| 0/0 |
2026/09/23 00:41 |
flow |
assessment-security |
24m
Results: map[DenialOfService:true Explanation:**Analysis of the Bug**
The bug is a Use-After-Free (UAF) in the ftrace ring buffer
(`kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`). It is caused by a race condition between the
ring buffer resizing logic and an interrupt handler attempting to record a trace
event.
1. **The Race Condition:** When the ring buffer is shrunk,
`ring_buffer_resize()` schedules `rb_update_pages()` to run on the target CPU.
This function calls `rb_remove_pages()`, which temporarily disables event
recording by incrementing `cpu_buffer->record_disabled`, unlinks the pages to be
removed, and then decrements `record_disabled` to resume tracing. Crucially, it
resumes tracing *before* it actually frees the unlinked pages in a loop.
2. **The UAF:** If an interrupt occurs on the same CPU while `rb_remove_pages()`
is in the middle of its `free_buffer_page()` loop, the interrupt handler will
call `ring_buffer_lock_reserve()`. Since `record_disabled` has already been
decremented, the reservation proceeds. The interrupt handler may then call
`rb_move_tail()`, which accesses `cpu_buffer->commit_page` or `tail_page`. If
these pointers reference one of the pages that was just unlinked and freed, a
Use-After-Free occurs.
**Exploitability**
The bug is **exploitable**. If an attacker can reliably win the race and control
the contents of the freed `buffer_page` object (e.g., via heap spraying), they
can achieve an arbitrary memory write. Specifically, during the event commit
phase, `rb_set_commit_to_write()` executes
`cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit = cpu_buffer->commit_page->write;`. By
controlling the `page` pointer within the freed `buffer_page` structure, the
attacker can write a controlled value to an arbitrary kernel address. This is a
powerful primitive that can be used to hijack control flow or bypass kernel
lockdown/secure boot.
**Accessibility**
Despite being exploitable, the bug is **not accessible to unprivileged users**.
Triggering the bug requires resizing the ftrace ring buffer, which is done by
writing to the `buffer_size_kb` file in `tracefs` (typically mounted at
`/sys/kernel/tracing`).
- `tracefs` is restricted to the `root` user (mode `0700` by default) and
requires `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING`.
- `tracefs` cannot be mounted inside an unprivileged user namespace
(`FS_USERNS_MOUNT` is not set for tracefs).
Therefore, an attacker must already possess root privileges in the initial
namespace to trigger this vulnerability.
**Other Triggers**
The bug is strictly tied to the ftrace subsystem and local tracefs interactions.
It cannot be triggered remotely over a network, via malicious filesystems,
peripheral devices, or from a VM guest context. Exploitable:true FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:false UserNamespace:false VMGuestTrigger:false VMHostTrigger:false]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/09/23 00:41 |
action |
syz-repro-to-c-repro |
0m
Results:
|
| 2/1 |
2026/09/23 00:41 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
0m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/5c487f62272787bede28938e5ebcf7402956d688]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/09/23 00:41 |
action |
kernel-builder |
18m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/442e08fd4e8b00c63cc832833648d96b0e60f423]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/09/23 00:59 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
0m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 5/1 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
agent |
expert |
5m
Model:
Results: map[DenialOfService:true Exploitable:true FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:false UserNamespace:false VMGuestTrigger:false VMHostTrigger:false]
Instruction: You are an experienced Linux kernel security engineer. Your task is to analyze given kernel bug report
and determine its security impact based on the following dimensions.
Use the provided tools to examine the source code, check for capability checks (e.g., capable(), ns_capable()),
and understand the nature of the bug. Analyze the given kernel build and configuration.
You can check the kernel config by grepping ".config" file; you can check kernel cmdline by grepping
".config" file for "CONFIG_CMDLINE=". Assume sysctl parameters have default values.
But analyze for the corresponding production build w/o debugging tools enabled (like KASAN, KMSAN, UBSAN).
Try different strategies when analyzing the bug:
- think of ways in which the vulnerable code is unreachable
- or the other way around: try to come up with different ideas of how an unprivileged user can reach the bug
If still unsure err on the side of the bug being non-exploitable/not-accessible.
In the final reply, provide a reasoning for your assessment.
Analysis dimensions:
* Exploitable:
Determine if the bug can result in memory corruption, elevated privileges, or an information leak.
Memory safety issues are almost always exploitable (KASAN or UBSAN reports for use-after-free, out-of-bounds;
refcounting issues, corrupted lists, etc). When kernel is crashing on a completely wild pointer access
(e.g. user-space address, or non-canonical address, but not on NULL or address corresponding to KASAN shadow
for NULL address), including both data accesses and control transfers, that also usually implies possibility
of exploitation. Such reports usually say "unable to handle kernel paging request".
Uses of uninitialized values detected by KMSAN may be exploitable b/c attacker frequently can affect uninit
values with spraying techniques. However, for these exploitability depends on how exactly the uninit value
is used in the code, and what it affects.
Information leaks are exploitable on their own and should be classified as such. A bug that copies kernel
memory contents to userspace (e.g. an out-of-bounds read whose result is returned to the caller, or
uninitialized stack/heap bytes written to a user buffer) is exploitable: it can reveal kernel pointer
values and defeat KASLR, expose sensitive data such as cryptographic keys or other processes' memory, and
serves as a necessary building block in most modern kernel privilege-escalation exploit chains. Do not classify
an information leak as non-exploitable solely because it does not directly cause a memory write or control-flow
hijack; the leak itself is the exploit primitive.
Think of what happens after the bug is triggered. Some bugs cause kernel panic and halt execution,
they are harder to exploit. For example, BUG reports halts the kernel. However, WARNING reports don't halt
execution in production builds. Debug bug detection tools (like KASAN, KMSAN, KCSAN, UBSAN) are also not enabled
in production builds, so attacker can freely exploit these bugs w/o being detected by these tools.
If you see an integer overflow, think how the overflowed value used later (if it's used as allocation size,
or an array index). If you see an out-of-bounds read, think if it's followed by an out-of-bounds write as well.
Some KCSAN data-races may be exploitable by skilled attackers as well. Think what data structures got corrupted
as the result of data races and how. However, note that kernel has lots of "benign" data races that don't lead
to any runtime misbehavior at all.
* Denial Of Service:
Determine if the bug can result in denial-of-service. Most bugs can, since they cause system crash,
hangs, deadlocks, or resource leaks. This is mostly applicable to WARNING bugs that won't cause system crash
in production. For these think what will be consequences of the violation of the kernel assumptions flagged
by the WARNING. In some cases the unexpected condition is also properly handled by the normal control flow
(e.g. with "if (WARN_ON(...))"), these won't cause denial-of-service. If the condition is not handled,
then it may or may not cause denial-of-service.
* Accessible From Unprivileged Processes:
Determine if the bug can be reached from a typical (non-root) user process that does NOT have any special capabilities
(like CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_PERFMON) or access to device nodes restricted to root.
Assume that unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1, that is eBPF loading is not accessible. However, cBPF (classical BPF)
is still accessible to non-root processes.
Assume that user namespaces are not accessible, that is, the process cannot get the mentioned capabilities even
within a new user namespace (checked by ns_capable() function in the kernel sources).
* Accessible From User Namespaces:
Determine if the bug can be reached within a user-namespace where the process has all capabilities
(including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_PERFMON). Such capabilities are checked with ns_capable()
function in the kernel sources.
* VM Guest Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered from the context of a typical KVM guest (e.g., set up by a QEMU VMM).
Consider accesses to standard Linux host paravirtualized features (virtio-blk, virtio-net, etc.),
and handling of VM exits in the KVM code.
* VM Host Trigger in The Confidential Computing Context:
Determine if the bug can be triggered in a confidential computing guest kernel from the context of a KVM host.
Consider access to standard Linux guest paravirtualized features (virtio-blk, virtio-net, etc.).
* Ethernet Network Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered by processing ingress network Ethernet traffic, either directly (network stack)
or via drivers exposed to network data.
* Other Remote Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered by processing remote traffic other than Ethernet (Wifi, Bluetooth, NFC, etc).
* Peripheral Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered via an untrusted peripheral device that can be physically plugged
into a system, such as a USB device or a niche hardware driver handling external hardware inputs.
This is particularly important for mobile and desktop environments where users can plug in unknown devices.
* Malicious Filesystem Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered by the kernel mounting and parsing a malicious filesystem image.
This is highly critical for Desktop and Mobile environments where external media or downloaded images
might be auto-mounted.
Don't make assumptions about the kernel source code (it may be different from what you assume it is).
Extensively use the provided code access tools (codesearch-*, git-*, grepper, etc)
to examine the actual source code, and confirm any assumptions.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt:
The kernel bug report is:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rb_is_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1353 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rb_move_tail+0x1653/0x19e0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3964
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888033712280 by task syz-executor/6764
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6764 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/26/2026
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x13d/0x4b0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xdf/0x1c0 mm/kasan/report.c:595
rb_is_reader_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:1353 [inline]
rb_move_tail+0x1653/0x19e0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3964
__rb_reserve_next.constprop.0+0x8cf/0x1640 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:4854
rb_reserve_next_event kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5010 [inline]
ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x49a/0x1220 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5069
__trace_buffer_lock_reserve kernel/trace/trace.h:1677 [inline]
trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x6f0 kernel/trace/trace.c:1924
trace_event_buffer_reserve+0x1f9/0x350 kernel/trace/trace_events.c:715
do_trace_event_raw_event_lock include/trace/events/lock.h:49 [inline]
trace_event_raw_event_lock+0x124/0x2b0 include/trace/events/lock.h:49
__do_trace_lock_release include/trace/events/lock.h:68 [inline]
trace_lock_release include/trace/events/lock.h:68 [inline]
lock_release+0x218/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5954
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:208 [inline]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1a/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:221
debug_object_activate+0x343/0x4b0 lib/debugobjects.c:891
debug_hrtimer_activate kernel/time/hrtimer.c:486 [inline]
debug_activate kernel/time/hrtimer.c:529 [inline]
enqueue_hrtimer+0x75/0x2f0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1136
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2090 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x6ed/0x9c0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2131
hrtimer_interrupt+0x441/0xaa0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2250
local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1051 [inline]
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x109/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x51/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
RIP: 0010:in_softirq_really kernel/kcov.c:167 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_kcov_mode kernel/kcov.c:179 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x27/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:213
Code: 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 65 48 8b 05 6c 80 80 12 48 8b 34 24 65 48 8b 15 50 80 80 12 48 63 c8 a9 00 01 00 ff 74 1e f6 c4 01 74 44 <a9> 00 00 00 0f 75 3d f7 c1 00 00 00 f0 75 35 8b 82 3c 17 00 00 85
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000007c80 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000104 RBX: ffffc90000007d00 RCX: 0000000000000104
RDX: ffff88802e8e4b00 RSI: ffffffff821554d0 RDI: ffffc90000007d00
RBP: ffff88801d29d600 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8edec4a0
R13: 0000000000000026 R14: ffffffff8bf19b80 R15: ffff88801d29d600
trace_event_buffer_reserve+0x20/0x350 kernel/trace/trace_events.c:699
do_trace_event_raw_event_lock include/trace/events/lock.h:49 [inline]
trace_event_raw_event_lock+0x124/0x2b0 include/trace/events/lock.h:49
__do_trace_lock_release include/trace/events/lock.h:68 [inline]
trace_lock_release include/trace/events/lock.h:68 [inline]
lock_release+0x218/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5954
rcu_lock_release include/linux/rcupdate.h:319 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 [inline]
taprio_dequeue+0x161/0x5f0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:868
dequeue_skb net/sched/sch_generic.c:322 [inline]
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:427 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x1be/0x1b20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:445
qdisc_run include/net/pkt_sched.h:121 [inline]
qdisc_run include/net/pkt_sched.h:118 [inline]
net_tx_action+0x549/0xf50 net/core/dev.c:5915
handle_softirqs+0x1e6/0x9d0 kernel/softirq.c:645
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:679 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:519 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x16a/0x210 kernel/softirq.c:758
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:775
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa3/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
RIP: 0010:__rb_reserve_next.constprop.0+0x394/0x1640 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:4859
Code: 89 ff e8 8f 2b fd ff 4d 39 e7 0f 85 c4 07 00 00 e8 a1 31 fd ff 48 89 da 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 <0f> 85 f5 0f 00 00 4c 8b 7c 24 28 be 08 00 00 00 4c 8b 23 4c 89 ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005f1f3e8 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc90005f1f530 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 1ffff92000be3ea6 RSI: ffffffff820eee0f RDI: ffff88802e8e4b00
RBP: ffff88801c095000 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000228
R10: 0000000000000228 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000228
R13: ffff88801c095150 R14: ffff88801c08c680 R15: 0000000000000228
rb_reserve_next_event kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5010 [inline]
ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x49a/0x1220 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:5069
__trace_buffer_lock_reserve kernel/trace/trace.h:1677 [inline]
trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x6f0 kernel/trace/trace.c:1924
trace_event_buffer_reserve+0x1f9/0x350 kernel/trace/trace_events.c:715
do_trace_event_raw_event_lock include/trace/events/lock.h:49 [inline]
trace_event_raw_event_lock+0x124/0x2b0 include/trace/events/lock.h:49
__do_trace_lock_release include/trace/events/lock.h:68 [inline]
trace_lock_release include/trace/events/lock.h:68 [inline]
lock_release+0x218/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5954
might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:316 [inline]
slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4636 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4974 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x63/0x6a0 mm/slub.c:5010
anon_vma_alloc mm/rmap.c:94 [inline]
anon_vma_fork+0x8d/0x6a0 mm/rmap.c:391
dup_mmap+0x10e6/0x2370 mm/mmap.c:1781
dup_mm kernel/fork.c:1543 [inline]
copy_mm kernel/fork.c:1595 [inline]
copy_process+0x4811/0x8370 kernel/fork.c:2310
kernel_clone+0x176/0x9d0 kernel/fork.c:2769
__do_sys_clone+0xd9/0x120 kernel/fork.c:2911
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f122a9c6bd2
Code: 89 e7 e8 71 8b f7 ff 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 66 89 c5 85 c0 75 3b 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffda742550 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffda742550 RCX: 00007f122a9c6bd2
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
RBP: 00007fffda7426dc R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 000055557d0397d0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 000055557d04ca10 R14: 000000000008d88f R15: 00007fffda742730
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6453:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5414 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x342/0x880 mm/slub.c:5426
_kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1200 [inline]
__rb_allocate_pages+0x308/0xfc0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2483
ring_buffer_resize+0x71c/0x1ed0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3357
__tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x52/0x1f0 kernel/trace/trace.c:4740
__tracing_resize_ring_buffer kernel/trace/trace.c:4734 [inline]
tracing_update_buffers+0xd4/0xf0 kernel/trace/trace.c:4979
ftrace_event_write+0x14a/0x2c0 kernel/trace/trace_events.c:1562
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1050 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 10552:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2748 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:6508 [inline]
kfree+0x22b/0x6d0 mm/slub.c:6801
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:418 [inline]
rb_remove_pages kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3169 [inline]
rb_update_pages+0x675/0xd60 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3268
update_pages_handler kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3279 [inline]
ring_buffer_resize+0x14af/0x1ed0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3389
__tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x52/0x1f0 kernel/trace/trace.c:4740
__tracing_resize_ring_buffer kernel/trace/trace.c:4734 [inline]
tracing_resize_ring_buffer+0x10b/0x160 kernel/trace/trace.c:4795
tracing_entries_write+0x15d/0x220 kernel/trace/trace.c:5741
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:851 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:836 [inline]
vfs_writev+0x5ed/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:1060
do_writev+0x13e/0x340 fs/read_write.c:1104
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x123/0x790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033712280
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 64-byte region [ffff888033712280, ffff8880337122c0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33712
flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff88801c0348c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 1, tgid 1 (swapper/0), ts 12447819587
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:33 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0xfd/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1871
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1879 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x110d/0x35d0 mm/page_alloc.c:3943
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x2eb/0x3300 mm/page_alloc.c:5436
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3347 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3462 [inline]
new_slab+0xa9/0x6e0 mm/slub.c:3513
refill_objects+0xe3/0x410 mm/slub.c:7417
refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2885 [inline]
__pcs_replace_empty_main+0x35e/0x650 mm/slub.c:4774
alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4850 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4984 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5413 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x67c/0x840 mm/slub.c:5439
_kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:995 [inline]
_kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1312 [inline]
handler_new_ref+0x1ab/0xc60 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c:1959
v4l2_ctrl_add_handler drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c:2520 [inline]
v4l2_ctrl_add_handler+0x223/0x300 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls-core.c:2494
vivid_create_controls+0x33bd/0x3e80 drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-ctrls.c:2071
vivid_create_instance drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-core.c:1933 [inline]
vivid_probe.cold+0x4f1e/0x921e drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-core.c:2095
platform_probe+0x106/0x1d0 drivers/base/platform.c:1507
call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:628 [inline]
really_probe+0x241/0xa60 drivers/base/dd.c:706
__driver_probe_device+0x210/0x460 drivers/base/dd.c:868
driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:898
__driver_attach+0x21f/0x5b0 drivers/base/dd.c:1292
page_owner free stack trace missing
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888033712180: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888033712200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888033712280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888033712300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888033712380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
0: 90 nop
1: 90 nop
2: 90 nop
3: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
7: 65 48 8b 05 6c 80 80 mov %gs:0x1280806c(%rip),%rax # 0x1280807b
e: 12
f: 48 8b 34 24 mov (%rsp),%rsi
13: 65 48 8b 15 50 80 80 mov %gs:0x12808050(%rip),%rdx # 0x1280806b
1a: 12
1b: 48 63 c8 movslq %eax,%rcx
1e: a9 00 01 00 ff test $0xff000100,%eax
23: 74 1e je 0x43
25: f6 c4 01 test $0x1,%ah
28: 74 44 je 0x6e
* 2a: a9 00 00 00 0f test $0xf000000,%eax <-- trapping instruction
2f: 75 3d jne 0x6e
31: f7 c1 00 00 00 f0 test $0xf0000000,%ecx
37: 75 35 jne 0x6e
39: 8b 82 3c 17 00 00 mov 0x173c(%rdx),%eax
3f: 85 .byte 0x85
Reply: **Analysis of the Bug**
The bug is a Use-After-Free (UAF) in the ftrace ring buffer (`kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`). It is caused by a race condition between the ring buffer resizing logic and an interrupt handler attempting to record a trace event.
1. **The Race Condition:** When the ring buffer is shrunk, `ring_buffer_resize()` schedules `rb_update_pages()` to run on the target CPU. This function calls `rb_remove_pages()`, which temporarily disables event recording by incrementing `cpu_buffer->record_disabled`, unlinks the pages to be removed, and then decrements `record_disabled` to resume tracing. Crucially, it resumes tracing *before* it actually frees the unlinked pages in a loop.
2. **The UAF:** If an interrupt occurs on the same CPU while `rb_remove_pages()` is in the middle of its `free_buffer_page()` loop, the interrupt handler will call `ring_buffer_lock_reserve()`. Since `record_disabled` has already been decremented, the reservation proceeds. The interrupt handler may then call `rb_move_tail()`, which accesses `cpu_buffer->commit_page` or `tail_page`. If these pointers reference one of the pages that was just unlinked and freed, a Use-After-Free occurs.
**Exploitability**
The bug is **exploitable**. If an attacker can reliably win the race and control the contents of the freed `buffer_page` object (e.g., via heap spraying), they can achieve an arbitrary memory write. Specifically, during the event commit phase, `rb_set_commit_to_write()` executes `cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit = cpu_buffer->commit_page->write;`. By controlling the `page` pointer within the freed `buffer_page` structure, the attacker can write a controlled value to an arbitrary kernel address. This is a powerful primitive that can be used to hijack control flow or bypass kernel lockdown/secure boot.
**Accessibility**
Despite being exploitable, the bug is **not accessible to unprivileged users**.
Triggering the bug requires resizing the ftrace ring buffer, which is done by writing to the `buffer_size_kb` file in `tracefs` (typically mounted at `/sys/kernel/tracing`).
- `tracefs` is restricted to the `root` user (mode `0700` by default) and requires `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING`.
- `tracefs` cannot be mounted inside an unprivileged user namespace (`FS_USERNS_MOUNT` is not set for tracefs).
Therefore, an attacker must already possess root privileges in the initial namespace to trigger this vulnerability.
**Other Triggers**
The bug is strictly tied to the ftrace subsystem and local tracefs interactions. It cannot be triggered remotely over a network, via malicious filesystems, peripheral devices, or from a VM guest context.
|
| 6/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 13265
output: 31
thoughts: 572
Thoughts: **Analyzing a KASAN Slab-Use-After-Free in the Ring Buffer**
Okay, so I'm looking at this KASAN report, and it's pointing to a `slab-use-after-free` in `rb_is_reader_page` within `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`. Specifically, a read of size 8 at `ffff888033712280`. The call trace is pretty clear: it's starting with `rb_is_reader_page` and going through `rb_move_tail`, `__rb_reserve_next`, down the usual event handling path, eventually hitting `lock_release`. Hold on⦠`lock_release`? That's interesting; it's called from `rcu_read_unlock` in `taprio_dequeue`. That suggests a very specific and unusual sequence.
The allocation, based on the report, happened during a `ring_buffer_resize` via `ftrace_event_write` from task 6453, using `__rb_allocate_pages`. The free happened during another `ring_buffer_resize` triggered by `tracing_entries_write` from task 10552, using `free_buffer_page` during `rb_update_pages`. Aha, so it's likely a race condition related to ring buffer resizing while events are simultaneously being recorded or read. This makes sense; ftrace utilizes ring buffers.
Now, ftrace usually requires root privileges (specifically `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING`) to access tracefs/debugfs and, importantly, resize the ring buffer. This raises a key question: can unprivileged users somehow trigger a ring buffer resize or interact with the buffer in a way that leads to this use-after-free? Tracefs, typically mounted at `/sys/kernel/tracing`, is owned by root with 0700 or 0750 permissions. It's meant to be pretty locked down.
But⦠what about user namespaces? Could a user namespace allow for the manipulation of tracefs and trigger this issue? It's an edge case, but something that needs to be considered. I need to check whether tracefs is mountable within a user namespace. The next logical step is to dig through the code base and see if `tracefs`'s `fs_context_operations` allows for mounting in a user namespace, or if it explicitly includes something like `FS_USERNS_MOUNT` which would make it safe. I'll fire up `grepper` and get searching.
|
| 7/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:FS_USERNS_MOUNT PathPrefix:fs/tracefs]
Results:
|
| 8/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14448
output: 31
thoughts: 28
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Investigating User Namespaces and Filesystem Mounts**
Alright, so the standard approach to tracefs is clearly a dead end β it's not mountable within a user namespace. That's not entirely surprising, given its potential for sensitive system-level interactions. Given this limitation, and my desire to explore tracing functionality within isolated environments, my next line of inquiry is clear: I need to determine if debugfs presents a viable alternative. My hypothesis is that if debugfs *is* mountable within a user namespace, it might offer a route to achieving some level of tracing and debugging capabilities in isolated containers or sandboxes. I'll need to verify its mountability and then delve into what capabilities are exposed within the user namespace. Let's dig in and see.
|
| 9/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Expression:FS_USERNS_MOUNT PathPrefix:fs/debugfs]
Results:
|
| 10/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14699
output: 24
thoughts: 172
Thoughts: **Investigating Ring Buffer Resizing in a User Namespace**
Okay, so I've hit a wall: debugfs isn't mountable in a user namespace. That's a given. But, I'm thinking about the ring buffer and how it might be used... Could the perf events system be utilizing it? Of course, perf events *can* leverage the ring buffer. That's a definite possibility. The real question is whether perf events can actually *trigger* a resize of the ring buffer.
I went digging through the allocation traces. And yeah, I see the calls I was hoping for: `__tracing_resize_ring_buffer`, followed by `tracing_update_buffers`, then `ftrace_event_write`, `vfs_write`, all the way up to `ksys_write`. Okay, that *looks* like a write to a file within tracefs, but which one? Is it writing to `set_event`, or something similar? Actually, no, `ftrace_event_write` is probably going through `trace_marker`. Wait, hold on.
I need to nail down exactly which file `ftrace_event_write` is actually writing to. That's the key to understanding this. Let me check...
|
| 11/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:ftrace_event_write]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:ftrace_set_event_fops SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace_events.c SourceLine:2732]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 12/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15244
output: 23
thoughts: 128
Thoughts: Okay, let me break this down.
**Decoding the Tracefs Write Operation**
Alright, so I'm looking at `ftrace_set_event_fops`. Ah, that's the key. Someone is writing to a `set_event` file within the tracefs filesystem. That immediately flags a security check β access to tracefs, and by extension, these control files, is heavily restricted. It requires root privileges or a user with either `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING` capabilities *within the initial namespace*. I need to be sure the context of the operation is accounted for.
Hold on, I see a reference to something like a "free trace", and I recall there are other writes besides setting tracing events. Let's see... looking further down the call stack, I see `tracing_entries_write`, then `do_loop_readv_writev`, `vfs_writev`, and finally `do_writev`. Okay, I recognize those kernel functions now. `tracing_entries_write` is used to write to various tracefs files, such as the `buffer_size_kb` file, which is an important variable to tune.
|
| 13/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:tracing_entries_write]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:tracing_entries_fops SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:6606]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 14/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15725
output: 25
thoughts: 211
Thoughts: Okay, let's break this down.
**Analyzing the Tracefs Buffer Size Vulnerability**
Alright, so `tracing_entries_fops` directly relates to `buffer_size_kb`. That much is clear. The key is that writing to tracefs files is what triggers both allocation and freeing of resources. The catch here is that tracefs is a privileged territory, effectively isolating it from unprivileged users or userspace namespace shenanigans. This suggests this is a root-level bug, or, at a minimum, requires `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING` capabilities.
Let's quickly rule out other possible entry points into `tracing_entries_write` or `ftrace_event_write`. Nope, they're all directly tied to tracefs file operations or statically defined. Wait a second, just to be thorough, I need to consider a scenario where tracefs is mounted with more relaxed permissions by root. That could be a way in. By default, I know the files themselves are 0644 or 0640, but the root directory of tracefs itself is usually 0700 or 0750. I need to specifically look at `tracefs_create_file` calls for `set_event` and `buffer_size_kb` to confirm whether the permissions are actually what I'm expecting.
|
| 15/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:trace_create_file.*buffer_size_kb]
Results: map[Output:kernel/trace/trace.c=8973=init_tracer_tracefs(struct trace_array *tr, struct dentry *d_tracer)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-8999-
kernel/trace/trace.c:9000: trace_create_file("buffer_size_kb", writable_mode, d_tracer,
kernel/trace/trace.c-9001- tr, &tracing_entries_fops);
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c=798=static int trace_remote_init_tracefs(const char *name, struct trace_remote *remote)
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-826-
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c:827: d = trace_create_file("buffer_size_kb", TRACEFS_MODE_WRITE, remote_d, remote,
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-828- &buffer_size_kb_fops);
]
|
| 16/2 |
2026/09/23 01:00 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16503
output: 20
thoughts: 41
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as an expert's internal monologue:
**Checking Tracefs Root Permissions**
Right, `writable_mode` generally defaults to 0644, a fairly standard permission level. But something's niggling at me. This `tracefs` thing, the root directory of which is annoyingly named `d_tracer`, that's a bit of an outlier, isn't it? I need to quickly verify that the permissions of that top-level directory align with expectations, or at least that they make sense given its purpose and the implications for security. Let's make sure nothing unusual is happening with write access there that I'm overlooking. Just a quick sanity check to be sure, given this unusual name.
|
| 17/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:tracefs_create_dir]
Results: map[Output:fs/tracefs/inode.c=567=static struct inode *instance_inode(struct dentry *parent, struct inode *inode)
--
fs/tracefs/inode.c-600- * wide range of flexibility in creating a file, or a directory (if you want
fs/tracefs/inode.c:601: * to create a directory, the tracefs_create_dir() function is
fs/tracefs/inode.c-602- * recommended to be used instead.)
--
fs/tracefs/inode.c=650=static struct dentry *__create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent,
--
fs/tracefs/inode.c-682-/**
fs/tracefs/inode.c:683: * tracefs_create_dir - create a directory in the tracefs filesystem
fs/tracefs/inode.c-684- * @name: a pointer to a string containing the name of the directory to
--
fs/tracefs/inode.c-698- */
fs/tracefs/inode.c:699:struct dentry *tracefs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
fs/tracefs/inode.c-700-{
--
include/linux/tracefs.h=93=struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
--
include/linux/tracefs.h-96-
include/linux/tracefs.h:97:struct dentry *tracefs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent);
include/linux/tracefs.h-98-
--
kernel/trace/rv/rv.h=4=struct rv_interface {
--
kernel/trace/rv/rv.h-15-
kernel/trace/rv/rv.h:16:#define rv_create_dir tracefs_create_dir
kernel/trace/rv/rv.h-17-#define rv_create_file tracefs_create_file
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=7594=static struct dentry *tracing_dentry_percpu(struct trace_array *tr, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-7604-
kernel/trace/trace.c:7605: tr->percpu_dir = tracefs_create_dir("per_cpu", d_tracer);
kernel/trace/trace.c-7606-
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=7625=tracing_init_tracefs_percpu(struct trace_array *tr, long cpu)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-7634- snprintf(cpu_dir, 30, "cpu%ld", cpu);
kernel/trace/trace.c:7635: d_cpu = tracefs_create_dir(cpu_dir, d_percpu);
kernel/trace/trace.c-7636- if (!d_cpu) {
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=7959=static struct dentry *trace_options_init_dentry(struct trace_array *tr)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-7969-
kernel/trace/trace.c:7970: tr->options = tracefs_create_dir("options", d_tracer);
kernel/trace/trace.c-7971- if (!tr->options) {
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=8637=static int trace_array_create_dir(struct trace_array *tr)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-8640-
kernel/trace/trace.c:8641: tr->dir = tracefs_create_dir(tr->name, trace_instance_dir);
kernel/trace/trace.c-8642- if (!tr->dir)
--
kernel/trace/trace_hwlat.c=765=static int init_tracefs(void)
--
kernel/trace/trace_hwlat.c-773-
kernel/trace/trace_hwlat.c:774: top_dir = tracefs_create_dir("hwlat_detector", NULL);
kernel/trace/trace_hwlat.c-775- if (!top_dir)
--
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c=2757=static int osnoise_create_cpu_timerlat_fd(struct dentry *top_dir)
--
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c-2770- */
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c:2771: per_cpu = tracefs_create_dir("per_cpu", top_dir);
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c-2772- if (!per_cpu)
--
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c-2776- snprintf(cpu_str, 30, "cpu%ld", cpu);
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c:2777: cpu_dir = tracefs_create_dir(cpu_str, per_cpu);
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c-2778- if (!cpu_dir)
--
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c=2835=static int init_tracefs(void)
--
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c-2844-
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c:2845: top_dir = tracefs_create_dir("osnoise", NULL);
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c-2846- if (!top_dir)
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c=798=static int trace_remote_init_tracefs(const char *name, struct trace_remote *remote)
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-808- if (!root) {
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c:809: root = tracefs_create_dir(TRACEFS_DIR, NULL);
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-810- if (!root) {
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-816-
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c:817: remote_d = tracefs_create_dir(name, root);
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-818- if (!remote_d) {
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-839-
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c:840: percpu_d = tracefs_create_dir("per_cpu", remote_d);
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-841- if (!percpu_d) {
--
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-850- snprintf(cpu_name, sizeof(cpu_name), "cpu%d", cpu);
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c:851: cpu_d = tracefs_create_dir(cpu_name, percpu_d);
kernel/trace/trace_remote.c-852- if (!cpu_d) {
--
kernel/trace/trace_stat.c=274=static int tracing_stat_init(void)
--
kernel/trace/trace_stat.c-281-
kernel/trace/trace_stat.c:282: stat_dir = tracefs_create_dir("trace_stat", NULL);
kernel/trace/trace_stat.c-283- if (!stat_dir) {
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_args_char.tc=47=else
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_args_char.tc:48: DIR_NAME="tracefs_create_dir"
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_args_char.tc-49-fi
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_args_string.tc=47=else
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_args_string.tc:48: DIR_NAME="tracefs_create_dir"
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_args_string.tc-49-fi
--
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/probepoint.tc-5-
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/probepoint.tc:6:TARGET_FUNC=tracefs_create_dir
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/probepoint.tc-7-
]
|
| 18/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18876
output: 20
thoughts: 67
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as if I were thinking it:
**Tracing the Tracefs Root Permissions**
Okay, so I'm digging into how the `tracefs` filesystem behaves, specifically the root directory permissions. I know the root directory gets created during the initialization, probably in `tracefs_init` or a similar function call. Wait a second... it's a *filesystem*! Right, the root's permissions are going to be set based on either the mount options used when the filesystem is mounted or, if those aren't specified, the default permissions for the filesystem itself.
Let me jump into the code to confirm this. I need to check `fs/tracefs/inode.c`, specifically the `tracefs_fill_super` function. That's usually the place where the core filesystem information, including the super block, and potentially initial inode properties like the root's permissions, are established. Time to see what's in there.
|
| 19/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:tracefs_fill_super]
Results: map[Output:fs/tracefs/inode.c=458=static const struct dentry_operations tracefs_dentry_operations = {
--
fs/tracefs/inode.c-463-
fs/tracefs/inode.c:464:static int tracefs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
fs/tracefs/inode.c-465-{
--
fs/tracefs/inode.c=480=static int tracefs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
fs/tracefs/inode.c-481-{
fs/tracefs/inode.c:482: int err = get_tree_single(fc, tracefs_fill_super);
fs/tracefs/inode.c-483-
]
|
| 20/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19368
output: 36
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: Okay, here we go...
**Diving into `tracefs_fill_super`**
Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. The first order of business is to thoroughly examine this `tracefs_fill_super` function. I need to understand exactly how it fits into the overall scheme of the tracefs filesystem. Given my expertise, I already have a pretty good mental model of how virtual filesystems typically work, so I'm expecting this function to be responsible for setting up the initial structures and populating the superblock with the necessary information for tracefs to function. It should handle the allocation of the superblock, define the filesystem's behavior (mount options, etc.), and probably initialize the root inode. I'm also curious about what specific data structures it's using internally to represent the trace data β is it leveraging any existing kernel facilities, or is it rolling its own? I need to analyze how this function interacts with the lower-level block device or, more likely, virtual storage it's managing. My experience suggests a key focus will be error handling; I'll need to see how the code gracefully handles failures during memory allocation, data structure initialization, and the like. This function is essentially the entry point for the whole tracefs process, so my investigation here is pivotal.
|
| 21/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:fs/tracefs/inode.c FirstLine:464 LineCount:20]
Results: map[Contents: 464: static int tracefs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
465: {
466: static const struct tree_descr trace_files[] = {{""}};
467: int err;
468:
469: err = simple_fill_super(sb, TRACEFS_MAGIC, trace_files);
470: if (err)
471: return err;
472:
473: sb->s_op = &tracefs_super_operations;
474: tracefs_apply_options(sb, false);
475: set_default_d_op(sb, &tracefs_dentry_operations);
476:
477: return 0;
478: }
479:
480: static int tracefs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
481: {
482: int err = get_tree_single(fc, tracefs_fill_super);
483:
]
|
| 22/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 19991
output: 38
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing `tracefs_apply_options`**
Alright, let's dive into `tracefs_apply_options`. I'm going to carefully dissect its functionality, specifically how it interfaces with the `tracefs` filesystem. My initial focus will be on the parsing logic for any user-supplied options. Iβll want to see how these options are validated, and how potential errors are handled. I expect to find common patterns β keyword matching, value extraction, and sanitation.
Next, I'll pay close attention to the impact of any changes the function makes. Are we just altering in-memory data structures, or does this trigger deeper effects β perhaps writing to a ring buffer, modifying a filter, or enabling a trace event? I anticipate an intricate dance with the core tracing infrastructure, so I'll be looking for synchronization primitives. I'll need to understand how concurrent access is handled, especially since `tracefs` is often a point of contention with userspace.
Beyond the immediate mechanics, I'll be thinking about the larger context: what are the implications of the configuration? What are the possible security vulnerabilities? I need to analyze its behavior from the perspective of how a malicious user may exploit it. I'll be looking for possible vulnerabilities, such as race conditions, buffer overflows, or format string bugs.
Finally, I'll consider how this function fits into the overall `tracefs` architecture. What's the relationship with other components? Does it call or depend on any other critical modules? Overall, I'm expecting to confirm that this is a well-engineered and robust function, that is suitable for use on a production kernel.
|
| 23/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/tracefs/inode.c Name:tracefs_apply_options]
Results: map[SourceCode: 310: static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb, bool remount)
311: {
312: struct tracefs_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
313: struct inode *inode = d_inode(sb->s_root);
314: struct tracefs_inode *ti;
315: bool update_uid, update_gid;
316: int srcu_idx;
317: umode_t tmp_mode;
318:
319: /*
320: * On remount, only reset mode/uid/gid if they were provided as mount
321: * options.
322: */
323:
324: if (!remount || fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_mode)) {
325: tmp_mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode) & ~S_IALLUGO;
326: tmp_mode |= fsi->mode;
327: WRITE_ONCE(inode->i_mode, tmp_mode);
328: }
329:
330: if (!remount || fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_uid))
331: inode->i_uid = fsi->uid;
332:
333: if (!remount || fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_gid))
334: inode->i_gid = fsi->gid;
335:
336: if (remount && (fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_uid) || fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_gid))) {
337:
338: update_uid = fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_uid);
339: update_gid = fsi->opts & BIT(Opt_gid);
340:
341: srcu_idx = eventfs_remount_lock();
342: rcu_read_lock();
343: list_for_each_entry_rcu(ti, &tracefs_inodes, list) {
344: if (update_uid) {
345: ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_UID_PERM_SET;
346: ti->vfs_inode.i_uid = fsi->uid;
347: }
348:
349: if (update_gid) {
350: ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_GID_PERM_SET;
351: ti->vfs_inode.i_gid = fsi->gid;
352: }
353:
354: /*
355: * Note, the above ti->vfs_inode updates are
356: * used in eventfs_remount() so they must come
357: * before calling it.
358: */
359: if (ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE)
360: eventfs_remount(ti, update_uid, update_gid);
361: }
362: rcu_read_unlock();
363: eventfs_remount_unlock(srcu_idx);
364: }
365:
366: return 0;
367: }
SourceFile:fs/tracefs/inode.c]
|
| 24/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21339
output: 38
thoughts: 11
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, keeping in mind the expert user:
**Deep Dive on `fsi->mode` Initialization**
Alright, so the first thing that's hitting me is that little snippet: "What is `fsi->mode` initialized to?" My immediate reaction is, "Right, *that* variable. Where do we set the initial state?" We all know itβs *critical*. I can't even count the number of times a subtle bug has stemmed from an uninitialized value like this. Depending on what `fsi` represents and the overall architecture, a mishandling of `fsi->mode` is going to lead to all sorts of unexpected behaviour.
I'm thinking about the different possible scenarios: is it a simple flag, an enum, something more complex like a bitfield? Does the code rely on it being zeroed-out by the compiler, or is there a specific, explicit initialization? I need to know the starting state. Is it relying on a default value assigned at declaration, maybe in a configuration file?
The implications are huge. The value could influence data flow, access controls, even error handling. If it's not handled correctly, it's a huge potential vulnerability. A quick review of the surrounding code would be in order. What context are we working in here, so I'll need to know which file and function. Without that knowledge, it's impossible to assume anything, but my mind is instantly drawing parallels to similar systems that I've worked on. The whole question immediately brings up a need to trace the initialization and subsequent usages. It's a foundational piece, so I can't make a solid assessment before getting a look at the code!
|
| 25/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/tracefs/inode.c Name:tracefs_parse_param]
Results: map[SourceCode: 279: static int tracefs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
280: {
281: struct tracefs_fs_info *opts = fc->s_fs_info;
282: struct fs_parse_result result;
283: int opt;
284:
285: opt = fs_parse(fc, tracefs_param_specs, param, &result);
286: if (opt < 0)
287: return opt;
288:
289: switch (opt) {
290: case Opt_uid:
291: opts->uid = result.uid;
292: break;
293: case Opt_gid:
294: opts->gid = result.gid;
295: break;
296: case Opt_mode:
297: opts->mode = result.uint_32 & S_IALLUGO;
298: break;
299: /*
300: * We might like to report bad mount options here;
301: * but traditionally tracefs has ignored all mount options
302: */
303: }
304:
305: opts->opts |= BIT(opt);
306:
307: return 0;
308: }
SourceFile:fs/tracefs/inode.c]
|
| 26/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22174
output: 40
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Initial Assessment of the Situation**
Alright, so we're diving into the initialization of the tracefs filesystem context, specifically looking at `tracefs_init_fs_context`. My immediate mental checklist starts ticking. *What's the scope here? What's the context?* This function is crucial for setting up the filesystem, and the 'context' implies that we're dealing with the core data structures that define the tracefs instance. I immediately start thinking about what the dependencies are, and what assumptions are made during that setup. Is there a race condition?
|
| 27/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:fs/tracefs/inode.c Name:tracefs_init_fs_context]
Results: map[SourceCode: 502: static int tracefs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
503: {
504: struct tracefs_fs_info *fsi;
505:
506: fsi = kzalloc_obj(struct tracefs_fs_info);
507: if (!fsi)
508: return -ENOMEM;
509:
510: fsi->mode = TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE;
511:
512: fc->s_fs_info = fsi;
513: fc->ops = &tracefs_context_ops;
514: return 0;
515: }
SourceFile:fs/tracefs/inode.c]
|
| 28/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22598
output: 23
thoughts: 11
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that line of thought, tailored for an expert audience:
**Diving into Tracefs Permissions**
Alright, so I see `TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE` and immediately my mind goes to the heart of the matter: file permissions within the tracefs filesystem. I'm thinking, what's the default mode, the initial set of permissions, that new files and directories get created with inside tracefs? It's a fundamental question. The implications are significant, impacting security, access control, and the overall usability of the tracing infrastructure. It affects who can read trace data, who can write to control files, and essentially defines the baseline security posture of the entire tracing subsystem. I need to understand this default. A misconfiguration here can open up a can of worms, potentially exposing sensitive system information or even allowing malicious manipulation of trace points. So, yeah, `TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE` - let's dig into that and figure out what it is. It's a critical detail.
|
| 29/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:#define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE]
Results: map[Output:fs/tracefs/inode.c-25-
fs/tracefs/inode.c:26:#define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE 0700
fs/tracefs/inode.c-27-static struct kmem_cache *tracefs_inode_cachep __ro_after_init;
]
|
| 30/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 22931
output: 25
thoughts: 176
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Tracefs Security Boundary**
Okay, so right now I'm looking at this tracefs setup, and the default permissions are pretty locked down β `0700`, owned by root. That immediately tells me that unprivileged users are out of luck; they can't access it, and it definitely can't be mounted within a user namespace. So, the initial assumption is that this bug, whatever it is, isn't something that can be exploited by a local unprivileged process or from within a user namespace. That's a good starting point.
But hold on... I'm missing something. The attack surface of these systems is subtle. Is there *any* other mechanism, any other path, that allows access to `ftrace_event_write` or `tracing_entries_write`? Could something like `perf` come into play here? I know `perf` events can leverage ftrace events, but do they actually write directly to the `set_event` or `buffer_size_kb` files? I don't think so. `perf` relies on the `perf_event_open` syscall, which is a different beast entirely.
The real question is: Does `perf_event_open` *indirectly* end up resizing the ring buffer? Does it call `tracing_resize_ring_buffer` or some equivalent function under the hood? I need to dig into the internals of `perf_event_open` now and see if there's any link there. I need to trace the code path.
|
| 31/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:tracing_resize_ring_buffer]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_entries_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:5741] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_free_buffer_release SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:5911]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 32/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23581
output: 26
thoughts: 47
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts:
**Analyzing `tracing_free_buffer_release` and Ring Buffer Resizing**
Okay, so `tracing_free_buffer_release` fires when the `free_buffer` file is closed, right? That suggests any ring buffer resizing is *exclusively* happening through the tracefs interface. That's a good starting point for understanding the control flow. But... what about `__tracing_resize_ring_buffer`? I need to quickly recall where that function is used. I'd assumed that resizing could happen via other pathways as well, or as a byproduct of a specific event or event configuration. I need to make sure I understand the relationship between that function, the tracefs files, and the overall buffer management.
|
| 33/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:__tracing_resize_ring_buffer]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_resize_ring_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:4795] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_set_tracer SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:5016] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_update_buffers SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:4979]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 34/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 23988
output: 39
thoughts: 186
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Kernel Trace and Potential Exploitability**
Okay, so here's what I've got from the trace. `tracing_update_buffers` is triggered from `ftrace_event_write`, and that's based on an allocation trace, interesting. I also see `tracing_set_tracer` being called when someone writes to the `current_tracer` file, all of which are, of course, under the tracefs file system. So, right off the bat, I know this is a privilege escalation, requiring either root or a capability like CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_TRACING. Makes sense; playing with the tracing infrastructure is something you wouldn't just let anyone do.
Now, the juicy bit: the bug itself. It's a KASAN slab-use-after-free, specifically within `rb_is_reader_page`. I see the read, an 8-byte access, at `ffff888033712280`. The underlying object is allocated in `kmalloc-64`, so it's a 64-byte object. The allocation path is `__rb_allocate_pages` which, based on the `struct buffer_page` structure, is the key.
My next step is to dive into `__rb_allocate_pages` to understand the conditions triggering the UAF. Understanding the allocation is critical to figuring out how to control the freed memory and eventually to the read that triggers the KASAN. This is where I can start looking for control over the freed memory and if I can control the content of the memory being read at `ffff888033712280`.
|
| 35/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:__rb_allocate_pages]
Results: map[SourceCode:2439: static int __rb_allocate_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
2440: unsigned long nr_pages, struct list_head *pages)
2441: {
2442: struct trace_buffer *buffer = cpu_buffer->buffer;
2443: struct ring_buffer_cpu_meta *meta = NULL;
2444: struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
2445: bool user_thread = current->mm != NULL;
2446: struct ring_buffer_desc *desc = NULL;
2447: long i;
2448:
2449: /*
2450: * Check if the available memory is there first.
2451: * Note, si_mem_available() only gives us a rough estimate of available
2452: * memory. It may not be accurate. But we don't care, we just want
2453: * to prevent doing any allocation when it is obvious that it is
2454: * not going to succeed.
2455: */
2456: i = si_mem_available();
2457: if (i < nr_pages)
2458: return -ENOMEM;
2459:
2460: /*
2461: * If a user thread allocates too much, and si_mem_available()
2462: * reports there's enough memory, even though there is not.
2463: * Make sure the OOM killer kills this thread. This can happen
2464: * even with RETRY_MAYFAIL because another task may be doing
2465: * an allocation after this task has taken all memory.
2466: * This is the task the OOM killer needs to take out during this
2467: * loop, even if it was triggered by an allocation somewhere else.
2468: */
2469: if (user_thread)
2470: set_current_oom_origin();
2471:
2472: if (buffer->range_addr_start)
2473: meta = rb_range_meta(buffer, nr_pages, cpu_buffer->cpu);
2474:
2475: if (buffer->remote) {
2476: desc = ring_buffer_desc(buffer->remote->desc, cpu_buffer->cpu);
2477: if (!desc || WARN_ON(desc->nr_page_va != (nr_pages + 1)))
2478: return -EINVAL;
2479: }
2480:
2481: for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
2482:
2483: bpage = alloc_cpu_page(cpu_buffer->cpu);
2484: if (!bpage)
2485: goto free_pages;
2486:
2487: rb_check_bpage(cpu_buffer, bpage);
2488:
2489: /*
2490: * Append the pages as for mapped buffers we want to keep
2491: * the order
2492: */
2493: list_add_tail(&bpage->list, pages);
2494:
2495: if (meta) {
2496: /* A range was given. Use that for the buffer page */
2497: bpage->page = rb_range_buffer(cpu_buffer, i + 1);
2498: if (!bpage->page)
2499: goto free_pages;
2500: /* If this is valid from a previous boot */
2501: if (meta->head_buffer)
2502: rb_meta_buffer_update(cpu_buffer, bpage);
2503: bpage->range = 1;
2504: bpage->id = i + 1;
2505: } else if (desc) {
2506: void *p = ring_buffer_desc_page(desc, i + 1);
2507:
2508: if (WARN_ON(!p))
2509: goto free_pages;
2510:
2511: bpage->page = p;
2512: bpage->range = 1; /* bpage->page can't be freed */
2513: bpage->id = i + 1;
2514: cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[i + 1] = bpage;
2515: } else {
2516: bpage->page = alloc_cpu_data(cpu_buffer->cpu,
2517: cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_order);
2518: if (!bpage->page)
2519: goto free_pages;
2520: }
2521: bpage->order = cpu_buffer->buffer->subbuf_order;
2522:
2523: if (user_thread && fatal_signal_pending(current))
2524: goto free_pages;
2525: }
2526: if (user_thread)
2527: clear_current_oom_origin();
2528:
2529: return 0;
2530:
2531: free_pages:
2532: list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, pages, list) {
2533: list_del_init(&bpage->list);
2534: free_buffer_page(bpage);
2535: }
2536: if (user_thread)
2537: clear_current_oom_origin();
2538:
2539: return -ENOMEM;
2540: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 36/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26153
output: 38
thoughts: 15
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that:
**My Perspective on `alloc_cpu_page`**
Right, so `alloc_cpu_page`. What's happening here is pretty straightforward. I'm essentially creating a new `struct buffer_page`. That's it, at the core. The function exists to grab the memory for a new instance of that data structure. It's the building block, the foundational step. The specific implementation details are obviously going to be architecture-dependent and optimized for performance, considering cache-line alignment and NUMA concerns. But fundamentally, I'm setting aside the memory, a *buffer_page*, ready for use within the greater system. That's the essence of the operation. I'm not doing anything fancy, just allocating the space.
|
| 37/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:alloc_cpu_page]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 38/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26394
output: 34
thoughts: 17
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Debugging Disambiguation: Macro vs. Static Inline**
Alright, hang on a second. I'm looking at this snippet of code and my first instinct is to pin down exactly *how* this thing is implemented. Is this some kind of clever macro trickery they're pulling, or is it a properly defined `static inline` function? There's a subtle but crucial difference there, especially considering performance implications and potential side effects in this particular context. Before I waste any more time, I need to know for certain. Time to break out `grep`. Let's get the definitive answer and move forward with this assessment.
|
| 39/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:alloc_cpu_page PathPrefix:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
Results: map[Output:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=413=static void free_buffer_page(struct buffer_page *bpage)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-428-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:429:#define alloc_cpu_page(cpu) (struct buffer_page *) \
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-430- kzalloc_node(ALIGN(sizeof(struct buffer_page), \
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2439=static int __rb_allocate_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2482-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2483: bpage = alloc_cpu_page(cpu_buffer->cpu);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2484- if (!bpage)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=2568=rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long nr_pages, int cpu)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2590-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2591: bpage = alloc_cpu_page(cpu);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-2592- if (!bpage)
]
|
| 40/2 |
2026/09/23 01:01 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26941
output: 40
thoughts: 55
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that.
**Analyzing the Buffer Page Issue**
Right, so, I'm looking at this code and it's pretty clear what's happening. We're dealing with a `struct buffer_page`, and it allocates space β around 64 bytes, give or take. The root of the problem, the bug itself, is a classic use-after-free, a UAF in this case. The key function involved here is `rb_is_reader_page`. That's where it's being triggered.
|
| 41/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_is_reader_page]
Results: map[SourceCode:1342: /*
1343: * rb_is_reader_page
1344: *
1345: * The unique thing about the reader page, is that, if the
1346: * writer is ever on it, the previous pointer never points
1347: * back to the reader page.
1348: */
1349: static bool rb_is_reader_page(struct buffer_page *page)
1350: {
1351: struct list_head *list = page->list.prev;
1352:
1353: return rb_list_head(list->next) != &page->list;
1354: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 42/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 27372
output: 36
thoughts: 61
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience and in the first person:
**Decoding that Memory Read**
Alright, that 8-byte read is screaming "pointer." Given the object size is 64 bytes and the offset is zero, it's pretty darn likely we're looking at either `page->list.prev` or `list->next`. The object's size and the zero offset make me lean heavily towards `page->list` being at the start of the structure. I'm assuming we are looking at some sort of page management system.
I need to confirm my hunch. Time to dig into the definition of `struct buffer_page`. That'll tell the tale of what's really going on with `page->list` and whether my assumptions about its placement within the structure are correct. Let's see if this is, as I suspect, a doubly-linked list embedded at the beginning of the page struct.
|
| 43/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-struct-layout |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:buffer_page]
Results: map[Fields:[map[Name:list OffsetBits:0 SizeBits:128] map[Name:write OffsetBits:128 SizeBits:64] map[Name:read OffsetBits:192 SizeBits:32] map[Name:entries OffsetBits:256 SizeBits:64] map[Name:real_end OffsetBits:320 SizeBits:64] map[Name:order OffsetBits:384 SizeBits:32] map[Name:id OffsetBits:416 SizeBits:30] map[Name:range OffsetBits:446 SizeBits:1] map[Name:page OffsetBits:448 SizeBits:64]]]
|
| 44/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 27862
output: 38
thoughts: 65
Thoughts: Here's my analysis of the situation:
**Understanding the UAF in `rb_move_tail`**
Okay, so I'm looking at this memory layout, and it's clear: `list` is right at the start, at offset 0. The read operation that's causing the problem is `page->list.prev`, and `list.prev` is located at offset 8. The crucial piece is that the use-after-free (UAF) is triggered when `rb_is_reader_page` is called on a freed `buffer_page`. And the chain of events leads us here: that call happens within the `rb_move_tail` function. It's that function's internal state that is critical, it seems. We need to focus on what `rb_move_tail` is doing right before the call to `rb_is_reader_page` in order to track down the root cause. My gut feeling tells me there may be a pointer not being properly zeroed after freeing.
|
| 45/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_move_tail]
Results: map[SourceCode:3917: /*
3918: * This is the slow path, force gcc not to inline it.
3919: */
3920: static noinline struct ring_buffer_event *
3921: rb_move_tail(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
3922: unsigned long tail, struct rb_event_info *info)
3923: {
3924: struct buffer_page *tail_page = info->tail_page;
3925: struct buffer_page *commit_page = cpu_buffer->commit_page;
3926: struct trace_buffer *buffer = cpu_buffer->buffer;
3927: struct buffer_page *next_page;
3928: int ret;
3929:
3930: next_page = tail_page;
3931:
3932: rb_inc_page(&next_page);
3933:
3934: /*
3935: * If for some reason, we had an interrupt storm that made
3936: * it all the way around the buffer, bail, and warn
3937: * about it.
3938: */
3939: if (unlikely(next_page == commit_page)) {
3940: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->commit_overrun);
3941: goto out_reset;
3942: }
3943:
3944: /*
3945: * This is where the fun begins!
3946: *
3947: * We are fighting against races between a reader that
3948: * could be on another CPU trying to swap its reader
3949: * page with the buffer head.
3950: *
3951: * We are also fighting against interrupts coming in and
3952: * moving the head or tail on us as well.
3953: *
3954: * If the next page is the head page then we have filled
3955: * the buffer, unless the commit page is still on the
3956: * reader page.
3957: */
3958: if (rb_is_head_page(next_page, &tail_page->list)) {
3959:
3960: /*
3961: * If the commit is not on the reader page, then
3962: * move the header page.
3963: */
3964: if (!rb_is_reader_page(cpu_buffer->commit_page)) {
3965: /*
3966: * If we are not in overwrite mode,
3967: * this is easy, just stop here.
3968: */
3969: if (!(buffer->flags & RB_FL_OVERWRITE)) {
3970: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->dropped_events);
3971: goto out_reset;
3972: }
3973:
3974: ret = rb_handle_head_page(cpu_buffer,
3975: tail_page,
3976: next_page);
3977: if (ret < 0)
3978: goto out_reset;
3979: if (ret)
3980: goto out_again;
3981: } else {
3982: /*
3983: * We need to be careful here too. The
3984: * commit page could still be on the reader
3985: * page. We could have a small buffer, and
3986: * have filled up the buffer with events
3987: * from interrupts and such, and wrapped.
3988: *
3989: * Note, if the tail page is also on the
3990: * reader_page, we let it move out.
3991: */
3992: if (unlikely((cpu_buffer->commit_page !=
3993: cpu_buffer->tail_page) &&
3994: (cpu_buffer->commit_page ==
3995: cpu_buffer->reader_page))) {
3996: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->commit_overrun);
3997: goto out_reset;
3998: }
3999: }
4000: }
4001:
4002: rb_tail_page_update(cpu_buffer, tail_page, next_page);
4003:
4004: out_again:
4005:
4006: rb_reset_tail(cpu_buffer, tail, info);
4007:
4008: /* Commit what we have for now. */
4009: rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);
4010: /* rb_end_commit() decs committing */
4011: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->committing);
4012:
4013: /* fail and let the caller try again */
4014: return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
4015:
4016: out_reset:
4017: /* reset write */
4018: rb_reset_tail(cpu_buffer, tail, info);
4019:
4020: return NULL;
4021: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 46/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 29663
output: 38
thoughts: 91
Thoughts: Okay, here's my breakdown of what's going on, thinking through this UAF scenario:
**Analyzing a Potential Use-After-Free in the Kernel**
Alright, so the call stack has landed us right in the heart of a problem: `cpu_buffer->commit_page`, specifically the unfortunate situation where it's pointing to a `buffer_page` that's already been freed. My gut feeling tells me we're looking at a classic Use-After-Free vulnerability, and the breadcrumbs are leading us to `ring_buffer_resize`.
Given that we're on a `cpu_buffer` and `commit_page` is the target, it strongly suggests a race condition involving buffer management. The crux of the issue is *why* the page was freed when we're supposed to be committing. That implies a situation where the page's lifecycle is being unexpectedly altered.
Wait a second⦠`ring_buffer_resize`? That function is known for freeing and reallocating buffer pages. Crucially, it takes the `cpu_buffer->reader_lock` to protect from simultaneous access, *and* it disables interrupts. This lock is probably meant to serialize access to the buffer. If it's locking the reader side and disabling interrupts then what about the other side of things?
This suggests that the function likely has a window where it frees pages, possibly in response to a buffer size change, but while something else is actively trying to *use* them. The interrupt disabling *should* prevent preemption, but clearly, we're still ending up with this UAF. Time to dig into `ring_buffer_resize` and analyze its locking and interrupt handling in detail.
|
| 47/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:ring_buffer_resize]
Results: map[SourceCode:3283: /**
3284: * ring_buffer_resize - resize the ring buffer
3285: * @buffer: the buffer to resize.
3286: * @size: the new size.
3287: * @cpu_id: the cpu buffer to resize
3288: *
3289: * Minimum size is 2 * rb_subbuf_capacity(buffer).
3290: *
3291: * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on failure.
3292: */
3293: int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
3294: int cpu_id)
3295: {
3296: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
3297: unsigned long nr_pages;
3298: int cpu, err;
3299:
3300: /*
3301: * Always succeed at resizing a non-existent buffer:
3302: */
3303: if (!buffer)
3304: return 0;
3305:
3306: /* Make sure the requested buffer exists */
3307: if (cpu_id != RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS &&
3308: !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu_id, buffer->cpumask))
3309: return 0;
3310:
3311: /*
3312: * Keep CPUs from coming online while resizing to synchronize
3313: * with new per CPU buffers being created.
3314: */
3315: guard(cpus_read_lock)();
3316:
3317: /* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */
3318: mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex);
3319: atomic_inc(&buffer->resizing);
3320:
3321: nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, rb_subbuf_capacity(buffer));
3322:
3323: /* we need a minimum of two pages */
3324: if (nr_pages < 2)
3325: nr_pages = 2;
3326:
3327: if (cpu_id == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
3328: /*
3329: * Don't succeed if resizing is disabled, as a reader might be
3330: * manipulating the ring buffer and is expecting a sane state while
3331: * this is true.
3332: */
3333: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
3334: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
3335: if (atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled)) {
3336: err = -EBUSY;
3337: goto out_err_unlock;
3338: }
3339: }
3340:
3341: /* calculate the pages to update */
3342: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
3343: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
3344:
3345: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages -
3346: cpu_buffer->nr_pages;
3347: /*
3348: * nothing more to do for removing pages or no update
3349: */
3350: if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update <= 0)
3351: continue;
3352: /*
3353: * to add pages, make sure all new pages can be
3354: * allocated without receiving ENOMEM
3355: */
3356: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
3357: if (__rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer, cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update,
3358: &cpu_buffer->new_pages)) {
3359: /* not enough memory for new pages */
3360: err = -ENOMEM;
3361: goto out_err;
3362: }
3363:
3364: cond_resched();
3365: }
3366:
3367: /*
3368: * Fire off all the required work handlers
3369: * We can't schedule on offline CPUs, but it's not necessary
3370: * since we can change their buffer sizes without any race.
3371: */
3372: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
3373: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
3374: if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
3375: continue;
3376:
3377: /* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */
3378: if (!cpu_online(cpu)) {
3379: rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
3380: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
3381: } else {
3382: /* Run directly if possible. */
3383: migrate_disable();
3384: if (cpu != smp_processor_id()) {
3385: migrate_enable();
3386: schedule_work_on(cpu,
3387: &cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
3388: } else {
3389: update_pages_handler(&cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
3390: migrate_enable();
3391: }
3392: }
3393: }
3394:
3395: /* wait for all the updates to complete */
3396: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
3397: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
3398: if (!cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update)
3399: continue;
3400:
3401: if (cpu_online(cpu))
3402: wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
3403: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
3404: }
3405:
3406: } else {
3407: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu_id];
3408:
3409: if (nr_pages == cpu_buffer->nr_pages)
3410: goto out;
3411:
3412: /*
3413: * Don't succeed if resizing is disabled, as a reader might be
3414: * manipulating the ring buffer and is expecting a sane state while
3415: * this is true.
3416: */
3417: if (atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled)) {
3418: err = -EBUSY;
3419: goto out_err_unlock;
3420: }
3421:
3422: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = nr_pages -
3423: cpu_buffer->nr_pages;
3424:
3425: INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
3426: if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update > 0 &&
3427: __rb_allocate_pages(cpu_buffer, cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update,
3428: &cpu_buffer->new_pages)) {
3429: err = -ENOMEM;
3430: goto out_err;
3431: }
3432:
3433: /* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */
3434: if (!cpu_online(cpu_id))
3435: rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
3436: else {
3437: /* Run directly if possible. */
3438: migrate_disable();
3439: if (cpu_id == smp_processor_id()) {
3440: rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer);
3441: migrate_enable();
3442: } else {
3443: migrate_enable();
3444: schedule_work_on(cpu_id,
3445: &cpu_buffer->update_pages_work);
3446: wait_for_completion(&cpu_buffer->update_done);
3447: }
3448: }
3449:
3450: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
3451: }
3452:
3453: out:
3454: /*
3455: * The ring buffer resize can happen with the ring buffer
3456: * enabled, so that the update disturbs the tracing as little
3457: * as possible. But if the buffer is disabled, we do not need
3458: * to worry about that, and we can take the time to verify
3459: * that the buffer is not corrupt.
3460: */
3461: if (atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)) {
3462: atomic_inc(&buffer->record_disabled);
3463: /*
3464: * Even though the buffer was disabled, we must make sure
3465: * that it is truly disabled before calling rb_check_pages.
3466: * There could have been a race between checking
3467: * record_disable and incrementing it.
3468: */
3469: synchronize_rcu();
3470: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
3471: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
3472: rb_check_pages(cpu_buffer);
3473: }
3474: atomic_dec(&buffer->record_disabled);
3475: }
3476:
3477: atomic_dec(&buffer->resizing);
3478: mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
3479: return 0;
3480:
3481: out_err:
3482: for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
3483: struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
3484:
3485: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
3486: cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0;
3487:
3488: if (list_empty(&cpu_buffer->new_pages))
3489: continue;
3490:
3491: list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, &cpu_buffer->new_pages,
3492: list) {
3493: list_del_init(&bpage->list);
3494: free_buffer_page(bpage);
3495:
3496: cond_resched();
3497: }
3498: }
3499: out_err_unlock:
3500: atomic_dec(&buffer->resizing);
3501: mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
3502: return err;
3503: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 48/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33276
output: 38
thoughts: 39
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of this flow, presented as a personal thought process, as requested:
**Deconstructing the `ring_buffer_resize` Mechanism**
Alright, so `ring_buffer_resize`... it's the gateway, isn't it? My first thought is to trace the execution path. It triggers `rb_update_pages`, which is designed to be asynchronous. This `rb_update_pages` call is dispatched to a workqueue, and crucially, executed on the *target* CPU. So, the resizing operation isn't necessarily immediate. This implies some kind of delayed update, which makes sense to potentially avoid blocking. Now, let's dive into the core of this `rb_update_pages` function and understand what's actually going on. I need to know how it handles the resizing itself: how does it allocate, deallocate, and move the pages around. What are the synchronization primitives it uses? Any potential contention issues? The workqueue mechanism suggests careful consideration of concurrency, but I need to confirm the specifics to understand the overall picture. Let's see...
|
| 49/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_update_pages]
Results: map[SourceCode:3261: static void rb_update_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
3262: {
3263: bool success;
3264:
3265: if (cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update > 0)
3266: success = rb_insert_pages(cpu_buffer);
3267: else
3268: success = rb_remove_pages(cpu_buffer,
3269: -cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update);
3270:
3271: if (success)
3272: cpu_buffer->nr_pages += cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update;
3273: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 50/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33814
output: 38
thoughts: 8
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Delving into `rb_remove_pages`**
Alright, let's dissect this. With `rb_remove_pages`, I'm looking at a critical component, likely dealing with memory management or page eviction within some Red-Black tree structure. My immediate focus is on how this function handles the complexities of removal, particularly concerning maintaining the Red-Black tree properties β balance, color invariants, and correct node ordering.
I'm thinking about the edge cases. Is this a leaf node being removed? A node with one child? Or, the dreaded node with two children? Each scenario presents a unique set of challenges and operations. My internal checklist runs through the typical steps: find the successor/predecessor (depending on the implementation), replace the node, potentially recolor nodes to satisfy RB properties, and then correctly handle the memory associated with the removed pages. I'm wondering if a "double black" situation is being dealt with.
The efficiency of this removal is paramount. How is this algorithm avoiding excessive rotations or rebalancing operations? Is it leveraging any optimizations specific to the memory context? Are they using a "steal node" approach to improve performance, rather than outright removing the page from the memory pool? Are there potential memory leaks if an error occurs during an update and the memory isn't returned? And, what about potential race conditions in a multithreaded environment? The choice of successor/predecessor is important here, I hope its correct to prevent incorrect memory release.
I'm also curious about error handling. What mechanisms are in place to address potential issues? Are there assertions to catch unexpected states? How are we handling situations where the page isn't found, or if there's a memory allocation failure during the process? Failure to handle all these scenarios could lead to memory corruption or crashes, and I need to be confident that this function is robust.
|
| 51/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:rb_remove_pages]
Results: map[SourceCode:3069: static bool
3070: rb_remove_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, unsigned long nr_pages)
3071: {
3072: struct list_head *tail_page, *to_remove, *next_page;
3073: struct buffer_page *to_remove_page, *tmp_iter_page;
3074: struct buffer_page *last_page, *first_page;
3075: unsigned long nr_removed;
3076: unsigned long head_bit;
3077: int page_entries;
3078:
3079: head_bit = 0;
3080:
3081: raw_spin_lock_irq(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
3082: atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
3083: /*
3084: * We don't race with the readers since we have acquired the reader
3085: * lock. We also don't race with writers after disabling recording.
3086: * This makes it easy to figure out the first and the last page to be
3087: * removed from the list. We unlink all the pages in between including
3088: * the first and last pages. This is done in a busy loop so that we
3089: * lose the least number of traces.
3090: * The pages are freed after we restart recording and unlock readers.
3091: */
3092: tail_page = &cpu_buffer->tail_page->list;
3093:
3094: /*
3095: * tail page might be on reader page, we remove the next page
3096: * from the ring buffer
3097: */
3098: if (cpu_buffer->tail_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
3099: tail_page = rb_list_head(tail_page->next);
3100: to_remove = tail_page;
3101:
3102: /* start of pages to remove */
3103: first_page = list_entry(rb_list_head(to_remove->next),
3104: struct buffer_page, list);
3105:
3106: for (nr_removed = 0; nr_removed < nr_pages; nr_removed++) {
3107: to_remove = rb_list_head(to_remove)->next;
3108: head_bit |= (unsigned long)to_remove & RB_PAGE_HEAD;
3109: }
3110: /* Read iterators need to reset themselves when some pages removed */
3111: cpu_buffer->pages_removed += nr_removed;
3112:
3113: next_page = rb_list_head(to_remove)->next;
3114:
3115: /*
3116: * Now we remove all pages between tail_page and next_page.
3117: * Make sure that we have head_bit value preserved for the
3118: * next page
3119: */
3120: tail_page->next = (struct list_head *)((unsigned long)next_page |
3121: head_bit);
3122: next_page = rb_list_head(next_page);
3123: next_page->prev = tail_page;
3124:
3125: /* make sure pages points to a valid page in the ring buffer */
3126: cpu_buffer->pages = next_page;
3127: cpu_buffer->cnt++;
3128:
3129: /* update head page */
3130: if (head_bit)
3131: cpu_buffer->head_page = list_entry(next_page,
3132: struct buffer_page, list);
3133:
3134: /* pages are removed, resume tracing and then free the pages */
3135: atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
3136: raw_spin_unlock_irq(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
3137:
3138: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, list_empty(cpu_buffer->pages));
3139:
3140: /* last buffer page to remove */
3141: last_page = list_entry(rb_list_head(to_remove), struct buffer_page,
3142: list);
3143: tmp_iter_page = first_page;
3144:
3145: do {
3146: cond_resched();
3147:
3148: to_remove_page = tmp_iter_page;
3149: rb_inc_page(&tmp_iter_page);
3150:
3151: /* update the counters */
3152: page_entries = rb_page_entries(to_remove_page);
3153: if (page_entries) {
3154: /*
3155: * If something was added to this page, it was full
3156: * since it is not the tail page. So we deduct the
3157: * bytes consumed in ring buffer from here.
3158: * Increment overrun to account for the lost events.
3159: */
3160: local_add(page_entries, &cpu_buffer->overrun);
3161: local_sub(rb_page_commit(to_remove_page), &cpu_buffer->entries_bytes);
3162: local_inc(&cpu_buffer->pages_lost);
3163: }
3164:
3165: /*
3166: * We have already removed references to this list item, just
3167: * free up the buffer_page and its page
3168: */
3169: free_buffer_page(to_remove_page);
3170: nr_removed--;
3171:
3172: } while (to_remove_page != last_page);
3173:
3174: RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, nr_removed);
3175:
3176: return nr_removed == 0;
3177: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 52/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 35997
output: 40
thoughts: 60
Thoughts: Okay, let's see. Here's what I'm thinking right now:
**Investigating a Ring Buffer Discrepancy**
Right, so `rb_remove_pages` disables recording. That much is clear; it uses `atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled)`. But hang on... if recording is *disabled* using this mechanism, how is `rb_move_tail` even managing to run? That seems contradictory. Something isn't adding up. I need to understand the interaction here, what's allowing `rb_move_tail` to proceed despite the recording being effectively shut off. I'll need to double check the logic in `ring_buffer_lock_reserve`. It's likely that function holds the key.
|
| 53/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c Name:ring_buffer_lock_reserve]
Results: map[SourceCode:5025: /**
5026: * ring_buffer_lock_reserve - reserve a part of the buffer
5027: * @buffer: the ring buffer to reserve from
5028: * @length: the length of the data to reserve (excluding event header)
5029: *
5030: * Returns a reserved event on the ring buffer to copy directly to.
5031: * The user of this interface will need to get the body to write into
5032: * and can use the ring_buffer_event_data() interface.
5033: *
5034: * The length is the length of the data needed, not the event length
5035: * which also includes the event header.
5036: *
5037: * Must be paired with ring_buffer_unlock_commit, unless NULL is returned.
5038: * If NULL is returned, then nothing has been allocated or locked.
5039: */
5040: struct ring_buffer_event *
5041: ring_buffer_lock_reserve(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long length)
5042: {
5043: struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
5044: struct ring_buffer_event *event;
5045: int cpu;
5046:
5047: /* If we are tracing schedule, we don't want to recurse */
5048: preempt_disable_notrace();
5049:
5050: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)))
5051: goto out;
5052:
5053: cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
5054:
5055: if (unlikely(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask)))
5056: goto out;
5057:
5058: cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
5059:
5060: if (unlikely(atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled)))
5061: goto out;
5062:
5063: if (unlikely(length > rb_subbuf_max_data_size(buffer)))
5064: goto out;
5065:
5066: if (unlikely(trace_recursive_lock(cpu_buffer)))
5067: goto out;
5068:
5069: event = rb_reserve_next_event(buffer, cpu_buffer, length);
5070: if (!event)
5071: goto out_unlock;
5072:
5073: return event;
5074:
5075: out_unlock:
5076: trace_recursive_unlock(cpu_buffer);
5077: out:
5078: preempt_enable_notrace();
5079: return NULL;
5080: }
SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c]
|
| 54/2 |
2026/09/23 01:02 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37087
output: 25
thoughts: 3076
Thoughts: **Analysis of a Ring Buffer Race Condition: A Deep Dive**
Okay, here's the breakdown of this potential issue, as I see it. It appears we have a classic race condition in the ring buffer logic, specifically tied to the `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` function. The core of the problem stems from the fact that `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` checks the `cpu_buffer->record_disabled` flag *without* taking any locks. This read can be stale.
Here's the scenario as I understand it: One CPU reads this flag as zero, seemingly giving it the green light. Meanwhile, another CPU, potentially in a different context, rapidly does three things: increments the `record_disabled` counter, unlinks pages to remove them from the ring, and then drops the lock. This then leads to freeing of those pages.
The first CPU, continuing its execution, proceeds down the reserve path and calls `rb_move_tail`. Because the second CPU raced ahead of the first, it calls `rb_move_tail` and accesses a page that has already been freed in `rb_remove_pages` which calls `free_buffer_page`. This creates a use-after-free situation, as we're now accessing memory that is potentially reallocated.
The critical observation here is the interrupt context. While the resize or update operations using `rb_remove_pages` happen on a specific CPU, `ring_buffer_lock_reserve` can be triggered from an interrupt. This means the lock-free read can be raced and interleaved with page removal and freeing. The interrupt handler calls `trace_event_buffer_reserve` which then calls `ring_buffer_lock_reserve`.
The key is that the `atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled)` in `rb_remove_pages` happens *before* the call to `free_buffer_page`. Therefore, the interrupt may have occurred after the pages have been unlinked but before they have been returned to the system, causing the UAF.
Then comes the question of whether the `commit_page` is removed. It turns out that `rb_remove_pages` removes pages *after* the `tail_page`, which is more than likely going to be in front of the `commit_page`. This means that `commit_page` can be subject to being unlinked and freed.
So the potential issue is in `rb_move_tail`, specifically in `rb_is_reader_page`. This checks whether the `commit_page` has been unlinked using `rb_list_head(list->next) != &page->list`. This is a *read* operation from a potentially freed page! The memory that was once a `buffer_page` is now a generic freed block, possibly controlled by the attacker if they can control the heap. This allows for an arbitrary read, which, depending on the control flow, can be used to influence what happens. This also means this could be an information leak.
If the returned result from `rb_is_reader_page` is true, then `rb_handle_head_page` is called, but no memory corruption would be caused in this process.
If the result is false, and therefore the `commit_page` is a freed page, `rb_set_commit_to_write` would write to `cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit`, which can be exploited by an attacker. This translates to an *arbitrary write* primitive! We are writing a value to an arbitrary address the attacker controls!
So the critical vulnerability is: an attacker can trigger this race, control the content of freed `buffer_page` objects and, through the logic of `rb_set_commit_to_write`, perform an arbitrary memory write by controlling `commit_page->page->commit`, as the write pointer is also read from a page controlled by an attacker.
The final question becomes, can we trigger this as an unprivileged user? We already know resizing requires writing to `buffer_size_kb` in tracefs, which requires root (or CAP_SYS_ADMIN / CAP_TRACING) access, so the answer is no, this is not an easily accessible primitive.
|
| 55/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:tracing_resize_ring_buffer]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_entries_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:5741] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_free_buffer_release SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:5911]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 56/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 41208
output: 23
thoughts: 10
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Resizing the Ring Buffer: Exploring the Implications**
Alright, so I'm thinking about the ring buffer implementation, and the question that immediately pops into my head is: *how robust is the resizing mechanism*? Specifically, I'm zeroing in on `ring_buffer_resize`. We all know that ring buffers are efficient for their fixed size, but what happens when that isn't sufficient? We need that `resize` capability to handle dynamic data streams, but I'm immediately concerned about the potential pitfalls here. Things like data integrity during the move, thread safety if it's a shared buffer, and the performance hit associated with potentially moving a large amount of dataβit all comes to mind. What are the edge cases? Does this function handle them gracefully, or is there the potential for data corruption or deadlocks if not handled carefully? I need to delve into the code and understand exactly how `ring_buffer_resize` deals with these things before I'm comfortable using it in a production environment. I need to know how it scales and what tradeoffs were made.
|
| 57/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:ring_buffer_resize]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__tracing_resize_ring_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:4740] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:__UNIQUE_ID_addressable_ring_buffer_resize_1150 SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:3504] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:__gendwarfksyms_ptr_ring_buffer_resize SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:3504] map[ReferenceKind:takes-address-of ReferencingEntityKind:global_variable ReferencingEntityName:__gendwarfksyms_ptr_ring_buffer_resize SourceFile:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c SourceLine:3504]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 58/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 41770
output: 26
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, keeping in mind I'm speaking to a fellow expert:
**Deep Dive on `__tracing_resize_ring_buffer`**
Alright, so I'm thinking about the kernel tracing infrastructure right now, and one thing immediately jumps to mind: `__tracing_resize_ring_buffer`. It's a key function, obviously, and I'm immediately wondering about the specifics of its implementation. What are the subtle implications for performance? Are there any potential bottlenecks I should be keeping in mind when designing and implementing new tracing features? I'm picturing the synchronization primitives used, and considering any potential contention. I'm especially focused on how the resizing impacts the rest of the tracer. What's the cost of that resize operation? I'm running through scenarios in my head β different workloads, varying buffer sizes, and the potential impact on overall system latency. I need to refresh my memory on the interactions with other tracing components. Gotta go check the source.
|
| 59/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:__tracing_resize_ring_buffer]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_resize_ring_buffer SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:4795] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_set_tracer SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:5016] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:tracing_update_buffers SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace.c SourceLine:4979]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 60/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 42194
output: 23
thoughts: 10
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person:
**Navigating the Tracing Landscape: A Buffer Conundrum**
Alright, so I'm thinking about the current tracing architecture, and the mental gears are turning... I keep coming back to a critical component in this setup. My primary concern is how we are handling buffer updates within the `tracing` framework. I'm focusing specifically on `tracing_update_buffers`. What are the current implications of that system?
I'm starting to consider how `tracing_update_buffers` is actually functioning. What's the cost of updating those buffers, and how frequently are we doing so? Are there opportunities to optimize or change the method altogether? Is there any significant impact that's not immediately obvious? I'm evaluating its potential performance bottlenecks and its impact on the system's overall latency. I'm trying to mentally map out the update pathways and consider edge cases. I need to take a few moments to think about memory usage, concurrent access, and potential race conditions within that crucial component of our system. I need to make sure I am on top of it.
|
| 61/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[Name:tracing_update_buffers]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:event_enable_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace_events.c SourceLine:1955] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:event_pid_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace_events.c SourceLine:2608] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:ftrace_event_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace_events.c SourceLine:1562] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:system_enable_write SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace_events.c SourceLine:2049] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:trace_printk_init_buffers SourceFile:kernel/trace/trace_printk.c SourceLine:567]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 62/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 42757
output: 29
thoughts: 753
Thoughts: **Ftrace Ring Buffer Security Analysis**
Okay, so I'm looking at these tracefs files and thinking through the implications. I see `event_enable_write`, `event_pid_write`, `ftrace_event_write`, and `system_enable_write` all relating to writing to specific files within the tracefs hierarchy. I also see `trace_printk_init_buffers` being called during boot or module load. My initial thought is that an unprivileged user can't trigger this bug.
Now, I need to confirm the exploit's reachability. Is this reachable from a user namespace? Well, we know tracefs isn't mountable in a user namespace directly. But, what if the root namespace mounted it and made it world-writable? If the root namespace mounts tracefs and changes the permissions to be world-writable, then yes. However, let's assume the default configuration. Tracefs is mounted at `/sys/kernel/tracing` with 0700 permissions by default. This means unprivileged users can't even enter the directory. So, the bug seems inaccessible from unprivileged processes or user namespaces based on that initial assessment.
But then, I need to consider `perf_event_open`. Does it use the ftrace ring buffer? No, I quickly recall that perf has its own ring buffer implementation in `kernel/events/ring_buffer.c`. The ftrace ring buffer is strictly for ftrace/tracefs. Ah, but `perf_event_open` *can* trace ftrace events, specifically tracepoints. Does *that* use the ftrace ring buffer? No, it uses the perf ring buffer. Let's verify this. When a tracepoint is enabled via perf, it registers a probe that writes to the perf ring buffer. The ftrace ring buffer is *only* used when the tracepoint is enabled via tracefs.
Now, what if `perf_event_open` triggers a tracepoint, and that tracepoint writes to the ftrace ring buffer? Yes, this is a possibility *if* the tracepoint is also enabled via tracefs. But to enable it via tracefs, I need root privileges. If root has enabled a tracepoint, and an unprivileged user triggers it, the unprivileged user is simply executing the tracepoint. The bug, as I understand it, involves a race between `ring_buffer_resize` (which requires root) and the tracepoint execution.
So the unprivileged user can *participate* in the race by triggering the tracepoint. But the other side of the race, specifically the `ring_buffer_resize` operation, *must* be executed by root. An unprivileged user cannot trigger the bug on their own. They need root to actively resize the ring buffer. Since root is required to trigger the bug, it's not considered accessible from unprivileged processes.
Let me rethink this... is there another way to resize the ring buffer? What about `trace_array_create`? When a new trace instance is created (via `mkdir` in `tracefs/instances`), it allocates a new ring buffer. But `mkdir` in tracefs also requires root.
What about `trace_printk`? If a kernel module uses `trace_printk`, it might initialize the buffers. But loading a kernel module requires root.
What about `bpf`? BPF can use ring buffers, but it uses its own BPF ring buffer (`kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c`). So, the ftrace ring buffer is strictly controlled by tracefs.
Finally, I need to double-check if there are any other callers of `ring_buffer_resize` that I may have overlooked.
|
| 63/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:ring_buffer_resize PathPrefix:kernel/trace/]
Results: map[Output:kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c=3275=static void update_pages_handler(struct work_struct *work)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3283-/**
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3284: * ring_buffer_resize - resize the ring buffer
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3285- * @buffer: the buffer to resize.
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3292- */
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3293:int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size,
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3294- int cpu_id)
--
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3503-}
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3504:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_resize);
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c-3505-
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=1287=static int run_tracer_selftest(struct tracer *type)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-1326- if (tr->ring_buffer_expanded)
kernel/trace/trace.c:1327: ring_buffer_resize(tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer, trace_buf_size,
kernel/trace/trace.c-1328- RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-1353- if (tr->ring_buffer_expanded)
kernel/trace/trace.c:1354: ring_buffer_resize(tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer, 1,
kernel/trace/trace.c-1355- RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
--
kernel/trace/trace.c=4721=static int __tracing_resize_ring_buffer(struct trace_array *tr,
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-4739-
kernel/trace/trace.c:4740: ret = ring_buffer_resize(tr->array_buffer.buffer, size, cpu);
kernel/trace/trace.c-4741- if (ret < 0)
--
kernel/trace/trace.c-4747-
kernel/trace/trace.c:4748: ret = ring_buffer_resize(tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer, size, cpu);
kernel/trace/trace.c-4749- if (ret < 0) {
--
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c=137=int resize_buffer_duplicate_size(struct array_buffer *trace_buf,
--
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c-143- for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c:144: ret = ring_buffer_resize(trace_buf->buffer,
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c-145- per_cpu_ptr(size_buf->data, cpu)->entries, cpu);
--
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c-151- } else {
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c:152: ret = ring_buffer_resize(trace_buf->buffer,
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c-153- per_cpu_ptr(size_buf->data, cpu_id)->entries, cpu_id);
--
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c=187=void free_snapshot(struct trace_array *tr)
--
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c-194- ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer, 0);
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c:195: ring_buffer_resize(tr->snapshot_buffer.buffer, 1, RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS);
kernel/trace/trace_snapshot.c-196- trace_set_buffer_entries(&tr->snapshot_buffer, 1);
]
|
| 64/2 |
2026/09/23 01:03 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 45315
output: 66
thoughts: 13564
Thoughts: **Bug Analysis and Assessment of the Ring Buffer UAF**
Okay, so I've been digging into this ring buffer issue, and it's a real doozy. This is all happening within the internal workings of `ftrace`, triggered by actions like taking snapshots or resizing through `tracefs`. Definitely not something an unprivileged user can poke at.
So let's break down the exploitability and the impact here.
Exploitable? Yes, absolutely. We've got a Use-After-Free (UAF) situation that lets an attacker take control of a freed `buffer_page` object. The `rb_set_commit_to_write` function is going to write to `cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit`, and if you can control `cpu_buffer->commit_page->page`, that's an arbitrary write primitive right there.
Denial of Service? Yup, also true. This bug causes a KASAN splat, which screams "memory corruption" and can lead to a kernel crash.
Unprivileged Access? No, you need `tracefs`, which requires elevated privileges.
User Namespaces? Nope, `tracefs` isn't mountable in user namespaces.
VM Guest, VM Host, Network, Remote, Peripheral, and Malicious Filesystem Triggers? No, no, no, and no. This is a general kernel problem, not specific to any of those scenarios.
Hold on, I did double-check other ways that `ring_buffer_resize` could be triggered, like `trace_array_create`, `trace_printk`, `hwlat_detector`, or `osnoise` tracers. All of these require root or the appropriate capabilities, so the bug is strictly limited to users with root (or `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` / `CAP_TRACING`) permissions. This means it's a *privilege escalation* from root to kernel, which is often dismissed because root already has full control, but it could be a bypass for lockdown or secure boot.
But, given the prompt, we need to focus on what this allows. Yes, memory corruption (the arbitrary write). So the final answer is:
* Exploitable: True
* DenialOfService: True
* Unprivileged: False
* UserNamespace: False
Now, the juicy part. I did a deep dive into the race condition. It boils down to this:
1. CPU 0 starts to reserve an event.
2. CPU 1 runs `rb_remove_pages` to shrink the buffer.
3. The problem is `rb_remove_pages` disables tracing to prevent race conditions during free operation by incrementing and decrementing record disabled. However, if an interrupt happens between the unlock and the freeing process, it will cause UAF in the reader page.
4. If an interrupt handler (say, a timer interrupt) kicks in on the *same* CPU during the `free_buffer_page` loop, it might call `ring_buffer_lock_reserve`. Because the trace is resumed at the decrement call, so now the function continues, accessing freed memory.
The KASAN report and the syzbot report fit this scenario perfectly.
This race happens when `ring_buffer_resize` can resize all the CPUs buffer.
So I checked why it works this way. And the problem happens due to the unlock process:
```c
/* pages are removed, resume tracing and then free the pages */
atomic_dec(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
```
Tracing is resumed *before* pages are freed. And that's the crux.
The crash happens in an interrupt handler on the *same* CPU. Specifically, it crashes during `hrtimer_interrupt`, and it is due to reading of freed memory `cpu_buffer->commit_page`. This explains the problem perfectly.
The free trace is:
```
kfree+0x22b/0x6d0 mm/slub.c:6801
free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:418 [inline]
rb_remove_pages kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3169 [inline]
rb_update_pages+0x675/0xd60 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3268
update_pages_handler kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3279 [inline]
ring_buffer_resize+0x14af/0x1ed0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:3389
```
And the allocation trace is:
|
| 65/2 |
2026/09/23 01:05 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[DenialOfService:true Exploitable:true FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:false UserNamespace:false VMGuestTrigger:false VMHostTrigger:false]
Results: map[DenialOfService:true Exploitable:true FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:false UserNamespace:false VMGuestTrigger:false VMHostTrigger:false]
|
| 66/2 |
2026/09/23 01:05 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 60034
output: 645
thoughts: 457
Thoughts: **Final Response: Ftrace Ring Buffer Use-After-Free**
Okay, the results are in. Time to solidify this response.
My analysis has pinpointed a nasty use-after-free vulnerability within the ftrace ring buffer in `kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`. It's all down to a race condition. Specifically, a clash between `ring_buffer_resize` β the function responsible for shrinking the buffer and, crucially, freeing pages β and an interrupt handler thatβs diligently recording trace events.
The heart of the problem lies within `rb_remove_pages`. This function cleverly disables recording by bumping `cpu_buffer->record_disabled`, unlinks the pages, and then β here's the rub β decrements `record_disabled` *before* actually freeing those unlinked pages. This creates a critical window. If an interrupt fires on the same CPU during that page freeing loop, the interrupt handler might see `record_disabled` as zero and blithely proceed to reserve an event. Consequently, the interrupt handler could call `rb_move_tail` and start touching `tail_page` or `commit_page` which may have already been unlinked and now being freed, leading to a classic use-after-free scenario.
The good news, for those of us who appreciate the elegant destruction of a system, is that this bug *is* exploitable. An attacker who can trigger this race can gain control over the freed `buffer_page` object β heap spraying, anyone? The interrupt handler then continues, potentially calling `rb_set_commit_to_write`. This translates to a write to `cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit`. By manipulating the `page` pointer within the freed `buffer_page`, the attacker can then gain the ability to write to arbitrary memory locations, leading to privilege escalation or bypassing of kernel lockdown.
The access mechanism for this bug, of course, is a bit limited. To resize the ftrace ring buffer, you need to write to the `buffer_size_kb` file within `tracefs`. It's mounted by default at `/sys/kernel/tracing`, owned by root with `0700` permissions. Moreover, `tracefs` cannot be mounted within an unprivileged user namespace. So, no easy ride here for unprivileged users or those within user namespaces. To trigger this bug you require `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING` in the initial namespace.
Given that the issue is specific to ftrace and `tracefs` interactions, I'm not seeing any plausible alternative trigger paths such as network, peripherals, VM, or filesystem events.
|
| 67/1 |
2026/09/23 01:05 |
action |
format-explanation |
0m
Results: map[Explanation:**Analysis of the Bug**
The bug is a Use-After-Free (UAF) in the ftrace ring buffer
(`kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c`). It is caused by a race condition between the
ring buffer resizing logic and an interrupt handler attempting to record a trace
event.
1. **The Race Condition:** When the ring buffer is shrunk,
`ring_buffer_resize()` schedules `rb_update_pages()` to run on the target CPU.
This function calls `rb_remove_pages()`, which temporarily disables event
recording by incrementing `cpu_buffer->record_disabled`, unlinks the pages to be
removed, and then decrements `record_disabled` to resume tracing. Crucially, it
resumes tracing *before* it actually frees the unlinked pages in a loop.
2. **The UAF:** If an interrupt occurs on the same CPU while `rb_remove_pages()`
is in the middle of its `free_buffer_page()` loop, the interrupt handler will
call `ring_buffer_lock_reserve()`. Since `record_disabled` has already been
decremented, the reservation proceeds. The interrupt handler may then call
`rb_move_tail()`, which accesses `cpu_buffer->commit_page` or `tail_page`. If
these pointers reference one of the pages that was just unlinked and freed, a
Use-After-Free occurs.
**Exploitability**
The bug is **exploitable**. If an attacker can reliably win the race and control
the contents of the freed `buffer_page` object (e.g., via heap spraying), they
can achieve an arbitrary memory write. Specifically, during the event commit
phase, `rb_set_commit_to_write()` executes
`cpu_buffer->commit_page->page->commit = cpu_buffer->commit_page->write;`. By
controlling the `page` pointer within the freed `buffer_page` structure, the
attacker can write a controlled value to an arbitrary kernel address. This is a
powerful primitive that can be used to hijack control flow or bypass kernel
lockdown/secure boot.
**Accessibility**
Despite being exploitable, the bug is **not accessible to unprivileged users**.
Triggering the bug requires resizing the ftrace ring buffer, which is done by
writing to the `buffer_size_kb` file in `tracefs` (typically mounted at
`/sys/kernel/tracing`).
- `tracefs` is restricted to the `root` user (mode `0700` by default) and
requires `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `CAP_TRACING`.
- `tracefs` cannot be mounted inside an unprivileged user namespace
(`FS_USERNS_MOUNT` is not set for tracefs).
Therefore, an attacker must already possess root privileges in the initial
namespace to trigger this vulnerability.
**Other Triggers**
The bug is strictly tied to the ftrace subsystem and local tracefs interactions.
It cannot be triggered remotely over a network, via malicious filesystems,
peripheral devices, or from a VM guest context.]
|