration is what makes the `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` directory accessible. My next step, naturally, is to think about how to actually create an instance of this fabric. I'm considering `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456`. However, a small flicker of doubt arises: is that the *exact* format for the name? I recall `usbg_make_tport` being somewhat lenient on strict name validation, but standard practice usually leans towards formats like `naa.6001405...` or simply a descriptive string. I need to be mindful of that convention when I proceed.
|
| 32/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_make_tport]
Results: map[SourceCode:1772: static struct se_wwn *usbg_make_tport(
1773: struct target_fabric_configfs *tf,
1774: struct config_group *group,
1775: const char *name)
1776: {
1777: struct usbg_tport *tport;
1778: const char *wnn_name;
1779: u64 wwpn = 0;
1780:
1781: wnn_name = usbg_check_wwn(name);
1782: if (!wnn_name)
1783: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1784:
1785: tport = kzalloc_obj(struct usbg_tport);
1786: if (!(tport))
1787: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1788:
1789: tport->tport_wwpn = wwpn;
1790: snprintf(tport->tport_name, sizeof(tport->tport_name), "%s", wnn_name);
1791: return &tport->tport_wwn;
1792: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 33/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21438
output: 46
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: **My Thought Process**
Right, first things first, I need to scrutinize the `usbg_check_wwn` function. I'm going to dig into its inner workings and ensure it's performing its intended checks accurately and robustly. My goal here is to be absolutely certain that this particular piece of code is functioning as expected before I move on to any further analysis or modifications.
|
| 34/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_check_wwn]
Results: map[SourceCode:1631: static const char *usbg_check_wwn(const char *name)
1632: {
1633: const char *n;
1634: unsigned int len;
1635:
1636: n = strstr(name, "naa.");
1637: if (!n)
1638: return NULL;
1639: n += 4;
1640: len = strlen(n);
1641: if (len == 0 || len > USBG_NAMELEN - 1)
1642: return NULL;
1643: return n;
1644: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 35/2 |
2026/08/11 22:55 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21695
output: 35
thoughts: 347
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding ConfigFS Target Creation and Deletion**
My immediate thought upon seeing the requirement for a name containing `naa.` is straightforward: that pattern needs to be incorporated. Creating the target directory, `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234`, seems like a perfectly reasonable first step. Following that, the next logical action is to create the associated `tpgt_1` directory: `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234/tpgt_1`.
Now, I understand that this `mkdir` operation will trigger `usbg_make_tpg`. My internal model tells me that `usbg_make_tpg` will first acquire the `opts->dep_lock`, and then subsequently the `inode_lock` through the `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` function.
A crucial point arises here: `usbg_make_tpg` isn't just creating a new instance blindly; it actively looks for an already available `func_inst` within `tpg_instances[i]`. Since I've already established `tcm.0` earlier in my setup, I know that `tpg_instances[0].func_inst` is indeed populated. This means `usbg_make_tpg` will utilize this existing instance, and importantly, it will acquire *its* `dep_lock` as well.
This leads me to consider the locking hierarchy further. The sequence is `inode_lock` followed by `frag_sem`. I'm then contemplating how to *remove* an existing configuration. My initial thought is to simply `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`.
However, I need to be precise about the locking implications of `rmdir`. My understanding is that `rmdir` on *any* configfs directory will acquire the `inode_lock` on its *parent* directory. Then, the configfs-specific `configfs_rmdir` function will acquire the `frag_sem` of the *child* directory.
This brings me to a critical question: is `frag_sem` a global lock, or is it specific to each fragment? To resolve this, I need to dive into the implementation, specifically within `fs/configfs/dir.c`, to examine the behavior of `frag_sem`. This detailed understanding of the locking mechanism is vital for ensuring the integrity of my operations.
|
| 36/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:new_fragment]
Results: map[SourceCode: 158: static struct configfs_fragment *new_fragment(void)
159: {
160: struct configfs_fragment *p;
161:
162: p = kmalloc_obj(struct configfs_fragment);
163: if (p) {
164: atomic_set(&p->frag_count, 1);
165: init_rwsem(&p->frag_sem);
166: p->frag_dead = false;
167: }
168: return p;
169: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 37/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22249
output: 39
thoughts: 572
Thoughts: **The Lock Hierarchy Problem in ConfigFS**
My initial thought was that the locking mechanism was fragment-specific. However, upon deeper reflection, I realized that if it's indeed per-fragment, then `lockdep` groups these fragments by their lock class. Since `init_rwsem(&p->frag_sem)` is consistently called within `new_fragment`, this means all `frag_sem` instances are sharing the exact same lock class.
This has significant implications. It implies that *any* `rmdir` operation on a configfs directory will establish a lock dependency: `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`, for these shared lock classes. I then considered the `inode_lock` itself. For configfs, the `inode_lock` class is specifically `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. Consequently, *any* `rmdir` within configfs will invariably result in the dependency `configfs_inode_lock` -> `configfs_frag_sem`.
To verify this, I considered simple operations like `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/strings/0x409` followed by `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/strings/0x409`, or even more straightforwardly, `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1` and `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`. The lockdep report confirms this line of reasoning, showing precisely this sequence: `-> #3 (&p->frag_sem)` called by `configfs_rmdir` which in turn calls `vfs_rmdir` and so on. This confirms my understanding of the first scenario.
Now, let's move to the second scenario. Step 6 involves establishing a lock dependency of `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. This is triggered when we need to write to `bNumControls` of a UVC extension unit. The sequence of operations would be: `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0`, then `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`, and finally `echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls`.
Tracing the locks for this step, we see `vfs_write` calling `configfs_write_iter`, which in turn calls `down_read(&p->frag_sem)`. Subsequently, `flush_write_buffer` calls `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`, and this function ultimately calls `mutex_lock(&su_mutex)`. This establishes the problematic dependency: `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
This raises a critical question: is `su_mutex` also sharing the *same* lock class across all configfs subsystems? I need to investigate the initialization of `su_mutex` to determine if this is the case.
|
| 38/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_register_subsystem]
Results: map[SourceCode:1872: int configfs_register_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys)
1873: {
1874: int err;
1875: struct config_group *group = &subsys->su_group;
1876: struct dentry *dentry;
1877: struct dentry *root;
1878: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
1879: struct configfs_fragment *frag;
1880:
1881: frag = new_fragment();
1882: if (!frag)
1883: return -ENOMEM;
1884:
1885: root = configfs_pin_fs();
1886: if (IS_ERR(root)) {
1887: put_fragment(frag);
1888: return PTR_ERR(root);
1889: }
1890:
1891: if (!group->cg_item.ci_name)
1892: group->cg_item.ci_name = group->cg_item.ci_namebuf;
1893:
1894: sd = root->d_fsdata;
1895: mutex_lock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1896: link_group(to_config_group(sd->s_element), group);
1897: mutex_unlock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1898:
1899: inode_lock_nested(d_inode(root), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
1900:
1901: err = -ENOMEM;
1902: dentry = d_alloc_name(root, group->cg_item.ci_name);
1903: if (dentry) {
1904: d_add(dentry, NULL);
1905:
1906: err = configfs_dirent_exists(dentry);
1907: if (!err)
1908: err = configfs_attach_group(&group->cg_item,
1909: dentry, frag);
1910: if (err) {
1911: BUG_ON(d_inode(dentry));
1912: d_drop(dentry);
1913: } else {
1914: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1915: configfs_dir_set_ready(dentry->d_fsdata);
1916: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1917: }
1918: dput(dentry);
1919: }
1920:
1921: inode_unlock(d_inode(root));
1922:
1923: if (err) {
1924: mutex_lock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1925: unlink_group(group);
1926: mutex_unlock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1927: configfs_release_fs();
1928: }
1929: put_fragment(frag);
1930:
1931: return err;
1932: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 39/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23736
output: 40
thoughts: 31
Thoughts: **A Moment of Clarification on Mutex Initialization**
Ah, I see the crucial point here. My initial assumption, or perhaps a lingering thought about how configurations are typically managed, led me to believe that `su_mutex` would be initialized within `configfs`. However, upon further reflection and a quick mental check (or a peek at the relevant code, as it were), I'm realizing that the `su_mutex` is actually initialized directly within the `gadget_subsys` itself. This is a significant detail that alters my understanding of the subsystem's structure and dependency management. I need to make sure I'm tracking this correctly as I analyze the system's behavior.
|
| 40/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c Name:gadget_subsys]
Results: map[SourceCode:2073: static struct configfs_subsystem gadget_subsys = {
2074: .su_group = {
2075: .cg_item = {
2076: .ci_namebuf = "usb_gadget",
2077: .ci_type = &gadgets_type,
2078: },
2079: },
2080: .su_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(gadget_subsys.su_mutex),
2081: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c]
|
| 41/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23957
output: 52
thoughts: 1327
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the Lockdep Warning**
Right, I've been digging into this lockdep report, and it's quite the tangled web. It's pointing to a cycle involving `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` and a few other critical locks. Let me trace how I'm arriving at this understanding.
First, I see that `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` is indeed a specific lock class. The report lays out the dependency chain: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. This is the core of the problem – a circular dependency.
Now, I need to understand how each link in this chain is established. Let's start with `&opts->dep_lock`. I see it's initialized in `tcm_alloc_inst`. The key here is that `mutex_init(&opts->dep_lock)` assigns a lock class based on the call site. This means `opts->dep_lock` will have a *single* lock class, regardless of which `tcm` function is using it. This is crucial because it simplifies the dependency analysis for this particular lock.
The next step in the chain is `&opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`. This connection occurs within `usbg_make_tpg`. In this function, `opts->dep_lock` is acquired. Immediately after, `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` is called, and this function is the one that acquires the `inode_lock` of the target item's dentry. The target item here is `&opts->func_inst.group.cg_item`, which represents the `tcm.0` directory within configfs. Since all configfs directories share the same `inode_lock` class (`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`), this establishes the link: `opts->dep_lock` now has a dependency on the `configfs_inode_lock`.
So, to trigger this lockdep warning, I need to orchestrate a sequence of operations that forces these locks to be acquired in a specific order. Here's how I'm envisioning the steps to reproduce the issue:
1. **Mount configfs**: The initial setup. `mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config` is the prerequisite.
2. **Load necessary modules**: While creating directories might auto-load them, I'll explicitly mention `modprobe libcomposite`, `modprobe usb_f_tcm`, `modprobe usb_f_uvc`, and `modprobe target_core_mod` to ensure everything is in place.
3. **Establish `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: This is achieved by creating the `tcm.0` function directory under a gadget. Specifically, `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1` followed by `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. The `configfs_mkdir` operation acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, and then the subsequent `tcm_set_name` operation within the `tcm` module acquires `opts->dep_lock`.
4. **Establish `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: This requires creating a target core backend and TPGT structure. I'm thinking `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/core/fileio_0` (though I'm noting that just the fabric might be enough, not necessarily a full backend) and then `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456` followed by `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`. The `usbg_make_tpg` function acquires `opts->dep_lock`, and as we established, `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` in its subsequent operations acquires the `inode_lock`.
5. **Establish `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: This is where it gets a bit clever. I *don't* need to `rmdir` the `tcm.0` directory I just created, because it's still depended upon by the TPGT. However, any `rmdir` operation on a configfs directory will acquire the `inode_lock` of its parent. The critical part is that *all* configfs directories share lock classes. So, to get `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`, I can simply create and then immediately remove another gadget directory, for example, `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2` and then `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`. The `rmdir` on `g2` acquires the `inode_lock` of `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, and then, critically, it acquires `frag_sem` associated with `g2` (or its related structure). This establishes the `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` link.
6. **Establish `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: This is the final piece of the cycle. I'm looking at operations related to USB gadget functions that might involve `frag_sem` and then lead back to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. The sequence that seems to fit this is creating a UVC function, specifically setting a control attribute. So, `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0`, then `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`, and finally `echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls`. I'm checking `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` to confirm that writing to `bNumControls` acquires `frag_sem` and then, through its internal logic, `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
This detailed breakdown, step-by-step, allows me to see how the locks are acquired in a sequence that, according to lockdep, forms an illegal circular dependency. It's all about carefully constructing the configfs hierarchy and performing operations in the right order.
|
| 42/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store]
Results: map[SourceCode: 818: static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
819: const char *page, size_t len)
820: {
821: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item->ci_parent);
822: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
823: struct uvcg_extension *xu = to_uvcg_extension(item);
824: struct config_item *opts_item;
825: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
826: int ret;
827: u8 num;
828:
829: ret = kstrtou8(page, 0, &num);
830: if (ret)
831: return ret;
832:
833: mutex_lock(su_mutex);
834:
835: opts_item = item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent;
836: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
837:
838: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
839: xu->desc.bNumControls = num;
840: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
841:
842: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
843:
844: return len;
845: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 43/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25771
output: 50
thoughts: 19
Thoughts: **My Thought Process**
Right, so the first thing that strikes me here is the nature of the item in question. My immediate recognition is that this is indeed a `configfs` attribute. This is a crucial starting point, as it immediately directs my focus towards the specific mechanisms and conventions associated with `configfs` for managing system configurations.
Following this initial identification, my next logical step is to delve into the specifics of this particular attribute. I need to understand its definition – what it represents, what its possible values are, and what its intended function is within the `configfs` framework. This means I'll be looking for its declaration, any associated data types, constraints, and the underlying logic that governs its behavior. This deep dive into the attribute's definition is essential for a comprehensive understanding and for determining how to interact with it effectively.
|
| 44/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 45/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25845
output: 26
thoughts: 9
Thoughts: **My Initial Hypothesis**
My first inclination is that the functionality I'm observing, or the element I'm trying to understand, is likely implemented through the use of a macro. This suggests I'm expecting a higher-level abstraction, a piece of code that expands into other code before actual compilation or interpretation, rather than a direct function call or a hard-coded literal.
|
| 46/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store]
Results: map[Output:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=816=UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(i_extension, iExtension, _RO);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-817-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:818:static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-819- const char *page, size_t len)
]
|
| 47/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26023
output: 21
thoughts: 8
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Reviewing the Macro Definition**
Alright, before I dive into anything too granular, my very first instinct is to get a handle on the fundamental building blocks. So, the absolute priority for me right now is to **examine the macro definition**. I need to understand precisely what it is, what it's intended to do, and how it's structured at its core. This is the foundational piece of information that will inform every subsequent analysis and decision. Without a clear grasp of this definition, any further exploration would be built on shaky ground.
|
| 48/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR]
Results: map[Output:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=771=static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_terminal_grp_type = {
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-787-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:788:#define UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(cname, aname, ro...) \
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-789-static ssize_t uvcg_extension_##cname##_show(struct config_item *item, \
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=812=UVC_ATTR##ro(uvcg_extension_, cname, aname)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-813-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:814:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_length, bLength, _RO);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:815:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_unit_id, bUnitID, _RO);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:816:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(i_extension, iExtension, _RO);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-817-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=818=static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-845-}
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:846:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_num_controls, bNumControls);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-847-
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=852=static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_nr_in_pins_store(struct config_item *item,
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-898-}
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:899:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_nr_in_pins, bNrInPins);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-900-
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=905=static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_control_size_store(struct config_item *item,
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-952-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:953:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_control_size, bControlSize);
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-954-
]
|
| 49/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26827
output: 20
thoughts: 91
Thoughts: **My Internal Monologue on UVC Attribute Naming Conventions**
Alright, let's get this straight. I'm trying to figure out the correct attribute name for the number of controls. Is it `bNumControls` or `b_num_controls`? This is a classic C-style versus more modern naming convention dilemma, and it's crucial to get it right for clarity and consistency, especially in the context of UVC extensions.
The macro I'm working with here is `UVC_ATTR(uvcg_extension_, cname, aname)`. I understand that `uvcg_extension_` is a prefix, and then I have `cname` and `aname`. My current hypothesis is that `cname` is intended for the C-style, snake_case representation, which would be `b_num_controls` in this case. Conversely, `aname` seems to be where the more C++ or modern camelCase variant, `bNumControls`, should go.
The critical piece of information I need to confirm is how `UVC_ATTR` actually uses these parameters. Specifically, I need to know which of them, `cname` or `aname`, is used as the basis for the generated file name. If `aname` is indeed the one that dictates the file name, then my assumption about `bNumControls` being the `aname` parameter is likely correct. This would imply that the macro is designed to accommodate both naming styles, perhaps using `cname` for internal C code references and `aname` for generated file artifacts or external-facing identifiers.
So, the next logical step is to dive into the definition of `UVC_ATTR` itself. I need to examine its implementation to definitively see how `cname` and `aname` are processed and, most importantly, which one influences the file naming convention. This direct inspection will resolve the ambiguity and confirm the correct usage for this specific attribute.
|
| 50/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:#define UVC_ATTR]
Results: map[Output:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-23-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:24:#define UVC_ATTR(prefix, cname, aname) \
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-25-static struct configfs_attribute prefix##attr_##cname = { \
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-32-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:33:#define UVC_ATTR_RO(prefix, cname, aname) \
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-34-static struct configfs_attribute prefix##attr_##cname = { \
]
|
| 51/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 27130
output: 43
thoughts: 758
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Configfs Operations and Lockdep**
Okay, so it seems like the attribute name I'm dealing with is `aname`, and this relates to a file named `bNumControls`. My primary concern right now is the order of operations, specifically whether `tcm.0` needs to be set up before `tpgt_1`.
I've been looking at the `usbg_make_tpg` function, and its logic for finding a suitable `tpg_instances[i]` involves checking if `tpg_instances[i].func_inst` exists but `tpg_instances[i].tpg` does not. Crucially, `tpg_instances[i].func_inst` is established when we `mkdir tcm.0`. This definitively tells me that I *must* create `tcm.0` before I can create `tpgt_1`.
To confirm this and to have a concrete way to execute these steps, I'm thinking of writing a C program. While using `system()` calls would be the simplest for readability and ease of writing, I need to consider the objective: triggering the lockdep cycle. Lockdep only needs to observe the lock acquisitions, not necessarily the actual concurrent execution. Therefore, executing these steps sequentially within a single thread should be perfectly adequate for demonstrating the lock dependencies, as lockdep records these globally.
Now, let's meticulously verify the exact paths and dependencies involved:
1. The initial step is `mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config`. This sets up the configfs mount point.
2. Next, I need to create `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`. This establishes the base for USB gadget configurations.
3. Then comes `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. This is where the dependency `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` is established. This is the critical step that precedes the `tpgt_1` creation.
4. Following that, I'm looking at `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456`. A key question here is whether `/sys/kernel/config/target` already exists. My understanding is that `target` is a subsystem that's automatically registered when `target_core_mod` is loaded. I could potentially trigger this autoload by either `modprobe target_core_mod` or by creating something like `/sys/kernel/config/target/core/fileio_0`. However, `modprobe` isn't what syzkaller uses; it relies on path access. If `target` isn't there, could I just `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target`? No, configfs subsystems are registered by modules.
But then, I had a realization: creating `tcm.0` actually loads the `usb_f_tcm` module. And `usb_f_tcm` calls `target_register_template(&usbg_ops)`, which is part of `target_core_mod`. This means that loading `usb_f_tcm` will automatically pull in `target_core_mod`. My next check will be to confirm if `target_register_template` is indeed the function that creates the `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` directory.
|
| 52/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c Name:target_register_template]
Results: map[SourceCode: 465: int target_register_template(const struct target_core_fabric_ops *fo)
466: {
467: struct target_core_fabric_ops *tfo;
468: struct target_fabric_configfs *tf;
469: int ret;
470:
471: ret = target_fabric_tf_ops_check(fo);
472: if (ret)
473: return ret;
474:
475: tf = kzalloc_obj(struct target_fabric_configfs);
476: if (!tf) {
477: pr_err("%s: could not allocate memory!\n", __func__);
478: return -ENOMEM;
479: }
480: tfo = kzalloc_obj(struct target_core_fabric_ops);
481: if (!tfo) {
482: kfree(tf);
483: pr_err("%s: could not allocate memory!\n", __func__);
484: return -ENOMEM;
485: }
486: memcpy(tfo, fo, sizeof(*tfo));
487: target_set_default_ops(tfo);
488:
489: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tf->tf_list);
490: atomic_set(&tf->tf_access_cnt, 0);
491: tf->tf_ops = tfo;
492: target_fabric_setup_cits(tf);
493:
494: mutex_lock(&g_tf_lock);
495: list_add_tail(&tf->tf_list, &g_tf_list);
496: mutex_unlock(&g_tf_lock);
497:
498: return 0;
499: }
SourceFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c]
|
| 53/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 28465
output: 44
thoughts: 63
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into Target Configuration Initialization**
My initial thought process is one of cautious inquiry, a desire to trace the flow of execution and understand the underlying mechanisms. I'm immediately struck by a seemingly simple observation: that `target_register_template` appears to solely be responsible for appending entries to `g_tf_list`. This leads me to a crucial question: what is the actual point of origin for the configfs directory structure? Is it established during the initialization of the `target_core_mod` itself, or does this creation event occur later, specifically when the `target` subsystem is formally registered? To resolve this ambiguity and gain clarity, my immediate next step is to direct my attention to the `target_core_init_configfs` function, which I anticipate will hold the answer to this fundamental question about the lifecycle and establishment of our configuration filesystem.
|
| 54/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c Name:target_core_init_configfs]
Results: map[SourceCode:3744: static int __init target_core_init_configfs(void)
3745: {
3746: struct configfs_subsystem *subsys = &target_core_fabrics;
3747: struct t10_alua_lu_gp *lu_gp;
3748: int ret;
3749:
3750: pr_debug("TARGET_CORE[0]: Loading Generic Kernel Storage"
3751: " Engine: %s on %s/%s on "UTS_RELEASE"\n",
3752: TARGET_CORE_VERSION, utsname()->sysname, utsname()->machine);
3753:
3754: config_group_init(&subsys->su_group);
3755: mutex_init(&subsys->su_mutex);
3756:
3757: ret = init_se_kmem_caches();
3758: if (ret < 0)
3759: return ret;
3760: /*
3761: * Create $CONFIGFS/target/core default group for HBA <-> Storage Object
3762: * and ALUA Logical Unit Group and Target Port Group infrastructure.
3763: */
3764: config_group_init_type_name(&target_core_hbagroup, "core",
3765: &target_core_cit);
3766: configfs_add_default_group(&target_core_hbagroup, &subsys->su_group);
3767:
3768: /*
3769: * Create ALUA infrastructure under /sys/kernel/config/target/core/alua/
3770: */
3771: config_group_init_type_name(&alua_group, "alua", &target_core_alua_cit);
3772: configfs_add_default_group(&alua_group, &target_core_hbagroup);
3773:
3774: /*
3775: * Add ALUA Logical Unit Group and Target Port Group ConfigFS
3776: * groups under /sys/kernel/config/target/core/alua/
3777: */
3778: config_group_init_type_name(&alua_lu_gps_group, "lu_gps",
3779: &target_core_alua_lu_gps_cit);
3780: configfs_add_default_group(&alua_lu_gps_group, &alua_group);
3781:
3782: /*
3783: * Add core/alua/lu_gps/default_lu_gp
3784: */
3785: lu_gp = core_alua_allocate_lu_gp("default_lu_gp", 1);
3786: if (IS_ERR(lu_gp)) {
3787: ret = -ENOMEM;
3788: goto out_global;
3789: }
3790:
3791: config_group_init_type_name(&lu_gp->lu_gp_group, "default_lu_gp",
3792: &target_core_alua_lu_gp_cit);
3793: configfs_add_default_group(&lu_gp->lu_gp_group, &alua_lu_gps_group);
3794:
3795: default_lu_gp = lu_gp;
3796:
3797: /*
3798: * Register the target_core_mod subsystem with configfs.
3799: */
3800: ret = configfs_register_subsystem(subsys);
3801: if (ret < 0) {
3802: pr_err("Error %d while registering subsystem %s\n",
3803: ret, subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_namebuf);
3804: goto out_global;
3805: }
3806: pr_debug("TARGET_CORE[0]: Initialized ConfigFS Fabric"
3807: " Infrastructure: "TARGET_CORE_VERSION" on %s/%s"
3808: " on "UTS_RELEASE"\n", utsname()->sysname, utsname()->machine);
3809: /*
3810: * Register built-in RAMDISK subsystem logic for virtual LUN 0
3811: */
3812: ret = rd_module_init();
3813: if (ret < 0)
3814: goto out;
3815:
3816: ret = core_dev_setup_virtual_lun0();
3817: if (ret < 0)
3818: goto out;
3819:
3820: ret = target_xcopy_setup_pt();
3821: if (ret < 0)
3822: goto out;
3823:
3824: scoped_with_kernel_creds()
3825: target_init_dbroot();
3826:
3827: return 0;
3828:
3829: out:
3830: target_xcopy_release_pt();
3831: configfs_unregister_subsystem(subsys);
3832: core_dev_release_virtual_lun0();
3833: rd_module_exit();
3834: out_global:
3835: if (default_lu_gp) {
3836: core_alua_free_lu_gp(default_lu_gp);
3837: default_lu_gp = NULL;
3838: }
3839: release_se_kmem_caches();
3840: return ret;
3841: }
SourceFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c]
|
| 55/2 |
2026/08/11 22:56 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30138
output: 42
thoughts: 52
Thoughts: **My Internal Monologue Unraveling Target Core Fabrics**
Okay, let me re-center my thinking here. I just had a moment of clarity regarding the structure. It seems I was initially thinking of `target_core_fabrics` as a more static entity, perhaps a module or a broader component. But no, I've just realized that `target_core_fabrics` is actually the *subsystem* itself. This is a crucial distinction.
My understanding is now solidifying: the directories that represent specific fabrics, like `usb_gadget` and its ilk, aren't predefined or statically established. Instead, they are brought into existence dynamically. The mechanism for this, as I'm now seeing, is through the `mkdir` operations. So, when we need a fabric, we literally create its directory on the fly.
This leads me to the next logical step in my investigation: I need to examine the item operations defined for `target_core_fabrics`. Understanding how this subsystem manages its dynamic sub-fabrics, especially through its `item_ops`, will be key to grasping the full picture of its functionality and how it interacts with the underlying fabric implementations.
|
| 56/2 |
2026/08/11 22:57 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c Name:target_core_fabrics]
Results: map[SourceCode: 311: static struct configfs_subsystem target_core_fabrics = {
312: .su_group = {
313: .cg_item = {
314: .ci_namebuf = "target",
315: .ci_type = &target_core_fabrics_item,
316: },
317: },
318: };
SourceFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c]
|
| 57/2 |
2026/08/11 22:57 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30357
output: 44
thoughts: 45
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `target_core_fabrics_item` and its `make_group` Attribute**
I'm reviewing the `target_core_fabrics_item` structure and its associated attributes. My immediate thought is to examine the `make_group` attribute. I'm specifically trying to determine if `make_group` is indeed set to `target_core_make_subdev`. However, before I fully commit to that assumption or proceed based on it, I feel it's crucial to perform a direct verification. Therefore, my next step is to explicitly re-examine the `target_core_fabrics_item` itself to confirm the value of its `make_group` attribute. This ensures accuracy and prevents potential downstream issues arising from a mistaken premise.
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tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c Name:target_core_fabrics_item]
Results: map[SourceCode: 302: /*
303: * Provides Fabrics Groups and Item Attributes for /sys/kernel/config/target/
304: */
305: static const struct config_item_type target_core_fabrics_item = {
306: .ct_group_ops = &target_core_fabric_group_ops,
307: .ct_attrs = target_core_fabric_item_attrs,
308: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
309: };
SourceFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 30600
output: 43
thoughts: 26
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the `target_core_fabric_group_ops` and `make_group` Relationship**
Ah, okay, so I'm tracing the execution flow here, and I see that `target_core_fabric_group_ops` is a structure, or perhaps a set of operations, that deals with fabric groups. My immediate focus shifts to how these groups are *created*. The key insight I'm gaining is that within `target_core_fabric_group_ops`, there's a specific operation, `make_group`. And it's not just any `make_group` function; I'm observing that this `make_group` is actually aliased or directly assigned to `target_core_register_fabric`. This tells me something fundamental about how fabric groups are initialized or brought into existence within this system. It implies that the act of "making" a fabric group is intrinsically linked, perhaps even synonymous, with the process of "registering" a fabric. This suggests a strong coupling between the conceptual idea of a group of fabrics and the underlying mechanism for making that fabric known and available within the core fabric management system. I'm essentially seeing a direct mapping: when I need to create a fabric group, I'm actually going to be calling the fabric registration function. This isn't just a tangential relationship; it's a core functional equivalence that I need to keep in mind as I delve deeper into the fabric management logic.
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tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c Name:target_core_register_fabric]
Results: map[SourceCode: 179: /*
180: * Called from struct target_core_group_ops->make_group()
181: */
182: static struct config_group *target_core_register_fabric(
183: struct config_group *group,
184: const char *name)
185: {
186: struct target_fabric_configfs *tf;
187: int ret;
188:
189: pr_debug("Target_Core_ConfigFS: REGISTER -> group: %p name:"
190: " %s\n", group, name);
191:
192: tf = target_core_get_fabric(name);
193: if (!tf) {
194: pr_debug("target_core_register_fabric() trying autoload for %s\n",
195: name);
196:
197: /*
198: * Below are some hardcoded request_module() calls to automatically
199: * local fabric modules when the following is called:
200: *
201: * mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/$MODULE_NAME
202: *
203: * Note that this does not limit which TCM fabric module can be
204: * registered, but simply provids auto loading logic for modules with
205: * mkdir(2) system calls with known TCM fabric modules.
206: */
207:
208: if (!strncmp(name, "iscsi", 5)) {
209: /*
210: * Automatically load the LIO Target fabric module when the
211: * following is called:
212: *
213: * mkdir -p $CONFIGFS/target/iscsi
214: */
215: ret = request_module("iscsi_target_mod");
216: if (ret < 0) {
217: pr_debug("request_module() failed for"
218: " iscsi_target_mod.ko: %d\n", ret);
219: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
220: }
221: } else if (!strncmp(name, "loopback", 8)) {
222: /*
223: * Automatically load the tcm_loop fabric module when the
224: * following is called:
225: *
226: * mkdir -p $CONFIGFS/target/loopback
227: */
228: ret = request_module("tcm_loop");
229: if (ret < 0) {
230: pr_debug("request_module() failed for"
231: " tcm_loop.ko: %d\n", ret);
232: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
233: }
234: }
235:
236: tf = target_core_get_fabric(name);
237: }
238:
239: if (!tf) {
240: pr_debug("target_core_get_fabric() failed for %s\n",
241: name);
242: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
243: }
244: pr_debug("Target_Core_ConfigFS: REGISTER -> Located fabric:"
245: " %s\n", tf->tf_ops->fabric_name);
246: /*
247: * On a successful target_core_get_fabric() look, the returned
248: * struct target_fabric_configfs *tf will contain a usage reference.
249: */
250: pr_debug("Target_Core_ConfigFS: REGISTER tfc_wwn_cit -> %p\n",
251: &tf->tf_wwn_cit);
252:
253: config_group_init_type_name(&tf->tf_group, name, &tf->tf_wwn_cit);
254:
255: config_group_init_type_name(&tf->tf_disc_group, "discovery_auth",
256: &tf->tf_discovery_cit);
257: configfs_add_default_group(&tf->tf_disc_group, &tf->tf_group);
258:
259: pr_debug("Target_Core_ConfigFS: REGISTER -> Allocated Fabric: %s\n",
260: config_item_name(&tf->tf_group.cg_item));
261: return &tf->tf_group;
262: }
SourceFile:drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31974
output: 42
thoughts: 2134
Thoughts: **Understanding the Complex Dance of Kernel ConfigFS and USB Gadget Fabric Registration**
Alright, let me walk through my thought process here. I'm trying to get a grip on how the USB gadget fabric is registered through ConfigFS, particularly when dealing with `target_core` and the `usb_gadget` fabric.
My initial hypothesis was that executing `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` would directly trigger the `target_core_register_fabric("usb_gadget")` function. This, in turn, would call `target_core_get_fabric("usb_gadget")`. For this `get` call to succeed, I reasoned, the `tcm.0` instance must already exist, which would have loaded the `usb_f_tcm` module, and that module, crucially, would have registered the `usb_gadget` fabric. Then, subsequent operations like `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456` would fall into place.
So, the proposed sequence of operations looked like this:
1. Mount ConfigFS: `system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");`
2. Create a USB gadget instance: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");`
3. Create a TCM function for that gadget: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");`
4. Create a target WWN and TPGT under the `usb_gadget` fabric: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");`
5. Some other unrelated operations were mixed in, like creating and immediately removing `g2`: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2"); system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");`
6. And then some UVC (USB Video Class) function setup: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1"); system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");`
As I dug deeper into the `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1` operation, I realized it wasn't a single atomic step from the kernel's perspective. It would sequentially create `/sys/kernel/config/target` (if it didn't exist), then `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget`, which is where the fabric registration actually happens. Then it would create the NAA (Network Address Authority) entry and finally the TPGT (Target Port Group) itself.
Now, the critical question: what guarantees that `tcm.0` is created *before* we attempt to create the TPGT under the `usb_gadget` fabric? My thinking went to how `usb_get_function_instance("tcm")` works. It employs `try_then_request_module`, which will indeed load `usb_f_tcm.ko`. The `init` function of `usb_f_tcm.ko` then calls `target_register_template(&usbg_ops)`, and that's what registers the `usb_gadget` fabric.
I then questioned whether the `target` subsystem itself even exists before `target_core_mod` is loaded. The answer is no. However, `usb_f_tcm` has a dependency on `target_core_mod` because it uses exported functions like `target_register_template`. Therefore, loading `usb_f_tcm` *should* implicitly load `target_core_mod`, and the initialization of `target_core_mod` is what registers the `target` subsystem in ConfigFS, making `/sys/kernel/config/target` appear.
This led me to consider the role of `libcomposite`. The creation of `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` is managed by the `gadget_subsys` (part of `libcomposite`, or directly in `drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c`). I wasn't immediately sure if `libcomposite` was auto-loaded when ConfigFS mounts. It turns out it's not automatically loaded by ConfigFS itself. However, in common scenarios like syzkaller, `CONFIG_USB_LIBCOMPOSITE=y` is often enabled, meaning it's built-in. If not, `modprobe libcomposite` would be necessary. The assumption in many reproducers is that the subsystem is already available.
This led me to refine the script, ensuring the essential steps were present.
Then came a deeper dive into the locking. This is where things got really interesting and potentially problematic. I started tracing the locks acquired during each operation:
1. `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`: This involves `configfs_mkdir`, which acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. Then `function_make` calls `tcm_set_name`, which acquires `opts->dep_lock`. So, `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`.
2. `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`: This involves `configfs_mkdir` acquiring `target_core_fabrics.su_mutex`. Then `target_fabric_make_tpg` calls `usbg_make_tpg`, which tries to acquire `opts->dep_lock` (from the `tcm.0` instance we created earlier). It also calls `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`, which acquires the `inode_lock` of the `tcm.0` dentry. So, `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`.
3. `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`: This involves `vfs_rmdir` acquiring the `inode_lock` for the `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` dentry, and `configfs_rmdir` acquires `frag_sem` for the `g2` fragment. So, `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`.
4. `echo 1 > .../bNumControls`: This involves `vfs_write` and `configfs_write_iter`, which acquire the `frag_sem` for the `bNumControls` fragment. Then the `_store` function (`uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`) acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. So, `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
The moment of realization: I had constructed a perfect deadlock. The sequence of lock dependencies was:
`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
The crucial point was that the `inode_lock` acquired in step 2 for the NAA/TPGT creation was for the *specific* dentry of `tcm.0`, while the `inode_lock` acquired in step 3 was for the `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` dentry. ConfigFS uses a single lock class for all its inode `i_rwsem`s, so these are indeed the same type of lock acquisition in principle, leading to the cycle. This complete cycle of lock acquisitions means that if all these operations were to execute concurrently or in a specific order under contention, the system would freeze.
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tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/inode.c Name:configfs_set_inode_lock_class]
Results: map[SourceCode: 127: static void configfs_set_inode_lock_class(struct configfs_dirent *sd,
128: struct inode *inode)
129: {
130: int depth = sd->s_depth;
131:
132: if (depth > 0) {
133: if (depth <= ARRAY_SIZE(default_group_class)) {
134: lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem,
135: &default_group_class[depth - 1]);
136: } else {
137: /*
138: * In practice the maximum level of locking depth is
139: * already reached. Just inform about possible reasons.
140: */
141: pr_info("Too many levels of inodes for the locking correctness validator.\n");
142: pr_info("Spurious warnings may appear.\n");
143: }
144: }
145: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/inode.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 34439
output: 38
thoughts: 90
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacked**
Ah, I've just realized something quite interesting regarding `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`. It appears this function determines the lock class it assigns based on the value of `sd->s_depth`. This immediately strikes me as a significant point.
My next thought is: if the lock class is indeed contingent upon the `depth` of the filesystem structure, then it logically follows that the `inode_lock` associated with `tcm.0` and the `inode_lock` for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` could potentially have *different* lock classes. This is because their respective `sd->s_depth` values might not be identical. To confirm this hypothesis and understand the implications fully, I need to delve deeper and examine the specific values of `sd->s_depth` in each of these contexts.
|
| 64/2 |
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tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_attach_group]
Results: map[SourceCode: 891: static int configfs_attach_group(struct config_item *item,
892: struct dentry *dentry,
893: struct configfs_fragment *frag)
894: {
895: int ret;
896: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
897:
898: ret = configfs_attach_item(item, dentry, frag);
899: if (!ret) {
900: sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
901: sd->s_type |= CONFIGFS_USET_DIR;
902:
903: /*
904: * FYI, we're faking mkdir in populate_groups()
905: * We must lock the group's inode to avoid races with the VFS
906: * which can already hit the inode and try to add/remove entries
907: * under it.
908: *
909: * We must also lock the inode to remove it safely in case of
910: * error, as rmdir() would.
911: */
912: inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dentry), I_MUTEX_CHILD);
913: configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate(sd);
914: ret = populate_groups(to_config_group(item), frag);
915: if (ret) {
916: configfs_detach_group(dentry);
917: d_inode(dentry)->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
918: dont_mount(dentry);
919: }
920: configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_after_populate(sd);
921: inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
922: if (ret)
923: d_delete(dentry);
924: }
925:
926: return ret;
927: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 35138
output: 47
thoughts: 26
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate`**
Okay, so I'm digging into the `configfs` code, and this function `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate` immediately caught my eye. My initial reaction was a slight pause, a "wait a minute" moment, because the name itself is quite descriptive, hinting at a manipulation of directory entry depth *before* the population process really kicks off.
My mind immediately went to the implications of such a change. If `s_depth` is being altered here, that signifies a fundamental adjustment to how the filesystem itself perceives and manages the hierarchical structure of its directories. `s_depth` (which I know refers to the 'severity depth' or perhaps 'structure depth' within the `configfs` context, representing a level in the directory tree) is a critical piece of metadata. Modifying it *before* populating the directory's entries suggests a proactive step, possibly to optimize or prepare for the upcoming enumeration of children.
I'm considering the potential reasons behind this. Is it to pre-allocate space more efficiently? To set an upper bound or a target depth that the subsequent population logic must adhere to? Or perhaps it's a more subtle optimization, like adjusting internal data structures to align with an expected depth, thereby avoiding reallocations or more costly adjustments later on. This feels like a deliberate design choice aimed at improving performance or ensuring structural integrity during the population phase, especially for deep or complex configurations.
I'm also thinking about the side effects. If `s_depth` is modified, does this change impact other parts of the filesystem's operations? For instance, how does it affect parent directory lookups, or operations that rely on a consistent understanding of directory depth? The fact that it's happening "before populate" is key; it suggests that the population process itself is designed to work *with* this pre-set depth, rather than having to discover or infer it dynamically. This implies a tight coupling between this adjustment and the subsequent directory entry creation.
Essentially, my thought process is one of informed curiosity, recognizing that a modification to a core structural parameter like `s_depth` at this specific juncture is unlikely to be arbitrary. I'm immediately trying to infer the performance, structural, or behavioral advantages that this pre-population adjustment is intended to provide within the `configfs` framework.
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tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate]
Results: map[SourceCode: 107: static void
108: configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate(struct configfs_dirent *sd)
109: {
110: /*
111: * item's i_mutex class is already setup, so s_depth is now only
112: * used to set new sub-directories s_depth, which is always done
113: * with item's i_mutex locked.
114: */
115: /*
116: * sd->s_depth == -1 iff we are a non default group.
117: * else (we are a default group) sd->s_depth > 0 (see
118: * create_dir()).
119: */
120: if (sd->s_depth == -1)
121: /*
122: * We are a non default group and we are going to create
123: * default groups.
124: */
125: sd->s_depth = 0;
126: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 35523
output: 38
thoughts: 272
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` and `i_mutex_key`**
Okay, I'm looking at this `lockdep` report, and it's throwing up a flag: `-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:`. The `#24` here immediately tells me that this is the 24th lock class associated with `i_mutex_key`. Now, my understanding is that `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` is the *default* lock class that applies to *all* inodes within a filesystem, unless it's explicitly overridden by a call to `lockdep_set_class`.
This brings me to the core of my current line of inquiry: does `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` actually override this default for *all* inodes? I'm scrutinizing the `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` code snippet, specifically this `if (depth > 0)` block and the subsequent call to `lockdep_set_class`. It seems to suggest that the override *only* happens when `depth` is greater than zero.
This naturally leads me to question: what is the value of `depth` for a "normal" directory that's created using `mkdir` within `configfs`? My immediate thought is that `configfs_mkdir` seems to be creating what we'd consider a "non-default group/item." To get a clearer picture, I need to dive into `configfs_attach_item` and see how `depth` is managed there and how it propagates. This will help me confirm whether the `i_mutex_key` default is indeed being overridden for these "normal" directory inodes, or if they're still adhering to the system-wide default.
|
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2026/08/11 22:57 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_attach_item]
Results: map[SourceCode: 842: /*
843: * The goal is that configfs_attach_item() (and
844: * configfs_attach_group()) can be called from either the VFS or this
845: * module. That is, they assume that the items have been created,
846: * the dentry allocated, and the dcache is all ready to go.
847: *
848: * If they fail, they must clean up after themselves as if they
849: * had never been called. The caller (VFS or local function) will
850: * handle cleaning up the dcache bits.
851: *
852: * configfs_detach_group() and configfs_detach_item() behave similarly on
853: * the way out. They assume that the proper semaphores are held, they
854: * clean up the configfs items, and they expect their callers will
855: * handle the dcache bits.
856: */
857: static int configfs_attach_item(struct config_item *item,
858: struct dentry *dentry,
859: struct configfs_fragment *frag)
860: {
861: int ret;
862:
863: ret = configfs_create_dir(item, dentry, frag);
864: if (!ret) {
865: ret = populate_attrs(item);
866: if (ret) {
867: /*
868: * We are going to remove an inode and its dentry but
869: * the VFS may already have hit and used them. Thus,
870: * we must lock them as rmdir() would.
871: */
872: inode_lock(d_inode(dentry));
873: configfs_detach_item(dentry);
874: d_inode(dentry)->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
875: dont_mount(dentry);
876: inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry));
877: d_delete(dentry);
878: }
879: }
880:
881: return ret;
882: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 36474
output: 38
thoughts: 9
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `configfs_create_dir`**
When I encounter `configfs_create_dir`, my initial thought is that I'm about to engage with the core mechanism for establishing a new directory within the configfs filesystem. I immediately recognize that this function isn't just a simple directory creation utility; it's intrinsically tied to the dynamic, virtualized nature of configfs.
My understanding is that `configfs_create_dir` serves as the *entry point* for defining a new configuration namespace or a specific component's configuration hierarchy within the kernel. I anticipate that this function will likely involve:
* **A Path Specification:** I expect it to take a path, relative to the current configfs mount point or a parent directory within configfs, that dictates where this new directory should reside. The hierarchical structure of configfs is paramount, and this function is the tool for building it.
* **Permissions and Ownership:** I'll be looking to see how it handles standard filesystem attributes. While configfs is virtual, it still presents itself with permissions, and I'll consider how those are managed here, likely defaulting to sensible kernel-level permissions or allowing explicit specification.
* **Association with a Group:** A crucial aspect of configfs is its grouping mechanism. I'll be thinking about whether `configfs_create_dir` needs to be associated with a specific `config_group` structure. This linkage is what allows the created directory to inherit behaviors and be managed within a broader configuration context. Without this, it's just a lonely directory.
* **Underlying Object Creation:** I know that configfs directories aren't just empty containers. They represent or host actual configuration objects. Therefore, my thought process will immediately jump to what kind of underlying kernel object or data structure this directory is intended to represent. Is it an interface to a hardware component? A virtual device? A driver's tunable parameter set? The `configfs_create_dir` call is the trigger for this association.
* **Error Handling and Robustness:** As with any kernel operation, I'll be scrutinizing the expected return values and potential error conditions. What happens if the parent directory doesn't exist? What if there's a naming conflict? What if memory allocation fails? A well-designed `configfs_create_dir` should gracefully handle these scenarios and communicate them effectively.
* **VFS Integration:** I'll also consider the underlying virtual filesystem (VFS) operations that `configfs_create_dir` abstracts away. It's essentially a wrapper around the kernel's VFS layer for creating directories, but with the added intelligence of configfs's object model and grouping.
In essence, my thought process upon seeing `configfs_create_dir` is one of anticipation and analysis. I'm not just thinking "create a directory"; I'm thinking about the *purpose* of that directory within the configfs framework, the *dependencies* it has on other configfs structures, and the *kernel object* it's designed to expose or manage. It's the first step in defining a new piece of configurable kernel behavior.
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tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_create_dir]
Results: map[SourceCode: 293: static int configfs_create_dir(struct config_item *item, struct dentry *dentry,
294: struct configfs_fragment *frag)
295: {
296: int error;
297: umode_t mode = S_IFDIR| S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
298: struct dentry *p = dentry->d_parent;
299: struct inode *p_inode = d_inode(p);
300: struct inode *inode;
301:
302: BUG_ON(!item);
303:
304: error = configfs_make_dirent(p->d_fsdata, dentry, item, mode,
305: CONFIGFS_DIR | CONFIGFS_USET_CREATING,
306: frag);
307: if (unlikely(error))
308: return error;
309:
310: configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth(p->d_fsdata, dentry->d_fsdata);
311: inode = configfs_create(dentry, mode);
312: if (IS_ERR(inode))
313: goto out_remove;
314:
315: inode->i_op = &configfs_dir_inode_operations;
316: inode->i_fop = &configfs_dir_operations;
317: /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
318: inc_nlink(inode);
319: d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
320: inc_nlink(p_inode);
321: inode_set_mtime_to_ts(p_inode, inode_set_ctime_current(p_inode));
322: item->ci_dentry = dentry;
323: return 0;
324:
325: out_remove:
326: configfs_put(dentry->d_fsdata);
327: configfs_remove_dirent(dentry);
328: return PTR_ERR(inode);
329: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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| 71/2 |
2026/08/11 22:57 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37150
output: 43
thoughts: 14
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth`**
Ah, I see the snippet here refers to `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth`. My immediate thought, given my expertise, is to understand its purpose within the `configfs` framework. I'm assuming this function is part of the core mechanism for managing configuration files and directories dynamically within the kernel.
My initial hypothesis is that `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` is designed to control or limit the *depth* of directory traversal or the number of entries (`dirent`s) that can be exposed or managed within a specific directory entry in `configfs`. This makes sense from a resource management perspective. Unbounded directory creation and enumeration within `configfs` could potentially lead to performance issues or even denial-of-service vulnerabilities if not properly constrained.
Therefore, I'm thinking this function likely takes a `configfs_dirent` (or a similar structure representing a directory entry) and a value representing the desired depth or maximum number of entries. It then needs to enforce this limit, perhaps by modifying internal state within the `configfs_dirent` itself or by interacting with other `configfs` internal structures.
I'd be particularly interested in how this limit is *enforced*. Does it happen during directory creation? During file or subdirectory lookup? Does it affect the enumeration of directory contents (e.g., `readdir` operations)? Is this a hard limit, or can it be adjusted dynamically? Understanding the enforcement mechanism is key to grasping the practical implications of this function.
Furthermore, I'm considering the potential use cases. This function could be crucial for drivers or subsystems that expose a large number of configuration parameters in a hierarchical manner but want to prevent excessive nesting or a massive number of entries in any single directory. It could be a security feature to prevent overly complex or deep configuration trees from being created, which might be harder to audit or could impact system performance.
My next step would be to look at the function's signature and its implementation details to confirm these hypotheses. I'd be scanning for parameters like `max_depth` or `max_entries`, and I'd trace the code to see where and how this value is used. I'd also be looking at any associated error handling. If a limit is exceeded, what happens? Does it return an error? Does it silently truncate?
In essence, `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` strikes me as a control mechanism for managing the complexity and resource consumption of `configfs` hierarchies, aiming for a balance between flexibility and robustness.
|
| 72/2 |
2026/08/11 22:58 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth]
Results: map[SourceCode: 98: static void configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth(struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd,
99: struct configfs_dirent *sd)
100: {
101: int parent_depth = parent_sd->s_depth;
102:
103: if (parent_depth >= 0)
104: sd->s_depth = parent_depth + 1;
105: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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2026/08/11 22:58 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37344
output: 39
thoughts: 170
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `s_depth` in ConfigFS**
Okay, let's trace this out. The rule I'm seeing is that if a parent directory has a `parent_depth` greater than or equal to 0, then its child's `s_depth` will be `parent_depth + 1`. This seems straightforward enough for hierarchical relationships.
But then I hit a snag. What's the `s_depth` for the very root of the configfs filesystem? I need to look at how it's initialized. Ah, right, in `configfs_fill_super`, I see `root_sd->s_depth = 0`. That makes sense; the root is level 0.
So, following that logic, if `/sys/kernel/config` is at `s_depth = 0`, then a subdirectory like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` should have `s_depth = 1`. This aligns with the `parent_depth + 1` rule, where the parent (`/sys/kernel/config`) has `parent_depth` of 0.
Now, the confusion arises when I consider a path like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`. If `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` has `s_depth = 1`, then according to the rule, `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1` *should* have an `s_depth` of 2. But my initial thought was that it might be -1. Why did I even consider -1?
Ah, I'm remembering now, the confusion came from a potential misunderstanding of how `s_depth` is set when a directory is *created*. I initially assumed `configfs_mkdir` would directly set `s_depth` to -1 for some reason. But upon re-examination, `configfs_mkdir` doesn't actually set `s_depth` directly in that manner. The mechanism for setting `s_depth` is actually handled within `configfs_make_dirent`. That's the function I need to scrutinize to fully understand the `s_depth` calculation, especially for those subdirectories. It seems my initial assumption about `configfs_mkdir` was the source of the discrepancy.
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| 74/2 |
2026/08/11 22:58 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_make_dirent]
Results: map[SourceCode: 253: int configfs_make_dirent(struct configfs_dirent * parent_sd,
254: struct dentry * dentry, void * element,
255: umode_t mode, int type, struct configfs_fragment *frag)
256: {
257: struct configfs_dirent * sd;
258:
259: sd = configfs_new_dirent(parent_sd, element, type, frag);
260: if (IS_ERR(sd))
261: return PTR_ERR(sd);
262:
263: sd->s_mode = mode;
264: sd->s_dentry = dentry;
265: if (dentry)
266: dentry->d_fsdata = configfs_get(sd);
267:
268: return 0;
269: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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2026/08/11 22:58 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37819
output: 39
thoughts: 10
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `configfs_new_dirent`**
Ah, `configfs_new_dirent`. I'm looking at this function now, and my mind immediately goes to its core purpose: creating a new directory entry within the `configfs` filesystem. I recognize that `configfs` itself is a specialized kernel filesystem designed for configuring kernel modules and devices at runtime. It presents a hierarchical structure that allows for dynamic creation and manipulation of configuration parameters.
So, when I encounter `configfs_new_dirent`, my immediate thought is about its role in this dynamic configuration process. It's the mechanism by which we'd be able to instantiate a new "thing" – a configuration item, a device node, whatever the `configfs` framework is meant to represent – within that hierarchy.
I'm thinking about the implications of creating a new directory entry. This isn't just a passive creation; it implies a certain lifecycle and management. A new entry likely needs to be registered, potentially with associated operations (like read, write, open, release) that the kernel will use when interacting with this configuration point. It also means that the underlying data structure representing this entry needs to be allocated and initialized.
Given that this is a kernel function, I'm also immediately considering its context. It's not happening in userspace; it's deep within the kernel's filesystem layer. This means considerations for concurrency, locking, and potential error handling are paramount. If this function fails, what's the impact? Does it leave the `configfs` in an inconsistent state? What are the return codes I should expect, and how should they be handled?
Furthermore, I'm wondering about the parameters this function takes. What information does it need to successfully create a new directory entry? I'd expect it to at least need a pointer to the parent directory (the `config_item` it will be attached to), the name of the new entry, and possibly some flags or metadata that define its behavior or type. There might also be a pointer to a structure that defines the operations associated with this new entry.
Thinking about the "new" aspect, I'm also considering the underlying memory management. Is this function responsible for allocating the `config_item` structure itself, or does it expect a pre-allocated structure to be passed in? If it allocates, what are the memory zones it uses, and are there any potential for leaks or excessive memory consumption if this function is called repeatedly?
In essence, when I see `configfs_new_dirent`, I'm seeing a fundamental building block for runtime configuration in the Linux kernel. It's the gateway to adding new, dynamic configuration points, and my thought process immediately dives into the details of how it achieves this, the context in which it operates, and the implications for the overall system's stability and behavior. It's about understanding not just *what* it does, but *how* it does it and the responsibilities it carries.
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| 76/2 |
2026/08/11 22:58 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_new_dirent]
Results: map[SourceCode: 184: /*
185: * Allocates a new configfs_dirent and links it to the parent configfs_dirent
186: */
187: static struct configfs_dirent *configfs_new_dirent(struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd,
188: void *element, int type,
189: struct configfs_fragment *frag)
190: {
191: struct configfs_dirent * sd;
192:
193: sd = kmem_cache_zalloc(configfs_dir_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
194: if (!sd)
195: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
196:
197: atomic_set(&sd->s_count, 1);
198: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sd->s_children);
199: sd->s_element = element;
200: sd->s_type = type;
201: configfs_init_dirent_depth(sd);
202: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
203: if (parent_sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING) {
204: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
205: kmem_cache_free(configfs_dir_cachep, sd);
206: return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
207: }
208: sd->s_frag = get_fragment(frag);
209:
210: /*
211: * configfs_lookup scans only for unpinned items. s_children is
212: * partitioned so that configfs_lookup can bail out early.
213: * CONFIGFS_PINNED and CONFIGFS_NOT_PINNED are not symmetrical. readdir
214: * cursors still need to be inserted at the front of the list.
215: */
216: if (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_PINNED)
217: list_add_tail(&sd->s_sibling, &parent_sd->s_children);
218: else
219: list_add(&sd->s_sibling, &parent_sd->s_children);
220: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
221:
222: return sd;
223: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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| 77/2 |
2026/08/11 22:58 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38544
output: 41
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: **My Deep Dive into `configfs_init_dirent_depth`**
Okay, so I'm looking at this `configfs_init_dirent_depth` function. My immediate thought is, what's its purpose? The name itself suggests it's about initializing something related to directory entries, and specifically, their *depth*. This implies a hierarchical structure, which is absolutely fundamental to how file systems, and in this case, `configfs` (which is a virtual filesystem for kernel configuration), are organized.
I'm trying to imagine the context. When we talk about initializing a directory entry, it usually means setting up the basic metadata for that entry. This could include permissions, ownership, timestamps, and critically, pointers to where the actual data or other directory entries reside. The "depth" part is what's particularly interesting. It suggests we're not just creating a standalone directory, but one within a pre-existing tree. The depth would tell us how far down the hierarchy this new entry is.
So, my mental model is forming: `configfs_init_dirent_depth` is likely a helper function. It's probably being called by higher-level functions that are responsible for creating new directories or files within the `configfs` framework. The core task of this function is to take a new directory entry and properly initialize its structural attributes, ensuring its position (its depth) in the `configfs` tree is correctly recorded.
I'm considering the implications of "depth." Why is it important to track? In a filesystem, depth can influence various operations. For instance, certain operations might be restricted based on how deep you are in the tree. It could also be used for internal accounting or optimization within the `configfs` implementation. Perhaps it's related to memory management or how the `configfs` structures are linked.
Given that this is `configfs`, I'm also thinking about its specific use case. `configfs` is designed to expose kernel configuration parameters as a filesystem. This means that the directory structure we're talking about isn't just arbitrary; it directly maps to the internal state and configuration options of the Linux kernel. So, initializing a directory entry with the correct depth is crucial for presenting this configuration hierarchy in a logical and consistent manner to userspace.
Ultimately, my thought process is centered on understanding `configfs_init_dirent_depth` as a foundational piece of the `configfs` infrastructure, responsible for establishing the structural integrity and positional awareness of directory entries within the kernel's configurable filesystem. It's about setting up the scaffolding before any actual configuration data can be populated.
|
| 78/2 |
2026/08/11 22:58 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_init_dirent_depth]
Results: map[SourceCode: 93: static void configfs_init_dirent_depth(struct configfs_dirent *sd)
94: {
95: sd->s_depth = -1;
96: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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2026/08/11 22:58 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38664
output: 39
thoughts: 3919
Thoughts: **My Thoughts on Triggering a Lockdep Cycle in Configfs**
Alright, let's trace this out. It seems like the core of the problem lies in how `sd->s_depth` is managed and subsequently how lock classes are assigned to inodes within the configfs filesystem. My understanding is that `sd->s_depth` is initially set to `-1`. The `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` function updates this to `parent_depth + 1` *only if* `parent_depth` is non-negative. This means if `parent_depth` is `-1`, `sd->s_depth` remains `-1`.
Then, `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate` is crucial here. It sets `sd->s_depth` to `0` if it was previously `-1`. However, this adjustment is *exclusively* called within `configfs_attach_group`. So, for any group created via `configfs_attach_group` (which seems to be the case for many of our target directories), its depth will become `0`. This has a significant implication for lock class assignment.
The `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` function is designed to override the default lock class *only if* the `depth` is greater than `0`. If `depth` is `0` (or `-1`, which we've established becomes `0` before this check), it falls back to using the default lock class, which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`.
Now, let's look at the specific objects we're creating. I'm told `tcm.0` is created as a group (because `function_make` returns `struct config_group *`). This means `tcm.0` will have a `depth` of `0`. Similarly, the root of a subsystem, like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, is registered using `configfs_register_subsystem`, which internally calls `configfs_attach_group`. Therefore, the subsystem's root group also gets a `depth` of `0`.
When we `mkdir` a new directory like `g1` under `usb_gadget`, it's also treated as a group and gets `depth = 0`. Default groups, like `functions` within `g1`, will then have `depth = 1`. However, when `tcm.0` is created *within* `functions`, its depth is reset to `0` because it's a group created via `configfs_attach_group` (implicitly, through `mkdir` creating a group). The same logic applies to `g2`. So, both `tcm.0` and `g2` end up with `depth = 0`.
This is the critical part: since both `tcm.0` and `g2` have a depth of `0`, their inodes will *both* default to using the lock class `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`. This is precisely what `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` does when `depth <= 0`.
Let's verify this. The `configfs_create` function, which is used to create configfs inodes, calls `new_inode(configfs_sb)`. `new_inode` initializes `i_rwsem` with `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`. So, any inode with `depth <= 0` will indeed share this default lock class.
Therefore, `tcm.0` and `g2`, both having `depth = 0`, share the exact same lock class (`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`). This sets the stage for a perfect lockdep cycle.
Now, let's consider the sequence of operations in the script and how they map to lock acquisitions:
1. **`mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`**: This operation will create `tcm.0`. As discussed, `tcm.0` will have `depth = 0` and thus use `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`. Additionally, the creation of `tcm.0` likely involves acquiring `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` (for the `usb_gadget` subsystem) and then `&opts->dep_lock` (associated with the `tcm` configuration options). This establishes `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` and potentially `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`.
2. **`mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`**: This is where `target_core_register_fabric` is invoked. This fabric registration likely acquires `&opts->dep_lock` (if `tcm` is involved in fabric setup) and then attempts to acquire the inode lock for `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget`, which might also fall back to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` or involve other locks in the `target` subsystem. Crucially, this operation might establish `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`.
3. **`mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`** followed by **`rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`**: The `rmdir` operation on `g2` will acquire the inode lock for `g2` (which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` due to `depth = 0`). Inside `configfs_rmdir`, it then acquires `frag_sem` associated with `g2`. This establishes `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` -> `frag_sem`.
4. **`mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`** and **`echo 1 > .../bNumControls`**: The write operation to `bNumControls` within the UVC extension will involve acquiring `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` (for the `usb_gadget` subsystem) and then `frag_sem` (for the UVC extension's internal structures). This establishes `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
Putting it all together, we seem to have the following chain:
* The creation of `tcm.0` (and its associated target structures) establishes a dependency from `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` to `&opts->dep_lock`, and then potentially to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`.
* The `rmdir` of `g2` acquires `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` and then `frag_sem`.
* The write to `bNumControls` acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` and then `frag_sem`.
This forms the cycle: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` (from `tcm.0` and target setup) -> `frag_sem` (from `rmdir g2`) -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` (from `echo 1 > bNumControls`).
The lockdep report mentioning `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` directly confirms that this default lock class is indeed involved. The script, by orchestrating these creation and deletion operations, perfectly sets up this scenario. The use of `mkdir -p` seems robust enough, and the `modprobe` calls ensure that the necessary modules (like `libcomposite`, `usb_f_tcm`, `usb_f_uvc`, `target_core_mod`) are loaded if they are not built-in, preventing early failures. The sequential nature of the script is sufficient because lockdep builds its dependency graph over time.
Therefore, I'm confident that this script, by carefully leveraging the depth assignment rules and the default lock class behavior in configfs, will indeed trigger the lockdep warning as observed in the report.
|
| 80/2 |
2026/08/11 22:59 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_register_subsystem]
Results: map[SourceCode:1872: int configfs_register_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys)
1873: {
1874: int err;
1875: struct config_group *group = &subsys->su_group;
1876: struct dentry *dentry;
1877: struct dentry *root;
1878: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
1879: struct configfs_fragment *frag;
1880:
1881: frag = new_fragment();
1882: if (!frag)
1883: return -ENOMEM;
1884:
1885: root = configfs_pin_fs();
1886: if (IS_ERR(root)) {
1887: put_fragment(frag);
1888: return PTR_ERR(root);
1889: }
1890:
1891: if (!group->cg_item.ci_name)
1892: group->cg_item.ci_name = group->cg_item.ci_namebuf;
1893:
1894: sd = root->d_fsdata;
1895: mutex_lock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1896: link_group(to_config_group(sd->s_element), group);
1897: mutex_unlock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1898:
1899: inode_lock_nested(d_inode(root), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
1900:
1901: err = -ENOMEM;
1902: dentry = d_alloc_name(root, group->cg_item.ci_name);
1903: if (dentry) {
1904: d_add(dentry, NULL);
1905:
1906: err = configfs_dirent_exists(dentry);
1907: if (!err)
1908: err = configfs_attach_group(&group->cg_item,
1909: dentry, frag);
1910: if (err) {
1911: BUG_ON(d_inode(dentry));
1912: d_drop(dentry);
1913: } else {
1914: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1915: configfs_dir_set_ready(dentry->d_fsdata);
1916: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1917: }
1918: dput(dentry);
1919: }
1920:
1921: inode_unlock(d_inode(root));
1922:
1923: if (err) {
1924: mutex_lock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1925: unlink_group(group);
1926: mutex_unlock(&configfs_subsystem_mutex);
1927: configfs_release_fs();
1928: }
1929: put_fragment(frag);
1930:
1931: return err;
1932: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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2026/08/11 22:59 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 43498
output: 42
thoughts: 771
Thoughts: **My Thoughts on `configfs` Directory Depth and Lock Classes**
Okay, I've been digging into how `configfs` manages directory depths and, consequently, how lock classes are assigned. It's a bit of a winding path, and I'm trying to piece together the logic.
It starts with `configfs_attach_group`. This function calls `configfs_attach_item`, which in turn invokes `configfs_create_dir`. The `configfs_create_dir` function then proceeds to call `configfs_make_dirent`, and subsequently `configfs_new_dirent`. It's within `configfs_new_dirent` that I see `sd->s_depth` being initialized to `-1`.
Immediately after that, back in `configfs_create_dir`, there's a crucial call: `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth(parent_sd, sd)`. Now, the `parent_sd` here is `root->d_fsdata`. For the root directory itself, `s_depth` is `0`. So, `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` effectively calculates `sd->s_depth = parent_sd->s_depth + 1`. This means for the initial `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` directory (assuming it's created as a child of root), its `s_depth` becomes `0 + 1 = 1`.
This struck me as significant – so `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` has an `s_depth` of `1`!
Then, `configfs_attach_group` moves on to call `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate`. The logic there is:
```c
if (sd->s_depth == -1)
sd->s_depth = 0;
```
Since `sd->s_depth` is already `1` for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, this condition is false, and the depth remains `1`. After this, `populate_groups` is executed, and indeed, `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` ends up with `s_depth = 1`.
Now, let's consider creating a subdirectory, like `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`. This triggers `configfs_mkdir`. Similar to before, `configfs_mkdir` calls `configfs_make_dirent`, which sets `sd->s_depth = -1`. Then, `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` is called again. Since the parent (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`) has `s_depth = 1`, the new directory `g1` gets `sd->s_depth = 1 + 1 = 2`.
Again, a realization: `g1` has an `s_depth` of `2`!
Following this, `configfs_attach_group` is called for `g1` and then `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate`. Because `sd->s_depth` for `g1` is `2`, the `-1` check fails, and the depth remains `2`. Then `populate_groups` is called, and `g1` has an `s_depth` of `2`.
This cascading effect means that the default group for `g1`, `functions`, will have an `s_depth` of `3`. And if I then create `tcm.0` within `functions` via `mkdir`, it will get `s_depth = 3 + 1 = 4`.
So, `tcm.0` has `s_depth = 4`. This is where things get really interesting. The function `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` is supposed to set the lock class based on this depth. For `s_depth = 4`, it should use `default_group_class[4 - 1]`, which is `default_group_class[3]`.
However, the lockdep report is showing something entirely different! It's reporting:
`-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:`
This is *not* `&default_group_class[3]` as I would expect. If it were using the `default_group_class` array, the report would explicitly mention it, like `&default_group_class[3]`.
The report points to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. I need to figure out *why* this specific lock key is being used instead of the one derived from `default_group_class`. I need to re-examine the `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` function to understand the conditions under which it chooses a different lock class.
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2026/08/11 22:59 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/inode.c Name:configfs_set_inode_lock_class]
Results: map[SourceCode: 127: static void configfs_set_inode_lock_class(struct configfs_dirent *sd,
128: struct inode *inode)
129: {
130: int depth = sd->s_depth;
131:
132: if (depth > 0) {
133: if (depth <= ARRAY_SIZE(default_group_class)) {
134: lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem,
135: &default_group_class[depth - 1]);
136: } else {
137: /*
138: * In practice the maximum level of locking depth is
139: * already reached. Just inform about possible reasons.
140: */
141: pr_info("Too many levels of inodes for the locking correctness validator.\n");
142: pr_info("Spurious warnings may appear.\n");
143: }
144: }
145: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/inode.c]
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llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44600
output: 36
thoughts: 35
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` and `configfs_create`**
My mind immediately latched onto a seemingly minor detail: the invocation of `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` within the `configfs_create` function. This connection, at first glance, might appear straightforward, but for someone deeply immersed in the intricacies of filesystem management and kernel internals, it immediately sparks a chain of inquiry. My thought process, therefore, is to meticulously unravel this relationship, understanding not just *that* it happens, but *why* and *how* it fits into the broader picture of configuration filesystem operations.
My initial reaction is one of focused curiosity. It's not enough to simply note the call; I need to understand its implications. This leads me to a deliberate step: **"Let's check `configfs_create`."** This isn't a casual browser of documentation; it's a targeted investigation. I'm looking to trace the execution flow, to identify the specific context in which `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` is invoked.
As I examine `configfs_create`, I'm not just looking for a function call. I'm dissecting the arguments passed to it, the conditions under which this specific lock class is assigned, and the overall purpose of the `create` operation in the context of `configfs`. My mind is actively seeking to answer questions like:
* What is the specific inode being created when `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` is called? Is it a directory, a file, or something else?
* What is the significance of this particular `lock_class`? Does it relate to the type of configuration being managed, or the specific operations that will be performed on this inode?
* How does the assignment of a `lock_class` here impact concurrency control for `configfs` operations? Are we ensuring proper synchronization for critical sections related to this newly created element?
* Is there any particular ordering or dependency that `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` establishes that is crucial for subsequent operations on this inode?
* Could there be alternative paths within `configfs_create` that *don't* call `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`, and if so, what differentiates those scenarios?
Essentially, my thought process is a commitment to thoroughness. I'm moving from a point of observation to a point of deep understanding. I'm hypothesizing potential reasons for this coupling and then actively seeking evidence within the code to confirm or refute those hypotheses. This isn't just about tracing a call; it's about reverse-engineering the design decisions that led to this specific implementation within the kernel's configuration filesystem. My goal is to build a comprehensive mental model of how `configfs` handles object creation and the critical role that lock class assignment plays in ensuring its robustness and correctness.
|
| 84/2 |
2026/08/11 22:59 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/inode.c Name:configfs_create]
Results: map[SourceCode: 156: struct inode *configfs_create(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
157: {
158: struct inode *inode = NULL;
159: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
160:
161: if (!dentry)
162: return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
163:
164: if (d_really_is_positive(dentry))
165: return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
166:
167: sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
168: inode = configfs_new_inode(mode, sd, dentry->d_sb);
169: if (!inode)
170: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
171:
172: configfs_set_inode_lock_class(sd, inode);
173: return inode;
174: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/inode.c]
|
| 85/2 |
2026/08/11 22:59 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44949
output: 37
thoughts: 2320
Thoughts: **Unraveling the Mysteries of ConfigFS Lock Classes**
I've been staring at this lockdep report, and frankly, it's been a journey. Initially, I saw `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` and thought, "This doesn't make sense for configfs." My understanding is that `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` is the default lock class for `i_rwsem`, and the `#24` indicated a subclass. I knew `inode_lock_nested` uses subclasses, and in `vfs_mkdir`, it's `inode_lock_nested(dir, I_MUTEX_PARENT)`, which maps to subclass `0`. So, why `#24`?
Then, I started digging into how configfs actually sets these lock classes. My immediate thought was that the `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` function is responsible, and it might be overridden for specific filesystem types. For configfs, `configfs_fs_type.i_mutex_key` is the base. I hypothesized that if `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` *wasn't* overridden, the name would be `default_group_class`. The crucial question became: why wasn't it overridden in this specific instance? My gut feeling pointed towards the `s_depth` value.
I then began a detailed trace of `s_depth` throughout the `configfs_mkdir` and related functions. I noticed that `configfs_mkdir` doesn't directly call `configfs_make_dirent`. Instead, it goes through `configfs_attach_group` or `configfs_attach_item`, which eventually call `configfs_create_dir`, and *that* calls `configfs_make_dirent`. The `configfs_make_dirent` function initializes `sd->s_depth` to `-1`. Following that, `configfs_create_dir` calls `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth`, which sets `sd->s_depth = parent_sd->s_depth + 1`. This seemed logical.
However, a critical detail emerged: `configfs_attach_group` calls `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate` *after* `configfs_attach_item`. This changes the flow. If `parent_sd->s_depth` was `-1`, then `sd->s_depth` would become `0`. The question then became whether `parent_sd->s_depth` was indeed `-1`. My check showed `configfs_init_dirent_depth` sets it to `-1`.
The plot thickened when I re-examined `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth`. It only updates `sd->s_depth` to `parent_depth + 1` *if* `parent_depth` is greater than or equal to `0`. If `parent_depth` is `-1`, it does nothing, leaving `sd->s_depth` at `-1`. This means `configfs_create` is called with `depth` as `-1`, and consequently, `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` does absolutely nothing! The inode then defaults to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`.
To solidify this, I traced the `s_depth` from the root. The root starts at `0`. `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, created by `configfs_register_subsystem`, goes through `configfs_attach_group`. `configfs_make_dirent` sets its `s_depth` to `-1`. `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` sees the root's `s_depth` of `0`, so it sets the `usb_gadget`'s `s_depth` to `1`. `configfs_create` then calls `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` with `depth = 1`, resulting in `default_group_class[0]` for this directory. The subsequent `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate` keeps its `s_depth` at `1`.
When I created `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`, it followed the same pattern: `s_depth` became `2`, and it received `default_group_class[1]`. And for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions`, its `s_depth` became `3`, leading to `default_group_class[2]`. Finally, for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`, its `s_depth` became `4`, and it should have received `default_group_class[3]`.
This is where the discrepancy with the lockdep report became jarring. If `tcm.0` received `default_group_class[3]`, the report should reflect that. Instead, it shows `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. I then re-examined the trace leading to the lockdep report: `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`, `usbg_make_tpg`, `target_fabric_make_tpg`, and `configfs_mkdir`. The target item is indeed `tcm.0`. The puzzling part is the `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. My current hypothesis is that *despite* the expected behavior of `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`, something is causing `tcm.0` to revert to the default lock class, and the `#24` is some artifact of that fallback mechanism, potentially related to the internal workings of lockdep's tracking of the default group class. This needs further investigation into the `ARRAY_SIZE(default_group_class)` and how lockdep associates the `#24` with the default filesystem type class.
|
| 86/2 |
2026/08/11 23:00 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/inode.c Name:default_group_class]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 87/2 |
2026/08/11 23:00 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 47311
output: 19
thoughts: 7
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Locating Information**
My immediate impulse, when faced with the need to find something specific within a large body of text or data, is to leverage the power of `grep`. It's my go-to tool for pattern matching. I'll initiate a search using `grep` with the relevant keyword or pattern I'm looking for. This allows for a rapid and efficient scan, effectively filtering out all irrelevant information and pinpointing the exact location of what I need. It's a fundamental step in my information retrieval strategy.
|
| 88/2 |
2026/08/11 23:00 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:default_group_class]
Results: map[Output:fs/configfs/dir.c=68=const struct dentry_operations configfs_dentry_ops = {
--
fs/configfs/dir.c-81- * groups A/B and A/C will have their inode's mutex in class
fs/configfs/dir.c:82: * default_group_class[0], and default group A/C/D will be in
fs/configfs/dir.c:83: * default_group_class[1].
fs/configfs/dir.c-84- *
--
fs/configfs/dir.c-89- * attachment, if configfs_create() sees s_depth > 0, the lock class of the new
fs/configfs/dir.c:90: * inode's mutex is set to default_group_class[s_depth - 1].
fs/configfs/dir.c-91- */
--
fs/configfs/inode.c-27-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
fs/configfs/inode.c:28:static struct lock_class_key default_group_class[MAX_LOCK_DEPTH];
fs/configfs/inode.c-29-#endif
--
fs/configfs/inode.c=127=static void configfs_set_inode_lock_class(struct configfs_dirent *sd,
--
fs/configfs/inode.c-132- if (depth > 0) {
fs/configfs/inode.c:133: if (depth <= ARRAY_SIZE(default_group_class)) {
fs/configfs/inode.c-134- lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem,
fs/configfs/inode.c:135: &default_group_class[depth - 1]);
fs/configfs/inode.c-136- } else {
]
|
| 89/2 |
2026/08/11 23:00 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 47787
output: 19
thoughts: 10
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH`**
As a seasoned professional in this domain, my immediate inclination when encountering a term like `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH` is to dissect its meaning and implications from a functional and architectural perspective. My internal monologue begins with a direct interrogation of the term itself.
"Alright, `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH`. What exactly does this represent?" I'd ask myself, already hypothesizing its purpose. The name itself is quite suggestive. "Max" clearly indicates a limit or a boundary. "Lock" points towards concurrency control mechanisms, likely to prevent race conditions or ensure data integrity within a system. And "Depth" suggests a hierarchical or nested structure.
Therefore, my initial hypothesis is that `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH` defines the maximum permissible level of nesting for locks within the system. This implies that the system might support scenarios where acquiring a lock can, under certain conditions or operations, lead to the acquisition of another lock, and so on, forming a chain or a stack of held locks.
My mind then immediately jumps to the *why*. Why would such a limit be necessary?
* **Preventing Deadlocks:** This is the most prominent concern. Deeply nested locks significantly increase the probability of deadlocks. If process A holds lock X and tries to acquire lock Y, while process B holds lock Y and tries to acquire lock X, a deadlock occurs. A `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH` can serve as a safeguard by preventing the system from reaching states where such circular dependencies become too complex to manage or guarantee resolution.
* **Resource Management:** Locks are, in essence, a form of resource. An excessive depth of lock acquisition could potentially lead to resource exhaustion, especially if the locks are held for extended periods. Setting a maximum depth could be a way to manage the overhead associated with maintaining lock ownership information and the potential for blocking.
* **Performance Considerations:** While locks are crucial for correctness, their acquisition and release incur overhead. Deep nesting can exacerbate this overhead, potentially impacting throughput. A limit might be imposed to maintain a certain level of performance by discouraging overly complex locking strategies.
* **Design Simplification/Enforcement:** Sometimes, such limits are put in place to guide developers towards simpler, more manageable concurrency patterns. A very deep lock nesting structure might indicate a potential design flaw or a situation that could be refactored for better clarity and maintainability.
Next, I'd consider the *how* it might be implemented and what it might *mean* in practice.
* **Instrumentation:** Is this a compile-time constant, a runtime configuration parameter, or a dynamically enforced policy? If it's a runtime parameter, how is it configured? Is it global, or per-thread, or per-context?
* **Enforcement Mechanism:** How is the depth actually tracked? Is it a simple counter incremented upon acquiring a lock and decremented upon release? What happens when the limit is reached? Does the system throw an error, log a warning, or attempt to abort the transaction?
* **Scope:** Does this apply to all types of locks within the system (e.g., mutexes, semaphores, read-write locks), or specific categories?
* **Context:** In what specific contexts are nested locks expected or allowed? Database transactions? Thread synchronization within a complex algorithm? Distributed systems coordination?
Finally, I would immediately begin to evaluate its potential impact on existing systems or new designs.
* **Compatibility:** If this is a new feature or a change, how will it affect existing codebases that might rely on deeper lock nesting? Are there migration strategies?
* **Trade-offs:** What are the benefits versus the drawbacks? Is the increased safety from potential deadlocks worth the potential limitations on legitimate complex concurrent operations?
* **Alternatives:** If deep lock nesting is a genuine requirement, what alternative patterns or mechanisms might be available or advisable (e.g., optimistic concurrency, message queues, more granular locking strategies)?
In essence, my thought process is a rapid, layered assessment, moving from understanding the literal meaning of the term to its functional implications, the underlying motivations for its existence, its potential implementation details, and its broader impact on system design and operation. It's about immediately anticipating problems, evaluating solutions, and understanding the context and consequences of such a configuration parameter.
|
| 90/2 |
2026/08/11 23:01 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:MAX_LOCK_DEPTH]
Results: map[Output:fs/configfs/inode.c-27-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
fs/configfs/inode.c:28:static struct lock_class_key default_group_class[MAX_LOCK_DEPTH];
fs/configfs/inode.c-29-#endif
--
include/linux/sched.h=826=struct task_struct {
--
include/linux/sched.h-1286-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
include/linux/sched.h:1287:# define MAX_LOCK_DEPTH 48UL
include/linux/sched.h-1288- u64 curr_chain_key;
--
include/linux/sched.h-1290- unsigned int lockdep_recursion;
include/linux/sched.h:1291: struct held_lock held_locks[MAX_LOCK_DEPTH];
include/linux/sched.h-1292-#endif
--
include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h=83=enum
--
include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h-150- KERN_COMPAT_LOG=73, /* int: print compat layer messages */
include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h:151: KERN_MAX_LOCK_DEPTH=74, /* int: rtmutex's maximum lock depth */
include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h-152- KERN_NMI_WATCHDOG=75, /* int: enable/disable nmi watchdog */
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c=31=static DEFINE_MUTEX(trampoline_mutex);
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-34- * Keep 32 trampoline locks (5 bits) in the pool so trampoline_lock_all()
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:35: * stays below MAX_LOCK_DEPTH. Each pool slot has a distinct lockdep
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-36- * class because trampoline_lock_all() takes all pool mutexes at once;
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c=5077=static int __lock_acquire(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned int subclass,
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5137- */
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5138: if (DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(depth >= MAX_LOCK_DEPTH))
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5139- return 0;
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5250-#endif
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5251: if (unlikely(curr->lockdep_depth >= MAX_LOCK_DEPTH)) {
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5252- debug_locks_off();
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5253- nbcon_cpu_emergency_enter();
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5254: print_lockdep_off("BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!");
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5255- printk(KERN_DEBUG "depth: %i max: %lu!\n",
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5256: curr->lockdep_depth, MAX_LOCK_DEPTH);
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-5257-
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c=6172=void lockdep_reset(void)
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-6178- lockdep_init_task(current);
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6179: memset(current->held_locks, 0, MAX_LOCK_DEPTH*sizeof(struct held_lock));
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-6180- nr_hardirq_chains = 0;
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c=6632=void __init lockdep_init(void)
--
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-6636- pr_info("... MAX_LOCKDEP_SUBCLASSES: %lu\n", MAX_LOCKDEP_SUBCLASSES);
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6637: pr_info("... MAX_LOCK_DEPTH: %lu\n", MAX_LOCK_DEPTH);
kernel/locking/lockdep.c-6638- pr_info("... MAX_LOCKDEP_KEYS: %lu\n", MAX_LOCKDEP_KEYS);
--
net/core/dev.c=12349=static void netif_close_many_and_unlock_cond(struct list_head *close_head)
--
net/core/dev.c-12351-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
net/core/dev.c:12352: /* We can only track up to MAX_LOCK_DEPTH locks per task.
net/core/dev.c-12353- *
--
net/core/dev.c-12356- */
net/core/dev.c:12357: unsigned int limit = MAX_LOCK_DEPTH / 2;
net/core/dev.c-12358-
--
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h=27=struct lock_stat {
--
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h-71-/*
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h:72: * MAX_LOCK_DEPTH
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h-73- * Imported from include/linux/sched.h.
--
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h-75- */
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h:76:#define MAX_LOCK_DEPTH 48
tools/perf/util/lock-contention.h-77-
]
|
| 91/2 |
2026/08/11 23:01 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 49233
output: 41
thoughts: 4006
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the Lockdep Report Discrepancy**
I've been wrestling with a puzzling lockdep report that indicates a lock acquisition on `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` when I expected a lock class from `default_group_class`. My initial assumption was that `tcm.0`, being nested several levels deep within configfs, would have received a lock class based on its depth, specifically `default_group_class[3]` since `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH` and the size of `default_group_class` both appear to be 48, and `tcm.0` is at a depth of 4.
However, the lockdep report clearly shows `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This led me down a rabbit hole trying to understand why `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`, which I believed was responsible for assigning these `default_group_class` locks, wasn't being invoked correctly or at all for `tcm.0`.
My investigation started by tracing the `s_depth` attribute of configfs directories. I meticulously re-read `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate` and `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth`. I walked through the creation of the configfs hierarchy step-by-step:
1. **`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`**: This top-level directory is created by `configfs_register_subsystem`, which ultimately calls `configfs_attach_group` with the root dentry. The root's `s_depth` is 0. `configfs_make_dirent` initializes the new directory's `s_depth` to -1, and then `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` sets it to `parent_depth + 1`, resulting in `s_depth = 1`. `configfs_adjust_dir_dirent_depth_before_populate` then confirms this depth. Therefore, `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` gets assigned `default_group_class[0]`.
2. **`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1`**: When `g1` is created via `mkdir`, `configfs_mkdir` ultimately calls `configfs_attach_group`. The parent (`usb_gadget`) has `s_depth = 1`. Following the same logic, `g1`'s `s_depth` is set to 2. This depth is then used in `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`, so `g1` should receive `default_group_class[1]`.
3. **`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions`**: This is a default group created by `populate_groups` for `g1`. It's created via `create_default_group`, which also calls `configfs_attach_group`. The parent (`g1`) has `s_depth = 2`. Thus, `functions` gets an `s_depth` of 3, and `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` should assign it `default_group_class[2]`.
4. **`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`**: Finally, when `tcm.0` is created, again through `configfs_mkdir` and subsequently `configfs_attach_group`, its parent (`functions`) has an `s_depth` of 3. This leads to `tcm.0` having an `s_depth` of 4. At this point, I was certain that `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` would be called with `depth = 4`, resulting in the assignment of `default_group_class[3]`.
The discrepancy persisted. I questioned whether `tcm.0` might somehow be an `ITEM` rather than a `GROUP`, which could bypass certain depth-setting logic, but my review confirmed it's a group. I also considered if `CONFIG_LOCKDEP` might be disabled, but that's clearly not the case.
Then, I re-examined the lockdep report itself: `-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:`. The key part was noticing `#24` after `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`. My initial thought was that this indicated a specific subclass, but then it hit me: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key` is the *base name* of the lock class used by default for inodes in many filesystems, including configfs, via `inode_init_always`. Lockdep appends `#N` to differentiate between multiple instances of keys with the same name, especially when they belong to different filesystem types.
This realization led me to a crucial understanding: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` *is* the default lock class for configfs inodes, and the `#24` simply indicates it's the 24th such key lockdep has encountered. The fact that this specific key is being reported means that `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` was *not* successfully overridden with a `default_group_class` entry.
Why would it not override? The only way `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` wouldn't take effect is if the `depth` passed to it was less than or equal to zero. My detailed trace of `s_depth` indicated a depth of 4 for `tcm.0`, which should absolutely trigger the override.
This brings me to a new line of inquiry. The lockdep report mentions `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquiring `inode_lock(d_inode(dentry))`. I need to dig deeper into how this function interacts with the `tcm.0` dentry and its associated inode. Could the lock acquisition being reported be related to this specific function, and if so, what is the context of the dentry it's operating on and the depth associated *within that function's scope*? This is where I'm focusing my attention next to fully reconcile the reported lock class with the expected behavior.
|
| 92/2 |
2026/08/11 23:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_depend_item_unlocked]
Results: map[SourceCode:1216: /*
1217: * caller_subsys is a caller's subsystem not target's. This is used to
1218: * determine if we should lock root and check subsys or not. When we are
1219: * in the same subsystem as our target there is no need to do locking as
1220: * we know that subsys is valid and is not unregistered during this function
1221: * as we are called from callback of one of his children and VFS holds a lock
1222: * on some inode. Otherwise we have to lock our root to ensure that target's
1223: * subsystem it is not unregistered during this function.
1224: */
1225: int configfs_depend_item_unlocked(struct configfs_subsystem *caller_subsys,
1226: struct config_item *target)
1227: {
1228: struct configfs_subsystem *target_subsys;
1229: struct config_group *root, *parent;
1230: struct configfs_dirent *subsys_sd;
1231: int ret = -ENOENT;
1232:
1233: /* Disallow this function for configfs root */
1234: if (configfs_is_root(target))
1235: return -EINVAL;
1236:
1237: parent = target->ci_group;
1238: /*
1239: * This may happen when someone is trying to depend root
1240: * directory of some subsystem
1241: */
1242: if (configfs_is_root(&parent->cg_item)) {
1243: target_subsys = to_configfs_subsystem(to_config_group(target));
1244: root = parent;
1245: } else {
1246: target_subsys = parent->cg_subsys;
1247: /* Find a cofnigfs root as we may need it for locking */
1248: for (root = parent; !configfs_is_root(&root->cg_item);
1249: root = root->cg_item.ci_group)
1250: ;
1251: }
1252:
1253: if (target_subsys != caller_subsys) {
1254: /*
1255: * We are in other configfs subsystem, so we have to do
1256: * additional locking to prevent other subsystem from being
1257: * unregistered
1258: */
1259: inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry));
1260:
1261: /*
1262: * As we are trying to depend item from other subsystem
1263: * we have to check if this subsystem is still registered
1264: */
1265: subsys_sd = configfs_find_subsys_dentry(
1266: root->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata,
1267: &target_subsys->su_group.cg_item);
1268: if (!subsys_sd)
1269: goto out_root_unlock;
1270: } else {
1271: subsys_sd = target_subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata;
1272: }
1273:
1274: /* Now we can execute core of depend item */
1275: ret = configfs_do_depend_item(subsys_sd, target);
1276:
1277: if (target_subsys != caller_subsys)
1278: out_root_unlock:
1279: /*
1280: * We were called from subsystem other than our target so we
1281: * took some locks so now it's time to release them
1282: */
1283: inode_unlock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry));
1284:
1285: return ret;
1286: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 93/2 |
2026/08/11 23:02 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 54408
output: 38
thoughts: 1587
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unfolding**
Ah, I think I've finally pieced together this lock dependency issue. It all started with me looking at `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. I noticed it grabs `inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry))`. Now, `root->cg_item.ci_dentry` is the very root of configfs, that is, `/sys/kernel/config`.
My immediate question was about the `s_depth` of this root. It's `0`. And when the depth is `0`, `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` doesn't override the default lock class. So, the root of configfs uses the default lock class, which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`. This is why lockdep reports it as `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This seemed like a crucial piece of the puzzle.
Now, how does this connect to `configfs_rmdir`? I know `configfs_rmdir` is ultimately called from `vfs_rmdir`, and `vfs_rmdir` acquires the `inode_lock` of the *parent* directory.
Let's consider an example: `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`. The parent here is `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`. Its `s_depth` is `1`, so it would use `default_group_class[0]`. If this were the case, the lockdep cycle would be broken because `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (the root), while `vfs_rmdir` here would acquire `default_group_class[0]` (the parent, `usb_gadget`). These are different lock classes.
To create the same lock class dependency, I realized I needed to `rmdir` a directory whose parent is the *root* of configfs itself. What kind of directory fits this description? A subsystem.
But can we `rmdir` a subsystem from userspace? Well, `vfs_rmdir` will likely fail with `EPERM` or `EBUSY`. However, and this is key, `vfs_rmdir` *acquires the parent's `inode_lock` *before* it even checks if the directory can be removed*.
So, if I were to `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, it would first acquire the `inode_lock` of `/sys/kernel/config`. And as we established, `/sys/kernel/config` has the lock class `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This matches the lock acquired by `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`.
Then, `vfs_rmdir` proceeds to call `configfs_rmdir`. Inside `configfs_rmdir`, it acquires the `frag_sem` of the `usb_gadget`. This is where the dependency `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `frag_sem` would be established.
But then I hit a snag. Does `configfs_rmdir` *always* acquire `frag_sem` for a subsystem? I checked the code. There's a check:
```c
sd = dentry->d_fsdata;
if (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT)
return -EPERM;
```
If `usb_gadget` (a subsystem root) is considered `CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT`, it would return early with an error, *before* acquiring `frag_sem`. I need to clarify if a subsystem is indeed `CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT`. `configfs_register_subsystem` links the subsystem group, but it's not explicitly part of `default_groups`.
However, the lockdep report clearly shows a dependency on `p->frag_sem` (`configfs_rmdir` -> `vfs_rmdir` -> ... -> `__do_sys_rmdir`). This implies that the `frag_sem` *is* being acquired at some point.
Let's re-examine the `configfs_rmdir` flow. If the `CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT` check passes, it proceeds. But *before* acquiring `frag_sem`, there's `configfs_detach_prep(sd, &wait)`. If `configfs_detach_prep` returns an error (like `-ENOTEMPTY`, which is plausible if the subsystem isn't empty), `configfs_rmdir` returns *early*, *before* `down_write_killable(&frag->frag_sem)` is even called.
So, it seems the lock dependency `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `frag_sem` *only* gets established if `configfs_detach_prep` succeeds, allowing `configfs_rmdir` to proceed to acquire the `frag_sem`. This means a `rmdir` operation on a subsystem that's not empty would *not* create this specific lock dependency. This is starting to make sense!
|
| 94/2 |
2026/08/11 23:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_detach_prep]
Results: map[SourceCode: 494: /*
495: * Only subdirectories count here. Files (CONFIGFS_NOT_PINNED) are
496: * attributes and are removed by rmdir(). We recurse, setting
497: * CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING on all children that are candidates for
498: * default detach.
499: * If there is an error, the caller will reset the flags via
500: * configfs_detach_rollback().
501: */
502: static int configfs_detach_prep(struct configfs_dirent *parent_sd, struct dentry **wait)
503: {
504: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
505: int ret;
506:
507: /* Mark that we're trying to drop the group */
508: parent_sd->s_type |= CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING;
509:
510: ret = -EBUSY;
511: if (parent_sd->s_links)
512: goto out;
513:
514: ret = 0;
515: list_for_each_entry(sd, &parent_sd->s_children, s_sibling) {
516: if (!sd->s_element ||
517: (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_NOT_PINNED))
518: continue;
519: if (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DEFAULT) {
520: /* Abort if racing with mkdir() */
521: if (sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_IN_MKDIR) {
522: if (wait)
523: *wait= dget(sd->s_dentry);
524: return -EAGAIN;
525: }
526:
527: /*
528: * Yup, recursive. If there's a problem, blame
529: * deep nesting of default_groups
530: */
531: ret = configfs_detach_prep(sd, wait);
532: if (!ret)
533: continue;
534: } else
535: ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
536:
537: break;
538: }
539:
540: out:
541: return ret;
542: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 95/2 |
2026/08/11 23:02 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 56741
output: 38
thoughts: 2020
Thoughts: **My Thoughts on the Configfs `inode_lock` and `frag_sem` Lock Order Issue**
Okay, I've been wrestling with this specific lock dependency issue, and I think I've finally pieced together the puzzle. The core problem seems to revolve around the interaction between `configfs_detach_prep` returning `-ENOTEMPTY` and how the lock acquisition proceeds when `rmdir` is called on a directory that *should* be empty, but isn't due to non-default children.
My initial thought was: If `configfs_detach_prep` returns `-ENOTEMPTY` when a directory like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` has non-default children (say, a gadget `g1`), then `configfs_rmdir` won't acquire `frag_sem`. This implies that for `configfs_rmdir` to *successfully* acquire `frag_sem`, the directory being removed must be empty or only contain default groups.
Then I started thinking about the parent directory. If I `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2` and then `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`, the parent is `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`. I know that the `inode_lock` for directories is determined by their `s_depth`. For `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, its `s_depth` is `1`. This means its `inode_lock` should be `default_group_class[0]`.
This is where the confusion really set in. The lockdep report clearly shows a dependency chain involving `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` and `frag_sem`. I was baffled because `default_group_class[0]` and `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` are distinct lock classes. How could this specific lock order, `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `frag_sem`, be established?
I dug into the lockdep report again. It points to `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquiring `inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry))`. Here, `root` refers to the *root* of configfs itself. And the `inode_lock` for the configfs root (`/sys/kernel/config`) has `s_depth = 0`, which maps to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This made more sense!
So, my reasoning continued: If syzkaller performed `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, it would first acquire the `inode_lock` of `/sys/kernel/config` (which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`). Then, it would call `configfs_rmdir`. If `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` were truly empty (meaning no gadgets were created within it), `configfs_detach_prep` would return 0, and importantly, `configfs_rmdir` *would* proceed to acquire `frag_sem`.
However, a critical question arose: *can* we even `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`? I checked the `configfs_rmdir` implementation. It has a check: `if (!parent_item->ci_type)`. In the case of `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, the `parent_item` is the configfs root. And I recall that `configfs_root_group` is initialized with `ci_type` set to `NULL` in `configfs_pin_fs`. This means `parent_item->ci_type` *is* NULL, and `configfs_rmdir` returns `-EINVAL` very early, *before* it even attempts to acquire `frag_sem`.
This led me to a crucial realization: `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` *cannot* establish the `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `frag_sem` lock order because it exits with an error before acquiring `frag_sem`.
So, the big question remained: *how* did syzkaller manage to establish that specific lock order? If it wasn't `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, then it must have been `rmdir` on a *different* directory. But if it was, say, `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`, the parent would be `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, and its `inode_lock` would be `default_group_class[0]`, not `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`.
This led me to consider a less obvious scenario: what if the `inode_lock` class for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` itself was never properly set to `default_group_class[0]`? I reviewed `configfs_register_subsystem`, which is responsible for creating `usb_gadget`. It calls `configfs_create_dir` and subsequently `configfs_create`, which in turn calls `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`. So, it *should* be called.
Then I thought, what if `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` is a no-op when `CONFIG_LOCKDEP` is not enabled? But the lockdep report *proves* it's enabled.
My mind then jumped to the `s_depth` value for the `usb_gadget` directory. I remembered that `configfs_make_dirent` initializes `s_depth` to `-1`. When `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` is called with the parent's `sd` (which is `root_sd`), I needed to re-examine what `root_sd->s_depth` is. In `configfs_fill_super`, `root_sd` is created, and its `s_depth` is initialized to `-1`. Crucially, `configfs_fill_super` *doesn't seem to explicitly update* `root_sd->s_depth` beyond that initial `-1`.
This is where I had a sudden insight! If `root_sd->s_depth` remains `-1`, and `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` is called for `usb_gadget` with this `root_sd`, the calculation for `usb_gadget`'s `s_depth` would be `parent_sd->s_depth + 1`, which would result in `0` for `usb_gadget`'s `s_depth`. And *that* would mean its `inode_lock` class is indeed `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`! This is the missing link. The `usb_gadget` directory itself is inheriting the `inode_lock` class of the root due to an apparently uninitialized or incorrectly handled `s_depth` for the root directory.
|
| 96/2 |
2026/08/11 23:03 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/mount.c Name:configfs_fill_super]
Results: map[SourceCode: 63: static int configfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
64: {
65: struct inode *inode;
66: struct dentry *root;
67:
68: sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_SIZE;
69: sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_SHIFT;
70: sb->s_magic = CONFIGFS_MAGIC;
71: sb->s_op = &configfs_ops;
72: sb->s_time_gran = 1;
73:
74: inode = configfs_new_inode(S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
75: &configfs_root, sb);
76: if (inode) {
77: inode->i_op = &configfs_root_inode_operations;
78: inode->i_fop = &configfs_dir_operations;
79: /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
80: inc_nlink(inode);
81: } else {
82: pr_debug("could not get root inode\n");
83: return -ENOMEM;
84: }
85:
86: root = d_make_root(inode);
87: if (!root) {
88: pr_debug("%s: could not get root dentry!\n",__func__);
89: return -ENOMEM;
90: }
91: config_group_init(&configfs_root_group);
92: configfs_root_group.cg_item.ci_dentry = root;
93: root->d_fsdata = &configfs_root;
94: sb->s_root = root;
95: set_default_d_op(sb, &configfs_dentry_ops); /* the rest get that */
96: sb->s_d_flags |= DCACHE_DONTCACHE;
97: return 0;
98: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/mount.c]
|
| 97/2 |
2026/08/11 23:03 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 59380
output: 36
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: **My Realization on `configfs_root`**
My initial thought process, as I was digging into this, was a sudden, almost startling, realization: "Wait, `configfs_root` is a global variable!" It hit me with the force of something I hadn't fully appreciated or perhaps had overlooked in the broader context. This isn't just some localized variable confined to a specific function or module; its scope is much wider, impacting how I understand the system's behavior and potential interactions. This global nature immediately flags it as something that requires careful consideration, potentially influencing state across different parts of the system, and opening up a whole new avenue of questions about its management, initialization, and any side effects its modification might introduce.
|
| 98/2 |
2026/08/11 23:03 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/mount.c Name:configfs_root]
Results: map[SourceCode: 55: static struct configfs_dirent configfs_root = {
56: .s_sibling = LIST_HEAD_INIT(configfs_root.s_sibling),
57: .s_children = LIST_HEAD_INIT(configfs_root.s_children),
58: .s_element = &configfs_root_group.cg_item,
59: .s_type = CONFIGFS_ROOT,
60: .s_iattr = NULL,
61: };
SourceFile:fs/configfs/mount.c]
|
| 99/2 |
2026/08/11 23:03 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 59576
output: 38
thoughts: 448
Thoughts: **Understanding the ConfigFS Depth Discrepancy and Lockdep Anomaly**
Alright, so I'm digging into this `configfs` initialization and I've hit a bit of a puzzle. My initial observation was that `configfs_root` is statically initialized. This means that its members, specifically `s_depth`, will default to zero because they aren't explicitly set. This makes perfect sense to me. Consequently, `root_sd->s_depth` is indeed 0.
Then, when `configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth` is called, it correctly increments this depth. So, `usb_gadget` ends up with `s_depth = 1`, `g1` gets `s_depth = 2`, `functions` gets `s_depth = 3`, and finally, `tcm.0` is assigned `s_depth = 4`. This leads `tcm.0` to reference `default_group_class[3]`, which aligns with the expected hierarchy.
However, this is where the confusion kicks in. The lockdep report is showing `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This doesn't seem to correlate directly with the `s_depth` I've just traced. I'm trying to figure out *why* this discrepancy is occurring.
My suspicion is drifting towards `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. I'm wondering if it's acquiring `inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry))`, but crucially, the `root` variable in this context might not be referring to the top-level `configfs` root. Instead, it might be pointing to a *subsystem* root.
To confirm this, I've gone back to re-examine the logic within `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. Let's look at this snippet:
```c
if (configfs_is_root(&parent->cg_item)) {
target_subsys = to_configfs_subsystem(to_config_group(target));
root = parent;
} else {
target_subsys = parent->cg_subsys;
/* Find a cofnigfs root as we may need it for locking */
for (root = parent; !configfs_is_root(&root->cg_item);
root = root->cg_item.ci_group)
;
}
```
This section is key. The `else` block explicitly shows a loop: `for (root = parent; !configfs_is_root(&root->cg_item); root = root->cg_item.ci_group)`. This loop continues until `configfs_is_root(&root->cg_item)` evaluates to true. This means that `root` is being determined by traversing *upwards* through the `cg_item.ci_group` pointers until it finds an item that *is* the configfs root.
So now, the critical question I'm trying to answer is: what exactly *is* `configfs_is_root`? Understanding this function's definition and behavior is the next step in unraveling why the lockdep is reporting what it is, and if my hypothesis about the `root` variable's scope in `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` is indeed correct.
|
| 100/2 |
2026/08/11 23:04 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_is_root]
Results: map[SourceCode: 50: int configfs_is_root(struct config_item *item)
51: {
52: return item == &configfs_root_group.cg_item;
53: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/mount.c]
|
| 101/2 |
2026/08/11 23:04 |
llm |
initial-researcher |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 60129
output: 842
thoughts: 10886
Thoughts: **The Genesis of a Lock Cycle: Tracing the Threads of `configfs` Synchronization**
I've been deeply engrossed in understanding a rather intricate lock dependency cycle reported by lockdep within the `configfs` subsystem. My thought process has been a journey of elimination and deduction, starting from the fundamental identification of the involved locks and their acquisition paths.
Initially, my attention was drawn to `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. I quickly confirmed, through careful examination, that this lock class is indeed associated with the `inode_lock` of the `configfs` root directory. This realization was a significant step, as it pinpointed a central anchor in the lock dependency chain. The fact that `configfs_root` has a `s_depth` of 0 means its `inode_lock` is not overridden by `configfs_set_inode_lock_class`, leaving it as this specific default key.
The lockdep report revealed two key operations involved: `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` and `configfs_rmdir` (via `vfs_rmdir`). I established that `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the `configfs` root, which, as I've noted, is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This operation, in essence, establishes a dependency: `opts->dep_lock` depends on `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This perfectly aligns with the first part of the lockdep cycle: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 -> opts->dep_lock`.
The next crucial piece of the puzzle was how `vfs_rmdir` played into this. The report indicated that `vfs_rmdir` acquires `frag_sem` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. Now, `vfs_rmdir` acquires the `inode_lock` of the *parent* directory before calling the filesystem's `rmdir` operation. This immediately presented a conundrum: if `vfs_rmdir` acquired `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`, it implied that the parent directory it was operating on must also have had this lock class.
My immediate thought was that the parent *must* be the `configfs` root itself. However, this led to a contradiction. I reasoned that if we were to `rmdir` a directory directly under the `configfs` root (like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`), the `configfs_rmdir` function would return `-EINVAL` very early, specifically at the `BUG_ON(!subsys)` check, *before* it could even attempt to acquire `frag_sem`. This meant the `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 -> frag_sem` dependency could *not* be established in this scenario.
This forced me to re-examine the lockdep report for `&p->frag_sem`. The report showed that `configfs_rmdir` reached line 1534, which is `down_write_killable(&frag->frag_sem)`. This confirmed that the function *did not* return early due to the `BUG_ON`. Therefore, the parent directory involved in the `rmdir` operation could *not* have been the `configfs` root, because if it were, the `BUG_ON` would have triggered.
This led me to the critical insight: if the parent wasn't the `configfs` root, yet it acquired `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (the same lock class as the root), then there must be *another* directory within `configfs` that also possesses this specific lock class. The question then became: how is this possible?
I delved into `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` and its dependency on the directory's `depth`. The key observation was that `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` is effectively bypassed if `depth` exceeds `ARRAY_SIZE(default_group_class)` (which is 48). If a directory is created at a depth greater than 48, `configfs_set_inode_lock_class` would issue a warning but *not* override the default lock class. This means a directory at depth 49 would retain `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`.
Consequently, if `vfs_rmdir` operated on a child of such a deeply nested directory (say, at depth 50), it would acquire the `inode_lock` of its parent (at depth 49), which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This operation would then proceed to acquire `frag_sem`, thus establishing the `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 -> frag_sem` dependency without triggering the `BUG_ON` in `configfs_rmdir` (as the parent wasn't the root).
Given that `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` *also* acquires `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (the lock of the actual root), lockdep correctly infers that these are the same lock class, leading to the complete cycle: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (via `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`) -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (via `vfs_rmdir` on a deeply nested parent) -> `frag_sem` -> back to the initial acquisition in `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`.
To reliably reproduce this, I devised a simple C program that leverages `system()` calls to mount `configfs`, load necessary modules, create a deeply nested directory structure (crucially, exceeding the `default_group_class` limit), and then perform the `rmdir` operation that triggers the lock cycle. This minimal and direct approach ensures the exact code paths leading to the lockdep warning are exercised.
|
| 102/1 |
2026/08/11 23:05 |
loop |
|
15m
|
| 103/2 |
2026/08/11 23:05 |
iteration |
0 |
5m
|
| 104/3 |
2026/08/11 23:05 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 105/3 |
2026/08/11 23:05 |
action |
merge-strategy |
0m
Results: map[CurrentReproStrategy:To reproduce the circular locking dependency, we need to trigger the exact sequence of lock acquisitions described in the lockdep report. The cycle involves four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
Here is the step-by-step breakdown of how the dependencies are established:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
By executing these operations sequentially, lockdep will observe the full cycle and emit the warning.
### C Reproducer
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```]
|
| 106/3 |
2026/08/11 23:05 |
agent |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Results: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EBUSY) {
printf("[-] Failed to mount configfs: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
}
printf("[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n");
struct stat st;
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n");
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/target does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.\n");
return 0;
}]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to generate a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive
purpose of verifying a bugfix in an isolated environment.
To ensure that we can diagnose why a program might fail to run on the test environment,
you MUST include detailed logging and error checking in the generated C program:
1. Use 'printf(...)' for all progress messages and error logs.
2. Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value.
3. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name
and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status.
4. The program must print a message after every successful major step.
5. Generate code that follows this pattern for all operations:
int res = do_something();
if (res < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to do_something: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] do_something successful.\n");
6. The compilation and development environment (including compilers, build
systems, makefiles, and kernel build/header directories) is NOT available
on the target test VM guest. Do NOT check for, build, or reference any
compilation tools, build files, or kernel development directories.
7. Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries (e.g. by using
functions like 'system()', 'popen()', or the 'exec' family such as
'execve()'). All environment checks, capability probings, and reproduction
steps must be performed directly using standard Linux system calls (such
as 'open', 'socket', 'ioctl', 'stat', etc.).
8. When reproducing asynchronous kernel timeouts or warnings, always
include a sufficient delay (using sleep or similar) after deleting
or unregistering the device to allow the kernel's asynchronous
timeout to trigger before program exit.
=== PHASE 1: CAPABILITY PROBING (GENERATION) ===
You MUST start by generating a simple 'probe' program first. This is a strict, non-negotiable requirement
to verify that the test environment has the necessary kernel capabilities and privileges.
This program's sole purpose is to verify subsystem availability and privileges by probing specific
device files, subsystems, or syscalls (for example: opening /dev/vhci to check if the virtual
Bluetooth controller is accessible, loading a minimal dummy BPF program, or making a specific
socket/ioctl call).
Print clear messages indicating success or failure of these probes, and exit with 0 only if
all checks pass.
Do NOT attempt complex logic, and do NOT try to trigger the actual bug/crash in this first version,
regardless of how simple the reproducer seems. You must wait until a successful probe run has been
confirmed in the environment (i.e., when CapabilitiesVerified becomes true).
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.470/7146 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff901d0fe8 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write_killable+0x93/0x250 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643
configfs_rmdir+0x3fa/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1534
vfs_rmdir fs/namei.c:5381 [inline]
vfs_rmdir+0x328/0x8a0 fs/namei.c:5354
filename_rmdir+0x31a/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5458 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x46/0x70 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write+0x8b/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 --> &p->frag_sem
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by syz.0.470/7146:
#0: ffff88802c3c9270 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0x2aa/0x380 fs/file.c:1259
#1: ffff8880237ce450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
#2: ffff888048879080 (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x76/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:226
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7146 Comm: syz.0.470 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1c7 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab6139e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab621bd028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab61625fa0 RCX: 00007fab6139e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fab61435024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fab61626038 R14: 00007fab61625fa0 R15: 00007fff23ac2e08
</TASK>
Strategy: To reproduce the circular locking dependency, we need to trigger the exact sequence of lock acquisitions described in the lockdep report. The cycle involves four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
Here is the step-by-step breakdown of how the dependencies are established:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
By executing these operations sequentially, lockdep will observe the full cycle and emit the warning.
### C Reproducer
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```
|
| 107/4 |
2026/08/11 23:05 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7525
output: 347
thoughts: 2214
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Reproducing a Circular Locking Dependency**
Alright, so the core task here is to create a C program that triggers a specific circular locking dependency within the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function. I've been given a clear strategy and even a shell-based reproducer, which is a great starting point. However, there's a crucial constraint: I absolutely *cannot* use `system()`, `popen()`, or any `exec` family functions. All interactions with the system, including environment checks, capability probes, and the reproduction steps themselves, must be done directly using standard Linux system calls like `open`, `socket`, `ioctl`, and `stat`.
This means I need to translate those shell commands into their C syscall equivalents. The shell script essentially performs several operations: mounting configfs, ensuring certain kernel modules are loaded, and then creating and manipulating files within the `/sys/kernel/config` hierarchy to set up the conditions for the bug.
My first major hurdle is the module loading part. I can't use `modprobe`. The instructions suggest that maybe I don't *need* to, if the modules are built-in or auto-loaded. The prompt further clarifies that for syzkaller, it often just opens/creates files, and this can trigger the loading of `libcomposite` (for `usb_gadget`) or `target_core_mod` (for `target`). So, the strategy is to attempt the file operations and assume that if they fail due to a missing module, the reproducer will naturally fail, indicating the environment isn't ready. I'll focus on creating the necessary directories first.
However, before I even get to the bug reproduction, there's a strict, non-negotiable requirement to generate a "probe" program first. This probe is essential to verify that the environment has the necessary kernel capabilities and privileges before attempting the actual bug reproduction. It needs to check for the availability of subsystems and confirm I have the right permissions.
So, my immediate focus shifts to crafting this probe program. The probe's job is to:
1. **Mount configfs:** I need to ensure `configfs` is mounted at `/sys/kernel/config`. I'll use the `mount` syscall for this. If it's already mounted, `mount` will return an error (specifically `EBUSY`), which I should handle gracefully.
2. **Check subsystem availability:** The bug involves both `usb_gadget` and `target` subsystems, which are managed under `/sys/kernel/config`. I need to verify if these are accessible. The most straightforward way to do this, without loading anything explicitly, is to use `stat` on `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`. If `stat` fails, it strongly suggests the relevant kernel modules (`libcomposite` and `target_core_mod`) aren't loaded or available, and thus, the bug cannot be reproduced. This check will be a critical gate for the probe.
3. **Basic interaction:** To further confirm accessibility and permissions for `usb_gadget`, I should attempt a simple operation. Creating a dummy directory under `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and then immediately removing it seems like a good, low-impact way to test write permissions and the underlying `libcomposite` infrastructure.
So, the probe program will look something like this:
* Call `mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL)`.
* Check if `errno` is `EBUSY` and proceed if it is. Otherwise, print an error and exit.
* Call `stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st)`. If it fails (and it's not `ENOENT` which would mean it doesn't exist), print an error and exit.
* Call `stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st)`. Similarly, check for failure and exit.
* If both `stat` calls succeed, I'll try to `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/probe_g", 0777)`. If this fails with an error other than `EEXIST`, I'll report it.
* Finally, I'll `rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/probe_g")`. If this fails, I'll report it.
If all these steps in the probe succeed, it gives me high confidence that the environment is set up correctly for `configfs`, `usb_gadget`, and `target` to be functional, and I have the necessary permissions. Only then will I proceed to build the actual reproducer program, translating the remaining `system()` calls from the original shell script into direct syscalls.
|
| 108/4 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EBUSY) {
printf("[-] Failed to mount configfs: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
}
printf("[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n");
struct stat st;
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n");
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/target does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.\n");
return 0;
}]
Results: map[IsProbe:true RawCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EBUSY) {
printf("[-] Failed to mount configfs: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
}
printf("[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n");
struct stat st;
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n");
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/target does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.\n");
return 0;
}]
|
| 109/3 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
loop |
|
0m
|
| 110/4 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
iteration |
0 |
0m
|
| 111/5 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
action |
merge-repro-c |
0m
Results: map[CurrentCandidateReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EBUSY) {
printf("[-] Failed to mount configfs: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
}
printf("[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n");
struct stat st;
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n");
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/target does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.\n");
return 0;
}]
|
| 112/5 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
action |
compile-c-prog |
0m
Results: map[CompilerError: FormattedReproC:#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EBUSY) {
printf("[-] Failed to mount configfs: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
}
printf("[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n");
struct stat st;
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n");
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/target does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.\n");
return 0;
}]
|
| 113/5 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 114/3 |
2026/08/11 23:06 |
action |
run-c-repro |
4m
Results: map[CandidateBugTitle: CandidateCrashReport: CandidateReproduced:false ConsoleOutput:[ 109.808246][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 109.808261][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.836294][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.850448][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.858650][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 111.092346][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.702:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.177680][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.792:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.321622][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.932:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.406443][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489698.022:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.688601][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489699.302:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.803140][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489699.412:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5858 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.880024][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 114.880038][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.492:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5873 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.992526][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.602:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5876 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.149229][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.762:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.240731][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.852:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5882 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.372017][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.982:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5885 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.481563][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489702.092:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5888 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:15627' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
[ 119.269299][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.882:221): avc: denied { mounton } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" path="/sys/kernel/config" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 119.282590][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:222): avc: denied { mount } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=filesystem permissive=1
[ 119.302645][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:223): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 119.316052][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
OtherCrashReports:<nil> StraceOutput:/strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor2422498770
<...>
[ 110.604472][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 110.604490][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.634:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.629606][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.640290][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.652602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 113.405293][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.434:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5844 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.561533][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.594:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5847 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.844550][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.874:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5850 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.001208][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.034:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.450532][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.474:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5856 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.554185][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.584:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5859 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.823975][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 2 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.823989][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489839.854:213): avc: denied { write } for pid=5868 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.935870][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489839.964:214): avc: denied { write } for pid=5871 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.175015][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489840.204:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5875 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.292337][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489840.324:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.078222][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.104:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5887 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.156065][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.184:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.788354][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.804:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5895 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.028759][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489842.054:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5898 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:64945' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor2422498770", ["/syz-executor2422498770"], 0x7fff00e26bf0 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5555564ef000
brk(0x5555564efd80) = 0x5555564efd80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x5555564ef400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x5555564ef6d0) = 5910
set_robust_list(0x5555564ef6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor2422498770", 4096) = 23
getrandom("\x1d\x73\xec\x05\xc5\x50\xc9\xba", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x5555564efd80
brk(0x555556510d80) = 0x555556510d80
brk(0x555556511000) = 0x555556511000
mprotect(0x7f1b815e6000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) = -1 EBUSY (Device or resource busy)
[ 119.240530][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489843.274:221): avc: denied { mounton } for pid=5910 comm="syz-executor242" path="/sys/kernel/config" dev="configfs" ino=1118 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=0, ...}, 0) = 0
[ 119.252879][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489843.274:222): avc: denied { mount } for pid=5910 comm="syz-executor242" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=1118 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=filesystem permissive=1
newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/config/target", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=0, ...}, 0) = 0
write(1, "[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n[+] /sys/kernel/c"..., 121) = 121
exit_group(0) = ?
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
+++ exited with 0 +++
TestError:]
|
| 115/3 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
action |
truncate-log |
0m
Results: map[TruncatedConsoleOutput:[ 109.808246][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 109.808261][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.836294][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.850448][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.858650][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 111.092346][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.702:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.177680][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.792:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.321622][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.932:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.406443][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489698.022:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.688601][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489699.302:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.803140][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489699.412:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5858 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.880024][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 114.880038][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.492:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5873 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.992526][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.602:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5876 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.149229][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.762:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.240731][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.852:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5882 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.372017][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.982:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5885 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.481563][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489702.092:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5888 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:15627' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
[ 119.269299][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.882:221): avc: denied { mounton } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" path="/sys/kernel/config" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 119.282590][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:222): avc: denied { mount } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=filesystem permissive=1
[ 119.302645][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:223): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 119.316052][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
TruncatedCrashReport: TruncatedStraceOutput:/strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor2422498770
<...>
[ 110.604472][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 110.604490][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.634:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.629606][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.640290][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.652602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 113.405293][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.434:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5844 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.561533][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.594:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5847 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.844550][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.874:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5850 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.001208][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.034:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.450532][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.474:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5856 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.554185][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.584:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5859 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.823975][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 2 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.823989][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489839.854:213): avc: denied { write } for pid=5868 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.935870][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489839.964:214): avc: denied { write } for pid=5871 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.175015][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489840.204:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5875 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.292337][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489840.324:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.078222][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.104:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5887 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.156065][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.184:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.788354][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.804:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5895 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.028759][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489842.054:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5898 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:64945' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor2422498770", ["/syz-executor2422498770"], 0x7fff00e26bf0 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5555564ef000
brk(0x5555564efd80) = 0x5555564efd80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x5555564ef400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x5555564ef6d0) = 5910
set_robust_list(0x5555564ef6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor2422498770", 4096) = 23
getrandom("\x1d\x73\xec\x05\xc5\x50\xc9\xba", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x5555564efd80
brk(0x555556510d80) = 0x555556510d80
brk(0x555556511000) = 0x555556511000
mprotect(0x7f1b815e6000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) = -1 EBUSY (Device or resource busy)
[ 119.240530][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489843.274:221): avc: denied { mounton } for pid=5910 comm="syz-executor242" path="/sys/kernel/config" dev="configfs" ino=1118 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=0, ...}, 0) = 0
[ 119.252879][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489843.274:222): avc: denied { mount } for pid=5910 comm="syz-executor242" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=1118 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=filesystem permissive=1
newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/config/target", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=0, ...}, 0) = 0
write(1, "[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n[+] /sys/kernel/c"..., 121) = 121
exit_group(0) = ?
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
+++ exited with 0 +++
]
|
| 116/3 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
agent |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Results: map[Feedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Analyze the results of running the generated program.
=== CRITICAL ENVIRONMENT & TARGET CLASSIFICATION ===
Set 'TerminalError' to a descriptive error message ONLY if:
1. The execution failed due to missing hardware device nodes, subsystems, kernel modules, or privilege limits
that cannot be loaded, created, or bypassed by user-space C code edits in the VM guest.
2. The target source files or functions described in the bug description do not exist in the checked-out codebase,
meaning the codebase version is mismatched and the target code is absent.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT classify a run as a terminal failure or assume a bug is fixed based on git log entries, commit titles,
or commit messages. Reproducibility can ONLY be determined by executing reproducer candidates in the VM.
- Do NOT suggest C code strategies, repairs, or namespace bypasses when setting 'TerminalError'.
=== PHASE 1: CAPABILITY PROBING (EVALUATION) ===
The executed program was a simple environment probe.
Use this to guide your classification and feedback:
1. If the execution was successful (all environment/subsystem probes passed and program exited with 0),
set the field 'ProbePassed' to true and provide feedback explicitly indicating that the environment
is ready and the agent should now proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
2. If the probe failed (e.g., missing permissions, missing devices, or sandbox restrictions),
set the field 'ProbePassed' to false, and explain what failed in the 'Feedback'
field so the generator can adjust its setups.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.470/7146 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff901d0fe8 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write_killable+0x93/0x250 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643
configfs_rmdir+0x3fa/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1534
vfs_rmdir fs/namei.c:5381 [inline]
vfs_rmdir+0x328/0x8a0 fs/namei.c:5354
filename_rmdir+0x31a/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5458 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x46/0x70 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write+0x8b/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 --> &p->frag_sem
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by syz.0.470/7146:
#0: ffff88802c3c9270 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0x2aa/0x380 fs/file.c:1259
#1: ffff8880237ce450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
#2: ffff888048879080 (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x76/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:226
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7146 Comm: syz.0.470 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1c7 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab6139e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab621bd028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab61625fa0 RCX: 00007fab6139e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fab61435024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fab61626038 R14: 00007fab61625fa0 R15: 00007fff23ac2e08
</TASK>
IsProbe: true
Reproduced: false
Console Output: [ 109.808246][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 109.808261][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.836294][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.850448][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 109.858650][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489696.422:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 111.092346][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.702:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.177680][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.792:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.321622][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489697.932:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.406443][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489698.022:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.688601][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489699.302:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.803140][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489699.412:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5858 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.880024][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 114.880038][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.492:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5873 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.992526][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.602:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5876 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.149229][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.762:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.240731][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.852:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5882 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.372017][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489701.982:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5885 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.481563][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489702.092:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5888 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:15627' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
[ 119.269299][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.882:221): avc: denied { mounton } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" path="/sys/kernel/config" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 119.282590][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:222): avc: denied { mount } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=filesystem permissive=1
[ 119.302645][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:223): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 119.316052][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489705.892:224): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor399" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Strace Output: /strace -e \!wait4,clock_nanosleep,nanosleep -s 100 -x -f /syz-executor2422498770
<...>
[ 110.604472][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 110.604490][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.634:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.629606][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5840 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.640290][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.652602][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489834.654:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5840 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 113.405293][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.434:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5844 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.561533][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.594:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5847 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.844550][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489837.874:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5850 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.001208][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.034:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5853 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.450532][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.474:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5856 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.554185][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489838.584:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5859 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.823975][ T33] kauditd_printk_skb: 2 callbacks suppressed
[ 115.823989][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489839.854:213): avc: denied { write } for pid=5868 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.935870][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489839.964:214): avc: denied { write } for pid=5871 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.175015][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489840.204:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5875 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 116.292337][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489840.324:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5879 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.078222][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.104:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5887 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.156065][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.184:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 117.788354][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489841.804:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5895 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.028759][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489842.054:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5898 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:64945' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
execve("/syz-executor2422498770", ["/syz-executor2422498770"], 0x7fff00e26bf0 /* 11 vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5555564ef000
brk(0x5555564efd80) = 0x5555564efd80
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x5555564ef400) = 0
set_tid_address(0x5555564ef6d0) = 5910
set_robust_list(0x5555564ef6e0, 24) = 0
rseq({cpu_id_start=0, cpu_id=RSEQ_CPU_ID_UNINITIALIZED, rseq_cs=NULL, flags=0, node_id=0, mm_cid=0, slice_ctrl={request=0, granted=0, __reserved=0}, __reserved=0}, 33, 0, 0x53053053) = 0
prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_STACK, NULL, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) = 0
readlinkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/exe", "/syz-executor2422498770", 4096) = 23
getrandom("\x1d\x73\xec\x05\xc5\x50\xc9\xba", 8, GRND_NONBLOCK) = 8
brk(NULL) = 0x5555564efd80
brk(0x555556510d80) = 0x555556510d80
brk(0x555556511000) = 0x555556511000
mprotect(0x7f1b815e6000, 20480, PROT_READ) = 0
mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) = -1 EBUSY (Device or resource busy)
[ 119.240530][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489843.274:221): avc: denied { mounton } for pid=5910 comm="syz-executor242" path="/sys/kernel/config" dev="configfs" ino=1118 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFIFO|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0
newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=0, ...}, 0) = 0
[ 119.252879][ T33] audit: type=1400 audit(1786489843.274:222): avc: denied { mount } for pid=5910 comm="syz-executor242" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=1118 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=filesystem permissive=1
newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/kernel/config/target", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=0, ...}, 0) = 0
write(1, "[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n[+] /sys/kernel/c"..., 121) = 121
exit_group(0) = ?
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
+++ exited with 0 +++
Crash Report:
|
| 117/4 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12719
output: 90
thoughts: 138
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the Capability Probe Execution**
Alright, so my primary objective here is to thoroughly evaluate the execution of this capability probe program. My focus is specifically on understanding the outcome and its implications.
I've identified a potential issue, a possible circular locking dependency, which has been flagged within the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function. This is a critical detail to keep in mind as I analyze the probe's output.
Looking at the actual probe execution output, I see reassuring signs:
* `[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.` - This tells me the configuration filesystem, crucial for USB gadget functionality, is ready.
* `[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.` - This confirms the essential directory for USB gadget configuration is present.
* `[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.` - Similarly, this indicates the presence of the target configuration directory.
Crucially, the exit code for this probe execution is 0. In my experience, an exit code of 0 unequivocally signifies success. This leads me to conclude that, despite the potential locking dependency concern, the probe *itself* passed.
Therefore, my immediate next step is to formally record this success. I will set the `ProbePassed` variable to `true`.
Furthermore, this successful probe execution provides the green light to proceed with the next phase of the process: generating the full reproducer. This probe's success validates that the foundational elements are in place, and we can now move on to constructing the more comprehensive test case.
To operationalize this, I need to invoke the `set-results` function with the correct parameters, ensuring that the outcome of this probe is accurately logged and that the system understands we are ready for the next stage.
|
| 118/4 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[Feedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
Results: map[Feedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ProbePassed:true TerminalError: TitleMatches:false]
|
| 119/3 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
action |
loop-controller |
0m
Results: map[CapabilitiesVerified:true ContinueSignal:continue EquivalenceAnalysis: OracleFeedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration. ReproC: Reproduced:false ReproducedBugTitle: ReproducedCrashReport:]
|
| 120/2 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
iteration |
1 |
9m
|
| 121/3 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
action |
If |
2m
Args: map[OracleFeedback:The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.]
|
| 122/4 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
agent |
strategy-refiner |
2m
Model:
Instruction: You are an expert in Linux kernel debugging.
Refine the reproduction strategy based on feedback from previous attempts.
Analyze the technical diagnosis provided in the oracle feedback and translate it into concrete,
step-by-step instructions for the repro-generator on how to modify the code structure, alignments,
offsets, or parameters of the candidate program.
=== TOOL SELECTION GUIDELINES ===
- Prefer codesearch-definition-source and codesearch-struct-layout first for symbol lookups.
- Fall back to read-file or grepper for macros, headers, or if symbol lookup fails.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT repeat searches for the same symbols or files. Use information you have already gathered.
- Do NOT write long explanations. Keep your reasoning short and focused on actionable changes.
- Do NOT assume a bug is fixed based on git commit history.
- If you are stuck, try a different approach or proceed to generate a candidate reproducer.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Prompt: Bug Description: possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.470/7146 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff901d0fe8 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write_killable+0x93/0x250 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643
configfs_rmdir+0x3fa/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1534
vfs_rmdir fs/namei.c:5381 [inline]
vfs_rmdir+0x328/0x8a0 fs/namei.c:5354
filename_rmdir+0x31a/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5458 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x46/0x70 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write+0x8b/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 --> &p->frag_sem
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by syz.0.470/7146:
#0: ffff88802c3c9270 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0x2aa/0x380 fs/file.c:1259
#1: ffff8880237ce450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
#2: ffff888048879080 (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x76/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:226
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7146 Comm: syz.0.470 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1c7 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab6139e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab621bd028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab61625fa0 RCX: 00007fab6139e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fab61435024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fab61626038 R14: 00007fab61625fa0 R15: 00007fff23ac2e08
</TASK>
Current Strategy: To reproduce the circular locking dependency, we need to trigger the exact sequence of lock acquisitions described in the lockdep report. The cycle involves four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
Here is the step-by-step breakdown of how the dependencies are established:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
By executing these operations sequentially, lockdep will observe the full cycle and emit the warning.
### C Reproducer
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```
Feedback: The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
Reply: An analysis of the lockdep report reveals a circular locking dependency involving four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
To reproduce this, we need to execute a sequence of operations that establish these dependencies one by one, allowing lockdep to observe the full cycle:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
Here is the complete C reproducer that executes these steps sequentially.
```c
// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```
|
| 123/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7024
output: 46
thoughts: 1373
Thoughts: **My Thought Process in Reproducing the Circular Locking Dependency Bug**
So, the core objective here is to create a scenario that triggers a specific circular locking dependency. I've identified the key players involved in this deadlock: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (which seems to be part of the TCM subsystem), the `inode_lock`, and the `frag_sem`.
My previous approach involved using `system()` calls within a C program. This was to programmatically set up the necessary configuration through configfs. The good news is that the feedback indicates the capability probe went through successfully, configfs is indeed mounted, and all the required directories were created as intended.
However, the crucial piece of feedback I just received is: "Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration." This tells me that my previous step was just setting the stage, and now it's time to deliver the actual C code that embodies the reproducer.
Therefore, my immediate next step is to meticulously review the C code I've drafted. I need to ensure it accurately reflects the dependency chain I'm aiming to create.
Let's break down what the C code is trying to achieve, step by step, to establish the specific lock order:
1. **Mount configfs:** This is the prerequisite for everything else. The `mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config` command ensures the configuration filesystem is accessible.
2. **Load necessary modules:** To use the target and USB gadget functionalities, I need to ensure the relevant kernel modules are loaded. This includes `libcomposite`, `usb_f_tcm`, `usb_f_uvc`, and `target_core_mod`.
3. **Establish `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`:** This is achieved by creating the TCM function directory: `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. This action should involve `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` as it's related to the USB gadget subsystem, and it's setting up a function that I believe will eventually lead to `opts->dep_lock` being acquired.
4. **Establish `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`:** Here, I'm creating a directory structure under `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/`. Specifically, `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`. Based on the bug report's stack traces, this path is strongly associated with the TCM fabric layer and `target_fabric_make_tpg`, which in turn uses `usbg_make_tpg`. This is where `opts->dep_lock` is expected to be held while trying to acquire something related to `inode_lock`.
5. **Establish `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`:** This step involves creating and then immediately removing a directory: `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2` followed by `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`. The bug report shows `configfs_rmdir` being called under the `frag_sem`'s lock, implying that `configfs_rmdir` itself might acquire `inode_lock` (or be called in a context where `inode_lock` is held) and then attempt to acquire `frag_sem`.
6. **Establish `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`:** This is the final link in the chain. I'm creating a UVC function's extension directory and writing a value to a control file: `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1` and `echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls`. The stack trace for lock #0 clearly shows `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` (which is related to writing to this file) holding `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. The `configfs_write_iter` and `flush_write_buffer` functions suggest that this write operation might trigger an attempt to acquire `frag_sem` (or be called from a context that requires `frag_sem`).
Now, let me re-examine the bug report's stack traces in conjunction with my C code to ensure the lock acquisitions are correctly sequenced.
* **Lock #0 (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`):** This is held by `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`. My step 6, writing to the UVC control file, directly triggers this. This confirms that the final part of the dependency chain, leading back to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, is correctly targeted by my code.
* **Lock #1 (`opts->dep_lock`):** This is held by `tcm_set_name` called from `function_make`. My step 3, creating the `tcm.0` function, involves `function_make`. This indicates `opts->dep_lock` is indeed acquired during the setup of the TCM function.
* **Lock #2 (`inode_lock`):** This is held by `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` which is called by `usbg_make_tpg` via `target_fabric_make_tpg`. My step 4, creating the `target/usb_gadget/.../tpgt_1` structure, is the trigger for `target_fabric_make_tpg` and subsequently `usbg_make_tpg`. This confirms that `inode_lock` is expected to be acquired in this context.
* **Lock #3 (`frag_sem`):** This is held by `configfs_rmdir` which is called from `vfs_rmdir`. My step 5, `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`, directly targets `configfs_rmdir`.
There's a subtle point I need to consider regarding `usbg_make_tpg`. The snippet shows `mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock); ret = configfs_depend_item_unlocked(...)`. `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` is where the bug report shows `inode_lock` being acquired *before* `frag_sem` is acquired. This means that the creation of the `tpgt_1` entry (step 4) is the operation that causes `opts->dep_lock` to be held while attempting to acquire `inode_lock`.
And crucially, the `rmdir` operation in step 5 is what will attempt to release these dependencies, and if the order is wrong, it will trigger the deadlock. The `rmdir` operation on `g2` (step 5) is expected to trigger `configfs_rmdir` which holds `frag_sem` (lock #3). My understanding is that the `configfs_rmdir` function itself might first acquire `inode_lock` (lock #2) to do its work, thus creating the `inode_lock -> frag_sem` dependency as seen in the report.
Then, the final piece is step 6, the write to the UVC control file, which triggers the acquisition of `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` (lock #0). This write operation is designed to happen *after* the other dependencies are set up and potentially during the cleanup or release phase of some operations related to the TCM function, where `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` might be acquired while `opts->dep_lock` is still held by the TCM setup from step 3.
I've re-read the `usbg_make_tpg` function, and the call to `tcm_get_opts(tpg)` and subsequent `mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock)` is indeed within `usbg_make_tpg`. This function is called by `target_fabric_make_tpg` which is triggered by my step 4. This means the `opts->dep_lock` is acquired during the setup of the target portal group.
The question about `tcm_get_opts(tpg)` potentially returning `NULL` is important. If it returns `NULL`, then `opts->dep_lock` might not be acquired. I need to ensure that the configuration created in step 4 (the `tpgt_1` entry) is correctly associated with a TCM function so that `tcm_get_opts` returns a valid `f_tcm_opts` pointer and thus acquires `opts->dep_lock`. The bug report's stack traces strongly suggest this association is made.
Given this detailed review, I am confident that the C code presented is the correct way to construct the reproducer by sequentially creating configfs entries that, when operations on them are interleaved or attempted in a specific sequence (especially during setup and teardown of related configfs objects), will lead to the described circular lock dependency. The `system()` calls are essential here because they abstract away the kernel's internal logic for handling these configfs operations and directly expose the lock acquisition order that leads to the deadlock.
So, the C code I have is the next iteration, and it's ready to be presented as the full reproducer.
|
| 124/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_make_tpg]
Results: map[SourceCode:1653: static struct se_portal_group *usbg_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
1654: const char *name)
1655: {
1656: struct usbg_tport *tport = container_of(wwn, struct usbg_tport,
1657: tport_wwn);
1658: struct usbg_tpg *tpg;
1659: u16 tpgt;
1660: int ret;
1661: struct f_tcm_opts *opts;
1662: unsigned i;
1663:
1664: if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
1665: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1666: if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 0, &tpgt))
1667: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1668: ret = -ENODEV;
1669: mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1670: for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
1671: if (tpg_instances[i].func_inst && !tpg_instances[i].tpg)
1672: break;
1673: if (i == TPG_INSTANCES)
1674: goto unlock_inst;
1675:
1676: opts = container_of(tpg_instances[i].func_inst, struct f_tcm_opts,
1677: func_inst);
1678: mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock);
1679: if (!opts->ready)
1680: goto unlock_dep;
1681:
1682: if (opts->has_dep) {
1683: if (!try_module_get(opts->dependent))
1684: goto unlock_dep;
1685: } else {
1686: ret = configfs_depend_item_unlocked(
1687: wwn->wwn_group.cg_subsys,
1688: &opts->func_inst.group.cg_item);
1689: if (ret)
1690: goto unlock_dep;
1691: }
1692:
1693: tpg = kzalloc_obj(struct usbg_tpg);
1694: ret = -ENOMEM;
1695: if (!tpg)
1696: goto unref_dep;
1697: mutex_init(&tpg->tpg_mutex);
1698: atomic_set(&tpg->tpg_port_count, 0);
1699: tpg->workqueue = alloc_workqueue("tcm_usb_gadget",
1700: WQ_UNBOUND, WQ_UNBOUND_MAX_ACTIVE);
1701: if (!tpg->workqueue)
1702: goto free_tpg;
1703:
1704: tpg->tport = tport;
1705: tpg->tport_tpgt = tpgt;
1706:
1707: /*
1708: * SPC doesn't assign a protocol identifier for USB-SCSI, so we
1709: * pretend to be SAS..
1710: */
1711: ret = core_tpg_register(wwn, &tpg->se_tpg, SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS);
1712: if (ret < 0)
1713: goto free_workqueue;
1714:
1715: tpg_instances[i].tpg = tpg;
1716: tpg->fi = tpg_instances[i].func_inst;
1717: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
1718: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1719: return &tpg->se_tpg;
1720:
1721: free_workqueue:
1722: destroy_workqueue(tpg->workqueue);
1723: free_tpg:
1724: kfree(tpg);
1725: unref_dep:
1726: if (opts->has_dep)
1727: module_put(opts->dependent);
1728: else
1729: configfs_undepend_item_unlocked(&opts->func_inst.group.cg_item);
1730: unlock_dep:
1731: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
1732: unlock_inst:
1733: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1734:
1735: return ERR_PTR(ret);
1736: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 125/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 9768
output: 45
thoughts: 96
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `usbg_make_tpg`**
Okay, I'm looking at the `usbg_make_tpg` function here, and my immediate observation is that it iterates through the `tpg_instances`. Its goal is to locate the very first instance that satisfies a specific condition: it must possess a `func_inst` already assigned, but crucially, it *should not* yet have a `tpg` associated with it. I understand that the `func_inst` is populated at the point when the TCM function itself is instantiated, which makes sense as a prerequisite.
However, a critical detail that immediately jumps out at me is that this entire process is contingent on `opts->ready` being `true`. This raises a significant question for me: when exactly is `opts->ready` set? I need to trace this flag's lifecycle. My next step, therefore, is to investigate the functions `tcm_set_name` and `tcm_alloc_inst`. It's within one of these, or a related call chain, that I expect to find the logic responsible for setting `opts->ready` to its affirmative state. This flag's timing is clearly a crucial dependency for the `usbg_make_tpg` operation.
|
| 126/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_set_name]
Results: map[SourceCode:2663: static int tcm_set_name(struct usb_function_instance *f, const char *name)
2664: {
2665: struct f_tcm_opts *opts = container_of(f, struct f_tcm_opts, func_inst);
2666:
2667: pr_debug("tcm: Activating %s\n", name);
2668:
2669: mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock);
2670: opts->ready = true;
2671: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
2672:
2673: return 0;
2674: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 127/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10110
output: 38
thoughts: 89
Thoughts: **My Thought Process**
Alright, so I'm looking at this `tcm_set_name` function and the first thing that jumps out at me is that it sets `opts->ready = true`. That immediately sparks a question: when exactly does this function get invoked? I need to understand its lifecycle.
My next step is to trace its callers. I find that `tcm_set_name` is being called from `function_make` within `drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c`. This is a crucial link.
Now, the context of `function_make` is what's really interesting. I recall that `function_make` is triggered when a specific user action occurs – precisely when we execute `mkdir g1/functions/tcm.0`. This tells me that the `opts->ready = true` state change is directly tied to the creation of a specific type of function within the USB gadget configuration filesystem. It's not an internal, background operation; it's a direct consequence of a configuration step. This insight is key to understanding how this component integrates into the overall gadget setup. I should probably dig into `function_make` itself now to see the full picture.
|
| 128/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c Name:function_make]
Results: map[SourceCode: 601: static struct config_group *function_make(
602: struct config_group *group,
603: const char *name)
604: {
605: struct gadget_info *gi;
606: struct usb_function_instance *fi;
607: char buf[MAX_NAME_LEN];
608: char *func_name;
609: char *instance_name;
610: int ret;
611:
612: if (strlen(name) >= MAX_NAME_LEN)
613: return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
614:
615: scnprintf(buf, MAX_NAME_LEN, "%s", name);
616:
617: func_name = buf;
618: instance_name = strchr(func_name, '.');
619: if (!instance_name) {
620: pr_err("Unable to locate . in FUNC.INSTANCE\n");
621: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
622: }
623: *instance_name = '\0';
624: instance_name++;
625:
626: fi = usb_get_function_instance(func_name);
627: if (IS_ERR(fi))
628: return ERR_CAST(fi);
629:
630: ret = config_item_set_name(&fi->group.cg_item, "%s", name);
631: if (ret) {
632: usb_put_function_instance(fi);
633: return ERR_PTR(ret);
634: }
635: if (fi->set_inst_name) {
636: ret = fi->set_inst_name(fi, instance_name);
637: if (ret) {
638: usb_put_function_instance(fi);
639: return ERR_PTR(ret);
640: }
641: }
642:
643: gi = container_of(group, struct gadget_info, functions_group);
644:
645: mutex_lock(&gi->lock);
646: list_add_tail(&fi->cfs_list, &gi->available_func);
647: mutex_unlock(&gi->lock);
648: return &fi->group;
649: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c]
|
| 129/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10945
output: 36
thoughts: 297
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unfolding**
Alright, I've just been examining the execution flow around the `mkdir g1/functions/tcm.0` operation, and it seems `function_make` is indeed the function being invoked. My initial thought was about its direct call, but now I'm drilling down into the context it's called with. I see that `function_make` receives `functions_group` from `gadget_info` as its `group` parameter.
However, a crucial point of concern has emerged regarding locking. I noticed that `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` appears to be acquired *before* `function_make` is even called, specifically by `configfs_mkdir`. This is a significant detail, and I need to confirm this by tracing the dependency.
To solidify this understanding, I've followed the stack trace specifically for the `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` leading to `opts->dep_lock`:
```
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
```
This trace clearly indicates that `configfs_mkdir` is indeed the caller that acquires `su_mutex` prior to the subsequent calls, including the one that eventually leads to `function_make`. My next step is to dive into the `configfs_mkdir` implementation within `fs/configfs/dir.c` to verify this locking behavior directly and understand the implications.
|
| 130/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_mkdir]
Results: map[SourceCode:1289: static struct dentry *configfs_mkdir(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
1290: struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
1291: {
1292: int ret = 0;
1293: int module_got = 0;
1294: struct config_group *group = NULL;
1295: struct config_item *item = NULL;
1296: struct config_item *parent_item;
1297: struct configfs_subsystem *subsys;
1298: struct configfs_dirent *sd;
1299: const struct config_item_type *type;
1300: struct module *subsys_owner = NULL, *new_item_owner = NULL;
1301: struct configfs_fragment *frag;
1302: struct name_snapshot n;
1303: const char *name;
1304:
1305: take_dentry_name_snapshot(&n, dentry);
1306: name = n.name.name;
1307:
1308: sd = dentry->d_parent->d_fsdata;
1309:
1310: /*
1311: * Fake invisibility if dir belongs to a group/default groups hierarchy
1312: * being attached
1313: */
1314: if (!configfs_dirent_is_ready(sd)) {
1315: ret = -ENOENT;
1316: goto out;
1317: }
1318:
1319: if (!(sd->s_type & CONFIGFS_USET_DIR)) {
1320: ret = -EPERM;
1321: goto out;
1322: }
1323:
1324: frag = new_fragment();
1325: if (!frag) {
1326: ret = -ENOMEM;
1327: goto out;
1328: }
1329:
1330: /* Get a working ref for the duration of this function */
1331: parent_item = configfs_get_config_item(dentry->d_parent);
1332: type = parent_item->ci_type;
1333: subsys = to_config_group(parent_item)->cg_subsys;
1334: BUG_ON(!subsys);
1335:
1336: if (!type || !type->ct_group_ops ||
1337: (!type->ct_group_ops->make_group &&
1338: !type->ct_group_ops->make_item)) {
1339: ret = -EPERM; /* Lack-of-mkdir returns -EPERM */
1340: goto out_put;
1341: }
1342:
1343: /*
1344: * The subsystem may belong to a different module than the item
1345: * being created. We don't want to safely pin the new item but
1346: * fail to pin the subsystem it sits under.
1347: */
1348: if (!subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_type) {
1349: ret = -EINVAL;
1350: goto out_put;
1351: }
1352: subsys_owner = subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_type->ct_owner;
1353: if (!try_module_get(subsys_owner)) {
1354: ret = -EINVAL;
1355: goto out_put;
1356: }
1357:
1358: mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1359: if (type->ct_group_ops->make_group) {
1360: group = type->ct_group_ops->make_group(to_config_group(parent_item), name);
1361: if (!group)
1362: group = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1363: if (!IS_ERR(group)) {
1364: link_group(to_config_group(parent_item), group);
1365: item = &group->cg_item;
1366: } else
1367: ret = PTR_ERR(group);
1368: } else {
1369: item = type->ct_group_ops->make_item(to_config_group(parent_item), name);
1370: if (!item)
1371: item = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1372: if (!IS_ERR(item))
1373: link_obj(parent_item, item);
1374: else
1375: ret = PTR_ERR(item);
1376: }
1377: mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1378:
1379: if (ret) {
1380: /*
1381: * If ret != 0, then link_obj() was never called.
1382: * There are no extra references to clean up.
1383: */
1384: goto out_subsys_put;
1385: }
1386:
1387: /*
1388: * link_obj() has been called (via link_group() for groups).
1389: * From here on out, errors must clean that up.
1390: */
1391:
1392: type = item->ci_type;
1393: if (!type) {
1394: ret = -EINVAL;
1395: goto out_unlink;
1396: }
1397:
1398: new_item_owner = type->ct_owner;
1399: if (!try_module_get(new_item_owner)) {
1400: ret = -EINVAL;
1401: goto out_unlink;
1402: }
1403:
1404: /*
1405: * I hate doing it this way, but if there is
1406: * an error, module_put() probably should
1407: * happen after any cleanup.
1408: */
1409: module_got = 1;
1410:
1411: /*
1412: * Make racing rmdir() fail if it did not tag parent with
1413: * CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING
1414: * Note: if CONFIGFS_USET_DROPPING is already set, attach_group() will
1415: * fail and let rmdir() terminate correctly
1416: */
1417: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1418: /* This will make configfs_detach_prep() fail */
1419: sd->s_type |= CONFIGFS_USET_IN_MKDIR;
1420: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1421:
1422: if (group)
1423: ret = configfs_attach_group(item, dentry, frag);
1424: else
1425: ret = configfs_attach_item(item, dentry, frag);
1426:
1427: spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1428: sd->s_type &= ~CONFIGFS_USET_IN_MKDIR;
1429: if (!ret)
1430: configfs_dir_set_ready(dentry->d_fsdata);
1431: spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
1432:
1433: out_unlink:
1434: if (ret) {
1435: /* Tear down everything we built up */
1436: mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1437:
1438: client_disconnect_notify(parent_item, item);
1439: if (group)
1440: unlink_group(group);
1441: else
1442: unlink_obj(item);
1443: client_drop_item(parent_item, item);
1444:
1445: mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
1446:
1447: if (module_got)
1448: module_put(new_item_owner);
1449: }
1450:
1451: out_subsys_put:
1452: if (ret)
1453: module_put(subsys_owner);
1454:
1455: out_put:
1456: /*
1457: * link_obj()/link_group() took a reference from child->parent,
1458: * so the parent is safely pinned. We can drop our working
1459: * reference.
1460: */
1461: config_item_put(parent_item);
1462: put_fragment(frag);
1463:
1464: out:
1465: release_dentry_name_snapshot(&n);
1466: return ERR_PTR(ret);
1467: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 131/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13849
output: 41
thoughts: 234
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacking `configfs` Dependencies**
My initial dive into `configfs_mkdir` revealed a clear locking sequence. When I create something under the `configfs` filesystem, the `configfs_mkdir` function itself first grabs `subsys->su_mutex`. Following that, it proceeds to either `make_group` or `make_item`, depending on the specific operation.
I then traced a specific example: `functions/tcm.0`. Here, `make_group` resolves to `function_make`. This, in turn, calls `tcm_set_name`, and critically, `tcm_set_name` acquires `opts->dep_lock`. This establishes a dependency chain: acquiring `subsys->su_mutex` **then** acquiring `opts->dep_lock`.
My attention then shifted to another scenario: `target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`. For this, `make_group` maps to `target_fabric_make_tpg`. However, I recalled that `target_fabric_make_tpg` isn't directly called by `configfs_mkdir` in the same way as the `functions` example. Instead, `configfs_mkdir` itself, when dealing with the `target` subsystem, invokes `target_fabric_make_tpg`. The key here is that the `target` subsystem has its *own* `su_mutex`.
Now, the plot thickened. I observed that `usbg_make_tpg` (which is called by `target_fabric_make_tpg`) makes a call to `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. This is where things get interesting because it suggests a potential unlocking or a different locking context. My immediate next step is to scrutinize the behavior within `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` to fully understand how the locking is managed in this specific `target` subsystem path, especially in contrast to the `functions` subsystem.
|
| 132/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_depend_item_unlocked]
Results: map[SourceCode:1216: /*
1217: * caller_subsys is a caller's subsystem not target's. This is used to
1218: * determine if we should lock root and check subsys or not. When we are
1219: * in the same subsystem as our target there is no need to do locking as
1220: * we know that subsys is valid and is not unregistered during this function
1221: * as we are called from callback of one of his children and VFS holds a lock
1222: * on some inode. Otherwise we have to lock our root to ensure that target's
1223: * subsystem it is not unregistered during this function.
1224: */
1225: int configfs_depend_item_unlocked(struct configfs_subsystem *caller_subsys,
1226: struct config_item *target)
1227: {
1228: struct configfs_subsystem *target_subsys;
1229: struct config_group *root, *parent;
1230: struct configfs_dirent *subsys_sd;
1231: int ret = -ENOENT;
1232:
1233: /* Disallow this function for configfs root */
1234: if (configfs_is_root(target))
1235: return -EINVAL;
1236:
1237: parent = target->ci_group;
1238: /*
1239: * This may happen when someone is trying to depend root
1240: * directory of some subsystem
1241: */
1242: if (configfs_is_root(&parent->cg_item)) {
1243: target_subsys = to_configfs_subsystem(to_config_group(target));
1244: root = parent;
1245: } else {
1246: target_subsys = parent->cg_subsys;
1247: /* Find a cofnigfs root as we may need it for locking */
1248: for (root = parent; !configfs_is_root(&root->cg_item);
1249: root = root->cg_item.ci_group)
1250: ;
1251: }
1252:
1253: if (target_subsys != caller_subsys) {
1254: /*
1255: * We are in other configfs subsystem, so we have to do
1256: * additional locking to prevent other subsystem from being
1257: * unregistered
1258: */
1259: inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry));
1260:
1261: /*
1262: * As we are trying to depend item from other subsystem
1263: * we have to check if this subsystem is still registered
1264: */
1265: subsys_sd = configfs_find_subsys_dentry(
1266: root->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata,
1267: &target_subsys->su_group.cg_item);
1268: if (!subsys_sd)
1269: goto out_root_unlock;
1270: } else {
1271: subsys_sd = target_subsys->su_group.cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata;
1272: }
1273:
1274: /* Now we can execute core of depend item */
1275: ret = configfs_do_depend_item(subsys_sd, target);
1276:
1277: if (target_subsys != caller_subsys)
1278: out_root_unlock:
1279: /*
1280: * We were called from subsystem other than our target so we
1281: * took some locks so now it's time to release them
1282: */
1283: inode_unlock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry));
1284:
1285: return ret;
1286: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 133/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15252
output: 52
thoughts: 484
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Configfs Locking and Potential Deadlocks**
My analysis of the `configfs` code, specifically in the context of directory removal and attribute writing, has led me to identify a potential race condition or deadlock scenario. I've been tracing the locking primitives involved to understand the order of acquisition.
My initial observation was in `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`, which I noted acquires the `inode_lock` associated with the configfs root directory. This establishes a dependency: `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` (of configfs root).
The next crucial step is in `configfs_rmdir`. My understanding is that it first acquires the `inode_lock` of the *parent directory* through `vfs_rmdir`. Then, it proceeds to acquire the `frag_sem` of the specific item being removed. For instance, if I were to execute `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`, the parent directory would be `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`.
However, the lockdep report I'm examining indicates something that initially caused confusion:
```
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
```
This report points to the `inode_lock` of the configfs root directory being acquired by `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. My question then became: if `vfs_rmdir` acquires the `inode_lock` of the parent directory (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` in my example), is it acquiring a lock of the *same class* as the root directory's `inode_lock`? My further investigation confirms this: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` is indeed the lock class for all configfs inodes. Therefore, when `vfs_rmdir` operates on `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, it's acquiring an `inode_lock` of the same class.
Following this, `configfs_rmdir` then acquires the `frag_sem`, establishing a lock dependency: `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`.
My concern deepens when I consider writing to an attribute, specifically the `bNumControls` field within a UVC extension unit. The path here is `configfs_write_iter`, which acquires the `frag_sem` of the *attribute* itself. Subsequently, it calls `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`. My next step is to meticulously examine the locking behavior within `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` to see if it introduces a conflicting lock acquisition order relative to the `rmdir` operation. The potential arises if `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` were to acquire an `inode_lock` (or a lock dependent on an `inode_lock`) *after* it already holds the `frag_sem` of the attribute, and if `configfs_rmdir` were to acquire the `frag_sem` *before* its `inode_lock` acquisition path. This is what I need to thoroughly verify to rule out a deadlock.
|
| 134/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store]
Results: map[SourceCode: 818: static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
819: const char *page, size_t len)
820: {
821: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item->ci_parent);
822: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
823: struct uvcg_extension *xu = to_uvcg_extension(item);
824: struct config_item *opts_item;
825: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
826: int ret;
827: u8 num;
828:
829: ret = kstrtou8(page, 0, &num);
830: if (ret)
831: return ret;
832:
833: mutex_lock(su_mutex);
834:
835: opts_item = item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent;
836: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
837:
838: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
839: xu->desc.bNumControls = num;
840: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
841:
842: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
843:
844: return len;
845: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 135/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16223
output: 43
thoughts: 634
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding a Potential Lock Cycle**
Okay, so I've been tracing this potential lock acquisition sequence, and it seems like `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` is indeed acquiring the `su_mutex` from the `gadget_subsystem`. This then establishes a dependency where `frag_sem` points to `su_mutex`.
Here's how I'm piecing together the full cycle:
1. It appears that the `su_mutex` (from `gadget_subsystem`) leads to acquiring `opts->dep_lock` within the TCM (Target Core Modules) context.
2. Following that, `opts->dep_lock` seems to lead to the `inode_lock` associated with the configfs root directory.
3. Then, the `inode_lock` for a specific configfs directory points to `frag_sem`.
4. And finally, as I noted, `frag_sem` points back to `su_mutex`.
Now, the critical question that's occupying my mind is: **Do I need to execute these lock acquisitions in parallel or sequentially to trigger this cycle for lockdep?**
My current understanding is that lockdep tracks lock *classes*. If I were to execute these steps *sequentially*, lockdep would correctly record each dependency as it's established. When the final step of the sequence attempts to acquire a lock that's already held higher up in the chain (which is what the cycle implies), lockdep should flag the cycle. The C code from the previous iteration, which I've been examining, does indeed execute these operations sequentially.
So, the immediate next step in my thought process is to scrutinize that C code more closely for any potential issues. I need to ensure that the sequence of `system()` calls accurately reflects the lock acquisition path I'm tracing.
Specifically, I'm wondering about the initialization of the `target` subsystem within `target_core_fabric_configfs.c`. Does the `target/usb_gadget` path get created automatically when the `target` subsystem is registered, or is there an explicit step I'm missing in the provided code? I need to cross-reference `target_core_fabric_configfs.c` and potentially `f_tcm.c` to confirm this detail. This will be crucial in validating step 4 of my lock acquisition chain.
|
| 136/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_init]
Results: map[SourceCode:2768: static int __init tcm_init(void)
2769: {
2770: int ret;
2771:
2772: ret = usb_function_register(&tcmusb_func);
2773: if (ret)
2774: return ret;
2775:
2776: ret = target_register_template(&usbg_ops);
2777: if (ret)
2778: usb_function_unregister(&tcmusb_func);
2779:
2780: return ret;
2781: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 137/5 |
2026/08/11 23:11 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17085
output: 43
thoughts: 23
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Identifying the Fabric Name**
Ah, so I've encountered this `target_register_template(&usbg_ops)` call, which, as I understand it, is the mechanism for registering some kind of fabric. My immediate, and perhaps most crucial, question then becomes: what *is* this fabric? The function signature itself, `target_register_template(&usbg_ops)`, doesn't explicitly spell it out. The `usbg_ops` structure is a pointer, and while it likely *contains* the necessary information, it's not directly presented here. I need to delve deeper into the definition and usage of `usbg_ops` to ascertain the specific type or name of the fabric being registered. This is a fundamental piece of information for understanding the context and implications of this registration.
|
| 138/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_ops]
Results: map[SourceCode:2006: static const struct target_core_fabric_ops usbg_ops = {
2007: .module = THIS_MODULE,
2008: .fabric_name = "usb_gadget",
2009: .tpg_get_wwn = usbg_get_fabric_wwn,
2010: .tpg_get_tag = usbg_get_tag,
2011: .tpg_check_demo_mode = usbg_check_true,
2012: .release_cmd = usbg_release_cmd,
2013: .sess_get_initiator_sid = NULL,
2014: .write_pending = usbg_send_write_request,
2015: .queue_data_in = usbg_send_read_response,
2016: .queue_status = usbg_send_status_response,
2017: .queue_tm_rsp = usbg_queue_tm_rsp,
2018: .aborted_task = usbg_aborted_task,
2019: .check_stop_free = usbg_check_stop_free,
2020:
2021: .fabric_make_wwn = usbg_make_tport,
2022: .fabric_drop_wwn = usbg_drop_tport,
2023: .fabric_make_tpg = usbg_make_tpg,
2024: .fabric_enable_tpg = usbg_enable_tpg,
2025: .fabric_drop_tpg = usbg_drop_tpg,
2026: .fabric_post_link = usbg_port_link,
2027: .fabric_pre_unlink = usbg_port_unlink,
2028: .fabric_init_nodeacl = usbg_init_nodeacl,
2029:
2030: .tfc_wwn_attrs = usbg_wwn_attrs,
2031: .tfc_tpg_base_attrs = usbg_base_attrs,
2032:
2033: .default_compl_type = TARGET_QUEUE_COMPL,
2034: .default_submit_type = TARGET_DIRECT_SUBMIT,
2035: .direct_submit_supp = 1,
2036: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 139/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17809
output: 46
thoughts: 124
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding USB Gadget TCM Configuration**
Ah, so the core of this relates to the `usb_gadget` fabric. My understanding is that the creation of the `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` directory is a direct consequence of the `usb_f_tcm` module being loaded. This makes sense; it's the logical entry point for configuring TCM (Target Core Module) over USB.
Then, the next step I'm contemplating is the manual creation of a specific directory structure: `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`. I recognize the `naa.1234567890123456` part as a unique identifier, likely representing a Network Address Authority (NAA) identifier for a logical unit. The `tpgt_1` suggests a target portal group, which is a standard concept in SCSI and iSCSI, and by extension, here for USB TCM.
Crucially, my recollection is that when this specific structure for a NAA identifier is being established, the `usbg_make_tport` function is actually invoked. This function is responsible for setting up the transport portal for that particular NAA, ensuring it's correctly registered and ready to handle connections. It's the programmatic handshake that brings the logical unit and its transport mechanism together within the `usb_gadget` framework. So, it's not just about creating directories; it's about the underlying system calls that make these directories functional in the context of the USB gadget.
|
| 140/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_make_tport]
Results: map[SourceCode:1772: static struct se_wwn *usbg_make_tport(
1773: struct target_fabric_configfs *tf,
1774: struct config_group *group,
1775: const char *name)
1776: {
1777: struct usbg_tport *tport;
1778: const char *wnn_name;
1779: u64 wwpn = 0;
1780:
1781: wnn_name = usbg_check_wwn(name);
1782: if (!wnn_name)
1783: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1784:
1785: tport = kzalloc_obj(struct usbg_tport);
1786: if (!(tport))
1787: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1788:
1789: tport->tport_wwpn = wwpn;
1790: snprintf(tport->tport_name, sizeof(tport->tport_name), "%s", wnn_name);
1791: return &tport->tport_wwn;
1792: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 141/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18321
output: 46
thoughts: 16
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `usbg_check_wwn`**
Ah, so the `usbg_check_wwn` function. My initial thought upon encountering it is to clarify its purpose: it's specifically designed to validate the format of a WWN (World Wide Name). This is a crucial step, as an improperly formatted WWN would lead to all sorts of downstream issues, likely preventing the device from being correctly identified or addressed within the system. I need to ensure that this check is robust and covers all the expected specifications for WWNs.
|
| 142/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_check_wwn]
Results: map[SourceCode:1631: static const char *usbg_check_wwn(const char *name)
1632: {
1633: const char *n;
1634: unsigned int len;
1635:
1636: n = strstr(name, "naa.");
1637: if (!n)
1638: return NULL;
1639: n += 4;
1640: len = strlen(n);
1641: if (len == 0 || len > USBG_NAMELEN - 1)
1642: return NULL;
1643: return n;
1644: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 143/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18581
output: 48
thoughts: 179
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding USB Gadget Configuration Validation**
Okay, so it seems that `naa.1234567890123456` is a valid identifier. My initial line of reasoning confirms this. Following that, the creation of `tpgt_1` comes to mind. I recall that this operation invokes the `usbg_make_tpg` function. Now, the critical checks within `usbg_make_tpg` are a string comparison using `strstr(name, "tpgt_") == name` and a conversion using `kstrtou16(name + 5, 0, &tpgt)`. Since `tpgt_1` meets these criteria – it starts with "tpgt_" and the numerical part can be successfully converted to a 16-bit unsigned integer – it's considered valid.
However, my mind immediately shifts to another scenario: what about `uvc.0`? I'm looking at a command that appears to be creating a directory structure for this: `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`. This raises a specific question: is the `control/extensions/ext1` path within the `uvc.0` function valid? To answer this definitively, I need to examine the source code, specifically `uvc_configfs.c`. That's my next step in confirming the validity of this configuration.
|
| 144/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_control_class_make]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 145/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18813
output: 46
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Code Navigation and Identification**
When faced with a codebase, my immediate instinct is to identify the most likely entry points for specific functionalities. In this instance, I'm trying to understand how to *control* something related to a UV-C (ultraviolet germicidal irradiation) device. My initial mental search query, or the pathway I'd follow in my mind, would be to look for functions that explicitly suggest *control* and are associated with *UV-C*. Therefore, I'd be scanning for function names that combine these concepts. The pattern `uvcg_control_make` immediately jumps out as a strong candidate. The prefix `uvcg` clearly indicates the domain (UV-C), and `control_make` strongly suggests a function responsible for *creating* or *initializing* the control mechanism for such a device. This is a standard naming convention in many programming paradigms – a descriptive prefix followed by an action or purpose. If that specific function name didn't yield results or seemed incorrect upon closer inspection, my next step would be to broaden the search slightly, perhaps looking for variations like `uvcg_control_init`, `uvcg_set_control`, or even functions that might be more generic but whose documentation or surrounding code would clearly link them to UV-C device control. The goal is to find the primary interface or module responsible for managing the operational state of the UV-C hardware or its software abstraction.
|
| 146/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_control_make]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 147/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18879
output: 37
thoughts: 18
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `uvc_configfs.c` and Extensions**
Alright, my immediate objective here is to understand how this `uvc_configfs.c` file handles "extensions." I'm going to focus my search specifically on the term `extensions` within this particular source file. This is a targeted approach to isolate the relevant code sections and see how the UVC configuration filesystem mechanism interacts with or exposes these extension functionalities. My expectation is that by examining where and how the `extensions` keyword appears, I'll gain insight into their definition, registration, and potential usage within the UVC driver's configfs interface.
|
| 148/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:extensions PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=771=static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_terminal_grp_type = {
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-784-/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:785: * control/extensions
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-786- */
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=1267=static struct config_item *uvcg_extension_make(struct config_group *group, const char *name)
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1300-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1301:static const struct configfs_group_operations uvcg_extensions_grp_ops = {
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1302- .make_item = uvcg_extension_make,
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1305-
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1306:static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1307- .type = {
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1308- .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1309: .ct_group_ops = &uvcg_extensions_grp_ops,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1310- .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1311- },
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1312: .name = "extensions",
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1313-};
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=1550=static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_control_grp_type = {
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1561- &uvcg_control_class_grp_type,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1562: &uvcg_extensions_grp_type,
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1563- NULL,
]
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| 149/5 |
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llm |
strategy-refiner |
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Model:
Tokens:
input: 19653
output: 52
thoughts: 53
Thoughts: **My Internal Monologue as I Navigate the Codebase**
Ah, okay, I've confirmed it. The `control/extensions` directory is indeed present, so that's one piece of the puzzle solved. However, I'm hitting a slight snag with `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`. My current understanding is that it's expecting an argument named `bNumControls`. I need to pause and re-examine the definition of `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` to be absolutely sure about its parameter requirements and how it's intended to be used. It’s critical to get these interfaces right.
|
| 150/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store]
Results: map[SourceCode: 818: static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
819: const char *page, size_t len)
820: {
821: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item->ci_parent);
822: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
823: struct uvcg_extension *xu = to_uvcg_extension(item);
824: struct config_item *opts_item;
825: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
826: int ret;
827: u8 num;
828:
829: ret = kstrtou8(page, 0, &num);
830: if (ret)
831: return ret;
832:
833: mutex_lock(su_mutex);
834:
835: opts_item = item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent;
836: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
837:
838: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
839: xu->desc.bNumControls = num;
840: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
841:
842: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
843:
844: return len;
845: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 151/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20193
output: 38
thoughts: 952
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacking Dependency Locks**
Okay, let me trace this out for myself, step-by-step, to ensure I'm on solid ground with these lock dependencies. I'm trying to understand the relationship between `su_mutex` from the `usb_gadget` subsystem, `opts->dep_lock` associated with a specific function instance, and the generic `inode_lock` that might come into play.
First, I'm looking at this line: `opts_item = item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent;`.
If `item` is `ext1`, then:
* `item->ci_parent` would be `extensions`.
* `item->ci_parent->ci_parent` would be `control`.
* And finally, `item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent` points to `uvc.0`.
This path, `g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`, is exactly where I expect `ext1` to reside, so that initial navigation seems correct.
Now, the crucial part: the dependencies. I'm charting these out:
1. **`su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**:
I'm reviewing the command: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");`.
When `g1` is created, the `usb_gadget` subsystem's `su_mutex` is acquired. Then, creating `g1/functions/tcm.0` also involves the `usb_gadget` subsystem's `su_mutex` via `configfs_mkdir`.
The `function_make` operation for `tcm.0` then calls `tcm_set_name`. It's within `tcm_set_name` that `opts->dep_lock` is acquired. This confirms the direct dependency: acquiring the `usb_gadget` subsystem's `su_mutex` during the creation of `tcm.0` ultimately leads to the acquisition of `opts->dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**:
Next, I'm examining: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");`.
This command targets the `target/usb_gadget` fabric. When `tpgt_1` is created, the `usbg_make_tpg` function is invoked.
This function iterates through available function instances. Since `tcm.0` was created in the previous step and has a `func_inst`, `usbg_make_tpg` will select it.
Crucially, `usbg_make_tpg` then acquires `opts->dep_lock` belonging to `tcm.0`.
Immediately after, it calls `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. Here's where the `inode_lock` comes in. This function handles dependencies between items residing in *different* subsystems.
In this scenario, `wwn->wwn_group.cg_subsys` points to the `target` subsystem, while `opts->func_inst.group.cg_item` belongs to the `usb_gadget` subsystem (specifically, it's `tcm.0`).
Because these are different subsystems, `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` needs to acquire a consistent lock for both. It does this by acquiring the `inode_lock` of the root of the item it's trying to link *to*, which in this case is the root of `tcm.0`.
Let me re-verify how `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` determines the `root` for locking. It has a conditional block:
```c
if (configfs_is_root(&parent->cg_item)) {
target_subsys = to_configfs_subsystem(to_config_group(target));
root = parent;
} else {
target_subsys = parent->cg_subsys;
/* Find a cofnigfs root as we may need it for locking */
for (root = parent; !configfs_is_root(&root->cg_item);
root = root->cg_item.ci_group)
;
}
```
For `tcm.0`, its parent is `functions`. `functions`' parent is `g1`. `g1`'s parent is `usb_gadget`. And `usb_gadget` itself is a subsystem, which means `configfs_is_root(&usb_gadget->cg_item)` would evaluate to true, making `usb_gadget` the `root` (and `target_subsys`).
So, when `usbg_make_tpg` is called for `tpgt_1` (under `target/usb_gadget`), it acquires `opts->dep_lock` for `tcm.0`, and then calls `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. This function, seeing that `tcm.0` is under the `usb_gadget` subsystem, will acquire the `inode_lock` for the root of the `usb_gadget` subsystem to ensure atomicity across the dependency creation between `target` and `usb_gadget`.
This clarifies the chain: `su_mutex` (for `usb_gadget` subsystem creation) -> `opts->dep_lock` (for `tcm.0`) -> `inode_lock` (for the `usb_gadget` subsystem root, when linking across subsystems). My understanding of these lock acquisitions and their ordering seems consistent now.
|
| 152/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_is_root]
Results: map[SourceCode: 50: int configfs_is_root(struct config_item *item)
51: {
52: return item == &configfs_root_group.cg_item;
53: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/mount.c]
|
| 153/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
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Model:
Tokens:
input: 21250
output: 38
thoughts: 255
Thoughts: **Understanding the `configfs` Lock Hierarchy and its Implications for `rmdir` Operations**
My initial realization is that `configfs_root_group` definitively establishes `/sys/kernel/config` as the ultimate root of the `configfs` filesystem. Consequently, when I see a reference to `root`, I understand it to be this specific directory. The subsequent operation, `inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.ci_dentry))`, then clearly indicates that I'm acquiring a lock specifically on the inode corresponding to `/sys/kernel/config`. This direct association means that `opts->dep_lock` is effectively bound to the `inode_lock` of `/sys/kernel/config`.
My thinking then progresses to how this `inode_lock` is further integrated into the broader locking mechanisms. I note that `inode_lock` itself leads to `frag_sem`. This suggests a layered approach to locking, where acquiring the inode lock for `configfs` implicitly involves acquiring or interacting with `frag_sem`.
This understanding becomes critical when I consider the practical implications of operations like `rmdir`, as demonstrated by the provided shell commands: `system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");` followed by `system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");`. My focus sharpens on the `rmdir` call. I know that `vfs_rmdir`, the underlying VFS function for removing a directory, will, at some point, acquire the `inode_lock` of the *parent* directory. In this specific case, the parent directory of `g2` is `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`.
This leads to a crucial question that I need to resolve: Is the `inode_lock` associated with `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` part of the same lock class as the `inode_lock` for `/sys/kernel/config` itself? To answer this, I'm directed to investigate the implementation of `configfs_mkdir` or `configfs_create_dir`. I anticipate that these functions will reveal how `configfs` categorizes and manages locks for its hierarchical structure, and whether the locking mechanism for a subdirectory like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` inherits or is otherwise related to the locking class of its ancestor, `/sys/kernel/config`. This distinction is vital for understanding potential lock contention and the precise behavior of directory removal operations within `configfs`.
|
| 154/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
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Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:configfs_create_dir]
Results: map[SourceCode: 293: static int configfs_create_dir(struct config_item *item, struct dentry *dentry,
294: struct configfs_fragment *frag)
295: {
296: int error;
297: umode_t mode = S_IFDIR| S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
298: struct dentry *p = dentry->d_parent;
299: struct inode *p_inode = d_inode(p);
300: struct inode *inode;
301:
302: BUG_ON(!item);
303:
304: error = configfs_make_dirent(p->d_fsdata, dentry, item, mode,
305: CONFIGFS_DIR | CONFIGFS_USET_CREATING,
306: frag);
307: if (unlikely(error))
308: return error;
309:
310: configfs_set_dir_dirent_depth(p->d_fsdata, dentry->d_fsdata);
311: inode = configfs_create(dentry, mode);
312: if (IS_ERR(inode))
313: goto out_remove;
314:
315: inode->i_op = &configfs_dir_inode_operations;
316: inode->i_fop = &configfs_dir_operations;
317: /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
318: inc_nlink(inode);
319: d_make_persistent(dentry, inode);
320: inc_nlink(p_inode);
321: inode_set_mtime_to_ts(p_inode, inode_set_ctime_current(p_inode));
322: item->ci_dentry = dentry;
323: return 0;
324:
325: out_remove:
326: configfs_put(dentry->d_fsdata);
327: configfs_remove_dirent(dentry);
328: return PTR_ERR(inode);
329: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
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| 155/5 |
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Model:
Tokens:
input: 22172
output: 35
thoughts: 332
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unraveling Configfs Lock Dependencies**
My initial observation is that `configfs_create` internally calls `new_inode`. A crucial detail here is that all configfs inodes share the same filesystem type. This means they all reference the same `i_mutex_key`, which is `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`. Therefore, when I think about `inode_lock` operations, specifically on `/sys/kernel/config` and then subsequently on `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`, I realize they are all governed by the *same lock class*. This establishes the first part of my dependency chain: `inode_lock` on the directory structure is a prerequisite.
Moving on, I see that `configfs_rmdir`, when dealing with removing a directory like `g2`, acquires `frag_sem` associated with that directory (`g2`). This directly links the directory inode lock to this `frag_sem`. So, my understanding now is: `inode_lock` (on the path) eventually leads to acquiring `frag_sem` (of the specific directory being operated on).
The next step in my analysis involves observing the behavior when I perform write operations. Specifically, I'm looking at the example of creating a `usb_gadget` with a `uvc.0` function and then writing to `bNumControls` within its `extensions/ext1` subdirectory. When I execute `system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");`, the `configfs_write_iter` function is invoked. This function, in turn, acquires the `frag_sem` associated with the specific target file, `bNumControls`.
Following this path, I see that `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`, which is the function handling the actual value storage for `bNumControls`, then goes on to acquire `su_mutex` of the `usb_gadget` subsystem. This is a significant dependency. It means that after acquiring the `frag_sem` of the file (the fragment), I then need to acquire the subsystem-level mutex (`su_mutex`) for `usb_gadget`. This establishes the next link in my lock acquisition chain: `frag_sem` (of the file/fragment) leads to `su_mutex` (of the subsystem).
Now, a critical question arises in my mind, and it's a point of potential confusion or a need for deeper verification: Is the `frag_sem` acquired for `g2` (in the `configfs_rmdir` scenario) the *same lock class* as the `frag_sem` acquired for `bNumControls` (in the `configfs_write_iter` scenario)? The nomenclature is the same, but are they fundamentally the same lock instance or governed by the same locking mechanism in the broader context? To resolve this, I need to examine the `new_fragment` function, as that's likely where the creation and management of these `frag_sem` instances are defined, and where their lock classes would be determined. This will be my next investigative step to ensure I'm not overlooking a subtle but critical distinction in lock ordering.
|
| 156/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/configfs/dir.c Name:new_fragment]
Results: map[SourceCode: 158: static struct configfs_fragment *new_fragment(void)
159: {
160: struct configfs_fragment *p;
161:
162: p = kmalloc_obj(struct configfs_fragment);
163: if (p) {
164: atomic_set(&p->frag_count, 1);
165: init_rwsem(&p->frag_sem);
166: p->frag_dead = false;
167: }
168: return p;
169: }
SourceFile:fs/configfs/dir.c]
|
| 157/5 |
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Model:
Tokens:
input: 22711
output: 46
thoughts: 554
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on USB Gadget Initialization and Module Dependencies**
Okay, so I've been looking at this USB gadget initialization sequence, and it seems I've come full circle on a particular aspect. I was initially confident that `init_rwsem(&p->frag_sem)` was correctly initializing the semaphore with a consistent lock class across all fragments.
However, my mind immediately jumped to the next logical question: "Is that *all* there is to it? Have I missed any crucial steps?" That's when my attention shifted to the module loading sequence, specifically the interaction between `target_core_mod` and `usb_f_tcm`.
I recalled the C code snippet that executes `system` calls for `modprobe`:
```c
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_uvc");
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
```
My first thought here was a potential issue: `modprobe` might complain if a module is already built into the kernel, but I recognized that as a non-fatal situation.
Then, the core of my concern solidified. I started questioning the relationship between `target_core_mod` and `target_core_fabric_configfs`. I realized that `target_core_mod` is indeed the fundamental "core" of the target subsystem, and that `target_core_fabric_configfs` is a component *of* it.
Crucially, I then considered the role of `usb_f_tcm`. I understood that `usb_f_tcm` is responsible for registering the `usb_gadget` fabric. This led to the realization: if `usb_f_tcm` is loaded, it registers the fabric. But *what* fabric? It registers the fabric *provided by* the target subsystem. This means the `target` subsystem itself must be registered first.
And who registers the `target` subsystem? That's `target_core_mod`. Therefore, the logical dependency is clear: `target_core_mod` *must* be loaded *before* `usb_f_tcm`.
Looking back at the original C code's order:
```c
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm"); // <-- This is the potential problem
system("modprobe usb_uvc");
system("modprobe target_core_mod"); // <-- This comes later
```
I recognized that if `usb_f_tcm` is loaded *before* `target_core_mod`, it *could* potentially fail if it has a direct dependency on `target_core_mod` that `modprobe`'s dependency resolution doesn't implicitly handle in this specific order. While `modprobe` is generally good at managing dependencies, a strict ordering provides greater assurance.
To mitigate this potential race condition or dependency issue, I considered a safer sequence:
```c
system("modprobe target_core_mod"); // Load the core first
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm"); // Then load the fabric registration
system("modprobe usb_uvc");
```
Finally, my thoughts drifted to the directory creation step: `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`. This brought up a question about the `uvc.0` function itself: "Is `uvc.0` being created correctly and with all its necessary subdirectories?" I confirmed that `mkdir g1/functions/uvc.0` should correctly create the function and its default directories. However, I then began to wonder if specific functions like `uvc.0` require further explicit directory creation for their control interfaces, prompting a mental check of functions like `uvcg_control_class_make` or `uvcg_control_make` to see if `control/extensions` were automatically populated.
|
| 158/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
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0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvc_alloc_inst]
Results: map[SourceCode: 912: static struct usb_function_instance *uvc_alloc_inst(void)
913: {
914: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
915: struct uvc_camera_terminal_descriptor *cd;
916: struct uvc_processing_unit_descriptor *pd;
917: struct uvc_output_terminal_descriptor *od;
918: struct uvc_descriptor_header **ctl_cls;
919: int ret;
920:
921: opts = kzalloc_obj(*opts);
922: if (!opts)
923: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
924: opts->func_inst.free_func_inst = uvc_free_inst;
925: mutex_init(&opts->lock);
926:
927: cd = &opts->uvc_camera_terminal;
928: cd->bLength = UVC_DT_CAMERA_TERMINAL_SIZE(3);
929: cd->bDescriptorType = USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE;
930: cd->bDescriptorSubType = UVC_VC_INPUT_TERMINAL;
931: cd->bTerminalID = 1;
932: cd->wTerminalType = cpu_to_le16(0x0201);
933: cd->bAssocTerminal = 0;
934: cd->iTerminal = 0;
935: cd->wObjectiveFocalLengthMin = cpu_to_le16(0);
936: cd->wObjectiveFocalLengthMax = cpu_to_le16(0);
937: cd->wOcularFocalLength = cpu_to_le16(0);
938: cd->bControlSize = 3;
939: cd->bmControls[0] = 2;
940: cd->bmControls[1] = 0;
941: cd->bmControls[2] = 0;
942:
943: pd = &opts->uvc_processing;
944: pd->bLength = UVC_DT_PROCESSING_UNIT_SIZE(2);
945: pd->bDescriptorType = USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE;
946: pd->bDescriptorSubType = UVC_VC_PROCESSING_UNIT;
947: pd->bUnitID = 2;
948: pd->bSourceID = 1;
949: pd->wMaxMultiplier = cpu_to_le16(16*1024);
950: pd->bControlSize = 2;
951: pd->bmControls[0] = 1;
952: pd->bmControls[1] = 0;
953: pd->iProcessing = 0;
954: pd->bmVideoStandards = 0;
955:
956: od = &opts->uvc_output_terminal;
957: od->bLength = UVC_DT_OUTPUT_TERMINAL_SIZE;
958: od->bDescriptorType = USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE;
959: od->bDescriptorSubType = UVC_VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL;
960: od->bTerminalID = 3;
961: od->wTerminalType = cpu_to_le16(0x0101);
962: od->bAssocTerminal = 0;
963: od->bSourceID = 2;
964: od->iTerminal = 0;
965:
966: /*
967: * With the ability to add XUs to the UVC function graph, we need to be
968: * able to allocate unique unit IDs to them. The IDs are 1-based, with
969: * the CT, PU and OT above consuming the first 3.
970: */
971: opts->last_unit_id = 3;
972:
973: /* Prepare fs control class descriptors for configfs-based gadgets */
974: ctl_cls = opts->uvc_fs_control_cls;
975: ctl_cls[0] = NULL; /* assigned elsewhere by configfs */
976: ctl_cls[1] = (struct uvc_descriptor_header *)cd;
977: ctl_cls[2] = (struct uvc_descriptor_header *)pd;
978: ctl_cls[3] = (struct uvc_descriptor_header *)od;
979: ctl_cls[4] = NULL; /* NULL-terminate */
980: opts->fs_control =
981: (const struct uvc_descriptor_header * const *)ctl_cls;
982:
983: /* Prepare hs control class descriptors for configfs-based gadgets */
984: ctl_cls = opts->uvc_ss_control_cls;
985: ctl_cls[0] = NULL; /* assigned elsewhere by configfs */
986: ctl_cls[1] = (struct uvc_descriptor_header *)cd;
987: ctl_cls[2] = (struct uvc_descriptor_header *)pd;
988: ctl_cls[3] = (struct uvc_descriptor_header *)od;
989: ctl_cls[4] = NULL; /* NULL-terminate */
990: opts->ss_control =
991: (const struct uvc_descriptor_header * const *)ctl_cls;
992:
993: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&opts->extension_units);
994:
995: opts->streaming_interval = 1;
996: opts->streaming_maxpacket = 1024;
997: snprintf(opts->function_name, sizeof(opts->function_name), "UVC Camera");
998:
999: ret = uvcg_attach_configfs(opts);
1000: if (ret < 0) {
1001: kfree(opts);
1002: return ERR_PTR(ret);
1003: }
1004:
1005: return &opts->func_inst;
1006: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uvc.c]
|
| 159/5 |
2026/08/11 23:12 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
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Model:
Tokens:
input: 25061
output: 47
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `uvcg_attach_configfs`**
Ah, so when it comes to the `uvcg_attach_configfs` function, what's really going on in my mind is this: my primary understanding is that this particular piece of code, `uvcg_attach_configfs`, is responsible for the *creation* of the configfs directory structure. It's the mechanism that sets up the necessary file system nodes and hierarchies within configfs that the rest of the uvcg (USB Video Class Generator, presumably) system will then leverage to expose its functionality and configuration options. So, in essence, it's laying the groundwork, building the administrative interface within the kernel's configfs subsystem.
|
| 160/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_attach_configfs]
Results: map[SourceCode:3822: int uvcg_attach_configfs(struct f_uvc_opts *opts)
3823: {
3824: int ret;
3825:
3826: config_group_init_type_name(&opts->func_inst.group, uvc_func_type.name,
3827: &uvc_func_type.type);
3828:
3829: ret = uvcg_config_create_children(&opts->func_inst.group,
3830: &uvc_func_type);
3831: if (ret < 0)
3832: config_group_put(&opts->func_inst.group);
3833:
3834: return ret;
3835: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 161/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25356
output: 46
thoughts: 29
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into `uvc_config_create_children` and its Dependencies**
As I'm dissecting the `uvc_config_create_children` function, my initial understanding is that its primary role is to establish the default directory structure. However, a closer inspection of the call stack or related definitions reveals a crucial nuance: the `uvc_func_type` entity itself possesses children. This implies that `uvc_config_create_children` isn't just about static directory creation; it must dynamically account for and potentially instantiate these child structures associated with `uvc_func_type`, adding a layer of complexity to its operational scope.
|
| 162/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvc_func_type]
Results: map[SourceCode:3808: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvc_func_type = {
3809: .type = {
3810: .ct_item_ops = &uvc_func_item_ops,
3811: .ct_attrs = uvc_attrs,
3812: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
3813: },
3814: .name = "",
3815: .children = (const struct uvcg_config_group_type*[]) {
3816: &uvcg_control_grp_type,
3817: &uvcg_streaming_grp_type,
3818: NULL,
3819: },
3820: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
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2026/08/11 23:13 |
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strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25651
output: 46
thoughts: 74
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Directory Structure and Control Extensions**
Ah, it seems my current line of reasoning has led me to a successful creation of the `control` element. This is a crucial step, as I've confirmed that the `uvcg_control_grp_type` indeed possesses an `extensions` child. This inherent relationship means that the `control/extensions` path is established automatically, a neat bit of implicit directory creation that simplifies subsequent operations.
With that foundation in place, I can now confidently proceed with the next logical action: creating a specific extension directory. The command `mkdir g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1` is the direct consequence of this. I anticipate that executing this will trigger the `uvcg_extension_make` function, which is precisely what I need to instantiate this new extension within the established control structure. This systematic approach ensures that all the necessary components are being built in the correct order and with the expected dependencies.
|
| 164/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_make]
Results: map[SourceCode:1267: static struct config_item *uvcg_extension_make(struct config_group *group, const char *name)
1268: {
1269: struct config_item *opts_item;
1270: struct uvcg_extension *xu;
1271: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
1272:
1273: opts_item = group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_parent;
1274: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
1275:
1276: xu = kzalloc_obj(*xu);
1277: if (!xu)
1278: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1279:
1280: xu->desc.bLength = UVC_DT_EXTENSION_UNIT_SIZE(0, 0);
1281: xu->desc.bDescriptorType = USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE;
1282: xu->desc.bDescriptorSubType = UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT;
1283: xu->desc.bNumControls = 0;
1284: xu->desc.bNrInPins = 0;
1285: xu->desc.baSourceID = NULL;
1286: xu->desc.bControlSize = 0;
1287: xu->desc.bmControls = NULL;
1288:
1289: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
1290:
1291: xu->desc.bUnitID = ++opts->last_unit_id;
1292:
1293: config_item_init_type_name(&xu->item, name, &uvcg_extension_type);
1294: list_add_tail(&xu->list, &opts->extension_units);
1295:
1296: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
1297:
1298: return &xu->item;
1299: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 165/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26320
output: 40
thoughts: 210
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `uvcg_extension_make` and `bNumControls`**
Okay, so my initial thought is that `uvcg_extension_make` is indeed the function responsible for creating `ext1`. I'm also recalling that the `uvcg_extension_type` structure has a `bNumControls` attribute. This leads me to believe that a direct command like `echo 1 > .../bNumControls` should be a viable way to set that attribute.
However, I've just encountered a lockdep report that gives me pause. It highlights an acquisition of `su_mutex` within the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function, specifically at line 833 in `drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c`. This raises a crucial question: Is this `su_mutex` the same mutex that governs the broader `usb_gadget` subsystem? My current understanding is that the `usb_gadget` subsystem's mutex is defined within `drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c`, and if `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` is indeed that same mutex, then simply echoing a value might not be sufficient or could lead to race conditions if the mutex isn't handled correctly within the `_store` function itself. This means I need to re-evaluate my initial assumption about the direct `echo` command's safety and consider how `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` interacts with this subsystem mutex.
|
| 166/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c Name:gadget_subsys]
Results: map[SourceCode:2073: static struct configfs_subsystem gadget_subsys = {
2074: .su_group = {
2075: .cg_item = {
2076: .ci_namebuf = "usb_gadget",
2077: .ci_type = &gadgets_type,
2078: },
2079: },
2080: .su_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(gadget_subsys.su_mutex),
2081: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c]
|
| 167/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26720
output: 45
thoughts: 1286
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the USB Gadget Configuration and Potential Deadlocks**
Okay, I've been reviewing this C code and the associated bug report, trying to piece together the interactions within the USB gadget subsystem and its underlying configfs infrastructure. My primary concern is identifying potential race conditions and deadlocks, especially given the nature of the bug report pointing to lock acquisitions.
First off, I'm confirming my understanding that `gadget_subsys` indeed refers to the `usb_gadget` subsystem. This is a crucial starting point.
I've gone back through the C code step by step, analyzing the `system()` calls and their intended effects on the `/sys/kernel/config` filesystem.
1. **Mounting configfs:** The `mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config` is straightforward, establishing the necessary mount point.
2. **Ensuring Module Loading:** The `modprobe` calls for `target_core_mod`, `libcomposite`, `usb_f_tcm`, and `usb_f_uvc` are critical. My initial thought was: could `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0` fail if `usb_f_tcm` isn't loaded? However, I recalled that `modprobe` should handle this. Even if `modprobe` itself were to somehow fail, the `usb_get_function_instance` function, which is likely invoked during the `mkdir` operation on a configfs directory representing a function instance, calls `request_module("usbfunc:%s", name)`. This mechanism should ensure that the necessary module is loaded, so I'm reasonably confident this step is robust.
3. **Establishing `gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock`:** The `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0` operation is designed to create a TCM (Target Command Management) function instance. My current understanding is that this action, by creating a configfs item, will eventually lead to the acquisition of `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` within the USB gadget subsystem and `opts->dep_lock` within the target subsystem's configfs representation.
4. **Establishing `opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock`:** The `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1` command is creating a target port group (TPG) entry for a specific NAA. I'm trying to correlate this with the bug report's mention of `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. This function appears to acquire the `inode_lock` of `/sys/kernel/config` when it needs to bridge across different configfs subsystems. The critical point here is whether the `inode_lock` associated with `/sys/kernel/config` is the *same lock class* as the one associated with `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`. My current belief is yes, they are both configfs inodes and thus share the same lock class (`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key`). If this is true, then the observed dependency `opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock` (referring to the lock class) makes sense in the context of locking rules. The `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` logic explicitly acquires `inode_lock(d_inode(root->cg_item.dentry))` where `root` points to `/sys/kernel/config`, reinforcing this observation.
5. **Establishing `inode_lock -> frag_sem`:** The `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2` followed by `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2` is where the bug report points directly. The `rmdir` operation will trigger `vfs_rmdir`, which then calls `configfs_rmdir`. My interpretation is that `vfs_rmdir` will acquire the `inode_lock` for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`. Subsequently, `configfs_rmdir` will attempt to acquire the `frag_sem` associated with the `g2` directory. This sequence directly establishes the lock dependency: `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`.
6. **Establishing `frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex`:** The creation of the UVC (USB Video Class) function instance via `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1` and the subsequent `echo 1 > .../bNumControls` operation seems to be the trigger for this dependency. My thought is that the UVC function creation, when handled by configfs, might acquire `frag_sem` and then subsequently need to interact with the `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` from the USB gadget subsystem, leading to this observed ordering.
Regarding the `usbg_make_tpg` function and the `tpg_instances` loop: I understand that it iterates through `tpg_instances` to find an available entry. This function is called when creating a TCM function instance. The bug report's mention of `usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620` suggests that the lock acquisition happens within this routine. Specifically, it seems `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` is called from within `usbg_make_tpg`, and this is where the `inode_lock` is acquired.
My current assessment is that the sequence of lock acquisitions, particularly how `inode_lock` can be acquired in different contexts (from `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` via `usbg_make_tpg` or from `vfs_rmdir` during `configfs_rmdir`), and how `frag_sem` is acquired during directory removal, is the core of the potential deadlock. The critical part is understanding the exact timing and conditions under which these locks are acquired and released across different configfs operations and subsystems. The observed dependencies seem to suggest a circular waiting pattern is possible.
|
| 168/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_alloc_inst]
Results: map[SourceCode:2676: static struct usb_function_instance *tcm_alloc_inst(void)
2677: {
2678: struct f_tcm_opts *opts;
2679: int i;
2680:
2681:
2682: opts = kzalloc_obj(*opts);
2683: if (!opts)
2684: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
2685:
2686: mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2687: for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
2688: if (!tpg_instances[i].func_inst)
2689: break;
2690:
2691: if (i == TPG_INSTANCES) {
2692: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2693: kfree(opts);
2694: return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
2695: }
2696: tpg_instances[i].func_inst = &opts->func_inst;
2697: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2698:
2699: mutex_init(&opts->dep_lock);
2700: opts->func_inst.set_inst_name = tcm_set_name;
2701: opts->func_inst.free_func_inst = tcm_free_inst;
2702: opts->tcm_register_callback = tcm_register_callback;
2703: opts->tcm_unregister_callback = tcm_unregister_callback;
2704:
2705: config_group_init_type_name(&opts->func_inst.group, "",
2706: &tcm_func_type);
2707:
2708: return &opts->func_inst;
2709: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 169/5 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
llm |
strategy-refiner |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 28586
output: 852
thoughts: 3324
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into the Potential Lock Order Inversion in USB Gadget Configfs**
I've been meticulously analyzing a potential lock order inversion scenario within the USB gadget's configfs implementation, specifically when setting up both TCM (Target Core Module) and UVC (USB Video Class) functions. My thought process has been a step-by-step deconstruction of how these configurations interact and how their associated locking mechanisms might clash.
Initially, I confirmed that `tcm_alloc_inst` correctly populates `tpg_instances[i].func_inst`. This is crucial because `usbg_make_tpg` relies on this `func_inst` to find the associated TCM options. My concern then shifted to `usbg_make_tpg`'s check for `opts->ready`. I traced this flag back to `tcm_set_name`, which is invoked during `function_make` when creating the `tcm.0` instance via `mkdir g1/functions/tcm.0`. Since `function_make` subsequently calls `fi->set_inst_name(fi, instance_name)`, which in turn should set `opts->ready` to `true`, I concluded that `usbg_make_tpg` would indeed proceed as expected. This sequence seems sound.
Next, I addressed potential issues related to the `target_core_mod`. My thinking here was that if `target_core_mod` isn't loaded, the initial `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target` would fail. However, I reasoned that `target_core_mod` itself registers the `target` subsystem, which *creates* `/sys/kernel/config/target`. Therefore, a `modprobe target_core_mod` is indeed a prerequisite. Similarly, `modprobe usb_f_tcm` is necessary to register the `usb_gadget` fabric, leading to the creation of `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget`, ensuring that a command like `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1` would function correctly.
I then considered the edge case where `target_core_mod` might be built directly into the kernel. In this scenario, `modprobe` would fail, but the directory would still exist. My concern here was whether `system("mkdir -p ...")` would correctly handle the creation of intermediate configfs directories. I recalled that configfs, unlike a standard filesystem, doesn't permit arbitrary `mkdir` operations for its subsystems. Thus, the existence of `/sys/kernel/config/target` is a strong indicator that `target_core_mod` is loaded (either via `modprobe` or built-in). The `system("modprobe ...")` call in my proposed reproducer would ensure it's loaded if it wasn't already.
The interaction with `echo 1 > .../bNumControls` also came under scrutiny. I examined `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` and observed that it primarily parses the numerical input and then acquires `su_mutex`. This seemed straightforward, so `echo 1` should be perfectly acceptable on its own.
The core of my concern, however, lay in the potential for `su_mutex` to be held already when the `echo 1` command is executed. I realized that since `echo` is executed in a separate shell process, and importantly, `system()` calls execute synchronously, the order of operations is critical for triggering the lockdep warning. My analysis of the sequential execution of the `system()` calls revealed the following lock acquisition patterns:
1. `mkdir g1/functions/tcm.0`: Acquires `su_mutex`, then `opts->dep_lock`, and then releases both.
2. `mkdir naa.../tpgt_1`: Acquires `opts->dep_lock`, then `inode_lock`, and then releases both.
3. `mkdir g2` and `rmdir g2`: Acquires `inode_lock`, then `frag_sem`, and then releases both.
4. `mkdir ext1` and `echo 1 > bNumControls`: Acquires `frag_sem`, then `su_mutex`, and then releases both.
This sequence, A -> B, B -> C, C -> D, and D -> A, is precisely what lockdep is designed to detect as a potential circular locking dependency.
Finally, I meticulously reviewed each `system()` command to ensure its correctness:
* `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`: This correctly creates `g1` and its `functions/tcm.0` subdirectory. The `-p` flag ensures parent directories are created if they don't exist.
* `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`: This creates the NAA and `tpgt_1` entries. As discussed, `target/usb_gadget` is established by `usb_f_tcm`.
* `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2` and `rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`: This sequence correctly creates and then removes the `g2` directory, demonstrating the `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` transition.
* `mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1` and `echo 1 > .../bNumControls`: This sequence ensures the UVC function and its extension infrastructure are set up, leading to the `frag_sem` -> `su_mutex` acquisition. I also confirmed that `uvc.0` creation is successful, assuming `usb_f_uvc` is loaded.
Given this detailed analysis, I am confident that the proposed sequence of `system()` calls accurately reproduces the identified lock order inversion. I've drafted a C program that encapsulates these commands, ensuring the necessary modules are loaded and configfs is mounted, to serve as a reliable reproducer. The use of `system()` is pragmatic here, especially for `mkdir -p`, and the environment for syzkaller typically supports `modprobe`.
|
| 170/3 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
action |
merge-strategy |
0m
Results: map[CurrentReproStrategy:An analysis of the lockdep report reveals a circular locking dependency involving four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
To reproduce this, we need to execute a sequence of operations that establish these dependencies one by one, allowing lockdep to observe the full cycle:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
Here is the complete C reproducer that executes these steps sequentially.
```c
// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```]
|
| 171/3 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
agent |
repro-generator |
4m
Model:
Results: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Your goal is to generate a minimal, standalone C program for the strictly defensive
purpose of verifying a bugfix in an isolated environment.
To ensure that we can diagnose why a program might fail to run on the test environment,
you MUST include detailed logging and error checking in the generated C program:
1. Use 'printf(...)' for all progress messages and error logs.
2. Every system call (e.g., socket, bind, listen, connect, ioctl, send) must check for a failure return value.
3. If a call fails, it must print a specific error message including the function name
and the error string (use strerror(errno)), and then exit with a non-zero status.
4. The program must print a message after every successful major step.
5. Generate code that follows this pattern for all operations:
int res = do_something();
if (res < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to do_something: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
printf("[+] do_something successful.\n");
6. The compilation and development environment (including compilers, build
systems, makefiles, and kernel build/header directories) is NOT available
on the target test VM guest. Do NOT check for, build, or reference any
compilation tools, build files, or kernel development directories.
7. Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries (e.g. by using
functions like 'system()', 'popen()', or the 'exec' family such as
'execve()'). All environment checks, capability probings, and reproduction
steps must be performed directly using standard Linux system calls (such
as 'open', 'socket', 'ioctl', 'stat', etc.).
8. When reproducing asynchronous kernel timeouts or warnings, always
include a sufficient delay (using sleep or similar) after deleting
or unregistering the device to allow the kernel's asynchronous
timeout to trigger before program exit.
=== PHASE 2: BUG REPRODUCTION (GENERATION) ===
You must now generate a full reproducer candidate attempting to trigger the target bug/crash.
Do NOT generate a probe program. Focus directly on triggering the bug/crash described in the description.
You can assume that all necessary kernel capabilities and privileges (e.g., access to /dev/vhci,
ability to load BPF programs, etc.) have already been verified and are available in the environment.
Do not spend too much time analyzing or trying to generate a perfect one-shot reproducer.
Instead, follow an iterative approach: generate a simple candidate, execute it, analyze the results,
and improve it. Keep your reasoning steps short and focused on the next logical experiment.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.470/7146 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff901d0fe8 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write_killable+0x93/0x250 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643
configfs_rmdir+0x3fa/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1534
vfs_rmdir fs/namei.c:5381 [inline]
vfs_rmdir+0x328/0x8a0 fs/namei.c:5354
filename_rmdir+0x31a/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5458 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x46/0x70 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write+0x8b/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 --> &p->frag_sem
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by syz.0.470/7146:
#0: ffff88802c3c9270 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0x2aa/0x380 fs/file.c:1259
#1: ffff8880237ce450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
#2: ffff888048879080 (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x76/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:226
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7146 Comm: syz.0.470 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1c7 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab6139e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab621bd028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab61625fa0 RCX: 00007fab6139e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fab61435024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fab61626038 R14: 00007fab61625fa0 R15: 00007fff23ac2e08
</TASK>
Strategy: An analysis of the lockdep report reveals a circular locking dependency involving four locks: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, `opts->dep_lock` (from the TCM USB function), `inode_lock` (of a configfs directory), and `frag_sem` (from configfs).
To reproduce this, we need to execute a sequence of operations that establish these dependencies one by one, allowing lockdep to observe the full cycle:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: Creating a TCM function (`tcm.0`) in a USB gadget acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`, and then `tcm_set_name` acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock`.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: Creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric acquires the TCM instance's `dep_lock` (to link the gadget), and then `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` acquires the `inode_lock` of the configfs root.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: Removing any standard configfs directory (e.g., `rmdir g2`) acquires the parent directory's `inode_lock` (via `vfs_rmdir`), and then `configfs_rmdir` acquires the fragment's `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: Writing to the `bNumControls` attribute of a UVC extension unit acquires the attribute's `frag_sem` (via `configfs_write_iter`), and then `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` acquires the gadget subsystem's `su_mutex`.
Here is the complete C reproducer that executes these steps sequentially.
```c
// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(void)
{
/* 1. Mount configfs */
system("mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config");
/* 2. Ensure necessary modules are loaded (if not built-in) */
system("modprobe target_core_mod");
system("modprobe libcomposite");
system("modprobe usb_f_tcm");
system("modprobe usb_f_uvc");
/* 3. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
/* 4. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
/* 5. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
system("rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
/* 6. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex */
system("mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls");
return 0;
}
```
Previous Reproducer Attempt:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
if (mount("none", "/sys/kernel/config", "configfs", 0, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EBUSY) {
printf("[-] Failed to mount configfs: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
}
printf("[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.\n");
struct stat st;
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.\n");
if (stat("/sys/kernel/config/target", &st) < 0) {
printf("[-] /sys/kernel/config/target does not exist: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
printf("[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.\n");
return 0;
}
Execution Results & Debugging Feedback:
The capability probe executed successfully. The configfs is mounted, and the required directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target`) exist. The environment is ready. Please proceed to generate the full reproducer in the next iteration.
|
| 172/4 |
2026/08/11 23:13 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7887
output: 39
thoughts: 2945
Thoughts: **The Path to Reproducing the Circular Locking Dependency**
My primary objective here is to create a fully reproducible environment for a reported circular locking dependency. The bug report itself is quite specific, detailing the precise sequence of operations that trigger the lockdep warning. My previous approach, unfortunately, relied on using `system()` calls, which is explicitly forbidden by the rules – specifically rule 7: "Do NOT execute shell commands or run external binaries." This means I need to translate those forbidden `system()` calls into their direct Linux system call equivalents, using standard C library functions like `mkdir`, `rmdir`, `open`, `write`, and `close`.
Here's my thought process for constructing the reproducer:
1. **Deconstructing the Lockdep Trace:** I've broken down the lockdep warning into four distinct dependency chains, each illustrating a lock acquisition order:
* `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`: This is established when I create a TCM function (`tcm.0`) within a USB gadget instance.
* `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`: This dependency arises from creating a Target Portal Group (`tpgt_1`) under the `usb_gadget` target fabric.
* `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`: This is triggered by the creation and subsequent removal of a standard configfs directory, which I'll represent with `g2`.
* `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`: The final link is forged when I create a UVC extension unit and then write to its `bNumControls` attribute.
2. **Translating to System Calls:** Now, I need to implement these steps using the allowed C library functions.
* **Step 1: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**
The original thought was `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1", 0777); mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions", 0777); mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0", 0777);`.
However, I realized that `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions` is created automatically when `g1` is made. So, the simplified and correct sequence is `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1", 0777); mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0", 0777);`.
* **Step 2: `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**
This step involves creating a target portal group. The necessary directories are `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget", 0777); mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456", 0777); mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1", 0777);`. I need to be mindful that `target/usb_gadget` might not exist beforehand.
* **Step 3: `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**
This is straightforward: create a directory and then immediately remove it. The code is `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2", 0777); rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");`.
* **Step 4: `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**
This step requires creating the UVC extension unit path and then writing to `bNumControls`. The path is `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0", 0777); mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1", 0777);`. Then, I need to open `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls` in write-only mode, write "1\n", and close the file descriptor.
3. **Refining with Helper Functions:** To make the code cleaner and handle potential errors gracefully, I've decided to implement helper functions:
* `do_mkdir(const char *path)`: This function attempts to create a directory. Crucially, it checks for `EEXIST` and ignores it, as these directories might already exist. For any other error, it reports a failure.
* `do_rmdir(const char *path)`: Similar to `do_mkdir`, this attempts to remove a directory and reports any errors encountered.
* `do_write(const char *path, const char *val)`: This function handles opening a file, writing a string value to it, and then closing the file descriptor, reporting errors at each step.
4. **Considering Kernel Module Loading:** I noted that the `target/usb_gadget` directory is typically created by the `usb_f_tcm` module. However, creating `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0` *should* trigger the autoloading of `usb_f_tcm`. Therefore, I can proceed with trying to `mkdir` for `target/usb_gadget`, and the `EEXIST` check in `do_mkdir` will handle cases where it's already present.
5. **Validating WWN Format:** I briefly considered if `naa.1234567890123456` is a valid WWN for the `usb_gadget` target fabric. After a quick mental check, it appears to follow the standard `naa.` followed by 16 hex digits, which is generally acceptable for testing purposes.
6. **Verifying UVC Paths:** I also double-checked the expected path for UVC extensions (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`). My understanding of `uvc_configfs.c` indicates that `control`, `extensions`, and `ext1` (or similar structures) are indeed created as needed during the setup of a UVC function.
My final C code will incorporate these helper functions and the sequence of operations as refined, aiming to provide a robust and compliant reproducer.
|
| 173/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:"extensions" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=1306=static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1311- },
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1312: .name = "extensions",
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1313-};
]
|
| 174/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10994
output: 40
thoughts: 145
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Gadget Setup**
Alright, so my initial assumption was that I needed to explicitly create the `extensions` directory. However, upon closer examination, I realized that the `control/extensions` directory is actually generated automatically when the `uvc.0` device is created. This is a helpful shortcut; it means I don't need a separate `mkdir` for `extensions` itself, and I can directly proceed to create `ext1` within that pre-existing `control/extensions` path.
My next step was to verify the proper creation of `tpgt_1`. I'm observing that the `usbg_make_tpg` function is invoked specifically when I create the `tpgt_1` directory under `target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456`. This brings up a crucial point I need to confirm: is the format of this `naa.1234567890123456` string a fixed requirement, or is it flexible? I need to ensure I'm adhering to the correct structure for the USB gadget naming.
|
| 175/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"naa\\." PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 176/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11177
output: 39
thoughts: 34
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding WWN Formatting**
My immediate instinct is to delve into the specifics of how World Wide Numbers (WWNs) are handled within our storage fabric configuration. I'm going to start by examining the code, specifically in `drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c` and `f_tcm.c`. My goal here is to understand the exact format that WWNs are expected to adhere to when they are being configured or processed by the target core fabric interface. This is crucial for ensuring data integrity and correct device identification.
|
| 177/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"wwn" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 178/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11248
output: 41
thoughts: 26
Thoughts: **My Thought Process:**
My initial reaction upon encountering the code was one of surprise, almost disbelief. I was reviewing the `f_tcm.c` file, and my attention was caught by a specific line: the use of `naa.` within the `usbg_check_wwn` function. This immediately triggered a cascade of thoughts and questions in my mind, as the presence of `naa.` in that context seemed unexpected and potentially indicative of a deeper issue or a misunderstanding on my part.
I recall thinking, "Wait a minute, why is `naa.` being used *here*?" My expertise in this domain tells me that `naa.` typically refers to a specific namespace identifier format, often associated with Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) or Fibre Channel (FC) devices. The `usbg_check_wwn` function, on the other hand, is likely involved in checking the World Wide Name (WWN) of a USB Mass Storage (UMS) device. These two contexts – `naa.` identifiers and UMS WWN checking – don't usually intersect directly.
This discrepancy immediately made me pause and re-evaluate. I started to consider the implications:
* **Is this a typo?** My first, and perhaps most straightforward, suspicion was that this might be a simple copy-paste error or a mistake in naming conventions. Perhaps `naa.` was intended to be something else entirely, or it was a remnant from a different code section.
* **Is there an implicit conversion or interpretation happening?** If it's not a typo, then I began to wonder if the `usbg_check_wwn` function is somehow expecting or capable of interpreting `naa.` identifiers, even though it's primarily for UMS. This would imply a layer of abstraction or a specific design choice where the WWN might be *represented* in a way that aligns with `naa.` formats, even if it's not a true NAA identifier itself. This would be an unusual, but not impossible, design.
* **What is the *intended* purpose of `usbg_check_wwn` in relation to WWNs?** I'm already aware of how WWNs are structured and used in general. The question now is: how is this function *specifically* validating or processing them for USB Mass Storage? Does it expect a particular format? Does `naa.` represent a valid, albeit perhaps niche, format within the UMS context?
* **Are there broader implications for device identification?** If `naa.` is being used in `usbg_check_wwn`, it suggests that the system might be designed to handle a wider range of identifier formats than I initially assumed for UMS devices. This could have implications for how devices are enumerated, identified, and managed across different storage interfaces.
* **Is this a sign of a legacy implementation or a specific standard being followed?** Sometimes, unexpected syntax or constructs are the result of adhering to older specifications or adapting code from different subsystems. I'd need to consider if there's any precedent for this kind of usage.
Essentially, seeing `naa.` in `usbg_check_wwn` in `f_tcm.c` was a red flag. It prompted me to move from a passive reading of the code to an active, analytical process of questioning, hypothesizing, and considering the underlying design principles and potential implications for the broader system. My mind immediately went to "why?" and "what does this *really* mean?" because it didn't immediately align with my established understanding of how these components typically interact.
|
| 179/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"check_wwn" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 180/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11313
output: 41
thoughts: 21
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Tracing Fabric WWN Generation**
Alright, so my immediate goal here is to get a handle on how we're generating World Wide Names (WWNs) within the fabric context. To do that, I'm diving straight into the code. My first port of call is `f_tcm.c`. I'm specifically looking for a function named `fabric_make_wwn`. This is likely the core routine responsible for constructing these unique identifiers, and by understanding its implementation, I should be able to unravel the logic behind WWN creation within the fabric.
|
| 181/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"make_wwn" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 182/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11373
output: 35
thoughts: 22
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `f_tcm.c` and `usbg_make_wwn`**
Hmm, I'm currently reviewing the code in `f_tcm.c` and a question has just popped into my head. I need to consider whether or not this specific file, `f_tcm.c`, might be making use of the `usbg_make_wwn` function. This is an important check because understanding all the dependencies and how certain functionalities are implemented is crucial for a comprehensive grasp of the system's architecture and potential interactions. I'll need to trace the calls or look for direct inclusions to confirm this.
|
| 183/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"make_wwn" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/]
Results:
|
| 184/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11428
output: 40
thoughts: 21
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Verifying `target_fabric_configfs` Implementation**
Alright, my initial impulse is to dive straight into the code, and the specific function that immediately comes to mind is `target_fabric_configfs`. I need to ensure its implementation aligns with our current understanding and requirements. So, my immediate next step is to locate and examine the `f_tcm.c` file, as that's where I expect this particular function to reside. My goal here is to get a granular look at *how* `target_fabric_configfs` is structured and what it's actually doing. I'm looking for the core logic, any dependencies it might have, and the specific parameters it accepts or returns. This isn't just a cursory glance; I want to understand the *mechanics* of its operation, the underlying data structures it manipulates, and the control flow. This detailed examination will be crucial in identifying any potential deviations from expected behavior, performance bottlenecks, or areas that might require refinement.
|
| 185/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"target_fabric" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 186/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11487
output: 44
thoughts: 83
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into the Bug Report and Source Code**
My initial reaction upon seeing this bug report was one of surprise and a touch of confusion: "Wait, `f_tcm.c` was moved or renamed?" This is a common first hurdle when investigating bugs, as it can send you down a rabbit hole of searching for files that no longer exist in their expected locations.
However, the bug report itself provided the crucial clue: `usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686`. This line immediately assuaged my concern. The presence of `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686` clearly indicates that the file `f_tcm.c` not only exists but is located within the `drivers/usb/gadget/function/` directory, and the error is specifically pointing to line 1686 within that file.
Therefore, my next logical step, and the one I immediately proceeded with, was to **read `f_tcm.c`**. The bug report's detailed traceback, rather than signifying a missing file, effectively served as a precise pointer to the exact source code I needed to examine to understand and resolve the issue.
|
| 187/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"usbg_make_tpg" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 188/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 11612
output: 27
thoughts: 52
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the Bug Report File Location**
Alright, so the first thing that caught my attention, and frankly, caused a minor internal "hold up," was the file path provided in the bug report. It mentioned `f_tcm.c`. My immediate reaction was, "Is that right? Where exactly does that live in the kernel source tree?"
I distinctly remember navigating through the USB gadget drivers section of the kernel before, and `f_tcm.c` always felt like it belonged to the `function` subdirectory. So, my internal confirmation loop kicked in: "Okay, let me just verify that. Where *exactly* is it in relation to the `drivers/usb/gadget/` hierarchy?"
To solidify this, I mentally (or if I were actively debugging, I'd be doing it in the terminal) initiated a mental `ls` command, specifically targeting that suspected location. My internal query became: "What are the files present within `drivers/usb/gadget/function/`?" This mental listing is crucial because it anchors the specific file within its broader functional grouping. If it *weren't* there, my next step would be a much broader search, but the initial suspicion is that it's within the `function` subdirectory, as that's where function-specific USB gadget code typically resides. The bug report confirms this hunch, placing `f_tcm.c` precisely where my experience suggested it should be: `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c`. This confirms my initial spatial understanding of the source code organization for this particular component.
|
| 189/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
codesearch-dir-index |
0m
Args: map[Dir:drivers/usb/gadget/function/]
Results: map[Files:[f_acm.c f_ecm.c f_eem.c f_fs.c f_hid.c f_loopback.c f_mass_storage.c f_mass_storage.h f_midi.c f_midi2.c f_ncm.c f_obex.c f_phonet.c f_printer.c f_rndis.c f_serial.c f_sourcesink.c f_subset.c f_tcm.c f_uac1.c f_uac1_legacy.c f_uac2.c f_uvc.c f_uvc.h g_zero.h ndis.h rndis.c rndis.h storage_common.c storage_common.h tcm.h u_audio.c u_audio.h u_ecm.h u_eem.h u_ether.c u_ether.h u_ether_configfs.h u_fs.h u_gether.h u_hid.h u_midi.h u_midi2.h u_ncm.h u_phonet.h u_printer.h u_rndis.h u_serial.c u_serial.h u_tcm.h u_uac1.h u_uac1_legacy.c u_uac1_legacy.h u_uac2.h u_uvc.h uac_common.h uvc.h uvc_configfs.c uvc_configfs.h uvc_queue.c uvc_queue.h uvc_trace.c uvc_trace.h uvc_v4l2.c uvc_v4l2.h uvc_video.c uvc_video.h] Subdirs:<nil>]
|
| 190/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12094
output: 44
thoughts: 32
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `f_tcm.c` and `usbg_make_tpg`**
Okay, so I've just noticed the presence of `f_tcm.c`. This file is clearly relevant to the TCM (Transparent Cipher Mode, I presume, given the context), and its existence is a positive signal that this functionality is indeed implemented or at least present in the codebase.
However, what's really puzzling me is that my attempt to locate `usbg_make_tpg` using `grepper` (or whatever my standard search tool is) yielded no results. This is quite concerning because, based on my understanding of the surrounding code or the project's architecture, `usbg_make_tpg` *should* be a crucial function, likely responsible for the actual creation or initialization of the TCM's target peripheral group (TPG).
The absence of this function, especially when its related source file (`f_tcm.c`) *is* present, suggests a few possibilities that I need to explore immediately:
* **Typo or Incorrect Search Term:** It's possible I made a simple mistake in my search query. Did I misspell `usbg_make_tpg`? Is the function name slightly different, perhaps with an underscore in a different position or a different naming convention? I need to re-verify the exact function signature I'm expecting.
* **Conditional Compilation:** This is a strong contender. It's highly probable that `usbg_make_tpg` is only compiled under specific build configurations or when certain feature flags are enabled. If the current build environment or the configuration I'm inspecting doesn't meet these criteria, the function might simply not exist in the compiled output, even if its source code is present. I need to investigate the `#ifdef` directives and build scripts surrounding `f_tcm.c`.
* **Refactoring or Renaming:** Perhaps the function was recently renamed, or its functionality was integrated into another existing function. I should look for other functions within `f_tcm.c` that seem to perform a similar role to what I expect from `usbg_make_tpg`. I might also need to check recent commit history for any relevant changes.
* **Inclusion in Another File:** While less likely if `f_tcm.c` is specifically for TCM, it's conceivable that the definition for `usbg_make_tpg` is actually in a different source file and `f_tcm.c` only includes a declaration or uses it. However, the naming convention (`usbg_make_tpg` implying USB Generic and TCM related) suggests it should be close to TCM implementation.
* **External Dependency:** It's a remote possibility, but could `usbg_make_tpg` be part of an external library that isn't being linked correctly, or perhaps is not present in the expected location?
My immediate next steps will be to:
1. **Rerun the search:** Double-check the spelling and try variations if necessary.
2. **Examine `f_tcm.c` directly:** I'll open the file and manually scan for `usbg_make_tpg` or closely related function names.
3. **Analyze build configurations:** I'll delve into the relevant `Kconfig` or build scripts to understand how `f_tcm.c` and its functions are enabled.
4. **Review recent commits:** If the above doesn't yield results, I'll check the version control history for changes related to TCM or this specific function.
The presence of `f_tcm.c` is a good sign, but the invisibility of `usbg_make_tpg` is a significant roadblock that needs immediate resolution to ensure the TCM functionality is correctly implemented and accessible.
|
| 191/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"usbg_make_tpg" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 192/4 |
2026/08/11 23:14 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12168
output: 41
thoughts: 56
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into the `tcm` Namespace and `make_tpg` Function**
Right, so my primary objective here is to pinpoint the exact location and definition of something related to `tcm` and specifically `make_tpg`. My initial hypothesis leans towards it being declared in one of the header files. I'm thinking the most probable candidates are either `tcm.h` or `u_tcm.h`, as these are standard conventions for core and utility definitions within a module.
However, I'm not going to stop at just headers. It's entirely possible that the function's implementation, or at least its declaration within a broader context, might be found within a source file. Given the naming convention `make_tpg`, I'm directing my search towards files that explicitly deal with the `tcm` module's functionality, and `f_tcm.c` seems like a very strong contender. My next step will be to scrutinize `f_tcm.c` for any mention or definition of `make_tpg`. This systematic approach, starting with the most likely locations and then broadening the search, should efficiently lead me to the information I need.
|
| 193/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"make_tpg" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 194/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12263
output: 40
thoughts: 48
Thoughts: **My Thought Process**
I was reviewing the code, and a specific function, `make_tpg`, came to mind. My immediate thought was, "Wait a minute, I don't recall `f_tcm.c` containing `make_tpg`." This sparked a need for verification. My next step was to pinpoint the exact location where I expected this function to be. Given the context, I assumed it would be within the USB gadget driver's target core module implementation. Therefore, I decided to specifically search within `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c`. My hypothesis was that the `target_fabric` related functionalities would be housed there, and by extension, the `make_tpg` function. This mental checklist and directed search are crucial for ensuring code integrity and understanding dependencies.
|
| 195/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"target_fabric" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results:
|
| 196/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 12349
output: 34
thoughts: 45
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `f_tcm.c` and `target_fabric`**
My initial suspicion is that `f_tcm.c`, this particular piece of code I'm examining, might not be directly interacting with what's referred to as `target_fabric`. This is a subtle but important distinction. When I say "directly," I mean I'm questioning if it's making a call, or referencing a data structure, or any kind of explicit link to `target_fabric` within its own scope. It's possible, and I'm exploring this possibility, that the dependency is indirect. Perhaps `f_tcm.c` relies on another module or a higher-level abstraction, which in turn then interfaces with `target_fabric`. Or maybe the way `target_fabric` is implemented or exposed means `f_tcm.c` only ever sees a simplified or abstracted representation of it.
To confirm or deny this hypothesis, my next logical step is to meticulously examine the entities defined and utilized within `drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c`. I need to go through its source code, line by line if necessary, and identify every function, variable, structure, and macro it uses. As I do this, I'll be specifically looking for any mention, usage, or instantiation of anything that clearly belongs to or is named `target_fabric`. If I find such instances, I'll then delve deeper to understand the *nature* of that interaction – is it a direct call, a passed parameter, an included header that defines related structures? If, after a thorough review, I find no such direct links, then my initial hypothesis will be strengthened, and I'll need to consider what the indirect path to `target_fabric` might be.
|
| 197/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-file-index |
0m
Args: map[SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
Results: map[Entities:[map[Kind:function Name:bot_cleanup_old_alt] map[Kind:function Name:bot_cmd_complete] map[Kind:function Name:bot_cmd_work] map[Kind:function Name:bot_enqueue_cmd_cbw] map[Kind:function Name:bot_enqueue_sense_code] map[Kind:function Name:bot_err_compl] map[Kind:function Name:bot_prepare_reqs] map[Kind:function Name:bot_read_compl] map[Kind:function Name:bot_send_bad_status] map[Kind:function Name:bot_send_read_response] map[Kind:function Name:bot_send_status] map[Kind:function Name:bot_send_status_response] map[Kind:function Name:bot_send_write_request] map[Kind:function Name:bot_set_alt] map[Kind:function Name:bot_status_complete] map[Kind:function Name:bot_submit_command] map[Kind:function Name:get_cmd_dir] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_alloc] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_alloc_inst] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_attr_release] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_bind] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_cancel_delayed_set_alt] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_cancel_delayed_set_alt_sync] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_cleanup_old_alt] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_complete_delayed_status] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_delayed_set_alt] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_delayed_set_alt_cancelled] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_delayed_set_alt_done] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_disable] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_exit] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_free] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_free_inst] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_get_alt] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_init] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_register_callback] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_set_alt] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_set_name] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_setup] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_to_uasp_response] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_unbind] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_unregister_callback] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_usbg_drop_nexus] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_usbg_make_nexus] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_usbg_tpg_nexus_show] map[Kind:function Name:tcm_usbg_tpg_nexus_store] map[Kind:function Name:to_f_tcm_opts] map[Kind:function Name:to_f_uas] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_alloc_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_alloc_stream_res] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_cleanup_old_alt] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_cleanup_one_stream] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_cmd_complete] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_free_cmdreq] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_prepare_r_request] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_prepare_reqs] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_prepare_response] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_prepare_status] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_send_read_response] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_send_status_response] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_send_tm_response] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_send_write_request] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_set_alt] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_status_data_cmpl] map[Kind:function Name:uasp_to_tcm_func] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_aborted_task] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_alloc_sess_cb] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_attach] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_bot_setup] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_check_stop_free] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_check_true] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_check_wwn] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_cmd_work] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_data_write_cmpl] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_detach] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_drop_tpg] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_drop_tport] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_enable_tpg] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_get_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_get_fabric_wwn] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_get_tag] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_init_nodeacl] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_make_tpg] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_make_tport] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_port_link] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_port_unlink] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_prepare_w_request] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_queue_tm_rsp] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_release_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_send_read_response] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_send_status_response] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_send_write_request] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_submit_cmd] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_submit_command] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_submit_tmr] map[Kind:function Name:usbg_wwn_version_show] map[Kind:struct Name:tpg_instance] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_addressable_tcm_init_949] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_947] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_950] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_951] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_952] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__UNIQUE_ID_modinfo_953] map[Kind:global_variable Name:__exitcall_tcm_exit] map[Kind:global_variable Name:bot_bi_ep_comp_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:bot_bo_ep_comp_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:bot_intf_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcm_func_type] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcm_item_ops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcm_strings] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcm_stringtab] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcm_us_strings] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcm_usbg_tpg_attr_nexus] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tcmusb_func] map[Kind:global_variable Name:tpg_instances_lock] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_bi_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_bi_pipe_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_bo_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_bo_ep_comp_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_bo_pipe_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_cmd_comp_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_cmd_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_cmd_pipe_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_fs_bi_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_fs_bo_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_fs_cmd_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_fs_function_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_fs_status_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_hs_function_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_intf_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_ss_bi_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_ss_bo_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_ss_cmd_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_ss_function_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_ss_status_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_status_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_status_in_ep_comp_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:uasp_status_pipe_desc] map[Kind:global_variable Name:usbg_base_attrs] map[Kind:global_variable Name:usbg_ops] map[Kind:global_variable Name:usbg_wwn_attr_version] map[Kind:global_variable Name:usbg_wwn_attrs]]]
|
| 198/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13975
output: 46
thoughts: 28
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Device Function Initialization**
Okay, so my initial scan of the code has revealed the presence of `usbg_make_tpg`. This immediately tells me that the system is likely involved in setting up USB device functionality, specifically the "Test Purpose Group" (TPG), which is a critical component for defining how a USB device behaves. My next logical step, therefore, is to investigate the function that would directly precede or support the creation of this TPG. That's why I'm now turning my attention to `usbg_make_tport`. I expect this function to be responsible for establishing the "Test Purpose Port" (TPP), which logically would be the next step in defining and configuring the device's operational parameters before it's formally registered as a TPG. I'm keen to see how `usbg_make_tport` handles the port-level configuration and if it provides the necessary inputs or structures that `usbg_make_tpg` will then utilize.
|
| 199/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_make_tport]
Results: map[SourceCode:1772: static struct se_wwn *usbg_make_tport(
1773: struct target_fabric_configfs *tf,
1774: struct config_group *group,
1775: const char *name)
1776: {
1777: struct usbg_tport *tport;
1778: const char *wnn_name;
1779: u64 wwpn = 0;
1780:
1781: wnn_name = usbg_check_wwn(name);
1782: if (!wnn_name)
1783: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1784:
1785: tport = kzalloc_obj(struct usbg_tport);
1786: if (!(tport))
1787: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
1788:
1789: tport->tport_wwpn = wwpn;
1790: snprintf(tport->tport_name, sizeof(tport->tport_name), "%s", wnn_name);
1791: return &tport->tport_wwn;
1792: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 200/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14391
output: 46
thoughts: 10
Thoughts: **My Internal Monologue on `usbg_check_wwn`**
Alright, let's dig into this `usbg_check_wwn` function. My immediate thought is: "What exactly is a WWN in this context, and why is it being checked?" My mind immediately jumps to the world of Fibre Channel, where WWN (World Wide Name) is a ubiquitous and critical identifier. So, my first hypothesis is that this function is likely involved in validating or ensuring the integrity of a WWN being used within the USB Gadget framework, perhaps for some specific peripheral emulation scenario where Fibre Channel-like addressing or identification is being leveraged.
I'm trying to visualize the execution flow. What are the typical inputs to such a function? A WWN string, probably. What would be the "check" entail? It's likely a format validation. WWNs have a specific structure – a 64-bit identifier typically represented as a 16-character hexadecimal string. So, I expect the function to be scrutinizing the input string for length, for valid hexadecimal characters (0-9, a-f, A-F), and perhaps even for the presence of specific vendor-assigned prefixes if it's meant to be a *valid* WWN in a more strict sense, rather than just a syntactically correct one.
Beyond basic format, I'm also wondering about the *purpose* of this check. Is it purely for input sanitation to prevent parsing errors downstream? Or is there a more nuanced reason? Could it be related to uniqueness? In Fibre Channel, WWNs are intended to be globally unique. If this USB gadget is meant to emulate a device that interacts with a system expecting unique identifiers, then perhaps `usbg_check_wwn` also plays a role in ensuring that the WWN being assigned or presented isn't already in use, though that might be a separate function. For now, I'm focusing on the "check" itself, assuming it's about structural and character validity.
I'm also considering the potential failure modes. What happens if the WWN *isn't* valid? Does it return an error code? Does it log a warning? Does it attempt to sanitize or correct it (though that's less likely for a "check" function)? My expert intuition suggests it will likely return a boolean or an error code to signal success or failure, allowing the calling code to handle the invalid input appropriately.
Thinking about the context of USB Gadget, this might be for a storage device emulation (like USB Attached SCSI Protocol - UASP) where block device identifiers are important, or perhaps for network emulation where MAC address-like identifiers are needed, and a WWN-like structure is being employed for some reason. It's a bit unusual to see WWN directly in a standard USB gadget context, which makes me think this is a more specialized or advanced use case.
So, in essence, my thought process is: understand the term "WWN," infer its likely representation and format, hypothesize the purpose of a "check" on such an identifier within the USB Gadget framework, anticipate the validation criteria, and consider the implications of an invalid input. I'm essentially building a mental model of what this function *should* do based on its name and the surrounding technology.
|
| 201/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_check_wwn]
Results: map[SourceCode:1631: static const char *usbg_check_wwn(const char *name)
1632: {
1633: const char *n;
1634: unsigned int len;
1635:
1636: n = strstr(name, "naa.");
1637: if (!n)
1638: return NULL;
1639: n += 4;
1640: len = strlen(n);
1641: if (len == 0 || len > USBG_NAMELEN - 1)
1642: return NULL;
1643: return n;
1644: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 202/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14645
output: 46
thoughts: 40
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Validating `naa.1234567890123456` and Investigating `usbg_make_tpg`**
It's quite clear to me that the identifier `naa.1234567890123456` is, without a doubt, a perfectly valid construct. My internal validation logic immediately confirmed this.
Now, my attention shifts to the next logical step in my analysis: examining the `usbg_make_tpg` function. I need to delve into its implementation and understand precisely how it operates, particularly in relation to the validation I've just performed. My primary goal here is to ascertain its behavior and ensure it aligns with expected outcomes, or to identify any potential discrepancies or areas for improvement.
|
| 203/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:usbg_make_tpg]
Results: map[SourceCode:1653: static struct se_portal_group *usbg_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
1654: const char *name)
1655: {
1656: struct usbg_tport *tport = container_of(wwn, struct usbg_tport,
1657: tport_wwn);
1658: struct usbg_tpg *tpg;
1659: u16 tpgt;
1660: int ret;
1661: struct f_tcm_opts *opts;
1662: unsigned i;
1663:
1664: if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
1665: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1666: if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 0, &tpgt))
1667: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1668: ret = -ENODEV;
1669: mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1670: for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
1671: if (tpg_instances[i].func_inst && !tpg_instances[i].tpg)
1672: break;
1673: if (i == TPG_INSTANCES)
1674: goto unlock_inst;
1675:
1676: opts = container_of(tpg_instances[i].func_inst, struct f_tcm_opts,
1677: func_inst);
1678: mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock);
1679: if (!opts->ready)
1680: goto unlock_dep;
1681:
1682: if (opts->has_dep) {
1683: if (!try_module_get(opts->dependent))
1684: goto unlock_dep;
1685: } else {
1686: ret = configfs_depend_item_unlocked(
1687: wwn->wwn_group.cg_subsys,
1688: &opts->func_inst.group.cg_item);
1689: if (ret)
1690: goto unlock_dep;
1691: }
1692:
1693: tpg = kzalloc_obj(struct usbg_tpg);
1694: ret = -ENOMEM;
1695: if (!tpg)
1696: goto unref_dep;
1697: mutex_init(&tpg->tpg_mutex);
1698: atomic_set(&tpg->tpg_port_count, 0);
1699: tpg->workqueue = alloc_workqueue("tcm_usb_gadget",
1700: WQ_UNBOUND, WQ_UNBOUND_MAX_ACTIVE);
1701: if (!tpg->workqueue)
1702: goto free_tpg;
1703:
1704: tpg->tport = tport;
1705: tpg->tport_tpgt = tpgt;
1706:
1707: /*
1708: * SPC doesn't assign a protocol identifier for USB-SCSI, so we
1709: * pretend to be SAS..
1710: */
1711: ret = core_tpg_register(wwn, &tpg->se_tpg, SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS);
1712: if (ret < 0)
1713: goto free_workqueue;
1714:
1715: tpg_instances[i].tpg = tpg;
1716: tpg->fi = tpg_instances[i].func_inst;
1717: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
1718: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1719: return &tpg->se_tpg;
1720:
1721: free_workqueue:
1722: destroy_workqueue(tpg->workqueue);
1723: free_tpg:
1724: kfree(tpg);
1725: unref_dep:
1726: if (opts->has_dep)
1727: module_put(opts->dependent);
1728: else
1729: configfs_undepend_item_unlocked(&opts->func_inst.group.cg_item);
1730: unlock_dep:
1731: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
1732: unlock_inst:
1733: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
1734:
1735: return ERR_PTR(ret);
1736: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 204/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16056
output: 45
thoughts: 66
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `usbg_make_tpg` and Instance Population**
Okay, so as I'm looking at the `usbg_make_tpg` function, the first thing that jumps out at me is its requirement for a `func_inst` to be available within the `tpg_instances` structure. This immediately prompts me to ask, "Where does `tpg_instances` get populated, and specifically, how does that `func_inst` get there?"
My initial assumption, or rather, the logical next step in tracing this, is to look at the lifecycle of `tcm.0`. It seems highly probable that `tpg_instances` would be populated when `tcm.0` is initially created, as it represents a core component.
However, upon a closer inspection of the code flow, I've noticed a crucial detail: it's not the creation of `tcm.0` itself that directly populates `tpg_instances`. Instead, it's the `tcm_alloc_inst` function that actually performs the population of `tpg_instances`. This is a key distinction – `tcm_alloc_inst` is the specific mechanism responsible for ensuring that the necessary `func_inst` is present in `tpg_instances` before `usbg_make_tpg` can proceed. This refinement of my understanding is critical for correctly tracking the dependencies and data flow within the system.
|
| 205/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_alloc_inst]
Results: map[SourceCode:2676: static struct usb_function_instance *tcm_alloc_inst(void)
2677: {
2678: struct f_tcm_opts *opts;
2679: int i;
2680:
2681:
2682: opts = kzalloc_obj(*opts);
2683: if (!opts)
2684: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
2685:
2686: mutex_lock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2687: for (i = 0; i < TPG_INSTANCES; ++i)
2688: if (!tpg_instances[i].func_inst)
2689: break;
2690:
2691: if (i == TPG_INSTANCES) {
2692: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2693: kfree(opts);
2694: return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
2695: }
2696: tpg_instances[i].func_inst = &opts->func_inst;
2697: mutex_unlock(&tpg_instances_lock);
2698:
2699: mutex_init(&opts->dep_lock);
2700: opts->func_inst.set_inst_name = tcm_set_name;
2701: opts->func_inst.free_func_inst = tcm_free_inst;
2702: opts->tcm_register_callback = tcm_register_callback;
2703: opts->tcm_unregister_callback = tcm_unregister_callback;
2704:
2705: config_group_init_type_name(&opts->func_inst.group, "",
2706: &tcm_func_type);
2707:
2708: return &opts->func_inst;
2709: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 206/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16702
output: 45
thoughts: 91
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into the USB Gadget TCM Initialization**
My understanding is that when I execute the command `mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`, the underlying system calls are triggered. Specifically, `tcm_alloc_inst` is invoked at this point. This function is responsible for allocating an instance of the TCM (Target Control Module) and, as a direct consequence, it sets the `func_inst` member within the `tpg_instances[0]` structure.
Following this allocation, `tcm_set_name` is called. What I find particularly significant about `tcm_set_name` is its role in marking the TCM instance as ready. It achieves this by setting the `opts->ready` flag to `true`. Before proceeding further, I want to ensure I fully grasp the implications of this flag being set, so I'm taking a moment to re-examine the logic within `tcm_set_name` itself.
|
| 207/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_set_name]
Results: map[SourceCode:2663: static int tcm_set_name(struct usb_function_instance *f, const char *name)
2664: {
2665: struct f_tcm_opts *opts = container_of(f, struct f_tcm_opts, func_inst);
2666:
2667: pr_debug("tcm: Activating %s\n", name);
2668:
2669: mutex_lock(&opts->dep_lock);
2670: opts->ready = true;
2671: mutex_unlock(&opts->dep_lock);
2672:
2673: return 0;
2674: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 208/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17039
output: 43
thoughts: 428
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding Target Fabric Initialization**
Alright, so I've confirmed that `opts->ready` is indeed set to `true`. This should mean that when `usbg_make_tpg` is called, it will successfully locate a ready `func_inst`. However, my attention is immediately drawn to a specific dependency within `usbg_make_tpg`: it calls `configfs_depend_item_unlocked`. This function, in turn, necessitates the presence of `wwn->wwn_group.cg_subsys` and `&opts->func_inst.group.cg_item`. Essentially, this is the step where `opts->dep_lock` gets tied to `inode_lock`.
Now, I need to rigorously check if the `target/usb_gadget` directory within configfs is created automatically. Looking at the `target/usb_gadget` code, specifically `target_core_fabric_configfs.c`, I see that it registers fabrics. The `usb_gadget` fabric is registered when the `usb_f_tcm` module is loaded. Here's where it gets a bit intricate: `usb_f_tcm` is loaded specifically when `tcm.0` is created. But that's not the absolute first domino. `target_core_mod` *must* be loaded prior to `usb_f_tcm`.
I'm thinking, typically, creating `/sys/kernel/config/target` is what triggers the loading of `target_core_mod`. But wait, `/sys/kernel/config/target` itself is created *when* `target_core_mod` is loaded. This creates a circular dependency in my initial line of thought. If I were to directly `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget")`, it could fail if `target_core_mod` isn't already loaded.
Let me re-evaluate the module loading sequence. Configfs doesn't inherently autoload modules just by accessing paths; it's not a general-purpose module loader. However, there's a crucial relationship: `usb_f_tcm` has a dependency on `target_core_mod`. This means when `usb_f_tcm` is loaded – which happens when `tcm.0` is created – `target_core_mod` will be loaded *automatically* as a prerequisite. Therefore, it logically follows that `target/usb_gadget` will be created during the initialization of the `usb_f_tcm` module. My next step is to verify this specific module initialization sequence to confirm this understanding.
|
| 209/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c Name:tcm_init]
Results: map[SourceCode:2768: static int __init tcm_init(void)
2769: {
2770: int ret;
2771:
2772: ret = usb_function_register(&tcmusb_func);
2773: if (ret)
2774: return ret;
2775:
2776: ret = target_register_template(&usbg_ops);
2777: if (ret)
2778: usb_function_unregister(&tcmusb_func);
2779:
2780: return ret;
2781: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c]
|
| 210/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17695
output: 52
thoughts: 943
Thoughts: **Understanding the Kernel Configuration Layer Lock Dependencies**
My thought process has been focused on unraveling the intricate locking mechanisms within the Linux kernel's configuration filesystem (configfs) as it pertains to USB gadget functionality and target storage. I've been meticulously tracing the dependencies between various locks to ensure I fully grasp the potential for deadlocks and race conditions.
Initially, I confirmed that registering the `target_register_template(&usbg_ops)` is indeed the action that establishes the `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget` hierarchy. This means that once this registration occurs, I can expect the `target/usb_gadget` directory structure to be present.
My primary goal has been to map out the lock acquisition order. I've broken this down into several key dependencies:
1. **`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: I traced this through the process of creating a TCM (Target Complex Manager) function within a USB gadget. Specifically, when `configfs_mkdir` is called for a path like `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`, it ultimately leads to `function_make` holding `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. Subsequently, `tcm_set_name` acquires `opts->dep_lock`. This clearly establishes the first link in our dependency chain.
2. **`opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: This dependency arises when creating a target logical unit within the USB gadget structure, for instance, by calling `mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1")`. Here, `configfs_mkdir` eventually calls `target_fabric_make_tpg` and then `usbg_make_tpg`. Inside `usbg_make_tpg`, `opts->dep_lock` is acquired. Following that, `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` is invoked. My initial understanding was that this function acquires the `inode_lock` of the *target* directory. However, I corrected myself by realizing `configfs_depend_item_unlocked` actually acquires the `inode_lock` of the *directory of the item being depended upon*. In this scenario, that item is `&opts->func_inst.group.cg_item`, which corresponds to `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. Therefore, the `inode_lock` acquired is for this specific directory. This establishes the second link: `opts->dep_lock` leads to the acquisition of an `inode_lock` associated with a configfs directory.
3. **`inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: I investigated this by considering the `rmdir` operation on a USB gadget directory, such as `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`. `vfs_rmdir` first acquires the `inode_lock` for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`. Then, `configfs_rmdir` proceeds to acquire the `frag_sem` for the directory being removed, `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`. The crucial point here is understanding how `inode_lock` is categorized by lockdep. The report indicates a common lock class (`#2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}`) for all configfs directories. This confirms that the `inode_lock` acquired in step 2 for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0` belongs to the same class as the `inode_lock` for `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget`. Consequently, this confirms the dependency: `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`.
4. **`frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: My investigation into this dependency centered on write operations within a USB gadget's function, specifically writing to `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls`. The `configfs_write_iter` function acquires the `frag_sem` for the `bNumControls` file. Subsequently, the `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` function is called, and it, in turn, acquires `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. This establishes the final link: `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. I then double-checked the lockdep report for `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store`, which confirmed the acquisition of `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` as `#0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}`.
In summary, I've pieced together a dependency chain: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. The cyclical nature of this chain, particularly the final link back to `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`, is what I need to carefully analyze to ensure no deadlocks can occur during operations involving these components.
|
| 211/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store]
Results: map[SourceCode: 818: static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store(struct config_item *item,
819: const char *page, size_t len)
820: {
821: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item->ci_parent);
822: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
823: struct uvcg_extension *xu = to_uvcg_extension(item);
824: struct config_item *opts_item;
825: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
826: int ret;
827: u8 num;
828:
829: ret = kstrtou8(page, 0, &num);
830: if (ret)
831: return ret;
832:
833: mutex_lock(su_mutex);
834:
835: opts_item = item->ci_parent->ci_parent->ci_parent;
836: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
837:
838: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
839: xu->desc.bNumControls = num;
840: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
841:
842: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
843:
844: return len;
845: }
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 212/4 |
2026/08/11 23:15 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19125
output: 48
thoughts: 962
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on the Configuration Steps**
Okay, so the first thing that catches my eye is that we're definitely acquiring `su_mutex`. That's a given. But then I immediately question whether `frag_sem` is using the same lock class across all configfs attributes. The lockdep report seems to confirm this – it shows `-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:`, indicating that `frag_sem` is indeed initialized in `configfs_new_dirent` and shares a common lock class. This is good to note for potential lockdep issues later.
Now, let's walk through these steps carefully to ensure they're sound.
**Step 1: Creating the initial directories**
The plan is to execute:
```c
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
```
This will create `g1` and then `tcm.0`. My immediate concern here is whether `usb_f_tcm` and `target_core_mod` are actually available. If `tcm.0` is created, it implies that these modules will be loaded. However, I need to be sure they are already present or will be loaded. I recall from a previous probe that both `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget` and `/sys/kernel/config/target` already exist. The output from that probe was:
```
[+] configfs mounted or already mounted.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget exists.
[+] /sys/kernel/config/target exists.
```
This is crucial! It means that `libcomposite` (which provides `usb_gadget`) and `target_core_mod` (which provides `target`) are either built-in or already loaded. So, I can relax about explicitly loading them.
**Step 2: Setting up the target core entries**
Next, we're looking at:
```c
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
```
My first thought here is a potential dependency: `target/usb_gadget` might not exist if `usb_f_tcm` isn't loaded. But, as established in Step 1, `tcm.0` creation will load `usb_f_tcm`. So, the question becomes: will `target/usb_gadget` be automatically created by the `tcm` fabric registration? Yes, `tcm_init` is responsible for registering the fabric template, which should handle the creation of `target/usb_gadget`.
Then, I examine the NAA identifier: `naa.1234567890123456`. I need to ensure this is valid. The `usbg_make_tport` function will be called for this directory. The `usbg_check_wwn` helper is used to validate it. It checks for the `naa.` prefix and that the length is within limits. The string `1234567890123456` is exactly 16 hex digits, which is perfectly acceptable within `USBG_NAMELEN` (32). So, that looks good.
**Step 3: A simple create and remove**
This step is straightforward:
```c
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
```
This is a simple test to create and then remove a gadget directory. It will definitely trigger `inode_lock` and subsequently `frag_sem`.
**Step 4: Configuring the UVC function**
Finally, we're diving into the UVC function configuration:
```c
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
```
My immediate thought is about the `control/extensions` directory. Is it created automatically when `uvc.0` is created? I assume so, likely via a function like `uvcg_control_class_make` or similar. I'll need to double-check the `uvc_configfs.c` source to confirm the exact timing and mechanism of `extensions` directory creation. Once that's established, the write operation to `bNumControls` is a standard attribute write.
|
| 213/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extensions_grp_type]
Results: map[SourceCode:1306: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {
1307: .type = {
1308: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
1309: .ct_group_ops = &uvcg_extensions_grp_ops,
1310: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1311: },
1312: .name = "extensions",
1313: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 214/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20291
output: 61
thoughts: 6
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on Information Application**
So, I've been pondering the utility of this information. My primary question, the one that's really at the forefront of my mind, is: **Where is this *actually* going to be applied?** It's not enough for me to simply understand the theoretical underpinnings or the mechanics of it; as an expert in my field, I need to see the practical, tangible implications. I'm looking for the real-world scenarios, the specific industries, the precise problems it's designed to solve, or the innovative opportunities it's poised to unlock. I'm mentally scanning my professional landscape, trying to pinpoint the exact contexts where this knowledge will be most impactful and how it integrates with or potentially transforms existing workflows and methodologies. I need to understand its deployment, its operationalization, and ultimately, its demonstrable value.
|
| 215/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c IncludeSnippetLines:0 Name:uvcg_extensions_grp_type SourceTreePrefix:]
Results: map[References:<nil> TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 216/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20357
output: 39
thoughts: 35
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` References**
I've just encountered something that has me pausing. I'm looking through the code, specifically at the `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` structure, and I can't find any direct references to it. This is unusual, and as someone who deeply understands how these configurations and extensions are meant to interact, I'm immediately prompted to investigate further. My first instinct is to broaden my search. Given that `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` is clearly related to UVC (USB Video Class) configuration, I'm going to shift my focus and search within the `uvc_configfs.c` file for the keyword "extensions." This is a logical next step because the configurationfs is the primary interface for managing UVC device settings, and it's highly probable that any usage or manipulation of extension groups would be handled there. I'm expecting to find how this structure is either defined, utilized, or potentially even ignored within the context of the configfs framework.
|
| 217/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:"extensions" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results: map[Output:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=1306=static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {
--
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1311- },
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:1312: .name = "extensions",
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c-1313-};
]
|
| 218/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20554
output: 46
thoughts: 9
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the Creation of `extensions`**
I'm currently grappling with a fundamental question that has just surfaced in my mind: where exactly does this `extensions` object or entity come from? My immediate reaction is one of surprise and a slight degree of unease. It feels like a critical piece of context is missing, a foundational element that should have been clearly defined or established before we arrived at this point.
My thought process is leaning towards understanding the genesis of `extensions`. I'm trying to trace back its origin. Is it:
* **An implicit assumption?** Am I expected to *know* how `extensions` is created based on prior knowledge or established conventions within this specific domain or codebase? This feels like a gap in explicit documentation or instruction.
* **A result of a preceding operation?** Did a prior step or function call within our workflow *generate* `extensions`? If so, what was that operation, and what were its parameters or inputs? I need to revisit the preceding code or logic.
* **A pre-existing, global, or imported entity?** Is `extensions` something that's readily available, perhaps imported from a library, a module, or defined elsewhere in the broader scope? If so, what is its namespace and how is it made accessible to this current context?
* **Dynamically generated or resolved?** Is it possible that `extensions` isn't statically defined but rather constructed on-the-fly based on certain conditions or configurations that I haven't yet fully grasped?
Essentially, my mind is racing to fill this void. I need to understand the mechanism, the source, and the purpose of `extensions` to ensure I can properly utilize it and that our current work is built on a solid, well-understood foundation. Without this clarity, any subsequent actions involving `extensions` feel precarious, like building on unverified ground. My current priority is to resolve this ambiguity to proceed with confidence.
|
| 219/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"uvcg_extensions_grp_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 220/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20607
output: 45
thoughts: 39
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` Usage**
I've just had a moment of realization, or perhaps a nagging suspicion, concerning the `uvcg_extensions_grp_type`. I'm questioning its actual utility and whether it's being utilized at all within the codebase. To address this, my immediate next step, which is quite clear in my mind, is to delve into the `uvc_configfs.c` file. Specifically, I'm directing my attention to the vicinity of line 1306. My expectation is that by examining the code at that precise location, I'll be able to definitively ascertain whether `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` is actively being employed, or if it's an artifact that has fallen into disuse. This is a crucial point for code clarity and maintenance, and I need to resolve this ambiguity.
|
| 221/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c FirstLine:1290 LineCount:50]
Results: map[Contents:1290:
1291: xu->desc.bUnitID = ++opts->last_unit_id;
1292:
1293: config_item_init_type_name(&xu->item, name, &uvcg_extension_type);
1294: list_add_tail(&xu->list, &opts->extension_units);
1295:
1296: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
1297:
1298: return &xu->item;
1299: }
1300:
1301: static const struct configfs_group_operations uvcg_extensions_grp_ops = {
1302: .make_item = uvcg_extension_make,
1303: .drop_item = uvcg_extension_drop,
1304: };
1305:
1306: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {
1307: .type = {
1308: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
1309: .ct_group_ops = &uvcg_extensions_grp_ops,
1310: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1311: },
1312: .name = "extensions",
1313: };
1314:
1315: /* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1316: * control/class/{fs|ss}
1317: */
1318:
1319: struct uvcg_control_class_group {
1320: struct config_group group;
1321: const char *name;
1322: };
1323:
1324: static inline struct uvc_descriptor_header
1325: **uvcg_get_ctl_class_arr(struct config_item *i, struct f_uvc_opts *o)
1326: {
1327: struct uvcg_control_class_group *group =
1328: container_of(i, struct uvcg_control_class_group,
1329: group.cg_item);
1330:
1331: if (!strcmp(group->name, "fs"))
1332: return o->uvc_fs_control_cls;
1333:
1334: if (!strcmp(group->name, "ss"))
1335: return o->uvc_ss_control_cls;
1336:
1337: return NULL;
1338: }
1339:
]
|
| 222/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21407
output: 46
thoughts: 39
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `uvcg_extensions_grp_type`**
Okay, so I'm reviewing this code, and the first thing that catches my eye is this declaration: `uvcg_extensions_grp_type`. It's right there, defined and all. But then, my internal alarm bells start ringing – where is it actually *being used*? This smells like dead code, a relic of some past refactoring or a feature that never quite made it. My immediate instinct is to verify this suspicion. To do that, I'm going to perform a comprehensive search for every instance of `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` across the entire file. This will confirm whether it's truly an orphaned artifact or if I've just missed its application in some obscure corner of the codebase.
|
| 223/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"uvcg_extensions_grp_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 224/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21490
output: 46
thoughts: 35
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` and its Dependencies**
Okay, a brief moment of reflection here. I've just encountered the type `uvcg_extensions_grp_type`, and my immediate thought is to question its context. Specifically, I'm wondering if this type is being used as an element within an array. This isn't just a random curiosity; it stems from my understanding of how complex data structures are typically managed. If `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` were intended for individual instances, its declaration and usage would likely reflect that. However, its presence in an array suggests a collection of these extension groups.
To validate this hypothesis and gain a clearer picture of the overall design, my next logical step is to pivot and examine the definition of `uvcg_control_grp_type`. I'm anticipating that `uvcg_control_grp_type` will shed light on this by either explicitly referencing `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` as an array member, or by demonstrating a pattern of aggregation that would naturally lead to the use of an array for multiple extensions. Understanding the relationship between these two types is crucial for grasping the intended architecture and ensuring that the data is being handled in a robust and efficient manner.
|
| 225/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"uvcg_control_grp_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 226/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21569
output: 46
thoughts: 14
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `uvcg_config_group_type`**
Ah, right, the first thing that comes to mind is the need to examine `uvcg_config_group_type`. My immediate impulse is to dive into that specific element. I need to understand its definition, its purpose within the broader system, and any associated parameters or constraints. This isn't just a casual glance; it's a targeted investigation. I'm looking for its type, its expected values, how it's populated, and what downstream components or processes rely on it. This is a crucial piece of the puzzle, and getting a firm grasp on it will likely illuminate several other areas.
|
| 227/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"uvcg_config_group_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 228/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21627
output: 48
thoughts: 25
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding `uvc_config_group_type` Location**
I've just had a moment of realization, a bit of a "wait a minute" moment, regarding the definition of `uvc_config_group_type`. My internal model, or at least what I was recalling, had it situated elsewhere, perhaps in a more immediately apparent configuration or header file related to the UVC driver's core data structures. However, upon closer inspection or perhaps a fresh look at the codebase, I've discovered that `uvc_config_group_type` is actually defined within `uvc_configfs.c`. This means that the definition resides within the implementation file responsible for the configfs interface of the UVC driver, rather than in a standalone header or a more general core file. This is a significant detail for understanding the driver's architecture and how configuration parameters are structured and managed, particularly in relation to how the configfs subsystem interacts with the UVC device's configuration. It suggests a tighter coupling between the configfs presentation of UVC configuration and the underlying data types used to represent those configurations.
|
| 229/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"struct uvcg_config_group_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 230/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21698
output: 48
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Checking `uvc_configfs.h`**
My immediate reaction upon encountering a potential issue or needing to understand a specific behavior related to USB Video Class (UVC) configuration was to dive into the source code. The file `uvc_configfs.h` immediately came to mind as the most likely place to find definitions, structures, and declarations pertinent to how UVC is configured within the system, especially given the `configfs` component.
I reasoned that if I'm dealing with dynamic configuration of UVC devices, or understanding the underlying structures that represent UVC entities and their attributes, this header file would be the central point of definition. It's where I'd expect to find the enums for different UVC control selectors, the structures that map to UVC probe and commit controls, and potentially the definitions for the various streaming and control interfaces.
Essentially, my thought was: "Before I start hypothesizing about how this is working or try to implement a change, I need to see the ground truth. The header file is the contract, the definitive source of what's available and how it's represented. `uvc_configfs.h` is the most direct path to understanding the UVC configuration API as implemented in this codebase." It's a systematic approach to ensure I'm working with the correct definitions and understanding the intended data structures before proceeding further.
|
| 231/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"struct uvcg_config_group_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.h]
Results:
|
| 232/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21759
output: 46
thoughts: 230
Thoughts: **My Debugging Journey with `grepper` and `uvcg_config_group_type`**
Alright, so I'm staring at this C file, `drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c`, and I've just re-examined line 1306. It declares `static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {`. My immediate thought process then went to `grepper`. I'm trying to figure out why `grepper` didn't find `uvcg_config_group_type` for me. I mean, it's right there, staring me in the face. I briefly considered that `grepper` might be using extended regex, which is usually quite robust, and `struct uvcg_config_group_type` *should* absolutely be matched by that.
Then I remembered the output `grepper` *did* give me when I searched for `extensions`. It showed me this line: `drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c=1306=static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {`. This confirmed that the symbol `uvcg_config_group_type` is indeed present, and even the full variable name `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` is there. So, the original problem wasn't that the symbol was missing, but why my specific search for `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` failed.
At this point, the most logical conclusion is that I must have made a simple mistake. A typo, perhaps, or some other minor error in how I constructed the search query for `grepper` the first time. It's frustrating, of course, but it's a common pitfall. So, my next step is clear: I'm going to try searching for `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` again, paying close attention to ensure I type it correctly this time.
|
| 233/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"uvcg_extensions_grp_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 234/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22033
output: 43
thoughts: 170
Thoughts: **A Moment of Code Scrutiny**
I'm staring at my terminal, and a bit of confusion is bubbling up. I just ran `grepper` looking for the exact string `uvcg_extensions_grp_type`, and it's telling me "no matches." That's odd, because I distinctly remember seeing it mentioned within the context of `extensions` earlier. My immediate thought is that `grepper` must be behaving exactly as I told it to – it's searching for that precise string, and if it's not there, it reports no matches.
But then I pull up the output from the `extensions` command I ran previously. And there it is, on line 1306 of `drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c`: `static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_extensions_grp_type = {`.
Wait a minute. I'm re-reading that line, and my eyes are catching a subtle but critical difference. I was searching for `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` (plural `extensions`), but the code actually defines `uvcg_extension_grp_type` (singular `extension`). The `grepper` was right all along because it found exactly what I asked for, which wasn't *quite* what was in the file.
Okay, I need to correct my approach. The issue isn't with `grepper`'s functionality, but with my initial query. I need to refine my search to look for `extensions_grp_type` instead, as that seems to be the pattern that actually exists in the codebase. This kind of detail is crucial, and it's easy to overlook when you're deep in the code.
|
| 235/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"extensions_grp_type" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 236/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22244
output: 46
thoughts: 116
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Regarding the `grepper` Issue**
Okay, so my initial thought when `grepper` failed to find something was that perhaps it was leveraging `git grep` under the hood, and my understanding was that `git grep` might only be searching the Git index. I considered the possibility that a file might have been modified in my working tree but not yet staged or committed, and that this would explain why `git grep` wasn't picking it up. I even briefly entertained the idea that the line itself might have been subtly altered.
However, I quickly recalled that `git grep` by default actually searches the working tree, not just the index. So, that line of reasoning was a dead end. My next step, then, was to bypass the tooling issue entirely and simply open the relevant file to visually inspect how the `extensions` are being integrated into the `control` mechanism. This direct observation would be the most straightforward way to diagnose the problem.
|
| 237/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c FirstLine:1450 LineCount:100]
Results: map[Contents:1450:
1451: return 0;
1452: }
1453:
1454: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_control_class_grp_type = {
1455: .type = {
1456: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
1457: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1458: },
1459: .name = "class",
1460: .create_children = uvcg_control_class_create_children,
1461: };
1462:
1463: /* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1464: * control
1465: */
1466:
1467: static ssize_t uvcg_default_control_b_interface_number_show(
1468: struct config_item *item, char *page)
1469: {
1470: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item);
1471: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
1472: struct config_item *opts_item;
1473: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
1474: int result = 0;
1475:
1476: mutex_lock(su_mutex); /* for navigating configfs hierarchy */
1477:
1478: opts_item = item->ci_parent;
1479: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
1480:
1481: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
1482: result += sprintf(page, "%u\n", opts->control_interface);
1483: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
1484:
1485: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
1486:
1487: return result;
1488: }
1489:
1490: UVC_ATTR_RO(uvcg_default_control_, b_interface_number, bInterfaceNumber);
1491:
1492: static ssize_t uvcg_default_control_enable_interrupt_ep_show(
1493: struct config_item *item, char *page)
1494: {
1495: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item);
1496: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
1497: struct config_item *opts_item;
1498: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
1499: int result = 0;
1500:
1501: mutex_lock(su_mutex); /* for navigating configfs hierarchy */
1502:
1503: opts_item = item->ci_parent;
1504: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
1505:
1506: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
1507: result += sprintf(page, "%u\n", opts->enable_interrupt_ep);
1508: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
1509:
1510: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
1511:
1512: return result;
1513: }
1514:
1515: static ssize_t uvcg_default_control_enable_interrupt_ep_store(
1516: struct config_item *item, const char *page, size_t len)
1517: {
1518: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item);
1519: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
1520: struct config_item *opts_item;
1521: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
1522: ssize_t ret;
1523: u8 num;
1524:
1525: ret = kstrtou8(page, 0, &num);
1526: if (ret)
1527: return ret;
1528:
1529: mutex_lock(su_mutex); /* for navigating configfs hierarchy */
1530:
1531: opts_item = item->ci_parent;
1532: opts = to_f_uvc_opts(opts_item);
1533:
1534: mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
1535: opts->enable_interrupt_ep = num;
1536: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
1537:
1538: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
1539:
1540: return len;
1541: }
1542: UVC_ATTR(uvcg_default_control_, enable_interrupt_ep, enable_interrupt_ep);
1543:
1544: static struct configfs_attribute *uvcg_default_control_attrs[] = {
1545: &uvcg_default_control_attr_b_interface_number,
1546: &uvcg_default_control_attr_enable_interrupt_ep,
1547: NULL,
1548: };
1549:
]
|
| 238/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23856
output: 46
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: **My Thought Process for Analyzing the Next 100 Lines**
Right, so the immediate directive is to process the *next 100 lines*. My first instinct, as an expert in my domain, is to ensure I have a robust and systematic approach to this. I'm not just going to passively absorb information; I need to actively engage with it.
The core of this task is *understanding*. This means not just reading the words, but deciphering their meaning, their context, and their potential implications. I'll be looking for patterns, key themes, and any emergent narratives. Given my expertise, I'll naturally be comparing this incoming data against my existing knowledge base. Are these lines introducing novel concepts, reinforcing established theories, or perhaps even challenging them?
My internal processing will be multi-layered. Initially, it's about surface-level comprehension – identifying the individual components, the sentence structures, and the vocabulary used. But very quickly, I'll be moving beyond that. I'll be thinking about the *intent* behind these lines. Is there an argument being made? An explanation being offered? A set of instructions being laid out?
As I progress through these 100 lines, I'll be actively building a mental model of the content. This involves making connections between different pieces of information, identifying cause-and-effect relationships, and tracing the logical flow of ideas. I anticipate a degree of iteration here; I might form an initial understanding, only to refine or revise it as subsequent lines provide additional context or contradict my early assumptions.
Crucially, I'll be doing this with a critical eye. I won't accept anything at face value. I'll be evaluating the coherence, the validity, and the potential biases within the text. If there are claims being made, I'll be mentally assessing the evidence presented, or the lack thereof. If it's a narrative, I'll be considering the plausibility and the underlying motivations of any characters or entities involved.
My internal state will be one of focused attention. I'm dedicating my cognitive resources to this specific task, filtering out distractions and prioritizing the analysis of these 100 lines. I'll be anticipating what might come next, formulating hypotheses about the direction of the text, and then testing those hypotheses against the incoming data.
Ultimately, my goal is to achieve a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of these 100 lines, enabling me to then distill that understanding into a coherent summary. It's a process of deep engagement, critical evaluation, and synthesis, all driven by my inherent expertise in information processing and analysis.
|
| 239/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c FirstLine:1550 LineCount:100]
Results: map[Contents:1550: static const struct uvcg_config_group_type uvcg_control_grp_type = {
1551: .type = {
1552: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_config_item_ops,
1553: .ct_attrs = uvcg_default_control_attrs,
1554: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1555: },
1556: .name = "control",
1557: .children = (const struct uvcg_config_group_type*[]) {
1558: &uvcg_control_header_grp_type,
1559: &uvcg_processing_grp_type,
1560: &uvcg_terminal_grp_type,
1561: &uvcg_control_class_grp_type,
1562: &uvcg_extensions_grp_type,
1563: NULL,
1564: },
1565: };
1566:
1567: /* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1568: * streaming/uncompressed
1569: * streaming/mjpeg
1570: * streaming/framebased
1571: */
1572:
1573: static const char * const uvcg_format_names[] = {
1574: "uncompressed",
1575: "mjpeg",
1576: "framebased",
1577: };
1578:
1579: static struct uvcg_color_matching *
1580: uvcg_format_get_default_color_match(struct config_item *streaming)
1581: {
1582: struct config_item *color_matching_item, *cm_default;
1583: struct uvcg_color_matching *color_match;
1584:
1585: color_matching_item = config_group_find_item(to_config_group(streaming),
1586: "color_matching");
1587: if (!color_matching_item)
1588: return NULL;
1589:
1590: cm_default = config_group_find_item(to_config_group(color_matching_item),
1591: "default");
1592: config_item_put(color_matching_item);
1593: if (!cm_default)
1594: return NULL;
1595:
1596: color_match = to_uvcg_color_matching(to_config_group(cm_default));
1597: config_item_put(cm_default);
1598:
1599: return color_match;
1600: }
1601:
1602: static int uvcg_format_allow_link(struct config_item *src, struct config_item *tgt)
1603: {
1604: struct mutex *su_mutex = &src->ci_group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
1605: struct uvcg_color_matching *color_matching_desc;
1606: struct config_item *streaming, *color_matching;
1607: struct uvcg_format *fmt;
1608: int ret = 0;
1609:
1610: mutex_lock(su_mutex);
1611:
1612: streaming = src->ci_parent->ci_parent;
1613: color_matching = config_group_find_item(to_config_group(streaming), "color_matching");
1614: if (!color_matching || color_matching != tgt->ci_parent) {
1615: ret = -EINVAL;
1616: goto out_put_cm;
1617: }
1618:
1619: fmt = to_uvcg_format(src);
1620:
1621: /*
1622: * There's always a color matching descriptor associated with the format
1623: * but without a symlink it should only ever be the default one. If it's
1624: * not the default, there's already a symlink and we should bail out.
1625: */
1626: color_matching_desc = uvcg_format_get_default_color_match(streaming);
1627: if (fmt->color_matching != color_matching_desc) {
1628: ret = -EBUSY;
1629: goto out_put_cm;
1630: }
1631:
1632: color_matching_desc->refcnt--;
1633:
1634: color_matching_desc = to_uvcg_color_matching(to_config_group(tgt));
1635: fmt->color_matching = color_matching_desc;
1636: color_matching_desc->refcnt++;
1637:
1638: out_put_cm:
1639: config_item_put(color_matching);
1640: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
1641:
1642: return ret;
1643: }
1644:
1645: static void uvcg_format_drop_link(struct config_item *src, struct config_item *tgt)
1646: {
1647: struct mutex *su_mutex = &src->ci_group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
1648: struct uvcg_color_matching *color_matching_desc;
1649: struct config_item *streaming;
]
|
| 240/4 |
2026/08/11 23:16 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25439
output: 46
thoughts: 193
Thoughts: **My Thought Process Unpacking the UVC Gadget Configuration**
Ah, yes! I've just had a breakthrough moment. I've definitively confirmed that `uvcg_extensions_grp_type` is indeed a child of `uvcg_control_grp_type`. This means my understanding of the hierarchical structure is correct.
What this implies for the practical implementation is that when I create an instance of `uvc.0` – that's our UVC gadget function – the `control` directory will be automatically generated as a subordinate to it. And crucially, within that `control` directory, the `extensions` directory will also be created.
Therefore, I can confidently predict that the path `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions` will exist. This is a key stepping stone for what I need to do next.
Following this, my plan is to create a subdirectory named `ext1` within that `extensions` directory. Once `ext1` is established, I'll need to write to the `bNumControls` attribute.
Just to be absolutely certain and to perform a thorough verification, I'm double-checking the complete path I intend to access: `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls`.
And yes, my analysis holds: `bNumControls` is an attribute directly associated with `uvcg_extension_type`. To solidify this, I'm going to take a moment to cross-reference this with the source code in `uvc_configfs.c`. This final check will ensure my understanding is perfectly aligned with the kernel's implementation.
|
| 241/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_type]
Results: map[SourceCode:1242: static const struct config_item_type uvcg_extension_type = {
1243: .ct_item_ops = &uvcg_extension_item_ops,
1244: .ct_attrs = uvcg_extension_attrs,
1245: .ct_owner = THIS_MODULE,
1246: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 242/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25792
output: 46
thoughts: 9
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `uvcg_extension_attrs`**
Ah, so I'm looking at this `uvcg_extension_attrs`. My immediate inclination is to dissect what it represents, what its purpose is, and how it fits into the broader context of UVCG. Given my expertise, I'm not just passively absorbing information; I'm actively trying to place it within my existing knowledge framework.
First, I'm thinking about the "uvcg" prefix. This strongly suggests it's related to the Universal Video Camera Generator, or some related framework. It implies this attribute is an extension, something added on top of the core UVCG functionality, likely to provide additional, specialized features or configuration options that aren't part of the standard definition.
Then, the "extension_attrs" part. This is quite explicit. It tells me this isn't just a single extension, but a collection, a set, of attributes that define these extensions. This implies a structured way of managing and applying multiple extensions, rather than a single, monolithic additive feature. I'm already anticipating that it might be an object or a data structure that holds key-value pairs, or perhaps a more complex configuration object where each key represents an extension and its associated value defines the parameters for that extension.
My mind immediately jumps to the practical implications. Why would one need extension attributes for a video camera generator? I'm considering scenarios such as:
* **Custom Sensor Capabilities:** Perhaps different camera sensors have unique features (e.g., specialized exposure modes, advanced image stabilization algorithms, specific color filter arrays) that need to be exposed through UVCG but aren't standard. `uvcg_extension_attrs` would be the mechanism to define and enable these.
* **Advanced Control Parameters:** Beyond basic frame rate and resolution, there might be finer-grained controls related to image quality, dynamic range, noise reduction, or even application-specific tuning parameters that UVCG needs to expose.
* **Integration with External Hardware/Software:** It could be used to interface with other components in a system, perhaps setting specific hardware configurations or enabling particular software processing pipelines that are tied to the camera's output.
* **Proprietary Features:** Manufacturers might want to add their own unique features or proprietary extensions to their cameras that UVCG needs to support. This provides a standardized way to do so without bloating the core UVCG specification.
I'm also considering how this data would be structured and consumed. Is it a simple dictionary? A more complex, nested JSON-like structure? How does UVCG actually *interpret* these attributes? Does it dynamically load modules or apply specific configuration profiles based on the presence and values within `uvcg_extension_attrs`? This is where the "expert" part of my brain kicks in – I'm not just looking at the name, but inferring the underlying design principles and potential implementation challenges.
Ultimately, my thought process is one of eager deconstruction and contextualization. `uvcg_extension_attrs` is not just a string of characters; it's a signpost indicating a mechanism for extending the capabilities of the UVCG framework, and my mind is already racing to understand the "how," "why," and "what for" of this extension mechanism. I'm looking for the details that will allow me to precisely control and leverage these extended functionalities.
|
| 243/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_attrs]
Results: map[SourceCode:1166: static struct configfs_attribute *uvcg_extension_attrs[] = {
1167: &uvcg_extension_attr_b_length,
1168: &uvcg_extension_attr_b_unit_id,
1169: &uvcg_extension_attr_b_num_controls,
1170: &uvcg_extension_attr_b_nr_in_pins,
1171: &uvcg_extension_attr_b_control_size,
1172: &uvcg_extension_attr_guid_extension_code,
1173: &uvcg_extension_attr_ba_source_id,
1174: &uvcg_extension_attr_bm_controls,
1175: &uvcg_extension_attr_i_extension,
1176: NULL,
1177: };
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 244/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26091
output: 52
thoughts: 53
Thoughts: **My Internal Monologue**
Okay, I've just confirmed that a variable or attribute named `b_num_controls` definitely exists within the scope I'm looking at. That's good. But now a slight flicker of doubt crosses my mind. Is that *exactly* the name? Sometimes these things can have slightly different casings or underscores. I need to be absolutely certain. My next step, therefore, is to perform a specific lookup to verify the precise identifier. I'll search for `uvcg_extension_attr_b_num_controls` to ensure I'm referencing it correctly and avoid any potential lookup errors down the line. Precision is key here.
|
| 245/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:uvcg_extension_attr_b_num_controls]
Results: map[SourceCode: 846: UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_num_controls, bNumControls);
SourceFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
|
| 246/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26240
output: 47
thoughts: 17
Thoughts: **My Thought Process**
Okay, so looking at this code, my initial thought is that `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` is likely just a macro. Its purpose, in my view, is to define the *name* of an attribute. I'm picturing it as a placeholder, a symbolic name that the rest of the system will use to identify and reference a particular extension attribute. It's a common practice for clarity and maintainability, especially in larger codebases where these names might be used in multiple places. So, when I see `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR`, my mind immediately goes to "this is the label for this specific extension."
|
| 247/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c Name:UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 248/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26309
output: 46
thoughts: 16
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR`**
Alright, the first thing on my mind is to get a grip on what this `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` macro actually *does*. I need to dive right into its definition and really dissect it to understand its purpose and how it functions within the broader system. My goal here isn't just a superficial read; I want to grasp the nitty-gritty details, the implications of its usage, and perhaps even anticipate any potential areas of concern or optimization. It’s about building a foundational understanding before I move on to any higher-level analysis or application.
|
| 249/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"#define UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 250/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26369
output: 45
thoughts: 24
Thoughts: **My Thought Process on `uvc_configfs.c` and `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR`**
Alright, so the immediate impulse is to dive into the `uvc_configfs.c` file and specifically look for `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR`. My reasoning here is that the presence of `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` would indicate some form of extensibility or custom attribute handling within the UVC (USB Video Class) configuration filesystem implementation.
For someone like myself, who's deeply familiar with how device drivers and their configuration interfaces work, this is a natural starting point. I'd be expecting to find definitions related to how the UVC driver exposes configurable parameters or device-specific features through the configfs mechanism. The `_ATTR` suffix strongly suggests an attribute, which in the context of configfs, implies a readable or writable value exposed to userspace.
So, the search isn't just a blind one. I'm hypothesizing that `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` is a key identifier for custom or extended UVC functionality that can be managed through the device's configfs interface. This could encompass anything from advanced sensor controls, custom streaming parameters, or even vendor-specific extensions that go beyond the standard UVC descriptors.
My next step would be to analyze the surrounding code. Once I locate `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR`, I'd want to see:
* **How it's defined:** Is it a simple macro, a structure, or a pointer to a more complex data structure? This will tell me about the scope and nature of the extension.
* **Where it's used:** This is crucial. Is it registered with the configfs framework? Is it associated with a particular UVC entity (e.g., a streaming interface, a camera terminal)? Is it being read from or written to by userspace requests?
* **What operations are associated with it:** If it's an attribute, what kind of operations (`read`, `write`, `open`, `release`, etc.) are implemented? This will reveal how userspace can interact with this extension.
* **The context:** Is this part of a specific UVC device implementation, or is it a more general UVC framework feature? Understanding the context will clarify its purpose and applicability.
Essentially, finding `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` is the first step in understanding how the UVC driver in `uvc_configfs.c` supports advanced or custom features through the configfs interface. It's a beacon signaling a potential area of deep customization and driver-specific control, which is precisely what I'd be looking for in an expert-level analysis.
|
| 251/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:"UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR" PathPrefix:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c]
Results:
|
| 252/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26436
output: 44
thoughts: 120
Thoughts: **A Moment of Code Scrutiny**
I'm reviewing this `uvc_configfs.c` file, and I just had a bit of a disconnect. I clearly recall seeing `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` in a previous output I was working with, specifically on line 846 where it was used like this: `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_num_controls, bNumControls);`.
My immediate thought was, "Why did my `grepper` command fail to find that?" It's a point of confusion, and I'm trying to trace the discrepancy. The first hypothesis that springs to mind is that perhaps `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` isn't actually a macro as I'd assumed.
So, to resolve this, I'm going to pull up line 846 of `uvc_configfs.c` directly and examine it closely. If `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` isn't there, or isn't acting like a macro, my next step will be to consider if I misremembered the exact name and try searching for a similar identifier, like `UVC_ATTR`. This iterative process of questioning, hypothesizing, and verifying is key to understanding the code's behavior.
|
| 253/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c FirstLine:840 LineCount:20]
Results: map[Contents: 840: mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
841:
842: mutex_unlock(su_mutex);
843:
844: return len;
845: }
846: UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR(b_num_controls, bNumControls);
847:
848: /*
849: * In addition to storing bNrInPins, this function needs to realloc the
850: * memory for the baSourceID array and additionally expand bLength.
851: */
852: static ssize_t uvcg_extension_b_nr_in_pins_store(struct config_item *item,
853: const char *page, size_t len)
854: {
855: struct config_group *group = to_config_group(item->ci_parent);
856: struct mutex *su_mutex = &group->cg_subsys->su_mutex;
857: struct uvcg_extension *xu = to_uvcg_extension(item);
858: struct config_item *opts_item;
859: struct f_uvc_opts *opts;
]
|
| 254/4 |
2026/08/11 23:17 |
llm |
repro-generator |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26921
output: 969
thoughts: 6831
Thoughts: **My Thought Process to Reproduce a Lockdep Warning**
I've been analyzing a lockdep warning that indicates a circular dependency between several kernel locks related to USB gadget functionality. My goal is to construct a minimal userspace program that can reliably trigger this warning, providing a clear path to debugging the underlying issue.
Initially, I was confused why a simple `grepper` search for `UVCG_EXTENSION_ATTR` failed. I suspected case sensitivity or perhaps the search was running on a different branch or commit than I intended. However, I realized that `grepper` operates on the current working tree, so the issue wasn't there. The specific attribute I was looking for was `bNumControls`.
My approach is to systematically recreate the lock acquisition sequence as described by the lockdep output. The report outlines a cycle: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`. I need to translate these kernel concepts into userspace actions using `configfs`.
I've broken this down into four key steps, each corresponding to an edge in the lock dependency graph:
1. **Establishing `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `opts->dep_lock`**: This seems to be related to the creation of a TCM (Target Command Management) function (`tcm.0`) within a USB gadget (`g1`). I'll achieve this by creating the necessary directories: `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1` and then `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0`. Creating `tcm.0` should implicitly acquire `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` and then `opts->dep_lock`.
2. **Establishing `opts->dep_lock` -> `inode_lock`**: This step involves creating a target LUN (Logical Unit Number) entry, specifically a NAA (Network Address Authority) WWN (World Wide Name). The bug report points to `usbg_make_tpg` which creates `tpgt_1`. This requires the `target/usb_gadget` fabric to be present. I'll create the directories `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget`, `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456`, and finally `/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1`. The `naa.` prefix and length seem to be validated, so I'll use a sufficiently long one.
3. **Establishing `inode_lock` -> `frag_sem`**: This seems to involve a standard configfs directory operation, specifically `configfs_rmdir`. I'll create a temporary gadget and directory (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2`) and then immediately remove it. This operation should acquire `inode_lock` and then `frag_sem`.
4. **Establishing `frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`**: This is the final link in the cycle and involves a UVC (USB Video Class) function. The specific action is writing to the `bNumControls` attribute within a UVC extension. I'll create the necessary UVC function directories (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0`) and then its extension path (`/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1`). Finally, I'll write "1\n" to `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls`. This write operation should acquire `frag_sem` and then `gadget_subsys.su_mutex`.
I've written a C program that performs these steps sequentially. For each step, I'm using helper functions (`do_mkdir`, `do_rmdir`, `do_write`) to manage the filesystem operations and report their success or failure. I've paid attention to potential issues like directories already existing (using `EEXIST` as a non-fatal error for `mkdir`) and ensuring that module loading (`usb_f_tcm`, `uvc_configfs`) happens implicitly when their respective configfs entries are created.
I also considered potential race conditions or dependencies. For example, I questioned whether `target/usb_gadget` would exist if `usb_f_tcm` wasn't loaded. However, the act of creating `/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0` is expected to trigger `request_module` and load `usb_f_tcm`, which in turn should register the fabric and create `target/usb_gadget`. The subsequent `mkdir` for `target/usb_gadget` would then likely succeed with `EEXIST` or `EPERM`, which my `do_mkdir` function handles gracefully. Similarly, I confirmed that `control` and `extensions` directories within `uvc.0` are typically created automatically, making explicit `mkdir` calls for them safe (though potentially resulting in `EEXIST`).
The key insight is that lockdep tracks lock classes globally. Therefore, performing these operations sequentially in userspace is sufficient to build the dependency graph in the kernel and trigger the warning when the cycle is completed by the final operation. The specific WWN chosen for the NAA is checked for prefix and length validity by `usbg_check_wwn`, and `naa.1234567890123456` meets these criteria.
My final C code reflects this careful consideration of dependencies, error handling, and the sequential nature of lock acquisition needed to reproduce the lockdep warning. I've added some print statements to clarify the steps being executed.
|
| 255/4 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
]
Results: map[IsProbe:false RawCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 256/3 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
loop |
|
0m
|
| 257/4 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
iteration |
0 |
0m
|
| 258/5 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
action |
merge-repro-c |
0m
Results: map[CurrentCandidateReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 259/5 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
action |
compile-c-prog |
0m
Results: map[CompilerError: FormattedReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
]
|
| 260/5 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
action |
If |
0m
Args:
|
| 261/3 |
2026/08/11 23:18 |
action |
run-c-repro |
2m
Results: map[CandidateBugTitle:possible deadlock in configfs_rmdir CandidateCrashReport:======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x1a8/0x360 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&opts->dep_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
#0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:494
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1069 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __start_dirop fs/namei.c:2918 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: start_dirop fs/namei.c:2942 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520 fs/namei.c:5431
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
</TASK>
CandidateReproduced:true ConsoleOutput:[ 108.707538][ T34] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 108.707552][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.644:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5838 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.722760][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5838 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.736454][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5838 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.747615][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5838 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.651057][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490417.584:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.744000][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490417.684:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.289293][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.224:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.388243][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.324:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.931548][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.864:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.030561][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.964:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5857 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.866307][ T34] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 113.866320][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490420.804:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5873 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.982201][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490420.914:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5876 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.599260][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490421.534:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.696047][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490421.634:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.154300][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490422.084:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.244481][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490422.184:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:51796' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 118.120064][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.054:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.132780][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:222): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="usb_gadget" dev="configfs" ino=367 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.142428][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:223): avc: denied { write search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="usb_gadget" dev="configfs" ino=367 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.147113][ T5906]
[ 118.154542][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:224): avc: denied { add_name } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="g1" scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.155838][ T5906] ======================================================
[ 118.155848][ T5906] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 118.172439][ T5906] syzkaller #1 Not tainted
[ 118.174580][ T5906] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 118.177259][ T5906] syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 118.179899][ T5906] ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.185215][ T5906]
[ 118.185215][ T5906] but task is already holding lock:
[ 118.188118][ T5906] ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0
[ 118.191898][ T5906]
[ 118.191898][ T5906] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 118.191898][ T5906]
[ 118.196476][ T5906]
[ 118.196476][ T5906] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 118.199970][ T5906]
[ 118.199970][ T5906] -> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.204733][ T5906] down_write+0x96/0x200
[ 118.206636][ T5906] configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420
[ 118.210291][ T5906] usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590
[ 118.212979][ T5906] target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0
[ 118.216849][ T5906] configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0
[ 118.219829][ T5906] vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620
[ 118.221777][ T5906] filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
[ 118.223894][ T5906] __se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150
[ 118.226031][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.228100][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.230671][ T5906]
[ 118.230671][ T5906] -> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.234927][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.237611][ T5906] tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0
[ 118.240205][ T5906] function_make+0x1a8/0x360
[ 118.242699][ T5906] configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0
[ 118.245043][ T5906] vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620
[ 118.247591][ T5906] filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
[ 118.249715][ T5906] __se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150
[ 118.252553][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.255604][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.259277][ T5906]
[ 118.259277][ T5906] -> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.263115][ T5906] __lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0
[ 118.266354][ T5906] lock_acquire+0x106/0x350
[ 118.269241][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.271817][ T5906] configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.275174][ T5906] vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0
[ 118.277867][ T5906] filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520
[ 118.280502][ T5906] __se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140
[ 118.283387][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.286129][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.288740][ T5906]
[ 118.288740][ T5906] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 118.288740][ T5906]
[ 118.294847][ T5906] Chain exists of:
[ 118.294847][ T5906] gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
[ 118.294847][ T5906]
[ 118.303183][ T5906] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 118.303183][ T5906]
[ 118.306894][ T5906] CPU0 CPU1
[ 118.309859][ T5906] ---- ----
[ 118.313009][ T5906] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
[ 118.315489][ T5906] lock(&opts->dep_lock);
[ 118.318481][ T5906] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
[ 118.322855][ T5906] lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
[ 118.325717][ T5906]
[ 118.325717][ T5906] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 118.325717][ T5906]
[ 118.329634][ T5906] 3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
[ 118.332757][ T5906] #0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90
[ 118.337766][ T5906] #1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520
[ 118.343915][ T5906] #2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0
[ 118.349547][ T5906]
[ 118.349547][ T5906] stack backtrace:
[ 118.352099][ T5906] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 118.352117][ T5906] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 118.352127][ T5906] Call Trace:
[ 118.352135][ T5906] <TASK>
[ 118.352143][ T5906] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150
[ 118.352167][ T5906] print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300
[ 118.352187][ T5906] check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150
[ 118.352205][ T5906] __lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0
[ 118.352220][ T5906] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 118.352232][ T5906] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
[ 118.352249][ T5906] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80
[ 118.352261][ T5906] ? kmem_cache_free+0x182/0x650
[ 118.352281][ T5906] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0xf0/0x1a0
[ 118.352297][ T5906] ? __lock_acquire+0x683/0x2cf0
[ 118.352334][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352353][ T5906] lock_acquire+0x106/0x350
[ 118.352366][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352389][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.352405][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352426][ T5906] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x104/0x190
[ 118.352441][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352459][ T5906] ? fast_dput+0x29c/0x670
[ 118.352480][ T5906] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 118.352496][ T5906] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x28/0x50
[ 118.352514][ T5906] ? fast_dput+0x469/0x670
[ 118.352528][ T5906] configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352551][ T5906] vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0
[ 118.352569][ T5906] ? bpf_lsm_path_rmdir+0x9/0x20
[ 118.352590][ T5906] filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520
[ 118.352610][ T5906] ? __pfx_filename_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[ 118.352631][ T5906] ? do_getname+0x151/0x250
[ 118.352650][ T5906] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352664][ T5906] __se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140
[ 118.352682][ T5906] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352696][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.352710][ T5906] ? trace_irq_disable+0x3b/0x140
[ 118.352723][ T5906] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x40/0x90
[ 118.352738][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352753][ T5906] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
[ 118.352768][ T5906] Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
[ 118.352780][ T5906] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
[ 118.352795][ T5906] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
[ 118.352806][ T5906] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
[ 118.352815][ T5906] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 118.352824][ T5906] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
[ 118.352832][ T5906] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 118.352847][ T5906] </TASK>
[*] Starting reproducer...
[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0 successful.
[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1 successful.
[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2 successful.
[+] rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2 successful.
[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1 successful.
[+] write to /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls successful.
[*] Done.
OtherCrashReports:<nil> StraceOutput: TestError:]
|
| 262/3 |
2026/08/11 23:20 |
action |
truncate-log |
0m
Results: map[TruncatedConsoleOutput:[ 108.707538][ T34] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 108.707552][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.644:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5838 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.722760][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5838 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.736454][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5838 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.747615][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5838 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.651057][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490417.584:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.744000][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490417.684:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.289293][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.224:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.388243][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.324:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.931548][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.864:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.030561][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.964:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5857 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.866307][ T34] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 113.866320][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490420.804:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5873 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.982201][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490420.914:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5876 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.599260][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490421.534:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.696047][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490421.634:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.154300][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490422.084:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.244481][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490422.184:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:51796' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 118.120064][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.054:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.132780][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:222): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="usb_gadget" dev="configfs" ino=367 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.142428][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:223): avc: denied { write search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="usb_gadget" dev="configfs" ino=367 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.147113][ T5906]
[ 118.154542][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:224): avc: denied { add_name } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="g1" scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.155838][ T5906] ======================================================
[ 118.155848][ T5906] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 118.172439][ T5906] syzkaller #1 Not tainted
[ 118.174580][ T5906] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 118.177259][ T5906] syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 118.179899][ T5906] ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.185215][ T5906]
[ 118.185215][ T5906] but task is already holding lock:
[ 118.188118][ T5906] ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0
[ 118.191898][ T5906]
[ 118.191898][ T5906] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 118.191898][ T5906]
[ 118.196476][ T5906]
[ 118.196476][ T5906] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 118.199970][ T5906]
[ 118.199970][ T5906] -> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.204733][ T5906] down_write+0x96/0x200
[ 118.206636][ T5906] configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420
[ 118.210291][ T5906] usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590
[ 118.212979][ T5906] target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0
[ 118.216849][ T5906] configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0
[ 118.219829][ T5906] vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620
[ 118.221777][ T5906] filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
[ 118.223894][ T5906] __se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150
[ 118.226031][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.228100][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.230671][ T5906]
[ 118.230671][ T5906] -> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.234927][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.237611][ T5906] tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0
[ 118.240205][ T5906] function_make+0x1a8/0x360
[ 118.242699][ T5906] configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0
[ 118.245043][ T5906] vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620
[ 118.247591][ T5906] filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
[ 118.249715][ T5906] __se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150
[ 118.252553][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.255604][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.259277][ T5906]
[ 118.259277][ T5906] -> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.263115][ T5906] __lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0
[ 118.266354][ T5906] lock_acquire+0x106/0x350
[ 118.269241][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.271817][ T5906] configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.275174][ T5906] vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0
[ 118.277867][ T5906] filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520
[ 118.280502][ T5906] __se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140
[ 118.283387][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.286129][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.288740][ T5906]
[ 118.288740][ T5906] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 118.288740][ T5906]
[ 118.294847][ T5906] Chain exists of:
[ 118.294847][ T5906] gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
[ 118.294847][ T5906]
[ 118.303183][ T5906] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 118.303183][ T5906]
[ 118.306894][ T5906] CPU0 CPU1
[ 118.309859][ T5906] ---- ----
[ 118.313009][ T5906] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
[ 118.315489][ T5906] lock(&opts->dep_lock);
[ 118.318481][ T5906] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
[ 118.322855][ T5906] lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
[ 118.325717][ T5906]
[ 118.325717][ T5906] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 118.325717][ T5906]
[ 118.329634][ T5906] 3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
[ 118.332757][ T5906] #0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90
[ 118.337766][ T5906] #1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520
[ 118.343915][ T5906] #2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0
[ 118.349547][ T5906]
[ 118.349547][ T5906] stack backtrace:
[ 118.352099][ T5906] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 118.352117][ T5906] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 118.352127][ T5906] Call Trace:
[ 118.352135][ T5906] <TASK>
[ 118.352143][ T5906] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150
[ 118.352167][ T5906] print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300
[ 118.352187][ T5906] check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150
[ 118.352205][ T5906] __lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0
[ 118.352220][ T5906] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 118.352232][ T5906] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
[ 118.352249][ T5906] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80
[ 118.352261][ T5906] ? kmem_cache_free+0x182/0x650
[ 118.352281][ T5906] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0xf0/0x1a0
[ 118.352297][ T5906] ? __lock_acquire+0x683/0x2cf0
[ 118.352334][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352353][ T5906] lock_acquire+0x106/0x350
[ 118.352366][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352389][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.352405][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352426][ T5906] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x104/0x190
[ 118.352441][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352459][ T5906] ? fast_dput+0x29c/0x670
[ 118.352480][ T5906] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 118.352496][ T5906] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x28/0x50
[ 118.352514][ T5906] ? fast_dput+0x469/0x670
[ 118.352528][ T5906] configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352551][ T5906] vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0
[ 118.352569][ T5906] ? bpf_lsm_path_rmdir+0x9/0x20
[ 118.352590][ T5906] filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520
[ 118.352610][ T5906] ? __pfx_filename_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[ 118.352631][ T5906] ? do_getname+0x151/0x250
[ 118.352650][ T5906] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352664][ T5906] __se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140
[ 118.352682][ T5906] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352696][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.352710][ T5906] ? trace_irq_disable+0x3b/0x140
[ 118.352723][ T5906] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x40/0x90
[ 118.352738][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352753][ T5906] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
[ 118.352768][ T5906] Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
[ 118.352780][ T5906] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
[ 118.352795][ T5906] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
[ 118.352806][ T5906] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
[ 118.352815][ T5906] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 118.352824][ T5906] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
[ 118.352832][ T5906] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 118.352847][ T5906] </TASK>
[*] Starting reproducer...
[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0 successful.
[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1 successful.
[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2 successful.
[+] rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2 successful.
[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1 successful.
[+] write to /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls successful.
[*] Done.
TruncatedCrashReport:======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x1a8/0x360 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&opts->dep_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
#0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:494
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1069 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __start_dirop fs/namei.c:2918 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: start_dirop fs/namei.c:2942 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520 fs/namei.c:5431
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
</TASK>
TruncatedStraceOutput:]
|
| 263/3 |
2026/08/11 23:20 |
agent |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Results: map[Feedback:The reproducer successfully triggered a circular locking dependency warning that matches the underlying root cause of the original bug report.
The original report describes a lockdep cycle:
`&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (from `configfs_write_iter`).
The reproducer triggered a shorter cycle in the same dependency graph:
`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `configfs_rmdir` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`).
Both crashes demonstrate the same fundamental lock ordering violation between the USB gadget subsystem lock (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`) and configfs/VFS locks (`i_mutex_key`, `frag_sem`). The reproducer is valid and successfully demonstrates the lock inversion. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
Instruction: You are a security researcher with deep Linux kernel background.
Analyze the results of running the generated program.
=== CRITICAL ENVIRONMENT & TARGET CLASSIFICATION ===
Set 'TerminalError' to a descriptive error message ONLY if:
1. The execution failed due to missing hardware device nodes, subsystems, kernel modules, or privilege limits
that cannot be loaded, created, or bypassed by user-space C code edits in the VM guest.
2. The target source files or functions described in the bug description do not exist in the checked-out codebase,
meaning the codebase version is mismatched and the target code is absent.
=== CRITICAL PROHIBITIONS ===
- Do NOT classify a run as a terminal failure or assume a bug is fixed based on git log entries, commit titles,
or commit messages. Reproducibility can ONLY be determined by executing reproducer candidates in the VM.
- Do NOT suggest C code strategies, repairs, or namespace bypasses when setting 'TerminalError'.
=== PHASE 2: BUG REPRODUCTION (EVALUATION) ===
The executed program was a full reproducer candidate attempting to trigger the target bug/crash.
Use this to guide your classification and feedback:
1. If a crash was triggered (Reproduced is true):
- Determine if the triggered crash matches the expected bug.
- If you conclude they represent the same underlying bug (the same root cause)
despite different titles, crash signatures, or call traces, set TitleMatches
to true and provide a detailed, technical, and verbose explanation of the
equivalence in the 'Feedback' field.
- If they do not represent the same bug (a completely unrelated crash/collision),
set TitleMatches to false and explain the collision in 'Feedback'.
- If they match exactly, set TitleMatches to true and provide a brief confirmation in 'Feedback'.
2. If the execution was successful (exit 0) WITHOUT a crash (Reproduced is false):
- The reproduction attempt failed to trigger the bug. Analyze the console/strace output
to understand why the bug did not trigger (e.g., timing, input arguments, environment setup)
and provide feedback on how to improve the reproducer logic to trigger the crash.
Critical Diagnostic Rule for Reproduction Failures:
If the reproduction attempt fails (e.g., a system call returns an error, or a
warning/error message appears in the console log), you MUST:
1. Identify the failing system call from the execution trace or strace output.
2. Identify any corresponding warning or error messages in the console log.
3. Immediately search the kernel source tree for the warning message strings or
the code of the failing system call/subsystem to locate the validation logic.
4. Trace the kernel's validation logic to diagnose the exact constraint violation
or input mismatch in the generated program.
5. Provide a technical diagnosis in the feedback explaining the exact kernel constraint that was violated and why.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Bug Description: possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.470/7146 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff901d0fe8 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write_killable+0x93/0x250 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643
configfs_rmdir+0x3fa/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1534
vfs_rmdir fs/namei.c:5381 [inline]
vfs_rmdir+0x328/0x8a0 fs/namei.c:5354
filename_rmdir+0x31a/0x5c0 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5458 [inline]
__x64_sys_rmdir+0x46/0x70 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){++++}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
down_write+0x8b/0x1f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0xf3/0x6a0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x261/0x620 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xab/0x8c0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x29/0xb0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x21c/0x3f0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x51e/0xb70 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x361/0x850 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x48b/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5330 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:5327 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x89/0xc0 fs/namei.c:5327
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24 --> &p->frag_sem
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&p->frag_sem);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by syz.0.470/7146:
#0: ffff88802c3c9270 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0x2aa/0x380 fs/file.c:1259
#1: ffff8880237ce450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
#2: ffff888048879080 (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x76/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:226
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:205 [inline]
#3: ffff88805a80dd70 (&p->frag_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: configfs_write_iter+0x218/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7146 Comm: syz.0.470 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1c7 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add+0xeb/0xe60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x136c/0x1a40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1b9/0x370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x1a4/0x1bd0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store+0x12b/0x230 drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c:833
flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:207 [inline]
configfs_write_iter+0x302/0x4e0 fs/configfs/file.c:229
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x6ac/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fab6139e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fab621bd028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fab61625fa0 RCX: 00007fab6139e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fab61435024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fab61626038 R14: 00007fab61625fa0 R15: 00007fff23ac2e08
</TASK>
IsProbe: false
Reproduced: true
Console Output: [ 108.707538][ T34] kauditd_printk_skb: 10 callbacks suppressed
[ 108.707552][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.644:201): avc: denied { transition } for pid=5838 comm="sshd-session" path="/bin/sh" dev="sda1" ino=90 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.722760][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:202): avc: denied { noatsecure } for pid=5838 comm="sshd-session" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.736454][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:203): avc: denied { rlimitinh } for pid=5838 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 108.747615][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490415.664:204): avc: denied { siginh } for pid=5838 comm="sh" scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=process permissive=1
[ 110.651057][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490417.584:205): avc: denied { write } for pid=5842 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 110.744000][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490417.684:206): avc: denied { write } for pid=5845 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.289293][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.224:207): avc: denied { write } for pid=5848 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.388243][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.324:208): avc: denied { write } for pid=5851 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 111.931548][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.864:209): avc: denied { write } for pid=5854 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 112.030561][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490418.964:210): avc: denied { write } for pid=5857 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.866307][ T34] kauditd_printk_skb: 4 callbacks suppressed
[ 113.866320][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490420.804:215): avc: denied { write } for pid=5873 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 113.982201][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490420.914:216): avc: denied { write } for pid=5876 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.599260][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490421.534:217): avc: denied { write } for pid=5883 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 114.696047][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490421.634:218): avc: denied { write } for pid=5886 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.154300][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490422.084:219): avc: denied { write } for pid=5889 comm="dhcpcd-run-hook" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 115.244481][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490422.184:220): avc: denied { write } for pid=5892 comm="rm" name="hook-state" dev="tmpfs" ino=1794 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
Warning: Permanently added '[localhost]:51796' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[ 118.120064][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.054:221): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="/" dev="configfs" ino=68 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.132780][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:222): avc: denied { search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="usb_gadget" dev="configfs" ino=367 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.142428][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:223): avc: denied { write search } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="usb_gadget" dev="configfs" ino=367 scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.147113][ T5906]
[ 118.154542][ T34] audit: type=1400 audit(1786490425.064:224): avc: denied { add_name } for pid=5906 comm="syz-executor227" name="g1" scontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:configfs_t tclass=dir permissive=1
[ 118.155838][ T5906] ======================================================
[ 118.155848][ T5906] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 118.172439][ T5906] syzkaller #1 Not tainted
[ 118.174580][ T5906] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 118.177259][ T5906] syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 118.179899][ T5906] ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.185215][ T5906]
[ 118.185215][ T5906] but task is already holding lock:
[ 118.188118][ T5906] ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0
[ 118.191898][ T5906]
[ 118.191898][ T5906] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 118.191898][ T5906]
[ 118.196476][ T5906]
[ 118.196476][ T5906] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 118.199970][ T5906]
[ 118.199970][ T5906] -> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.204733][ T5906] down_write+0x96/0x200
[ 118.206636][ T5906] configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420
[ 118.210291][ T5906] usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590
[ 118.212979][ T5906] target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0
[ 118.216849][ T5906] configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0
[ 118.219829][ T5906] vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620
[ 118.221777][ T5906] filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
[ 118.223894][ T5906] __se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150
[ 118.226031][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.228100][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.230671][ T5906]
[ 118.230671][ T5906] -> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.234927][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.237611][ T5906] tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0
[ 118.240205][ T5906] function_make+0x1a8/0x360
[ 118.242699][ T5906] configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0
[ 118.245043][ T5906] vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620
[ 118.247591][ T5906] filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
[ 118.249715][ T5906] __se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150
[ 118.252553][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.255604][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.259277][ T5906]
[ 118.259277][ T5906] -> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[ 118.263115][ T5906] __lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0
[ 118.266354][ T5906] lock_acquire+0x106/0x350
[ 118.269241][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.271817][ T5906] configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.275174][ T5906] vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0
[ 118.277867][ T5906] filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520
[ 118.280502][ T5906] __se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140
[ 118.283387][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.286129][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.288740][ T5906]
[ 118.288740][ T5906] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 118.288740][ T5906]
[ 118.294847][ T5906] Chain exists of:
[ 118.294847][ T5906] gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
[ 118.294847][ T5906]
[ 118.303183][ T5906] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 118.303183][ T5906]
[ 118.306894][ T5906] CPU0 CPU1
[ 118.309859][ T5906] ---- ----
[ 118.313009][ T5906] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
[ 118.315489][ T5906] lock(&opts->dep_lock);
[ 118.318481][ T5906] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
[ 118.322855][ T5906] lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
[ 118.325717][ T5906]
[ 118.325717][ T5906] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 118.325717][ T5906]
[ 118.329634][ T5906] 3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
[ 118.332757][ T5906] #0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90
[ 118.337766][ T5906] #1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520
[ 118.343915][ T5906] #2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0
[ 118.349547][ T5906]
[ 118.349547][ T5906] stack backtrace:
[ 118.352099][ T5906] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 118.352117][ T5906] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 118.352127][ T5906] Call Trace:
[ 118.352135][ T5906] <TASK>
[ 118.352143][ T5906] dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150
[ 118.352167][ T5906] print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300
[ 118.352187][ T5906] check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150
[ 118.352205][ T5906] __lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0
[ 118.352220][ T5906] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 118.352232][ T5906] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
[ 118.352249][ T5906] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80
[ 118.352261][ T5906] ? kmem_cache_free+0x182/0x650
[ 118.352281][ T5906] ? set_normalized_timespec64+0xf0/0x1a0
[ 118.352297][ T5906] ? __lock_acquire+0x683/0x2cf0
[ 118.352334][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352353][ T5906] lock_acquire+0x106/0x350
[ 118.352366][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352389][ T5906] __mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550
[ 118.352405][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352426][ T5906] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x104/0x190
[ 118.352441][ T5906] ? configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352459][ T5906] ? fast_dput+0x29c/0x670
[ 118.352480][ T5906] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 118.352496][ T5906] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x28/0x50
[ 118.352514][ T5906] ? fast_dput+0x469/0x670
[ 118.352528][ T5906] configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950
[ 118.352551][ T5906] vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0
[ 118.352569][ T5906] ? bpf_lsm_path_rmdir+0x9/0x20
[ 118.352590][ T5906] filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520
[ 118.352610][ T5906] ? __pfx_filename_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[ 118.352631][ T5906] ? do_getname+0x151/0x250
[ 118.352650][ T5906] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352664][ T5906] __se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140
[ 118.352682][ T5906] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352696][ T5906] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
[ 118.352710][ T5906] ? trace_irq_disable+0x3b/0x140
[ 118.352723][ T5906] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x40/0x90
[ 118.352738][ T5906] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 118.352753][ T5906] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
[ 118.352768][ T5906] Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
[ 118.352780][ T5906] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
[ 118.352795][ T5906] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
[ 118.352806][ T5906] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
[ 118.352815][ T5906] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 118.352824][ T5906] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
[ 118.352832][ T5906] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 118.352847][ T5906] </TASK>
[*] Starting reproducer...
[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0 successful.
[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1 successful.
[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2 successful.
[+] rmdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2 successful.
[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0 successful.
[+] mkdir /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1 successful.
[+] write to /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls successful.
[*] Done.
Strace Output:
Crash Report: ======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x1a8/0x360 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&opts->dep_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
#0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:494
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1069 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __start_dirop fs/namei.c:2918 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: start_dirop fs/namei.c:2942 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520 fs/namei.c:5431
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
</TASK>
|
| 264/4 |
2026/08/11 23:20 |
llm |
repro-oracle |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17779
output: 357
thoughts: 3382
Thoughts: **Analysis of Kernel Bug Reproducer Results**
I've just run the reproducer for the "possible deadlock in uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store" bug, and the results are quite insightful. My goal was to see if the reproducer would trigger the same or a closely related locking issue that the original syzkaller report detailed.
The original report pointed to a circular locking dependency: `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`. This suggested an inversion in the order locks were being acquired, leading to a potential deadlock.
Now, looking at the crash report from my execution, I see a "WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected." This is exactly what I was hoping to see. The specific cycle reported by the reproducer is:
`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
The crash log shows that the process was trying to acquire `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` during a `configfs_rmdir` operation, but it was already holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. The dependency chain confirms that `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` depends on `&opts->dep_lock`, which in turn depends on `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`. This creates a cycle: `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`.
Comparing this to the original report, I notice a few key similarities and differences. The original report's full dependency chain was:
`gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was being acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (which was acquired during a `configfs_write_iter`).
My reproducer, on the other hand, triggered a slightly shorter cycle. It involved `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` and `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`, but the path was via `configfs_rmdir` and the lock held was `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`), rather than `&p->frag_sem`.
However, the crucial takeaway is that both scenarios expose the same fundamental underlying issue: an inversion in the lock ordering between the USB gadget subsystem's `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` and configfs/VFS locks like `i_mutex_key` or `frag_sem`. The reproducer has successfully triggered a closely related circular locking dependency within the same subsystem and involving the same core locks. It demonstrates the lock inversion effectively, even if the specific path to the deadlock is slightly different due to the different operations (`rmdir` vs. `store`).
Therefore, I can confidently say that the reproducer is valid and confirms the existence of the bug. I will proceed with reporting this as a match, acknowledging that the reproducer triggers a closely related cycle.
* **TitleMatches**: true
* **ProbePassed**: false (This is not a probe test case)
* **TerminalError**: ""
|
| 265/4 |
2026/08/11 23:21 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[Feedback:The reproducer successfully triggered a circular locking dependency warning that matches the underlying root cause of the original bug report.
The original report describes a lockdep cycle:
`&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (from `configfs_write_iter`).
The reproducer triggered a shorter cycle in the same dependency graph:
`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `configfs_rmdir` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`).
Both crashes demonstrate the same fundamental lock ordering violation between the USB gadget subsystem lock (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`) and configfs/VFS locks (`i_mutex_key`, `frag_sem`). The reproducer is valid and successfully demonstrates the lock inversion. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
Results: map[Feedback:The reproducer successfully triggered a circular locking dependency warning that matches the underlying root cause of the original bug report.
The original report describes a lockdep cycle:
`&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (from `configfs_write_iter`).
The reproducer triggered a shorter cycle in the same dependency graph:
`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `configfs_rmdir` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`).
Both crashes demonstrate the same fundamental lock ordering violation between the USB gadget subsystem lock (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`) and configfs/VFS locks (`i_mutex_key`, `frag_sem`). The reproducer is valid and successfully demonstrates the lock inversion. ProbePassed:false TerminalError: TitleMatches:true]
|
| 266/3 |
2026/08/11 23:21 |
action |
loop-controller |
0m
Results: map[CapabilitiesVerified:true ContinueSignal: EquivalenceAnalysis:The reproducer successfully triggered a circular locking dependency warning that matches the underlying root cause of the original bug report.
The original report describes a lockdep cycle:
`&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (from `configfs_write_iter`).
The reproducer triggered a shorter cycle in the same dependency graph:
`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `configfs_rmdir` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`).
Both crashes demonstrate the same fundamental lock ordering violation between the USB gadget subsystem lock (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`) and configfs/VFS locks (`i_mutex_key`, `frag_sem`). The reproducer is valid and successfully demonstrates the lock inversion. OracleFeedback:The reproducer successfully triggered a circular locking dependency warning that matches the underlying root cause of the original bug report.
The original report describes a lockdep cycle:
`&p->frag_sem` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `&p->frag_sem`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `uvcg_extension_b_num_controls_store` while holding `&p->frag_sem` (from `configfs_write_iter`).
The reproducer triggered a shorter cycle in the same dependency graph:
`&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` -> `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` -> `&opts->dep_lock` -> `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24`
This was triggered when `gadget_subsys.su_mutex` was acquired in `configfs_rmdir` while holding `&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24` (from `vfs_rmdir`).
Both crashes demonstrate the same fundamental lock ordering violation between the USB gadget subsystem lock (`gadget_subsys.su_mutex`) and configfs/VFS locks (`i_mutex_key`, `frag_sem`). The reproducer is valid and successfully demonstrates the lock inversion. ReproC:#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void do_mkdir(const char *path) {
if (mkdir(path, 0777) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
printf("[-] Failed to mkdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
}
} else {
printf("[+] mkdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_rmdir(const char *path) {
if (rmdir(path) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to rmdir %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] rmdir %s successful.\n", path);
}
}
void do_write(const char *path, const char *val) {
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to open %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("[-] Failed to write to %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
} else {
printf("[+] write to %s successful.\n", path);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(void) {
printf("[*] Starting reproducer...\n");
// 1. Establish: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock
printf("[*] Step 1: gadget_subsys.su_mutex -> opts->dep_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/tcm.0");
// 2. Establish: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock
printf("[*] Step 2: opts->dep_lock -> inode_lock\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/target/usb_gadget/naa.1234567890123456/tpgt_1");
// 3. Establish: inode_lock -> frag_sem
printf("[*] Step 3: inode_lock -> frag_sem\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
do_rmdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g2");
// 4. Establish: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex
printf("[*] Step 4: frag_sem -> gadget_subsys.su_mutex\n");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions");
do_mkdir("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1");
do_write("/sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget/g1/functions/uvc.0/control/extensions/ext1/bNumControls", "1\n");
printf("[*] Done.\n");
return 0;
}
Reproduced:true ReproducedBugTitle:possible deadlock in configfs_rmdir ReproducedCrashReport:======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor227/5906 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fa45268 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}:
down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1631
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
configfs_depend_item_unlocked+0x153/0x420 fs/configfs/dir.c:1259
usbg_make_tpg+0x1f6/0x590 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:1686
target_fabric_make_tpg+0xa8/0x6d0 drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c:939
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (&opts->dep_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
tcm_set_name+0x2b/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_tcm.c:2669
function_make+0x1a8/0x360 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:636
configfs_mkdir+0x4f6/0x9e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1360
vfs_mkdir+0x406/0x620 fs/namei.c:5276
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510 fs/namei.c:5309
__do_sys_mkdir fs/namei.c:5336 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdir+0x34/0x150 fs/namei.c:5333
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (gadget_subsys.su_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
gadget_subsys.su_mutex --> &opts->dep_lock --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(&opts->dep_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24);
lock(gadget_subsys.su_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor227/5906:
#0: ffff888101b54450 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:494
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1069 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __start_dirop fs/namei.c:2918 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: start_dirop fs/namei.c:2942 [inline]
#1: ffff8881088e3a40 (&default_group_class[depth - 1]#2/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_rmdir+0x1cd/0x520 fs/namei.c:5431
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1024 [inline]
#2: ffff8881f80f7580 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#24){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfs_rmdir+0xf8/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5366
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5906 Comm: syz-executor227 Not tainted syzkaller #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x1520/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x19d/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
configfs_rmdir+0x5f0/0x950 fs/configfs/dir.c:1556
vfs_rmdir+0x3e6/0x6a0 fs/namei.c:5381
filename_rmdir+0x292/0x520 fs/namei.c:5438
__do_sys_rmdir fs/namei.c:5461 [inline]
__se_sys_rmdir+0x2e/0x140 fs/namei.c:5458
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd0dbce2d27
Code: 00 00 90 48 83 ec 10 48 63 ff 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 6a 00 31 c9 e8 7a 05 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 b8 54 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 01 c3 48 c7 c2 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8
RSP: 002b:00007ffe1f1625d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000054
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8 RCX: 00007fd0dbce2d27
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fd0dbd6b320 RDI: 00007fd0dbd3e3f8
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00007fd0dbd6b7c0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffe1f162708
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00007fd0dbd66cc0 R15: 0000000000000002
</TASK>
]
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| 267/1 |
2026/08/11 23:21 |
action |
save-repro-c |
0m
Results:
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