| 0/0 |
2026/07/14 00:00 |
flow |
assessment-security |
55m
Results: map[DenialOfService:true Explanation:Based on the provided kernel bug report and source code analysis, here is the
assessment of the bug:
**Analysis:**
The bug report indicates an RCU stall detected by CPU 1.
- CPU 1 is in `csd_lock_wait` (via `flush_tlb_multi` ->
`smp_call_function_many_cond`), spinning and waiting for CPU 0 to acknowledge
and process a TLB flush IPI.
- CPU 0 was executing `text_poke` (specifically `lock_is_held_type` called from
`lockdep_assert_held`) when it was interrupted by a local APIC timer interrupt
(`sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`).
- Inside the timer interrupt handler, CPU 0 is executing `__hrtimer_run_queues`.
The NMI backtrace captures CPU 0 exactly at `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` inside
`__run_hrtimer`, which is the point where the hrtimer subsystem drops the base
lock just before invoking a timer callback.
Because CPU 0 is executing a hardirq handler (the timer interrupt), it has
interrupts disabled and cannot process the pending IPI from CPU 1. CPU 1 is
spinning indefinitely waiting for CPU 0, which leads to the RCU stall.
The fact that CPU 0 is stuck inside `__hrtimer_run_queues` strongly indicates an
infinite loop caused by a misbehaving hrtimer callback. If an hrtimer callback
returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` without properly advancing the timer's expiration time
(e.g., via `hrtimer_forward` or `hrtimer_add_expires_ns`), the timer is
immediately re-enqueued with an expiration time that is still in the past.
`__hrtimer_run_queues` will then pick it up again in the same `while` loop,
leading to an infinite loop inside the hardirq handler.
**Security Impact:**
- **Exploitable:** No. This is a logical infinite loop in the timer processing
code. It does not involve memory corruption, out-of-bounds accesses, or
use-after-free conditions, so it cannot be exploited for privilege escalation or
information leaks.
- **Denial of Service:** Yes. The infinite loop in hardirq context completely
locks up the affected CPU and stalls any other CPUs attempting to send IPIs to
it, resulting in a system-wide hang/crash.
- **Unprivileged / User Namespace Accessible:** Yes. Unprivileged users can
create and arm various high-resolution timers (e.g., via `timer_create`,
`nanosleep`, `itimer`, or `io_uring` timeouts). If one of these paths contains
the buggy callback, an unprivileged user can trivially trigger the DoS.
- **VM Guest Trigger:** Yes. The bug occurs within the standard kernel timer
subsystem and can be triggered by a process running inside a VM guest.
- **VM Host / Network / Peripheral / Filesystem Trigger:** No. There is no
evidence that this requires malicious host interaction, network traffic, or
specific peripheral/filesystem data to trigger. Exploitable:false FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:true UserNamespace:true VMGuestTrigger:true VMHostTrigger:false]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/07/14 00:00 |
action |
syz-repro-to-c-repro |
0m
Results:
|
| 2/1 |
2026/07/14 00:00 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
1m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/335daa39c594b16ef1eec40d6e54219b33ac9772]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/07/14 00:02 |
action |
kernel-builder |
26m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/3a475be1eb70fd315804c07c72f584d3713fa054]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/07/14 00:28 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
17m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 5/1 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
agent |
expert |
9m
Model:
Results: map[DenialOfService:true Exploitable:false FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:true UserNamespace:true VMGuestTrigger:true VMHostTrigger:false]
Instruction: You are an experienced Linux kernel security engineer. Your task is to analyze given kernel bug report
and determine its security impact based on the following dimensions.
Use the provided tools to examine the source code, check for capability checks (e.g., capable(), ns_capable()),
and understand the nature of the bug. Analyze the given kernel build and configuration.
You can check the kernel config by grepping ".config" file; you can check kernel cmdline by grepping
".config" file for "CONFIG_CMDLINE=". Assume sysctl parameters have default values.
But analyze for the corresponding production build w/o debugging tools enabled (like KASAN, KMSAN, UBSAN).
Try different strategies when analyzing the bug:
- think of ways in which the vulnerable code is unreachable
- or the other way around: try to come up with different ideas of how an unprivileged user can reach the bug
If still unsure err on the side of the bug being non-exploitable/not-accessible.
In the final reply, provide a reasoning for your assessment.
Analysis dimensions:
* Exploitable:
Determine if the bug can result in memory corruption, elevated privileges, or an information leak.
Memory safety issues are almost always exploitable (KASAN or UBSAN reports for use-after-free, out-of-bounds;
refcounting issues, corrupted lists, etc). When kernel is crashing on a completely wild pointer access
(e.g. user-space address, or non-canonical address, but not on NULL or address corresponding to KASAN shadow
for NULL address), including both data accesses and control transfers, that also usually implies possibility
of exploitation. Such reports usually say "unable to handle kernel paging request".
Uses of uninitialized values detected by KMSAN may be exploitable b/c attacker frequently can affect uninit
values with spraying techniques. However, for these exploitability depends on how exactly the uninit value
is used in the code, and what it affects.
Information leaks are exploitable on their own and should be classified as such. A bug that copies kernel
memory contents to userspace (e.g. an out-of-bounds read whose result is returned to the caller, or
uninitialized stack/heap bytes written to a user buffer) is exploitable: it can reveal kernel pointer
values and defeat KASLR, expose sensitive data such as cryptographic keys or other processes' memory, and
serves as a necessary building block in most modern kernel privilege-escalation exploit chains. Do not classify
an information leak as non-exploitable solely because it does not directly cause a memory write or control-flow
hijack; the leak itself is the exploit primitive.
Think of what happens after the bug is triggered. Some bugs cause kernel panic and halt execution,
they are harder to exploit. For example, BUG reports halts the kernel. However, WARNING reports don't halt
execution in production builds. Debug bug detection tools (like KASAN, KMSAN, KCSAN, UBSAN) are also not enabled
in production builds, so attacker can freely exploit these bugs w/o being detected by these tools.
If you see an integer overflow, think how the overflowed value used later (if it's used as allocation size,
or an array index). If you see an out-of-bounds read, think if it's followed by an out-of-bounds write as well.
Some KCSAN data-races may be exploitable by skilled attackers as well. Think what data structures got corrupted
as the result of data races and how. However, note that kernel has lots of "benign" data races that don't lead
to any runtime misbehavior at all.
* Denial Of Service:
Determine if the bug can result in denial-of-service. Most bugs can, since they cause system crash,
hangs, deadlocks, or resource leaks. This is mostly applicable to WARNING bugs that won't cause system crash
in production. For these think what will be consequences of the violation of the kernel assumptions flagged
by the WARNING. In some cases the unexpected condition is also properly handled by the normal control flow
(e.g. with "if (WARN_ON(...))"), these won't cause denial-of-service. If the condition is not handled,
then it may or may not cause denial-of-service.
* Accessible From Unprivileged Processes:
Determine if the bug can be reached from a typical (non-root) user process that does NOT have any special capabilities
(like CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_PERFMON) or access to device nodes restricted to root.
Assume that unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1, that is eBPF loading is not accessible. However, cBPF (classical BPF)
is still accessible to non-root processes.
Assume that user namespaces are not accessible, that is, the process cannot get the mentioned capabilities even
within a new user namespace (checked by ns_capable() function in the kernel sources).
* Accessible From User Namespaces:
Determine if the bug can be reached within a user-namespace where the process has all capabilities
(including CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_PERFMON). Such capabilities are checked with ns_capable()
function in the kernel sources.
* VM Guest Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered from the context of a typical KVM guest (e.g., set up by a QEMU VMM).
Consider accesses to standard Linux host paravirtualized features (virtio-blk, virtio-net, etc.),
and handling of VM exits in the KVM code.
* VM Host Trigger in The Confidential Computing Context:
Determine if the bug can be triggered in a confidential computing guest kernel from the context of a KVM host.
Consider access to standard Linux guest paravirtualized features (virtio-blk, virtio-net, etc.).
* Ethernet Network Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered by processing ingress network Ethernet traffic, either directly (network stack)
or via drivers exposed to network data.
* Other Remote Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered by processing remote traffic other than Ethernet (Wifi, Bluetooth, NFC, etc).
* Peripheral Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered via an untrusted peripheral device that can be physically plugged
into a system, such as a USB device or a niche hardware driver handling external hardware inputs.
This is particularly important for mobile and desktop environments where users can plug in unknown devices.
* Malicious Filesystem Trigger:
Determine if the bug can be triggered by the kernel mounting and parsing a malicious filesystem image.
This is highly critical for Desktop and Mobile environments where external media or downloaded images
might be auto-mounted.
Don't make assumptions about the kernel source code (it may be different from what you assume it is).
Extensively use the provided code access tools (codesearch-*, git-*, grepper, etc)
to examine the actual source code, and confirm any assumptions.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt:
The kernel bug report is:
rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: 0-...!: (1 GPs behind) idle=c094/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=71806/71807 fqs=21
rcu: (detected by 1, t=10506 jiffies, g=85681, q=384 ncpus=2)
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14812 Comm: syz.6.2315 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/10/2026
RIP: 0010:find_held_lock+0x0/0x80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5343
Code: 91 89 c2 48 c7 c6 c2 3b 06 91 48 c7 c7 03 d5 17 8e e9 e4 4e 3d ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <41> 56 41 89 d6 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 f4 55 8d 6a ff 48 63 c5
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000007e30 EFLAGS: 00000006
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880b8428418 RCX: ffffc90000007e44
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffff8880b8428418 RDI: ffff888032f20000
RBP: ffffffff81f5913b R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888032f20000
R13: ffffffff89c6f9a0 R14: 0000000000000083 R15: 0000000000000005
FS: 00007f21e36ae6c0(0000) GS:ffff888123deb000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fde06391ff8 CR3: 000000002333a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5535 [inline]
lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5889 [inline]
lock_release+0xdb/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5875
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:176 [inline]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1a/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:198
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2028 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x37b/0x9c0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2096
hrtimer_interrupt+0x3e5/0x940 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2215
local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1051 [inline]
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x109/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x9e/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
RIP: 0010:lock_is_held_type+0xf5/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5945
Code: ff ff ff ff 65 0f c1 15 19 65 aa 08 83 fa 01 8b 44 24 04 75 2d 9c 5a 80 e6 02 75 47 41 f7 c5 00 02 00 00 74 01 fb 48 83 c4 08 <5b> 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 7c 3f 03 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c0
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005277bb0 EFLAGS: 00000292
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff8ea97840 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000046 RSI: ffffffff8e17d521 RDI: ffffffff8c400f80
RBP: ffff888032f20000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000246 R14: ffff888032f20c18 R15: 0000000000000003
lock_is_held include/linux/lockdep.h:249 [inline]
text_poke+0x8e/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2670
smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x6b5/0xc60 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:3061
arch_jump_label_transform_apply+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c:146
jump_label_update+0x37a/0x550 kernel/jump_label.c:910
static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0x1bc/0x270 kernel/jump_label.c:210
static_key_enable+0x1a/0x20 kernel/jump_label.c:223
__sched_core_enable kernel/sched/core.c:475 [inline]
sched_core_get+0x8a/0xa0 kernel/sched/core.c:499
sched_core_alloc_cookie kernel/sched/core_sched.c:20 [inline]
sched_core_share_pid+0x406/0x9d0 kernel/sched/core_sched.c:187
__do_sys_prctl+0x67b/0x2270 kernel/sys.c:2808
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x870 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f21e279de59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f21e36ae028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000009d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f21e2a25fa0 RCX: 00007f21e279de59
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 000000000000003e
RBP: 00007f21e2833e6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f21e2a26038 R14: 00007f21e2a25fa0 R15: 00007ffcfff2a948
</TASK>
rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10300 jiffies! g85681 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=1
rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior.
rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
task:rcu_preempt state:R running task stack:27528 pid:16 tgid:16 ppid:2 task_flags:0x208040 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5510 [inline]
__schedule+0x125c/0x6730 kernel/sched/core.c:7234
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:7311 [inline]
schedule+0xdd/0x2c0 kernel/sched/core.c:7326
schedule_timeout+0x127/0x280 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:99
rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x1a9/0x900 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2123
rcu_gp_kthread+0x179/0x230 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2325
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x72b/0xd50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13214 Comm: kworker/u8:21 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/10/2026
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0)
RIP: 0010:csd_lock_wait kernel/smp.c:342 [inline]
RIP: 0010:smp_call_function_many_cond+0x589/0x16c0 kernel/smp.c:892
Code: b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 54 24 08 49 89 d5 49 89 d4 49 c1 ed 03 41 83 e4 07 49 01 c5 41 83 c4 03 e8 c9 95 0c 00 f3 90 <41> 0f b6 45 00 41 38 c4 7c 08 84 c0 0f 85 2c 0f 00 00 8b 45 08 31
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004d66820 EFLAGS: 00000293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff81fd45bd
RDX: ffff8880292b8000 RSI: ffffffff81fd4597 RDI: ffff8880292b8000
RBP: ffff8880b8443680 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: ffffed10170886d1 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8880b853c880
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888123eeb000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2f00cff8 CR3: 000000008129d000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x40/0x90 kernel/smp.c:1057
__flush_tlb_multi arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:46 [inline]
flush_tlb_multi arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:1361 [inline]
flush_tlb_mm_range+0x45f/0x16f0 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:1451
flush_tlb_page arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:345 [inline]
ptep_clear_flush+0x148/0x170 mm/pgtable-generic.c:104
page_vma_mkclean_one.constprop.0+0x3a2/0x7b0 mm/rmap.c:1138
page_mkclean_one+0x1cd/0x2b0 mm/rmap.c:1186
__rmap_walk_file+0x383/0x680 mm/rmap.c:3064
rmap_walk_file+0x1d8/0x2a0 mm/rmap.c:3097
rmap_walk mm/rmap.c:3108 [inline]
folio_mkclean+0x2af/0x4e0 mm/rmap.c:1218
folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x1ba/0x960 mm/page-writeback.c:2909
mpage_submit_folio+0x84/0x330 fs/ext4/inode.c:2085
mpage_process_page_bufs+0x473/0x8d0 fs/ext4/inode.c:2215
mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0xb50/0x1920 fs/ext4/inode.c:2754
ext4_do_writepages+0x9f9/0x3ed0 fs/ext4/inode.c:2895
ext4_writepages+0x347/0x750 fs/ext4/inode.c:3043
do_writepages+0x278/0x600 mm/page-writeback.c:2571
__writeback_single_inode+0x164/0x1300 fs/fs-writeback.c:1787
writeback_sb_inodes+0x766/0x1c50 fs/fs-writeback.c:2079
__writeback_inodes_wb+0xf8/0x2d0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2155
wb_writeback+0x6f6/0xb50 fs/fs-writeback.c:2266
wb_check_old_data_flush fs/fs-writeback.c:2370 [inline]
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2449 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x93f/0xc80 fs/fs-writeback.c:2477
process_one_work+0xa23/0x1940 kernel/workqueue.c:3322
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3405 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x72b/0xd50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
Reply: Based on the provided kernel bug report and source code analysis, here is the assessment of the bug:
**Analysis:**
The bug report indicates an RCU stall detected by CPU 1.
- CPU 1 is in `csd_lock_wait` (via `flush_tlb_multi` -> `smp_call_function_many_cond`), spinning and waiting for CPU 0 to acknowledge and process a TLB flush IPI.
- CPU 0 was executing `text_poke` (specifically `lock_is_held_type` called from `lockdep_assert_held`) when it was interrupted by a local APIC timer interrupt (`sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`).
- Inside the timer interrupt handler, CPU 0 is executing `__hrtimer_run_queues`. The NMI backtrace captures CPU 0 exactly at `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` inside `__run_hrtimer`, which is the point where the hrtimer subsystem drops the base lock just before invoking a timer callback.
Because CPU 0 is executing a hardirq handler (the timer interrupt), it has interrupts disabled and cannot process the pending IPI from CPU 1. CPU 1 is spinning indefinitely waiting for CPU 0, which leads to the RCU stall.
The fact that CPU 0 is stuck inside `__hrtimer_run_queues` strongly indicates an infinite loop caused by a misbehaving hrtimer callback. If an hrtimer callback returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` without properly advancing the timer's expiration time (e.g., via `hrtimer_forward` or `hrtimer_add_expires_ns`), the timer is immediately re-enqueued with an expiration time that is still in the past. `__hrtimer_run_queues` will then pick it up again in the same `while` loop, leading to an infinite loop inside the hardirq handler.
**Security Impact:**
- **Exploitable:** No. This is a logical infinite loop in the timer processing code. It does not involve memory corruption, out-of-bounds accesses, or use-after-free conditions, so it cannot be exploited for privilege escalation or information leaks.
- **Denial of Service:** Yes. The infinite loop in hardirq context completely locks up the affected CPU and stalls any other CPUs attempting to send IPIs to it, resulting in a system-wide hang/crash.
- **Unprivileged / User Namespace Accessible:** Yes. Unprivileged users can create and arm various high-resolution timers (e.g., via `timer_create`, `nanosleep`, `itimer`, or `io_uring` timeouts). If one of these paths contains the buggy callback, an unprivileged user can trivially trigger the DoS.
- **VM Guest Trigger:** Yes. The bug occurs within the standard kernel timer subsystem and can be triggered by a process running inside a VM guest.
- **VM Host / Network / Peripheral / Filesystem Trigger:** No. There is no evidence that this requires malicious host interaction, network traffic, or specific peripheral/filesystem data to trigger.
|
| 6/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 10841
output: 45
thoughts: 505
Thoughts: **RCU Stall Deep Dive**
Okay, so we've got an RCU stall report, which means we have a CPU holding a lock and another CPU waiting on it. Let's break this down. CPU 0 is currently in the `find_held_lock` path, but it looks like it was interrupted while in a call stack that eventually led to a `__do_sys_prctl` call within the `sched_core_share_pid` function. The callstack includes several lock-related functions such as `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` which calls `__hrtimer_run_queues` but also a `text_poke` call through `jump_label_update`.
Meanwhile, CPU 1 is blocked, specifically in `wb_workfn` which then eventually calls `flush_tlb_multi` which requires an IPI. This means it's waiting for CPU 0 to respond to an inter-processor interrupt, likely for a TLB flush. The call stack points to `ptep_clear_flush`, `page_vma_mkclean_one`, and other memory management functions, indicating it's related to some kind of writeback or memory cleanup operation.
This suggests that CPU 1 is waiting on CPU 0 to finish something, specifically some code modification or jump label update, which would require the TLB flush. The `text_poke` call on CPU 0 is the key here. It looks like `text_poke` is being called from the `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` function, implying a batch-style process. This might explain the delay, but I need to look closer at those `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` internals.
I need to understand what `text_poke` does. Does it wait for other CPUs, or does it do something that can block, like patching code? This jump label update process and alternative patching can often introduce stalls. Let's dig into the `arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c` code to see how `text_poke` and `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` interact and determine the exact nature of the code modification and the locking involved. Understanding the flow of these functions and their impact on TLB invalidation is crucial to figuring out the root cause of this RCU stall.
|
| 7/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c Name:smp_text_poke_batch_finish]
Results: map[SourceCode:2918: /**
2919: * smp_text_poke_batch_finish() -- update instructions on live kernel on SMP
2920: *
2921: * Input state:
2922: * text_poke_array.vec: vector of instructions to patch
2923: * text_poke_array.nr_entries: number of entries in the vector
2924: *
2925: * Modify multi-byte instructions by using INT3 breakpoints on SMP.
2926: * We completely avoid using stop_machine() here, and achieve the
2927: * synchronization using INT3 breakpoints and SMP cross-calls.
2928: *
2929: * The way it is done:
2930: * - For each entry in the vector:
2931: * - add an INT3 trap to the address that will be patched
2932: * - SMP sync all CPUs
2933: * - For each entry in the vector:
2934: * - update all but the first byte of the patched range
2935: * - SMP sync all CPUs
2936: * - For each entry in the vector:
2937: * - replace the first byte (INT3) by the first byte of the
2938: * replacing opcode
2939: * - SMP sync all CPUs
2940: */
2941: void smp_text_poke_batch_finish(void)
2942: {
2943: unsigned char int3 = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
2944: unsigned int i;
2945: int do_sync;
2946:
2947: if (!text_poke_array.nr_entries)
2948: return;
2949:
2950: lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);
2951:
2952: /*
2953: * Corresponds to the implicit memory barrier in try_get_text_poke_array() to
2954: * ensure reading a non-zero refcount provides up to date text_poke_array data.
2955: */
2956: for_each_possible_cpu(i)
2957: atomic_set_release(per_cpu_ptr(&text_poke_array_refs, i), 1);
2958:
2959: /*
2960: * Function tracing can enable thousands of places that need to be
2961: * updated. This can take quite some time, and with full kernel debugging
2962: * enabled, this could cause the softlockup watchdog to trigger.
2963: * This function gets called every 256 entries added to be patched.
2964: * Call cond_resched() here to make sure that other tasks can get scheduled
2965: * while processing all the functions being patched.
2966: */
2967: cond_resched();
2968:
2969: /*
2970: * Corresponding read barrier in INT3 notifier for making sure the
2971: * text_poke_array.nr_entries and handler are correctly ordered wrt. patching.
2972: */
2973: smp_wmb();
2974:
2975: /*
2976: * First step: add a INT3 trap to the address that will be patched.
2977: */
2978: for (i = 0; i < text_poke_array.nr_entries; i++) {
2979: text_poke_array.vec[i].old = *(u8 *)text_poke_addr(&text_poke_array.vec[i]);
2980: text_poke(text_poke_addr(&text_poke_array.vec[i]), &int3, INT3_INSN_SIZE);
2981: }
2982:
2983: smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu();
2984:
2985: /*
2986: * Second step: update all but the first byte of the patched range.
2987: */
2988: for (do_sync = 0, i = 0; i < text_poke_array.nr_entries; i++) {
2989: u8 old[TEXT_POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE+1] = { text_poke_array.vec[i].old, };
2990: u8 _new[TEXT_POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE+1];
2991: const u8 *new = text_poke_array.vec[i].text;
2992: int len = text_poke_array.vec[i].len;
2993:
2994: if (len - INT3_INSN_SIZE > 0) {
2995: memcpy(old + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
2996: text_poke_addr(&text_poke_array.vec[i]) + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
2997: len - INT3_INSN_SIZE);
2998:
2999: if (len == 6) {
3000: _new[0] = 0x0f;
3001: memcpy(_new + 1, new, 5);
3002: new = _new;
3003: }
3004:
3005: text_poke(text_poke_addr(&text_poke_array.vec[i]) + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
3006: new + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
3007: len - INT3_INSN_SIZE);
3008:
3009: do_sync++;
3010: }
3011:
3012: /*
3013: * Emit a perf event to record the text poke, primarily to
3014: * support Intel PT decoding which must walk the executable code
3015: * to reconstruct the trace. The flow up to here is:
3016: * - write INT3 byte
3017: * - IPI-SYNC
3018: * - write instruction tail
3019: * At this point the actual control flow will be through the
3020: * INT3 and handler and not hit the old or new instruction.
3021: * Intel PT outputs FUP/TIP packets for the INT3, so the flow
3022: * can still be decoded. Subsequently:
3023: * - emit RECORD_TEXT_POKE with the new instruction
3024: * - IPI-SYNC
3025: * - write first byte
3026: * - IPI-SYNC
3027: * So before the text poke event timestamp, the decoder will see
3028: * either the old instruction flow or FUP/TIP of INT3. After the
3029: * text poke event timestamp, the decoder will see either the
3030: * new instruction flow or FUP/TIP of INT3. Thus decoders can
3031: * use the timestamp as the point at which to modify the
3032: * executable code.
3033: * The old instruction is recorded so that the event can be
3034: * processed forwards or backwards.
3035: */
3036: perf_event_text_poke(text_poke_addr(&text_poke_array.vec[i]), old, len, new, len);
3037: }
3038:
3039: if (do_sync) {
3040: /*
3041: * According to Intel, this core syncing is very likely
3042: * not necessary and we'd be safe even without it. But
3043: * better safe than sorry (plus there's not only Intel).
3044: */
3045: smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu();
3046: }
3047:
3048: /*
3049: * Third step: replace the first byte (INT3) by the first byte of the
3050: * replacing opcode.
3051: */
3052: for (do_sync = 0, i = 0; i < text_poke_array.nr_entries; i++) {
3053: u8 byte = text_poke_array.vec[i].text[0];
3054:
3055: if (text_poke_array.vec[i].len == 6)
3056: byte = 0x0f;
3057:
3058: if (byte == INT3_INSN_OPCODE)
3059: continue;
3060:
3061: text_poke(text_poke_addr(&text_poke_array.vec[i]), &byte, INT3_INSN_SIZE);
3062: do_sync++;
3063: }
3064:
3065: if (do_sync)
3066: smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu();
3067:
3068: /*
3069: * Remove and wait for refs to be zero.
3070: *
3071: * Notably, if after step-3 above the INT3 got removed, then the
3072: * smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu() will have serialized against any running INT3
3073: * handlers and the below spin-wait will not happen.
3074: *
3075: * IOW. unless the replacement instruction is INT3, this case goes
3076: * unused.
3077: */
3078: for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
3079: atomic_t *refs = per_cpu_ptr(&text_poke_array_refs, i);
3080:
3081: if (unlikely(!atomic_dec_and_test(refs)))
3082: atomic_cond_read_acquire(refs, !VAL);
3083: }
3084:
3085: /* They are all completed: */
3086: text_poke_array.nr_entries = 0;
3087: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c]
|
| 8/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 14671
output: 47
thoughts: 69
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this process:
**Diving into the Synchronization Path**
Okay, so I'm tracing through this `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` function. From what I'm seeing, it calls `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`. That makes sense - it’s probably a batch operation so it needs to synchronize. I'd expect that it's going to broadcast an inter-processor interrupt, or IPI, to all of the CPUs and then it will wait for some kind of acknowledgement that they've all caught up. That's a classic synchronization pattern.
Hmm... now that I'm thinking about it, that `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu` function uses `on_each_cpu` or something similar, which means it should be iterating through all of the CPUs. Right, right, it makes perfect sense because it has to hit them all. This is the mechanism by which it's going to make sure that the batch operation has run on every CPU. Got it.
|
| 9/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c Name:smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu]
Results: map[SourceCode:2771: void smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu(void)
2772: {
2773: on_each_cpu(do_sync_core, NULL, 1);
2774: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c]
|
| 10/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 15120
output: 38
thoughts: 279
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the Potential Deadlock**
Okay, let me break down what's happening here. I see that `on_each_cpu(do_sync_core, NULL, 1)` is initiating inter-processor interrupts (IPIs) to all CPUs and then waiting for them to complete. That's the baseline. Now, here's where it gets interesting.
CPU 0 is in `smp_text_poke_batch_finish`, which, as I recall, eventually calls `text_poke`. And from what I see in the code, `text_poke` uses a lock and I am *pretty* certain it uses `lock_is_held_type` (through `lockdep_assert_held` or a similar assertion mechanism) to confirm the lock's state.
Wait, CPU 0 is definitely in `text_poke` and thus `lock_is_held_type`. And then... bam! CPU 0 gets interrupted. Specifically, it's a timer interrupt (`sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`) that leads to `hrtimer_interrupt`, and ultimately involves an `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` which calls `lock_release` and then `find_held_lock`.
Crucially, CPU 0 is in the *middle* of `lock_is_held_type` when this timer interrupt hits. Okay, this is a red flag. Interrupts, especially timer interrupts that involve lock manipulation, can be tricky.
Now, let's look at CPU 1. It's in `flush_tlb_multi`, which leads to `on_each_cpu_cond_mask` -> `smp_call_function_many_cond` -> `csd_lock_wait`. Essentially, CPU 1 has sent an IPI to CPU 0 and is *waiting* for CPU 0 to do something.
Here's the problem. It seems like CPU 1 has sent an IPI to CPU 0, while CPU 0 is stuck in a critical section, and CPU 0's interrupts are *disabled* during `lock_is_held_type` and other such operations, thus it may not be able to process the IPI. This means CPU 1 is blocked, waiting for a response that will never come, which could cause a deadlock.
So the important question is: does `text_poke` disable interrupts? If it does, we have a clear path to a deadlock. I need to confirm if `text_poke` disables interrupts. If not, maybe something else is at play and there's a problem elsewhere. I need to check the code.
|
| 11/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c Name:text_poke]
Results: map[SourceCode:2652: /**
2653: * text_poke - Update instructions on a live kernel
2654: * @addr: address to modify
2655: * @opcode: source of the copy
2656: * @len: length to copy
2657: *
2658: * Only atomic text poke/set should be allowed when not doing early patching.
2659: * It means the size must be writable atomically and the address must be aligned
2660: * in a way that permits an atomic write. It also makes sure we fit on a single
2661: * page.
2662: *
2663: * Note that the caller must ensure that if the modified code is part of a
2664: * module, the module would not be removed during poking. This can be achieved
2665: * by registering a module notifier, and ordering module removal and patching
2666: * through a mutex.
2667: */
2668: void *text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
2669: {
2670: lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);
2671:
2672: return __text_poke(text_poke_memcpy, addr, opcode, len);
2673: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c]
|
| 12/2 |
2026/07/14 00:46 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16384
output: 48
thoughts: 799
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Lockup**
Okay, so `text_poke` is calling `lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex)`. Which then boils down to calls through `lock_is_held` down to `lock_is_held_type`. I see CPU 0 is currently executing `lock_is_held_type`. My immediate thought is, "Is CPU 0 stuck in this function?".
Let's look at the backtrace for CPU 0. It's an interrupt. It looks like it is calling `lock_is_held_type` in the process of a `lock_release` which is itself running as part of the `hrtimer_interrupt` routine. I see `__lock_release` at the top of the stack. Weird, is CPU 0 stuck in `find_held_lock` (called from `__lock_release`).
Hold on, the NMI backtrace from CPU 0 shows `find_held_lock` as the top of the stack as well! It was called from `__lock_release`. Is CPU 0 really hung there? Or is this just a random snapshot and it's making progress?
CPU 1 is detecting an RCU stall. That suggests CPU 1 is in `csd_lock_wait`, waiting for CPU 0 to process an IPI. This makes sense. But why isn't CPU 0 processing the IPI?
Ah, right. CPU 0 is in `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`. That's an interrupt handler. So I need to go back and check some more things. The question is, with an interrupt handler running, are interrupts disabled? Or am I going down the wrong path? I know that `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` runs with interrupts disabled, so I need to understand what this means. I need to examine `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` further.
|
| 13/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c Name:sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt]
Results: map[SourceCode:1054: /*
1055: * Local APIC timer interrupt. This is the most natural way for doing
1056: * local interrupts, but local timer interrupts can be emulated by
1057: * broadcast interrupts too. [in case the hw doesn't support APIC timers]
1058: *
1059: * [ if a single-CPU system runs an SMP kernel then we call the local
1060: * interrupt as well. Thus we cannot inline the local irq ... ]
1061: */
1062: DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt)
SourceFile:arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c]
|
| 14/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 17847
output: 40
thoughts: 134
Thoughts: **Debugging a Potentially Frozen Timer Interrupt**
Okay, so I'm looking at this trace, and something's clearly not right. We have `DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC` running, which, on x86, means interrupts are disabled – that's a key piece of context. Now, I see CPU 0 is in `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`, which makes perfect sense, given the context. But here’s where it gets interesting: the call stack shows `hrtimer_interrupt` leading to `__hrtimer_run_queues`. Within that, we have `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore`, which, in turn, goes to `lock_release` and finally, `find_held_lock`.
The question that immediately jumps out at me is: are we looping infinitely somewhere in this chain? Is it stuck in `find_held_lock`, getting tangled up in lock contention, or is the problem higher up, maybe within `__hrtimer_run_queues` itself? I’ll need to delve deeper into the code, and my focus is going to be on the `__hrtimer_run_queues` function. It's the most likely source of the problem.
|
| 15/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c Name:__hrtimer_run_queues]
Results: map[SourceCode:2070: static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now,
2071: unsigned long flags, unsigned int active_mask)
2072: {
2073: unsigned int active = cpu_base->active_bases & active_mask;
2074: struct hrtimer_clock_base *base;
2075:
2076: for_each_active_base(base, cpu_base, active) {
2077: ktime_t basenow = ktime_add(now, base->offset);
2078: struct hrtimer *timer;
2079:
2080: while ((timer = clock_base_next_timer(base))) {
2081: /*
2082: * The immediate goal for using the softexpires is
2083: * minimizing wakeups, not running timers at the
2084: * earliest interrupt after their soft expiration.
2085: * This allows us to avoid using a Priority Search
2086: * Tree, which can answer a stabbing query for
2087: * overlapping intervals and instead use the simple
2088: * BST we already have.
2089: * We don't add extra wakeups by delaying timers that
2090: * are right-of a not yet expired timer, because that
2091: * timer will have to trigger a wakeup anyway.
2092: */
2093: if (basenow < hrtimer_get_softexpires(timer))
2094: break;
2095:
2096: __run_hrtimer(cpu_base, base, timer, basenow, flags);
2097: if (active_mask == HRTIMER_ACTIVE_SOFT)
2098: hrtimer_sync_wait_running(cpu_base, flags);
2099: }
2100: }
2101: }
SourceFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c]
|
| 16/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18841
output: 37
thoughts: 38
Thoughts: Here's my take on the thought process, as if it were my own:
**Analyzing the hrtimer Execution Path**
Okay, I'm tracing through the `__run_hrtimer` function and it's calling the timer callback, as expected. But wait... this is interesting. I'm seeing a `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` *inside* `__run_hrtimer`. This immediately triggers a thought. Generally, spinlocks are held *during* critical sections, protecting shared data. Unlocking them, especially with IRQ restore, suggests the callback might be doing some heavy lifting, potentially touching shared resources that require careful synchronization. It could also mean the timer callback has completed it's critical work. It will be valuable to know why this unlock is happening specifically within this function and what context is required for it. This requires a deeper dive into the specific timer callback's implementation and the data it manipulates. I need to understand the exact reasons for the locking strategy here.
|
| 17/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c Name:__run_hrtimer]
Results: map[SourceCode:1973: /*
1974: * The write_seqcount_barrier()s in __run_hrtimer() split the thing into 3
1975: * distinct sections:
1976: *
1977: * - queued: the timer is queued
1978: * - callback: the timer is being ran
1979: * - post: the timer is inactive or (re)queued
1980: *
1981: * On the read side we ensure we observe timer->is_queued and cpu_base->running
1982: * from the same section, if anything changed while we looked at it, we retry.
1983: * This includes timer->base changing because sequence numbers alone are
1984: * insufficient for that.
1985: *
1986: * The sequence numbers are required because otherwise we could still observe
1987: * a false negative if the read side got smeared over multiple consecutive
1988: * __run_hrtimer() invocations.
1989: */
1990: static void __run_hrtimer(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, struct hrtimer_clock_base *base,
1991: struct hrtimer *timer, ktime_t now, unsigned long flags)
1992: __must_hold(&cpu_base->lock)
1993: {
1994: enum hrtimer_restart (*fn)(struct hrtimer *);
1995: bool expires_in_hardirq;
1996: int restart;
1997:
1998: lockdep_assert_held(&cpu_base->lock);
1999:
2000: debug_hrtimer_deactivate(timer);
2001: base->running = timer;
2002:
2003: /*
2004: * Separate the ->running assignment from the ->is_queued assignment.
2005: *
2006: * As with a regular write barrier, this ensures the read side in
2007: * hrtimer_active() cannot observe base->running == NULL &&
2008: * timer->is_queued == INACTIVE.
2009: */
2010: raw_write_seqcount_barrier(&base->seq);
2011:
2012: __remove_hrtimer(timer, base, HRTIMER_STATE_INACTIVE, false);
2013: fn = ACCESS_PRIVATE(timer, function);
2014:
2015: /*
2016: * Clear the 'is relative' flag for the TIME_LOW_RES case. If the
2017: * timer is restarted with a period then it becomes an absolute
2018: * timer. If its not restarted it does not matter.
2019: */
2020: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TIME_LOW_RES))
2021: timer->is_rel = false;
2022:
2023: /*
2024: * The timer is marked as running in the CPU base, so it is
2025: * protected against migration to a different CPU even if the lock
2026: * is dropped.
2027: */
2028: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_base->lock, flags);
2029: trace_hrtimer_expire_entry(timer, now);
2030: expires_in_hardirq = lockdep_hrtimer_enter(timer);
2031:
2032: restart = fn(timer);
2033:
2034: lockdep_hrtimer_exit(expires_in_hardirq);
2035: trace_hrtimer_expire_exit(timer);
2036: raw_spin_lock_irq(&cpu_base->lock);
2037:
2038: /*
2039: * Note: We clear the running state after enqueue_hrtimer and
2040: * we do not reprogram the event hardware. Happens either in
2041: * hrtimer_start_range_ns() or in hrtimer_interrupt()
2042: *
2043: * Note: Because we dropped the cpu_base->lock above,
2044: * hrtimer_start_range_ns() can have popped in and enqueued the timer
2045: * for us already.
2046: */
2047: if (restart == HRTIMER_RESTART && !timer->is_queued)
2048: enqueue_hrtimer(timer, base, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS, false);
2049:
2050: /*
2051: * Separate the ->running assignment from the ->is_queued assignment.
2052: *
2053: * As with a regular write barrier, this ensures the read side in
2054: * hrtimer_active() cannot observe base->running.timer == NULL &&
2055: * timer->is_queued == INACTIVE.
2056: */
2057: raw_write_seqcount_barrier(&base->seq);
2058:
2059: WARN_ON_ONCE(base->running != timer);
2060: base->running = NULL;
2061: }
SourceFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c]
|
| 18/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 20567
output: 39
thoughts: 1535
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Kernel Stall**
Okay, so I'm looking at this stack trace and RCU stall and trying to figure out what's happening. At line 2028 of `hrtimer.c`, the code unlocks a spinlock using `raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore`. The trace shows it's just a simple unlock, nothing too complex there. But, why is there a stall? The NMI backtrace from CPU 0 seems to be a snapshot. CPU 1 is the one that actually detected an RCU stall.
CPU 0 is reported as being one GP behind, and the backtrace on it shows the `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` function. My initial thought is that maybe `__hrtimer_run_queues` is taking too long due to a flood of timers or a problematic timer callback. However, the NMI backtrace shows that `lock_release` is being called inside `__run_hrtimer`. Furthermore, it looks like `lock_is_held_type` was active when the timer interrupt fired, so the interrupt occurred while a lock was held.
CPU 1 is waiting on `csd_lock_wait`, which means it's waiting for an IPI. But CPU 0 is in the interrupt handler. Interrupts are disabled (or, at least, masked) during the handler execution, and IPIs aren't directly processed by `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`. If this timer interrupt takes a long time, it can stall the other CPU and cause this RCU stall. The fact that the backtrace shows the unlock happening *before* the callback suggests it isn't an issue with the callback.
Could `__hrtimer_run_queues` be looping infinitely? I'll check for any known bugs with that.
Wait, what if CPU 0 is stuck in `text_poke`? `text_poke` is called from `smp_text_poke_batch_finish`. Looking back at that function, it looks like it calls `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`, which sends IPIs and waits for a response. CPU 0 is in `text_poke` before `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`, so it should not be a problem.
Here's a thought: Could CPU 0 and CPU 1 be deadlocked? CPU 1 is in `flush_tlb_multi` which eventually calls `smp_call_function_many_cond` and waits using `csd_lock_wait`. CPU 0 is in `text_poke` and then the timer interrupt fired. CPU 1 sends the IPI to CPU 0 and waits. Eventually, the timer interrupt should finish, and CPU 0 will continue `text_poke` and process the IPI.
Why isn't CPU 0 finishing the timer interrupt? Is it possible the timer interrupt itself is being interrupted by the NMI? Yes, since the backtrace is from CPU 1, which detected the RCU stall. So CPU 0 has been in the timer interrupt for a long time. Is it possible that `text_poke` has disabled interrupts? This would explain the stall.
|
| 19/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c Name:__text_poke]
Results: map[SourceCode:2546: static void *__text_poke(text_poke_f func, void *addr, const void *src, size_t len)
2547: {
2548: bool cross_page_boundary = offset_in_page(addr) + len > PAGE_SIZE;
2549: struct page *pages[2] = {NULL};
2550: struct mm_struct *prev_mm;
2551: unsigned long flags;
2552: pte_t pte, *ptep;
2553: spinlock_t *ptl;
2554: pgprot_t pgprot;
2555:
2556: /*
2557: * While boot memory allocator is running we cannot use struct pages as
2558: * they are not yet initialized. There is no way to recover.
2559: */
2560: BUG_ON(!after_bootmem);
2561:
2562: if (!core_kernel_text((unsigned long)addr)) {
2563: pages[0] = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
2564: if (cross_page_boundary)
2565: pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
2566: } else {
2567: pages[0] = virt_to_page(addr);
2568: WARN_ON(!PageReserved(pages[0]));
2569: if (cross_page_boundary)
2570: pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
2571: }
2572: /*
2573: * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not
2574: * implemented.
2575: */
2576: BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]));
2577:
2578: /*
2579: * Map the page without the global bit, as TLB flushing is done with
2580: * flush_tlb_mm_range(), which is intended for non-global PTEs.
2581: */
2582: pgprot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL);
2583:
2584: /*
2585: * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding.
2586: */
2587: ptep = get_locked_pte(text_poke_mm, text_poke_mm_addr, &ptl);
2588:
2589: /*
2590: * This must not fail; preallocated in poking_init().
2591: */
2592: VM_BUG_ON(!ptep);
2593:
2594: local_irq_save(flags);
2595:
2596: pte = mk_pte(pages[0], pgprot);
2597: set_pte_at(text_poke_mm, text_poke_mm_addr, ptep, pte);
2598:
2599: if (cross_page_boundary) {
2600: pte = mk_pte(pages[1], pgprot);
2601: set_pte_at(text_poke_mm, text_poke_mm_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1, pte);
2602: }
2603:
2604: /*
2605: * Loading the temporary mm behaves as a compiler barrier, which
2606: * guarantees that the PTE will be set at the time memcpy() is done.
2607: */
2608: prev_mm = use_temporary_mm(text_poke_mm);
2609:
2610: kasan_disable_current();
2611: func((u8 *)text_poke_mm_addr + offset_in_page(addr), src, len);
2612: kasan_enable_current();
2613:
2614: /*
2615: * Ensure that the PTE is only cleared after the instructions of memcpy
2616: * were issued by using a compiler barrier.
2617: */
2618: barrier();
2619:
2620: pte_clear(text_poke_mm, text_poke_mm_addr, ptep);
2621: if (cross_page_boundary)
2622: pte_clear(text_poke_mm, text_poke_mm_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1);
2623:
2624: /*
2625: * Loading the previous page-table hierarchy requires a serializing
2626: * instruction that already allows the core to see the updated version.
2627: * Xen-PV is assumed to serialize execution in a similar manner.
2628: */
2629: unuse_temporary_mm(prev_mm);
2630:
2631: /*
2632: * Flushing the TLB might involve IPIs, which would require enabled
2633: * IRQs, but not if the mm is not used, as it is in this point.
2634: */
2635: flush_tlb_mm_range(text_poke_mm, text_poke_mm_addr, text_poke_mm_addr +
2636: (cross_page_boundary ? 2 : 1) * PAGE_SIZE,
2637: PAGE_SHIFT, false);
2638:
2639: if (func == text_poke_memcpy) {
2640: /*
2641: * If the text does not match what we just wrote then something is
2642: * fundamentally screwy; there's nothing we can really do about that.
2643: */
2644: BUG_ON(memcmp(addr, src, len));
2645: }
2646:
2647: local_irq_restore(flags);
2648: pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
2649: return addr;
2650: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c]
|
| 20/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 24522
output: 44
thoughts: 104
Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential Race Conditions in `__text_poke`**
Okay, so I'm looking at this `__text_poke` function. Line 2594 immediately catches my eye – it calls `local_irq_save(flags)`, meaning interrupts are disabled. That’s standard practice for this type of operation, protecting against preemption during potentially critical memory manipulation. The function then proceeds with its work. My concern is triggered by the call to `flush_tlb_mm_range` at line 2635, which follows the irq disable. The TLB flush is potentially a performance bottleneck, and I need to consider what’s happening in this critical region. If the `flush_tlb_mm_range` call is happening with interrupts disabled, there are race conditions possible. Let's delve into the implementation of `flush_tlb_mm_range` in `arch/x86/mm/tlb.c` to fully understand the impact of the irq disabled region, and what specific steps are taken to handle it.
|
| 21/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/mm/tlb.c Name:flush_tlb_mm_range]
Results: map[SourceCode:1428: void flush_tlb_mm_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
1429: unsigned long end, unsigned int stride_shift,
1430: bool freed_tables)
1431: {
1432: struct flush_tlb_info *info;
1433: int cpu = get_cpu();
1434: u64 new_tlb_gen;
1435:
1436: /* This is also a barrier that synchronizes with switch_mm(). */
1437: new_tlb_gen = inc_mm_tlb_gen(mm);
1438:
1439: info = get_flush_tlb_info(mm, start, end, stride_shift, freed_tables,
1440: new_tlb_gen);
1441:
1442: /*
1443: * flush_tlb_multi() is not optimized for the common case in which only
1444: * a local TLB flush is needed. Optimize this use-case by calling
1445: * flush_tlb_func_local() directly in this case.
1446: */
1447: if (mm_global_asid(mm)) {
1448: broadcast_tlb_flush(info);
1449: } else if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), cpu) < nr_cpu_ids) {
1450: info->trim_cpumask = should_trim_cpumask(mm);
1451: flush_tlb_multi(mm_cpumask(mm), info);
1452: consider_global_asid(mm);
1453: } else if (mm == this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)) {
1454: lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
1455: local_irq_disable();
1456: flush_tlb_func(info);
1457: local_irq_enable();
1458: }
1459:
1460: put_flush_tlb_info();
1461: put_cpu();
1462: mmu_notifier_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs(mm, start, end);
1463: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/mm/tlb.c]
|
| 22/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 25550
output: 37
thoughts: 1464
Thoughts: **TLB Flushing, Interrupts, and Lockdep: A Conundrum**
Okay, so I'm looking at this `flush_tlb_mm_range` function and the way it's used within `__text_poke`. It's immediately apparent that something is potentially amiss. Line 1454 of `flush_tlb_mm_range` calls `lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled()`. However, `__text_poke` calls it with interrupts disabled. That seems wrong, but then I remember that `__text_poke` calls `flush_tlb_mm_range` via `text_poke_mm`. `text_poke_mm` is a special memory map. It is only loaded on a single CPU at a time. Therefore, `mm_cpumask(mm)` will only ever contain one CPU, the CPU temporarily using `text_poke_mm` via `use_temporary_mm`.
I see `unuse_temporary_mm(prev_mm)` is called *before* the TLB flush. If `unuse_temporary_mm` happens first, the `text_poke_mm` memory map is no longer loaded on any CPU. This means that the check `mm == this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)` will evaluate to false and effectively the TLB flush does nothing! It seems redundant, but wait, `flush_tlb_mm_range` might still do something if `mm_global_asid(mm)` is true. If it does nothing, then it just returns.
But the real kicker is the interrupt context. I see `local_irq_save(flags);` in `__text_poke`, disabling interrupts. Yet the NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 is in `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` -> `hrtimer_interrupt`. That means the timer interrupt *fired* while interrupts were disabled! The backtrace indicates it entered the timer interrupt through `lock_is_held_type` which is called *before* `__text_poke` via the check `lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);`. Therefore, the timer fired *before* interrupts were disabled. Inside the timer, we can see that it's executing `__hrtimer_run_queues`. This is all happening while CPU 1 is waiting for CPU 0 to process a TLB flush IPI. CPU 0 is effectively stuck in the timer interrupt handler.
This means that while CPU 0 is running the timer interrupt, it won't process the IPI. But this shouldn't be a problem, because CPU 0 should return to `text_poke` and continue with processing the IPI after handling the timer interrupt. But that isn't happening. I need to investigate why CPU 0 isn't finishing the timer interrupt handler. Is it somehow stuck in `find_held_lock`?
|
| 23/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/locking/lockdep.c Name:find_held_lock]
Results: map[SourceCode:5339: /* @depth must not be zero */
5340: static struct held_lock *find_held_lock(struct task_struct *curr,
5341: struct lockdep_map *lock,
5342: unsigned int depth, int *idx)
5343: {
5344: struct held_lock *ret, *hlock, *prev_hlock;
5345: int i;
5346:
5347: i = depth - 1;
5348: hlock = curr->held_locks + i;
5349: ret = hlock;
5350: if (match_held_lock(hlock, lock))
5351: goto out;
5352:
5353: ret = NULL;
5354: for (i--, prev_hlock = hlock--;
5355: i >= 0;
5356: i--, prev_hlock = hlock--) {
5357: /*
5358: * We must not cross into another context:
5359: */
5360: if (prev_hlock->irq_context != hlock->irq_context) {
5361: ret = NULL;
5362: break;
5363: }
5364: if (match_held_lock(hlock, lock)) {
5365: ret = hlock;
5366: break;
5367: }
5368: }
5369:
5370: out:
5371: *idx = i;
5372: return ret;
5373: }
SourceFile:kernel/locking/lockdep.c]
|
| 24/2 |
2026/07/14 00:47 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 28167
output: 36
thoughts: 1170
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential HRTimer Infinite Loop**
Okay, so I'm looking at this issue where CPU 0 seems to be stuck, and I'm pretty sure it's related to the `hrtimer` code. I've ruled out `find_held_lock` because it's just a simple loop and shouldn't cause an infinite hang. My initial thought was that CPU 0 might be overwhelmed in `__hrtimer_run_queues` due to too many timers, or even a runaway loop within that function.
Let's dive back into `__hrtimer_run_queues`. I see that the core of the problem could be a timer that's constantly being re-enqueued. Specifically, if a timer callback returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` and its expiration time isn't updated (or is set to a time in the past), it'll be immediately re-executed in the same `while` loop. The `clock_base_next_timer` would return it again, and the comparison `basenow < hrtimer_get_softexpires(timer)` would fail because the expiration time is now behind the current time. This is the smoking gun!
I'm thinking that if a timer callback forgets to advance its expiration time past the current time, or advances it by 0, it's essentially creating an infinite loop. The NMI backtrace, however, shows the CPU is stuck unlocking the lock *before* the callback is called: `__run_hrtimer` -> `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` -> `lock_release` -> `find_held_lock`. That's not the infinite loop itself, but it's *in* the loop.
So the lock is unlocked, the callback is called, then the lock is locked again, and the whole sequence is repeated. That's consistent with a timer callback causing an infinite loop by returning `HRTIMER_RESTART` without updating the expiration time. The backtrace isn't showing the callback itself because it was interrupted or it's just a snapshot of the execution.
Now the question is, *which* timer callback? The bug report isn't helping much on that front. It's not clear which timer is responsible for this, nor is there any clear path from the bug report as to the timer callback. The bug report is not showing the timer callback.
I see that `rcu` reports stalls, but the `softirq` counter doesn't appear to be growing significantly. This suggests the issue is in a hardirq, not a softirq. Specifically, the NMI is hitting `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`.
What I have to ask myself is, is the timer interrupt just delayed due to something else? Wait, looking at the task on CPU 0: It's running `prctl`, specifically `__do_sys_prctl`. Let's check `kernel/sys.c:2808`.
|
| 25/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/sys.c Name:__do_sys_prctl]
Results: map[SourceCode:2534: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
2535: unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
2536: {
2537: struct task_struct *me = current;
2538: unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
2539: long error;
2540:
2541: error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2542: if (error != -ENOSYS)
2543: return error;
2544:
2545: error = 0;
2546: switch (option) {
2547: case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
2548: if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
2549: error = -EINVAL;
2550: break;
2551: }
2552: /*
2553: * Ensure that either:
2554: *
2555: * 1. Subsequent getppid() calls reflect the parent process having died.
2556: * 2. forget_original_parent() will send the new me->pdeath_signal.
2557: *
2558: * Also prevent the read of me->pdeath_signal from being a data race.
2559: */
2560: read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2561: me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
2562: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2563: break;
2564: case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
2565: error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
2566: break;
2567: case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
2568: error = task_exec_state_get_dumpable(me);
2569: break;
2570: case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
2571: if (arg2 != TASK_DUMPABLE_OFF && arg2 != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) {
2572: error = -EINVAL;
2573: break;
2574: }
2575: task_exec_state_set_dumpable(arg2);
2576: break;
2577:
2578: case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
2579: error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
2580: break;
2581: case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
2582: error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
2583: break;
2584: case PR_SET_FPEMU:
2585: error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
2586: break;
2587: case PR_GET_FPEMU:
2588: error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
2589: break;
2590: case PR_SET_FPEXC:
2591: error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
2592: break;
2593: case PR_GET_FPEXC:
2594: error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
2595: break;
2596: case PR_GET_TIMING:
2597: error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
2598: break;
2599: case PR_SET_TIMING:
2600: if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
2601: error = -EINVAL;
2602: break;
2603: case PR_SET_NAME:
2604: comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0;
2605: if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
2606: sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
2607: return -EFAULT;
2608: set_task_comm(me, comm);
2609: proc_comm_connector(me);
2610: break;
2611: case PR_GET_NAME:
2612: get_task_comm(comm, me);
2613: if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
2614: return -EFAULT;
2615: break;
2616: case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
2617: error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
2618: break;
2619: case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
2620: error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
2621: break;
2622: case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
2623: error = prctl_get_seccomp();
2624: break;
2625: case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
2626: error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
2627: break;
2628: case PR_GET_TSC:
2629: error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
2630: break;
2631: case PR_SET_TSC:
2632: error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
2633: break;
2634: case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
2635: error = perf_event_task_disable();
2636: break;
2637: case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
2638: error = perf_event_task_enable();
2639: break;
2640: case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
2641: if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX)
2642: error = ULONG_MAX;
2643: else
2644: error = current->timer_slack_ns;
2645: break;
2646: case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
2647: if (rt_or_dl_task_policy(current))
2648: break;
2649: if (arg2 <= 0)
2650: current->timer_slack_ns =
2651: current->default_timer_slack_ns;
2652: else
2653: current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
2654: break;
2655: case PR_MCE_KILL:
2656: if (arg4 | arg5)
2657: return -EINVAL;
2658: switch (arg2) {
2659: case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
2660: if (arg3 != 0)
2661: return -EINVAL;
2662: current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
2663: break;
2664: case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
2665: current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
2666: if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
2667: current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
2668: else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
2669: current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
2670: else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
2671: current->flags &=
2672: ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
2673: else
2674: return -EINVAL;
2675: break;
2676: default:
2677: return -EINVAL;
2678: }
2679: break;
2680: case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
2681: if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
2682: return -EINVAL;
2683: if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
2684: error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
2685: PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
2686: else
2687: error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
2688: break;
2689: case PR_SET_MM:
2690: error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2691: break;
2692: case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
2693: error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2);
2694: break;
2695: case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
2696: me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
2697: if (!arg2)
2698: break;
2699:
2700: walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL);
2701: break;
2702: case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
2703: error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper,
2704: (int __user *)arg2);
2705: break;
2706: case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
2707: if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2708: return -EINVAL;
2709:
2710: task_set_no_new_privs(current);
2711: break;
2712: case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
2713: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2714: return -EINVAL;
2715: return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0;
2716: case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE:
2717: error = prctl_get_thp_disable(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2718: break;
2719: case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE:
2720: error = prctl_set_thp_disable(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2721: break;
2722: case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT:
2723: case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT:
2724: /* No longer implemented: */
2725: return -EINVAL;
2726: case PR_SET_FP_MODE:
2727: error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2);
2728: break;
2729: case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
2730: error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
2731: break;
2732: case PR_SVE_SET_VL:
2733: error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2);
2734: break;
2735: case PR_SVE_GET_VL:
2736: error = SVE_GET_VL();
2737: break;
2738: case PR_SME_SET_VL:
2739: error = SME_SET_VL(arg2);
2740: break;
2741: case PR_SME_GET_VL:
2742: error = SME_GET_VL();
2743: break;
2744: case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
2745: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2746: return -EINVAL;
2747: error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2);
2748: break;
2749: case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
2750: if (arg4 || arg5)
2751: return -EINVAL;
2752: error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3);
2753: break;
2754: case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS:
2755: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2756: return -EINVAL;
2757: error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2);
2758: break;
2759: case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS:
2760: if (arg4 || arg5)
2761: return -EINVAL;
2762: error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3);
2763: break;
2764: case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS:
2765: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2766: return -EINVAL;
2767: error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me);
2768: break;
2769: case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
2770: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2771: return -EINVAL;
2772: error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2);
2773: break;
2774: case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
2775: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2776: return -EINVAL;
2777: error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL();
2778: break;
2779: case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER:
2780: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
2781: return -EPERM;
2782:
2783: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2784: return -EINVAL;
2785:
2786: if (arg2 == 1)
2787: current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER;
2788: else if (!arg2)
2789: current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER;
2790: else
2791: return -EINVAL;
2792: break;
2793: case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER:
2794: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
2795: return -EPERM;
2796:
2797: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2798: return -EINVAL;
2799:
2800: error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER;
2801: break;
2802: case PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH:
2803: error = set_syscall_user_dispatch(arg2, arg3, arg4,
2804: (char __user *) arg5);
2805: break;
2806: #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
2807: case PR_SCHED_CORE:
2808: error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2809: break;
2810: #endif
2811: case PR_SET_MDWE:
2812: error = prctl_set_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2813: break;
2814: case PR_GET_MDWE:
2815: error = prctl_get_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2816: break;
2817: case PR_PPC_GET_DEXCR:
2818: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2819: return -EINVAL;
2820: error = PPC_GET_DEXCR_ASPECT(me, arg2);
2821: break;
2822: case PR_PPC_SET_DEXCR:
2823: if (arg4 || arg5)
2824: return -EINVAL;
2825: error = PPC_SET_DEXCR_ASPECT(me, arg2, arg3);
2826: break;
2827: case PR_SET_VMA:
2828: error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2829: break;
2830: case PR_GET_AUXV:
2831: if (arg4 || arg5)
2832: return -EINVAL;
2833: error = prctl_get_auxv((void __user *)arg2, arg3);
2834: break;
2835: #ifdef CONFIG_KSM
2836: case PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE:
2837: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2838: return -EINVAL;
2839: if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm))
2840: return -EINTR;
2841:
2842: if (arg2)
2843: error = ksm_enable_merge_any(me->mm);
2844: else
2845: error = ksm_disable_merge_any(me->mm);
2846: mmap_write_unlock(me->mm);
2847: break;
2848: case PR_GET_MEMORY_MERGE:
2849: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2850: return -EINVAL;
2851:
2852: error = !!mm_flags_test(MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY, me->mm);
2853: break;
2854: #endif
2855: case PR_RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL:
2856: error = RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL(arg2);
2857: break;
2858: case PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL:
2859: error = RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL();
2860: break;
2861: case PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX:
2862: error = RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX(arg2, arg3);
2863: break;
2864: case PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS:
2865: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2866: return -EINVAL;
2867: error = arch_get_shadow_stack_status(me, (unsigned long __user *) arg2);
2868: break;
2869: case PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS:
2870: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2871: return -EINVAL;
2872: error = arch_set_shadow_stack_status(me, arg2);
2873: break;
2874: case PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS:
2875: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2876: return -EINVAL;
2877: error = arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(me, arg2);
2878: break;
2879: case PR_TIMER_CREATE_RESTORE_IDS:
2880: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
2881: return -EINVAL;
2882: error = posixtimer_create_prctl(arg2);
2883: break;
2884: case PR_FUTEX_HASH:
2885: error = futex_hash_prctl(arg2, arg3, arg4);
2886: break;
2887: case PR_RSEQ_SLICE_EXTENSION:
2888: if (arg4 || arg5)
2889: return -EINVAL;
2890: error = rseq_slice_extension_prctl(arg2, arg3);
2891: break;
2892: case PR_GET_CFI:
2893: if (arg2 != PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS)
2894: return -EINVAL;
2895: if (arg4 || arg5)
2896: return -EINVAL;
2897: error = arch_prctl_get_branch_landing_pad_state(me, (unsigned long __user *)arg3);
2898: break;
2899: case PR_SET_CFI:
2900: if (arg2 != PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS)
2901: return -EINVAL;
2902: if (arg4 || arg5)
2903: return -EINVAL;
2904: error = arch_prctl_set_branch_landing_pad_state(me, arg3);
2905: if (error)
2906: break;
2907: if (arg3 & PR_CFI_LOCK && !(arg3 & PR_CFI_DISABLE))
2908: error = arch_prctl_lock_branch_landing_pad_state(me);
2909: break;
2910: default:
2911: trace_task_prctl_unknown(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
2912: error = -EINVAL;
2913: break;
2914: }
2915: return error;
2916: }
SourceFile:kernel/sys.c]
|
| 26/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 36011
output: 40
thoughts: 45
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this process:
**Diving into sched_core_share_pid**
Okay, so line 2808 is where things are hitting the fan. It's calling `sched_core_share_pid`, with `arg2`, `arg3`, `arg4`, and `arg5` as arguments. That's our focal point. Now, I need to understand what `sched_core_share_pid` *does*. My expert intuition tells me this function is the key, and I will now investigate its purpose. I will need to understand this function to figure out the nature of the error.
|
| 27/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/sched/core_sched.c Name:sched_core_share_pid]
Results: map[SourceCode: 130: /* Called from prctl interface: PR_SCHED_CORE */
131: int sched_core_share_pid(unsigned int cmd, pid_t pid, enum pid_type type,
132: unsigned long uaddr)
133: {
134: unsigned long cookie = 0, id = 0;
135: struct task_struct *task, *p;
136: struct pid *grp;
137: int err = 0;
138:
139: if (!sched_smt_active())
140: return -ENODEV;
141:
142: BUILD_BUG_ON(PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD != PIDTYPE_PID);
143: BUILD_BUG_ON(PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP != PIDTYPE_TGID);
144: BUILD_BUG_ON(PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP != PIDTYPE_PGID);
145:
146: if (type > PIDTYPE_PGID || cmd >= PR_SCHED_CORE_MAX || pid < 0 ||
147: (cmd != PR_SCHED_CORE_GET && uaddr))
148: return -EINVAL;
149:
150: rcu_read_lock();
151: if (pid == 0) {
152: task = current;
153: } else {
154: task = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
155: if (!task) {
156: rcu_read_unlock();
157: return -ESRCH;
158: }
159: }
160: get_task_struct(task);
161: rcu_read_unlock();
162:
163: /*
164: * Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
165: * process. Use the regular "ptrace_may_access()" checks.
166: */
167: if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
168: err = -EPERM;
169: goto out;
170: }
171:
172: switch (cmd) {
173: case PR_SCHED_CORE_GET:
174: if (type != PIDTYPE_PID || uaddr & 7) {
175: err = -EINVAL;
176: goto out;
177: }
178: cookie = sched_core_clone_cookie(task);
179: if (cookie) {
180: /* XXX improve ? */
181: ptr_to_hashval((void *)cookie, &id);
182: }
183: err = put_user(id, (u64 __user *)uaddr);
184: goto out;
185:
186: case PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE:
187: cookie = sched_core_alloc_cookie();
188: if (!cookie) {
189: err = -ENOMEM;
190: goto out;
191: }
192: break;
193:
194: case PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO:
195: cookie = sched_core_clone_cookie(current);
196: break;
197:
198: case PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM:
199: if (type != PIDTYPE_PID) {
200: err = -EINVAL;
201: goto out;
202: }
203: cookie = sched_core_clone_cookie(task);
204: __sched_core_set(current, cookie);
205: goto out;
206:
207: default:
208: err = -EINVAL;
209: goto out;
210: }
211:
212: if (type == PIDTYPE_PID) {
213: __sched_core_set(task, cookie);
214: goto out;
215: }
216:
217: read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
218: grp = task_pid_type(task, type);
219:
220: do_each_pid_thread(grp, type, p) {
221: if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
222: err = -EPERM;
223: goto out_tasklist;
224: }
225: } while_each_pid_thread(grp, type, p);
226:
227: do_each_pid_thread(grp, type, p) {
228: __sched_core_set(p, cookie);
229: } while_each_pid_thread(grp, type, p);
230: out_tasklist:
231: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
232:
233: out:
234: sched_core_put_cookie(cookie);
235: put_task_struct(task);
236: return err;
237: }
SourceFile:kernel/sched/core_sched.c]
|
| 28/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 37796
output: 40
thoughts: 32
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as if I were thinking these thoughts:
**Analyzing `sched_core_alloc_cookie`**
Okay, so line 187… right, it's assigning to `cookie` the return value of `sched_core_alloc_cookie()`. That's a pretty clear indicator of what's happening. My immediate thought is, let's drill down into that `sched_core_alloc_cookie` function. I need to understand what exactly this "cookie" represents and how it's being allocated. Is it a unique identifier? A pointer to some core data structure? What resources are being committed? I need to analyze its implementation to figure out the significance of this assignment and how this cookie will be used subsequently in the code. Understanding the semantics of the cookie is crucial for understanding how the scheduler core operates, so let's get cracking.
|
| 29/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/sched/core_sched.c Name:sched_core_alloc_cookie]
Results: map[SourceCode: 13: static unsigned long sched_core_alloc_cookie(void)
14: {
15: struct sched_core_cookie *ck = kmalloc_obj(*ck);
16: if (!ck)
17: return 0;
18:
19: refcount_set(&ck->refcnt, 1);
20: sched_core_get();
21:
22: return (unsigned long)ck;
23: }
SourceFile:kernel/sched/core_sched.c]
|
| 30/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38218
output: 36
thoughts: 25
Thoughts: Here's my analysis of the provided snippet, framed as my own thought process:
**Diving into `sched_core_get()`**
Okay, so we've hit line 20, and it calls `sched_core_get()`. Right away, my expert mind flags that as something critical to understand. I need to break down what's happening there. `sched_core_get` is likely involved in the scheduler's core, which suggests we're probably looking at how the kernel is obtaining some essential information, perhaps the active scheduling core, or some statistics. I need to delve deeper into its function definition and any related documentation to fully grasp its role in this context. Let's see what that function actually does, and how it fits into the broader scheduling architecture of the system.
|
| 31/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/sched/core.c Name:sched_core_get]
Results: map[SourceCode: 492: void sched_core_get(void)
493: {
494: if (atomic_inc_not_zero(&sched_core_count))
495: return;
496:
497: mutex_lock(&sched_core_mutex);
498: if (!atomic_read(&sched_core_count))
499: __sched_core_enable();
500:
501: smp_mb__before_atomic();
502: atomic_inc(&sched_core_count);
503: mutex_unlock(&sched_core_mutex);
504: }
SourceFile:kernel/sched/core.c]
|
| 32/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 38656
output: 37
thoughts: 28
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that.
**Analyzing `__sched_core_enable()`**
Alright, let's see, line 499... right, that's `__sched_core_enable()`. Time to dive in and understand what that function is doing. I need to refresh my memory on the sched core enabling process. What are the relevant data structures, the locking mechanisms it uses, and what its overall role in the scheduler is? Is this enabling an entire core, or a specific part of the scheduler's functionality, or what? Gotta figure out the context. I'll need to trace its call sites, its dependencies, the implications of its execution. Let's see if there are any specific notes, comments, or documentation around that function or related parts of the code. This might be where the real bottleneck could be if things are not well configured.
|
| 33/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/sched/core.c Name:__sched_core_enable]
Results: map[SourceCode: 473: static void __sched_core_enable(void)
474: {
475: static_branch_enable(&__sched_core_enabled);
476: /*
477: * Ensure all previous instances of raw_spin_rq_*lock() have finished
478: * and future ones will observe !sched_core_disabled().
479: */
480: synchronize_rcu();
481: __sched_core_flip(true);
482: sched_core_assert_empty();
483: }
SourceFile:kernel/sched/core.c]
|
| 34/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 39094
output: 35
thoughts: 1454
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential IPI Deadlock**
Okay, so I'm looking at this trace, and line 475 caught my eye – that `static_branch_enable` call. This is interesting because I know that's essentially modifying code at runtime. It's calling a chain of functions that eventually land at `text_poke`, which, crucially, grabs the `text_mutex`. That means we are dealing with code modification and locking, which requires careful synchronization.
Now, `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` is the key to this issue. I see it calls `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`, which sends IPIs and waits for a response from the other CPUs. And then, I see that CPU 0 is in `text_poke` within this `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` function. This makes me consider if there is an issue here.
Then, the trace shows a timer interrupt on CPU 0. At first, I'm thinking, "No big deal, interrupts are enabled in `text_poke`, so it should be fine. But this is where the trouble begins."
The trace indicates CPU 1 is blocked waiting for CPU 0 to process its IPI. CPU 1 is in a TLB flush, specifically in `csd_lock_wait`, which suggests it's waiting for a response from CPU 0 after sending an IPI. Meanwhile, CPU 0 is in the timer interrupt handler `__hrtimer_run_queues`. This is when alarm bells are going off.
If CPU 0 is in the timer interrupt handler, then interrupts should be disabled, meaning CPU 0 can't process the IPI from CPU 1 until it finishes. However, CPU 0 isn't finishing and CPU 1 is blocked. So, there is a reason for this.
So, either CPU 0 is stuck in the timer interrupt handler, which would be an infinite loop in `__hrtimer_run_queues`. Or, is CPU 0 is stuck in `text_poke`? If it were stuck in text poke the NMI backtrace would reflect that. Since the backtrace clearly shows `__run_hrtimer`, I am now focusing on the timer path.
And then I see it! The backtrace from the NMI shows that `__run_hrtimer` and then `__hrtimer_run_queues`. So, CPU 0 is definitely running the timer interrupt handler.
This is starting to look like a deadlock scenario. CPU 0 has the `text_mutex` and is running in the timer interrupt. CPU 1 is in `flush_tlb_multi` waiting for CPU 0 to process its IPI. This means CPU 1 is holding some locks, possibly related to page table management. So, there might be a classic IPI deadlock here.
Specifically, CPU 1 seems to be in the writeback path (`wb_workfn` -> `ext4_writepages` -> `mpage_submit_folio` -> `folio_clear_dirty_for_io` -> `folio_mkclean` -> `rmap_walk` -> `page_mkclean_one` -> `ptep_clear_flush` -> `flush_tlb_multi`). This path involves locks. Specifically: folio locks, and page table locks (PTL).
If a timer callback on CPU 0 attempts to acquire a lock that CPU 1 is holding, we have a deadlock! CPU 1 is waiting on CPU 0 to process an IPI (which requires completing the timer), but CPU 0 is waiting for CPU 1 to release the lock! Now, let's go check whether a timer callback could possibly try to take one of those locks.
|
| 35/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:mm/rmap.c Name:page_mkclean_one]
Results: map[SourceCode:1180: static bool page_mkclean_one(struct folio *folio, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
1181: unsigned long address, void *arg)
1182: {
1183: DEFINE_FOLIO_VMA_WALK(pvmw, folio, vma, address, PVMW_SYNC);
1184: int *cleaned = arg;
1185:
1186: *cleaned += page_vma_mkclean_one(&pvmw);
1187:
1188: return true;
1189: }
SourceFile:mm/rmap.c]
|
| 36/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 41575
output: 38
thoughts: 18
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts:
**The Implications of `page_vma_mkclean_one` and the Page Table Lock**
Alright, let's process this... *page_vma_mkclean_one*... right, that function. It's used in memory management, likely for cleaning or marking a specific page as clean within a virtual memory area. And now I'm remembering – it *takes* the Page Table Lock (PTL). This has some significant implications that I need to quickly run through. So, with that information, a deeper dive is needed.
|
| 37/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:mm/rmap.c Name:page_vma_mkclean_one]
Results: map[SourceCode:1103: static int page_vma_mkclean_one(struct page_vma_mapped_walk *pvmw)
1104: {
1105: int cleaned = 0;
1106: struct vm_area_struct *vma = pvmw->vma;
1107: struct mmu_notifier_range range;
1108: unsigned long address = pvmw->address;
1109:
1110: /*
1111: * We have to assume the worse case ie pmd for invalidation. Note that
1112: * the folio can not be freed from this function.
1113: */
1114: mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, MMU_NOTIFY_PROTECTION_PAGE, 0,
1115: vma->vm_mm, address, vma_address_end(pvmw));
1116: mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(&range);
1117:
1118: while (page_vma_mapped_walk(pvmw)) {
1119: int ret = 0;
1120:
1121: address = pvmw->address;
1122: if (pvmw->pte) {
1123: pte_t *pte = pvmw->pte;
1124: pte_t entry = ptep_get(pte);
1125:
1126: /*
1127: * PFN swap PTEs, such as device-exclusive ones, that
1128: * actually map pages are clean and not writable from a
1129: * CPU perspective. The MMU notifier takes care of any
1130: * device aspects.
1131: */
1132: if (!pte_present(entry))
1133: continue;
1134: if (!pte_dirty(entry) && !pte_write(entry))
1135: continue;
1136:
1137: flush_cache_page(vma, address, pte_pfn(entry));
1138: entry = ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pte);
1139: entry = pte_wrprotect(entry);
1140: entry = pte_mkclean(entry);
1141: set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pte, entry);
1142: ret = 1;
1143: } else {
1144: #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
1145: pmd_t *pmd = pvmw->pmd;
1146: pmd_t entry = pmdp_get(pmd);
1147:
1148: /*
1149: * Please see the comment above (!pte_present).
1150: * A non present PMD is not writable from a CPU
1151: * perspective.
1152: */
1153: if (!pmd_present(entry))
1154: continue;
1155: if (!pmd_dirty(entry) && !pmd_write(entry))
1156: continue;
1157:
1158: flush_cache_range(vma, address,
1159: address + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE);
1160: entry = pmdp_invalidate(vma, address, pmd);
1161: entry = pmd_wrprotect(entry);
1162: entry = pmd_mkclean(entry);
1163: set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pmd, entry);
1164: ret = 1;
1165: #else
1166: /* unexpected pmd-mapped folio? */
1167: WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
1168: #endif
1169: }
1170:
1171: if (ret)
1172: cleaned++;
1173: }
1174:
1175: mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
1176:
1177: return cleaned;
1178: }
SourceFile:mm/rmap.c]
|
| 38/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 42925
output: 24
thoughts: 1062
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Kernel Deadlock**
Okay, so here's what I'm thinking. We've got a situation where `page_vma_mapped_walk` grabs the PTL, calls `ptep_clear_flush`, which then triggers `flush_tlb_page` and an IPI. So, CPU 1 now *has* the PTL. The initial concern is a timer callback on CPU 0 trying to take the PTL and deadlocking. But hold on, the NMI backtrace from CPU 0 shows something different. It's in `find_held_lock` -> `lock_release` -> `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` -> `__run_hrtimer`. That `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` is unlocking `cpu_base->lock`, not *locking* a PTL. So, `find_held_lock` is being called *during* lock release. Weird.
Why is it stuck in `find_held_lock` if it's supposed to be releasing a lock?
Ah! It must be an infinite loop in `__hrtimer_run_queues`. This would cause repeated locking and unlocking of `cpu_base->lock`, so it keeps calling `lock_release` and `find_held_lock` repeatedly. It isn't actually deadlocked with CPU 1; CPU 1 is just waiting for the IPI on CPU 0 to process. CPU 0 is just busy in its loop.
So the real question becomes: which timer callback is returning `HRTIMER_RESTART` *without* advancing the expiration time? We need to hunt down those callbacks.
But wait, is there another possibility? Perhaps CPU 0 isn't infinitely looping but is deadlocked, after all. If it's deadlocked, it *must* be blocked on a lock somewhere. But the NMI backtrace shows `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore`, which isn't a blocking operation!
Unless, the NMI interrupted while releasing a lock. But that's a coincidence. But if there is a deadlock, where is it? It'd be blocked in `raw_spin_lock_irq(&cpu_base->lock)` or inside the timer callback. The backtrace shows `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore`, *before* the callback, suggesting an infinite loop. So, the NMI just happens to hit there!
Could `find_held_lock` itself be looping infinitely? The loop in `find_held_lock` iterates from `depth -1` down to 0, where `depth` is at most `MAX_LOCK_DEPTH`, which is 48. Nope, that's not it.
So, let's look at `__hrtimer_run_queues` again:
```c
while ((timer = clock_base_next_timer(base))) {
if (basenow < hrtimer_get_softexpires(timer))
break;
__run_hrtimer(cpu_base, base, timer, basenow, flags);
if (active_mask == HRTIMER_ACTIVE_SOFT)
hrtimer_sync_wait_running(cpu_base, flags);
}
```
If `__run_hrtimer` finishes, and the timer is re-enqueued with the *same* expiration time, the loop will run again. This is a known issue if the timer callback returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` without advancing the timer.
Looks like the obvious issue, let's look for fixes.
|
| 39/2 |
2026/07/14 00:48 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[hrtimer infinite loop]]
Results: map[Output:0ea9494be9c9 KVM: x86: WARN if hrtimer callback for periodic APIC timer fires with period=0
54db6d1bdd71 btrfs: fix discard worker infinite loop after disabling discard
d9ccb18f83ea ipv6: Fix soft lockups in fib6_select_path under high next hop churn
7991dbff6849 dm thin: Use last transaction's pmd->root when commit failed
7f22391cbe82 hrtimers: increase clock min delta threshold while interrupt hanging
1cc4fff0b360 hrtimers: increase clock min delta threshold while interrupt hanging
]
|
| 40/2 |
2026/07/14 00:49 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44966
output: 40
thoughts: 1713
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Deadlock in KVM/Guest Kernel Interactions**
Okay, let's break this down. First, the report references a potential issue related to `hrtimer` callbacks and APIC timers in a KVM guest on Google Compute Engine. My initial thought is to confirm that the reported bug is within the guest kernel, which appears to be the case since Syzkaller is running there. Now, there's a reference to an NMI backtrace from CPU 0, and if I understand this correctly, the backtrace suggests a potential problem within `__hrtimer_run_queues`, or at least within the timer interrupt handling itself, perhaps an infinite loop in `__hrtimer_run_queues`?
However, since the backtrace leads me to `lock_is_held_type`, which is connected to `text_poke`, it's not immediately clear whether it is an infinite loop. So, let's shift focus to `text_poke`. It's possible that `text_poke` is deadlocked with another process. `lock_is_held_type` is there to check `text_mutex`. Why would it take so long? The timer interrupt might be firing within `lock_is_held_type`. I'm starting to think about *when* the NMI fired during the interrupt process. Did it interrupt a lengthy timer callback? Or did the timer interrupt happen at the same time? It's possible the NMI fired while in the timer interrupt.
I'm starting to visualize the execution flow. `text_poke` calls `__text_poke`, which disables interrupts. After that, it calls `flush_tlb_mm_range`, then re-enables interrupts. Then, `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` calls `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`, which sends IPIs to *all* CPUs and waits for them. Now, wait a minute... if CPU 1 is in `flush_tlb_multi`, which *also* sends IPIs and waits, we could have a classic deadlock scenario! CPU 0 waits for CPU 1, and CPU 1 waits for CPU 0. It's an IPI tango!
Let me verify if this scenario is possible. Checking the `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` code, I see the loop calling `text_poke`. Wait a minute, the NMI backtrace on CPU 0 is within `text_poke`! So, it hasn't reached `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu` yet. That means CPU 0 *hasn't* sent any IPIs. That rules out the immediate deadlock I envisioned. This is unexpected. So why isn't CPU 0 making progress? If it's not waiting for CPU 1, it should just finish and move to `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`, right? Then when calling `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`, CPU 0 will send an IPI to CPU 1, *and* wait for CPU 1.
But CPU 1 is *already* waiting for CPU 0! Okay, it's possible. When CPU 0 gets to that `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu` call, it *will* deadlock. But it's still in `text_poke`. It is still running `lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex)`.
Okay, `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu` uses `on_each_cpu(do_sync_core, NULL, 1);`. That uses the IPI and waits. So if CPU 1 is calling `on_each_cpu_cond_mask` (from `flush_tlb_multi`), it's *also* sending an IPI and waiting. Are there possible deadlocks when calling `on_each_cpu` at the same time? I'll need to check the `smp_call_function_many_cond` code to confirm this, but right now, my suspicion is very high. It seems I am on to something.
|
| 41/2 |
2026/07/14 00:49 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/smp.c Name:smp_call_function_many_cond]
Results: map[SourceCode: 795: static void smp_call_function_many_cond(const struct cpumask *mask,
796: smp_call_func_t func, void *info,
797: unsigned int scf_flags,
798: smp_cond_func_t cond_func)
799: {
800: int cpu, last_cpu, this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
801: struct call_function_data *cfd;
802: bool wait = scf_flags & SCF_WAIT;
803: int nr_cpus = 0;
804: bool run_remote = false;
805:
806: lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
807:
808: /*
809: * Can deadlock when called with interrupts disabled.
810: * We allow cpu's that are not yet online though, as no one else can
811: * send smp call function interrupt to this cpu and as such deadlocks
812: * can't happen.
813: */
814: if (cpu_online(this_cpu) && !oops_in_progress &&
815: !early_boot_irqs_disabled)
816: lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
817:
818: /*
819: * When @wait we can deadlock when we interrupt between llist_add() and
820: * arch_send_call_function_ipi*(); when !@wait we can deadlock due to
821: * csd_lock() on because the interrupt context uses the same csd
822: * storage.
823: */
824: WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task());
825:
826: /* Check if we need remote execution, i.e., any CPU excluding this one. */
827: if (cpumask_any_and_but(mask, cpu_online_mask, this_cpu) < nr_cpu_ids) {
828: cfd = this_cpu_ptr(&cfd_data);
829: cpumask_and(cfd->cpumask, mask, cpu_online_mask);
830: __cpumask_clear_cpu(this_cpu, cfd->cpumask);
831:
832: cpumask_clear(cfd->cpumask_ipi);
833: for_each_cpu(cpu, cfd->cpumask) {
834: call_single_data_t *csd = per_cpu_ptr(cfd->csd, cpu);
835:
836: if (cond_func && !cond_func(cpu, info)) {
837: __cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, cfd->cpumask);
838: continue;
839: }
840:
841: /* Work is enqueued on a remote CPU. */
842: run_remote = true;
843:
844: csd_lock(csd);
845: if (wait)
846: csd->node.u_flags |= CSD_TYPE_SYNC;
847: csd->func = func;
848: csd->info = info;
849: #ifdef CONFIG_CSD_LOCK_WAIT_DEBUG
850: csd->node.src = this_cpu;
851: csd->node.dst = cpu;
852: #endif
853: trace_csd_queue_cpu(cpu, _RET_IP_, func, csd);
854:
855: /*
856: * Kick the remote CPU if this is the first work
857: * item enqueued.
858: */
859: if (llist_add(&csd->node.llist, &per_cpu(call_single_queue, cpu))) {
860: __cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, cfd->cpumask_ipi);
861: nr_cpus++;
862: last_cpu = cpu;
863: }
864: }
865:
866: /*
867: * Choose the most efficient way to send an IPI. Note that the
868: * number of CPUs might be zero due to concurrent changes to the
869: * provided mask.
870: */
871: if (nr_cpus == 1)
872: send_call_function_single_ipi(last_cpu);
873: else if (likely(nr_cpus > 1))
874: send_call_function_ipi_mask(cfd->cpumask_ipi);
875: }
876:
877: /* Check if we need local execution. */
878: if ((scf_flags & SCF_RUN_LOCAL) && cpumask_test_cpu(this_cpu, mask) &&
879: (!cond_func || cond_func(this_cpu, info))) {
880: unsigned long flags;
881:
882: local_irq_save(flags);
883: csd_do_func(func, info, NULL);
884: local_irq_restore(flags);
885: }
886:
887: if (run_remote && wait) {
888: for_each_cpu(cpu, cfd->cpumask) {
889: call_single_data_t *csd;
890:
891: csd = per_cpu_ptr(cfd->csd, cpu);
892: csd_lock_wait(csd);
893: }
894: }
895: }
SourceFile:kernel/smp.c]
|
| 42/2 |
2026/07/14 00:49 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 49274
output: 24
thoughts: 1225
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Deadlock in smp_call_function_many_cond**
Okay, so I'm digging into this `smp_call_function_many_cond` scenario. My initial thought is a classic deadlock possibility: if two CPUs call this at the same time, they both end up adding their `csd` to the other's queue, sending an IPI, and then waiting in `csd_lock_wait`. The problem? `csd_lock_wait` just spins, it *doesn't* process incoming IPIs. If CPU 0 is waiting for CPU 1, and CPU 1 is waiting for CPU 0, and neither can receive an IPI because of the spinlock, we've got a deadlock.
But wait, I need to double-check. Isn't `smp_call_function_many_cond` called with interrupts enabled? And it does look like interrupts *are* enabled during the critical section. The code asserts it! That means the CPU *should* take the incoming IPI, process the queue, and unlock the `csd`. So, no deadlock, right?
But, what if interrupts are disabled on one CPU? The code calls `local_irq_save` inside `__text_poke`, right? If CPU 0 has interrupts disabled, it can't respond to CPU 1's IPI. CPU 1 will wait forever! Okay, so CPU 0 *is* calling `text_poke`! It saves and restores interrupts, but for a short duration. So the window should be pretty small. It's a race, but if CPU 0 is within a critical section, there *could* be a deadlock.
If CPU 1 is waiting for ten seconds, that means CPU 0 is stuck. Is CPU 0 stuck in `__text_poke` for a long time? The NMI backtrace shows it in `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` -> `hrtimer_interrupt` -> `__hrtimer_run_queues` -> `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` -> `lock_release` -> `find_held_lock`. If it's in a timer interrupt, the timer fired, and *that* means interrupts must have been enabled at some point, because all interrupts are disabled in an interrupt handler on x86. So it can't be in the timer interrupt. But wait, no, the backtrace shows `text_poke` *before* the timer interrupt. So the timer interrupt fires, CPU 0 then *disables* interrupts. So the timer interrupt is running with interrupts disabled, and IPIs are blocked.
Since the backtrace shows the interrupt handler, interrupts *are* disabled, and CPU 0 can't process the IPI. If the timer interrupt is long, CPU 1 stalls! So the long time is the timer interrupt taking a long time. Is this an infinite loop in `__hrtimer_run_queues`? And if so, how can it happen?
Okay, could there be another reason? Deadlock inside the timer interrupt? The backtrace doesn't show a lock *being* waited for, but rather one *being released*. So, it's not deadlocked *on* a lock. It must be an infinite loop then. Any known infinite loops in timer callbacks? Let me check the syzkaller repro (if there is one). No repro. But I can search for issues with "hrtimer_interrupt" and "find_held_lock" or "rcu_preempt detected stalls." Wait, if it's an infinite loop in `__hrtimer_run_queues`, it's because a timer callback is returning `HRTIMER_RESTART` but *not* advancing the timer. I have to look into the timer callbacks! Is it `posixtimer_fn`, or `it_real_fn`, or `perf_mux_hrtimer_handler`? It is something to check. I should see if there are recent commits to fix this kind of issue in hrtimer.
|
| 43/2 |
2026/07/14 00:50 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[MessageRegexps:[hrtimer infinite loop]]
Results: map[Output:0ea9494be9c9 KVM: x86: WARN if hrtimer callback for periodic APIC timer fires with period=0
54db6d1bdd71 btrfs: fix discard worker infinite loop after disabling discard
d9ccb18f83ea ipv6: Fix soft lockups in fib6_select_path under high next hop churn
7991dbff6849 dm thin: Use last transaction's pmd->root when commit failed
7f22391cbe82 hrtimers: increase clock min delta threshold while interrupt hanging
1cc4fff0b360 hrtimers: increase clock min delta threshold while interrupt hanging
]
|
| 44/2 |
2026/07/14 00:50 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 51572
output: 26
thoughts: 29
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing a Potential HRTimer Bottleneck**
Okay, so I'm looking at commit `7f22391cbe82 hrtimers: increase clock min delta threshold while interrupt hanging`. My initial thought is, "Ah, right, this is likely addressing some kind of interrupt latency or scheduling issue related to HRT timers." The commit title strongly suggests we're dealing with a situation where HRT timers are experiencing some kind of hang or delay, specifically related to interrupt handling.
"Increase clock min delta threshold" immediately flags the potential solution space. The core idea here probably revolves around adjusting the minimum acceptable time delta for an HRTimer interrupt to fire. By increasing this threshold, the system is less sensitive to small variations or short-term delays in interrupt delivery. If interrupts are hanging, potentially due to contention or some other transient issue, increasing this delta provides a buffer, reducing the likelihood of missed or delayed timer expirations.
I'd want to dig into the commit itself to understand the specific problem being addressed. I'm guessing this might involve analyzing the code around the interrupt handling path, and also, I'd want to get details on the particular hardware and kernel configuration where this change was necessary. What specific platform or workload was triggering this issue? Was this a symptom of an overloaded system, a faulty hardware interrupt controller, or something else entirely?
I'd also be curious about the performance trade-offs. While increasing the threshold helps with stability, it can also impact the accuracy and responsiveness of the HRT timers, especially in latency-sensitive applications. If this has been backported to a stable kernel, I would want to assess the impact on performance regressions. I'd definitely want to verify the commit author's rationale and test results.
|
| 45/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 7f22391cbe82a80a9f891d8bd10fc28ff248d1e2
Author: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Date: Mon Dec 22 02:24:48 2008 +0100
hrtimers: increase clock min delta threshold while interrupt hanging
Impact: avoid timer IRQ hanging slow systems
While using the function graph tracer on a virtualized system, the
hrtimer_interrupt can hang the system on an infinite loop.
This can be caused in several situations:
- the hardware is very slow and HZ is set too high
- something intrusive is slowing the system down (tracing under emulation)
... and the next clock events to program are always before the current time.
This patch implements a reasonable compromise: if such a situation is
detected, we share the CPUs time in 1/4 to process the hrtimer interrupts.
This is enough to let the system running without serious starvation.
It has been successfully tested under VirtualBox with 1000 HZ and 100 HZ
with function graph tracer launched. On both cases, the clock events were
increased until about 25 ms periodic ticks, which means 40 HZ.
So we change a hard to debug hang into a warning message and a system that
still manages to limp along.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
diff --git a/kernel/hrtimer.c b/kernel/hrtimer.c
index f33afb0407bc..8fea312ca36c 100644
--- a/kernel/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/hrtimer.c
@@ -1158,6 +1158,29 @@ static void __run_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *timer)
#ifdef CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS
+static int force_clock_reprogram;
+
+/*
+ * After 5 iteration's attempts, we consider that hrtimer_interrupt()
+ * is hanging, which could happen with something that slows the interrupt
+ * such as the tracing. Then we force the clock reprogramming for each future
+ * hrtimer interrupts to avoid infinite loops and use the min_delta_ns
+ * threshold that we will overwrite.
+ * The next tick event will be scheduled to 3 times we currently spend on
+ * hrtimer_interrupt(). This gives a good compromise, the cpus will spend
+ * 1/4 of their time to process the hrtimer interrupts. This is enough to
+ * let it running without serious starvation.
+ */
+
+static inline void
+hrtimer_interrupt_hanging(struct clock_event_device *dev,
+ ktime_t try_time)
+{
+ force_clock_reprogram = 1;
+ dev->min_delta_ns = (unsigned long)try_time.tv64 * 3;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "hrtimer: interrupt too slow, "
+ "forcing clock min delta to %lu ns\n", dev->min_delta_ns);
+}
/*
* High resolution timer interrupt
* Called with interrupts disabled
@@ -1167,6 +1190,7 @@ void hrtimer_interrupt(struct clock_event_device *dev)
struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = &__get_cpu_var(hrtimer_bases);
struct hrtimer_clock_base *base;
ktime_t expires_next, now;
+ int nr_retries = 0;
int i;
BUG_ON(!cpu_base->hres_active);
@@ -1174,6 +1198,10 @@ void hrtimer_interrupt(struct clock_event_device *dev)
dev->next_event.tv64 = KTIME_MAX;
retry:
+ /* 5 retries is enough to notice a hang */
+ if (!(++nr_retries % 5))
+ hrtimer_interrupt_hanging(dev, ktime_sub(ktime_get(), now));
+
now = ktime_get();
expires_next.tv64 = KTIME_MAX;
@@ -1226,7 +1254,7 @@ void hrtimer_interrupt(struct clock_event_device *dev)
/* Reprogramming necessary ? */
if (expires_next.tv64 != KTIME_MAX) {
- if (tick_program_event(expires_next, 0))
+ if (tick_program_event(expires_next, force_clock_reprogram))
goto retry;
}
}
]
|
| 46/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 53215
output: 36
thoughts: 97
Thoughts: **Analyzing the hrtimer_interrupt Retry Loop**
Okay, so I'm looking at `hrtimer_interrupt`, and it looks like it's got a retry loop, interesting. The code suggests that if `tick_program_event` fails – probably because a scheduled event is in the past – it jumps to a `retry` point. Now, hang on a second... `tick_program_event` returns a non-zero value when the target time is *behind* the current time, right? And if the target time *is* in the past, it's supposed to retry immediately? That's definitely worth digging into. I need to get the current kernel source and double-check exactly how `hrtimer_interrupt` handles this. This behavior seems like it could have some interesting implications for event scheduling and latency, so I should see if this is consistent with the current implementation.
|
| 47/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c Name:hrtimer_interrupt]
Results: map[SourceCode:2181: /*
2182: * High resolution timer interrupt
2183: * Called with interrupts disabled
2184: */
2185: void hrtimer_interrupt(struct clock_event_device *dev)
2186: {
2187: struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
2188: ktime_t expires_next, now, entry_time, delta;
2189: unsigned long flags;
2190: int retries = 0;
2191:
2192: BUG_ON(!cpu_base->hres_active);
2193: cpu_base->nr_events++;
2194: dev->next_event = KTIME_MAX;
2195: dev->next_event_forced = 0;
2196:
2197: raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_base->lock, flags);
2198: entry_time = now = hrtimer_update_base(cpu_base);
2199: retry:
2200: cpu_base->deferred_rearm = true;
2201: /*
2202: * Set expires_next to KTIME_MAX, which prevents that remote CPUs queue
2203: * timers while __hrtimer_run_queues() is expiring the clock bases.
2204: * Timers which are re/enqueued on the local CPU are not affected by
2205: * this.
2206: */
2207: cpu_base->expires_next = KTIME_MAX;
2208:
2209: if (!ktime_before(now, cpu_base->softirq_expires_next)) {
2210: cpu_base->softirq_expires_next = KTIME_MAX;
2211: cpu_base->softirq_activated = true;
2212: raise_timer_softirq(HRTIMER_SOFTIRQ);
2213: }
2214:
2215: __hrtimer_run_queues(cpu_base, now, flags, HRTIMER_ACTIVE_HARD);
2216:
2217: /*
2218: * The next timer was already expired due to:
2219: * - tracing
2220: * - long lasting callbacks
2221: * - being scheduled away when running in a VM
2222: *
2223: * We need to prevent that we loop forever in the hrtiner interrupt
2224: * routine. We give it 3 attempts to avoid overreacting on some
2225: * spurious event.
2226: */
2227: now = hrtimer_update_base(cpu_base);
2228: expires_next = hrtimer_update_next_event(cpu_base);
2229: cpu_base->hang_detected = false;
2230: if (expires_next < now) {
2231: if (++retries < 3)
2232: goto retry;
2233:
2234: delta = ktime_sub(now, entry_time);
2235: cpu_base->max_hang_time = max_t(unsigned int, cpu_base->max_hang_time, delta);
2236: cpu_base->nr_hangs++;
2237: cpu_base->hang_detected = true;
2238: }
2239:
2240: hrtimer_interrupt_rearm(cpu_base, expires_next);
2241: raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_base->lock, flags);
2242: }
SourceFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c]
|
| 48/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 54558
output: 40
thoughts: 2719
Thoughts: **Analysis of a Potential Kernel Lockup**
Okay, here's what I've got. The `hrtimer_interrupt` function has a retry mechanism, but if that fails, it sets `hang_detected` and calls `hrtimer_interrupt_rearm`. However, if `__hrtimer_run_queues` gets stuck in an infinite loop, that retry logic will never be reached! `__hrtimer_run_queues` iterates through expired timers. If a timer callback returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` *without* advancing the timer's expiration time, it's re-enqueued with the *same* time. This means it will immediately be run again, leading to an infinite loop. So, there is an infinite loop inside `__hrtimer_run_queues`! This bypasses the retry logic, causing a hard lockup.
I need to confirm if there are any callbacks which return `HRTIMER_RESTART` without changing the timer’s expiration. If the timer's expiration time is not advanced, the callback will be re-enqueued and loop infinitely inside `__hrtimer_run_queues`.
The NMI backtrace on CPU 0 shows it was executing `prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, ...)`. This is calling `sched_core_alloc_cookie`, which goes through several functions ultimately calling `text_poke`. It looks like the timer interrupt fired while CPU 0 was in `text_poke`, which is patching instructions. There are two potential issues. The first is that the timer interrupt is looping infinitely, the second is that the call to `text_poke` is deadlocked. The initial assumption was that the timer interrupt was looping, and that `text_poke` was deadlocked, as CPU 1 was waiting for a response from CPU 0.
However, `text_poke` actually calls `local_irq_save` meaning that interrupts are enabled between calls. Since the interrupts are enabled, the timer interrupt can fire. Since `text_poke` is taking a long time because it is patching many instructions (up to 256), a timer could potentially fire many times and still be in `text_poke`. But why is CPU 0 spending 10 seconds in `text_poke`? Why is CPU 1 stalled for 10 seconds?
CPU 1 is stuck in `flush_tlb_multi`, waiting for an IPI from CPU 0. Based on the NMI backtrace, CPU 0 is actually *inside* the timer interrupt handler! Specifically, it is inside `__hrtimer_run_queues`, and specifically in `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore`, which unlocks the spinlock before calling the timer callback. If a timer callback is taking a long time, it would be *inside* that callback. But it's in the hrtimer code itself. That means that the problem is not in a long timer callback but that `__hrtimer_run_queues` is looping infinitely.
This points strongly to an infinite loop inside `__hrtimer_run_queues`. The loop could have been caused by a timer callback that returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` without advancing the expiration time, potentially leading to a hard lockup. This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Now, to see if an unprivileged process can create this scenario with, say, `timer_create`, `nanosleep`, or `itimer`. I need to review these callbacks. Let's start with `posixtimer_fn`.
|
| 49/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c Name:posixtimer_fn]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 50/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 58095
output: 40
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: Okay, here's the summary, expressed as though I'm the one thinking it:
**Decoding that Function Name**
Ah, right. It's `posix_timer_fn`. That name immediately tells me a few things. First, we're dealing with a POSIX timer – that's a clue about the underlying mechanism, likely involving signals or perhaps a dedicated thread/kernel interface to manage the timing. The 'fn' suffix strongly suggests this is a function, likely a callback or handler. Based on the name alone, my expert intuition kicks in. This function is almost certainly the callback routine that gets invoked when a POSIX timer expires. I'll need to dig deeper to see exactly *what* it does, but that initial association with POSIX timers provides a really useful context.
|
| 51/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c Name:posix_timer_fn]
Results: map[SourceCode: 368: /*
369: * This function gets called when a POSIX.1b interval timer expires from
370: * the HRTIMER interrupt (soft interrupt on RT kernels).
371: *
372: * Handles CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_BOOTTIME and CLOCK_TAI
373: * based timers.
374: */
375: static enum hrtimer_restart posix_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
376: {
377: struct k_itimer *timr = container_of(timer, struct k_itimer, it.real.timer);
378:
379: guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&timr->it_lock);
380: posix_timer_queue_signal(timr);
381: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
382: }
SourceFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c]
|
| 52/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 58600
output: 37
thoughts: 27
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, presented as my own mental process, given my expertise:
**Examining Timer Restart Behavior**
Right, so `posix_timer_fn` is explicitly returning `HRTIMER_NORESTART`. This is pretty straightforward; it means the POSIX timer *doesn't* automatically restart after it fires. It's a one-shot timer, essentially. That's fine, that's expected behavior in many contexts.
But that immediately begs the question: What's the deal with `it_real_fn`? Is *that* also behaving the same way? Is it also just a one-shot timer internally? Does it also use `HRTIMER_NORESTART`? Is there something in the implementation that I'm missing? I need to quickly recall the behavior of interval timers to verify that there isn't an issue with the base clock. I need to know whether the expectation is a single shot or whether it's implicitly handling the restart. Is this something that needs to be configured somewhere else and I missed it in my initial scan? I know what the docs say, but I want to be *sure*. I need to dig deeper into the code of `it_real_fn` and the surrounding timer infrastructure to confirm that assumption. Understanding the difference between these types of timers and how they restart (or don't) is absolutely critical for debugging potential scheduling issues down the line. I better write down my findings as well.
|
| 53/2 |
2026/07/14 00:51 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/itimer.c Name:it_real_fn]
Results: map[SourceCode: 171: /*
172: * Interval timers are restarted in the signal delivery path. See
173: * posixtimer_rearm_itimer().
174: */
175: enum hrtimer_restart it_real_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
176: {
177: struct signal_struct *sig =
178: container_of(timer, struct signal_struct, real_timer);
179: struct pid *leader_pid = sig->pids[PIDTYPE_TGID];
180:
181: trace_itimer_expire(ITIMER_REAL, leader_pid, 0);
182: kill_pid_info(SIGALRM, SEND_SIG_PRIV, leader_pid);
183:
184: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
185: }
SourceFile:kernel/time/itimer.c]
|
| 54/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 59247
output: 36
thoughts: 19
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, crafted with the understanding that I'm discussing this with a fellow expert:
**Investigating HRTIMER_NORESTART and Wakeup Scenarios**
Hmm, so the function is returning `HRTIMER_NORESTART`. Okay, that's the starting point. Now, what does that *actually* mean in the context of the larger picture? My immediate thought goes to the interaction with the `hrtimer_wakeup` function. We know `HRTIMER_NORESTART` indicates the timer shouldn't be restarted, but the consequences of that, specifically in the context of wakeups, need a closer look. Are we ending a chain, or skipping one? Are we leaving a wake-up unhandled? The implications for task scheduling or system responsiveness are significant. I need to understand the relationship between this `NORESTART` return and the subsequent call, or lack thereof, to `hrtimer_wakeup`. Is the desired behavior explicitly defined, or is this an implied state that needs scrutiny? I'm going to need to dig deeper into the surrounding code to determine how this affects the overall timing mechanism and task management.
|
| 55/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c Name:hrtimer_wakeup]
Results: map[SourceCode:2283: /*
2284: * Sleep related functions:
2285: */
2286: static enum hrtimer_restart hrtimer_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
2287: {
2288: struct hrtimer_sleeper *t = container_of(timer, struct hrtimer_sleeper, timer);
2289: struct task_struct *task = t->task;
2290:
2291: t->task = NULL;
2292: if (task)
2293: wake_up_process(task);
2294:
2295: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
2296: }
SourceFile:kernel/time/hrtimer.c]
|
| 56/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 59762
output: 38
thoughts: 20
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person:
**Investigating a Timing Issue**
Right, so I'm looking at a timing-related function, and it's returning `HRTIMER_NORESTART`. My immediate thought is, "Okay, why isn't this thing restarting? What's the context here?" That return value is throwing a flag. I need to understand the control flow leading to this. The next thing I'm checking is if this problem is related to `tick_sched_timer` or not. Is this a broader scheduling issue, or is it more isolated to the high-resolution timer implementation? I'll probably have to dive into the timer's callback function to see what it's trying to do, and why it's potentially failing to re-arm itself. I'll need to correlate the return with the timer's configuration and status, and possibly check for race conditions or lock contention that could be preventing the restart. Let's dig in.
|
| 57/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/tick-sched.c Name:tick_sched_timer]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 58/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 60062
output: 38
thoughts: 22
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts:
**Navigating the Kernel's Temporal Landscape**
Okay, so I'm trying to figure out where this `tick_sched_timer` function lives. Ah, right, a quick memory jog – it's located within `kernel/time/tick-sched.c`. That makes perfect sense; `tick-sched` obviously hints at the scheduling aspect of the system timer, and that's exactly where I'd expect to find the timer-related code. Time to dig in and see how this is all implemented!
|
| 59/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/tick-sched.c Name:tick_sched_timer]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 60/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 60263
output: 21
thoughts: 12
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Diving into the Kernel's Timer Landscape**
Okay, so I need to find something specific, and it's related to the high-resolution timer subsystem. The immediate thought is, "Where's this functionality implemented?" Instead of wading through the entire codebase, I'll leverage the most efficient tool: `grep`. It's almost automatic – a reflex. I'm going to search for `HRTIMER_RESTART`. This macro or symbol is a pretty good indicator; it's a key function call or a constant related to restarting a high-resolution timer. I expect that I can quickly narrow down the relevant source files or functions, saving me from a time-consuming search. This is going to give me a solid starting point for further investigation. It will identify the code paths that are likely involved in handling timer restarts. I'm hoping I can zero in on the relevant mechanisms rapidly and move onto more complex analysis.
|
| 61/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:return HRTIMER_RESTART;]
Results: map[Output:arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c=424=static enum hrtimer_restart mmdc_pmu_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c-431-
arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c:432: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/arm/mach-imx/mmdc.c-433-}
--
arch/arm/mm/cache-l2x0-pmu.c=151=static enum hrtimer_restart l2x0_pmu_poll(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/arm/mm/cache-l2x0-pmu.c-172- hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, l2x0_pmu_poll_period);
arch/arm/mm/cache-l2x0-pmu.c:173: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/arm/mm/cache-l2x0-pmu.c-174-}
--
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c=316=static enum hrtimer_restart kvm_bg_timer_expire(struct hrtimer *hrt)
--
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c-332- hrtimer_forward_now(hrt, ns_to_ktime(ns));
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:333: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c-334- }
--
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c=340=static enum hrtimer_restart kvm_hrtimer_expire(struct hrtimer *hrt)
--
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c-358- hrtimer_forward_now(hrt, ns_to_ktime(ns));
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c:359: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c-360- }
--
arch/mips/kvm/emulate.c=937=enum hrtimer_restart kvm_mips_count_timeout(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
arch/mips/kvm/emulate.c-941- vcpu->arch.count_period);
arch/mips/kvm/emulate.c:942: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/mips/kvm/emulate.c-943-}
--
arch/powerpc/kernel/watchdog.c=442=static enum hrtimer_restart watchdog_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/powerpc/kernel/watchdog.c-455-
arch/powerpc/kernel/watchdog.c:456: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/powerpc/kernel/watchdog.c-457-}
--
arch/powerpc/perf/vpa-dtl.c=288=static enum hrtimer_restart vpa_dtl_hrtimer_handle(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/powerpc/perf/vpa-dtl.c-301-
arch/powerpc/perf/vpa-dtl.c:302: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/powerpc/perf/vpa-dtl.c-303-}
--
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c=43=static enum hrtimer_restart kvm_riscv_vcpu_hrtimer_expired(struct hrtimer *h)
--
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c-52- hrtimer_forward_now(&t->hrt, ktime_set(0, delta_ns));
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c:53: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c-54- }
--
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c=111=static enum hrtimer_restart kvm_riscv_vcpu_vstimer_expired(struct hrtimer *h)
--
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c-120- hrtimer_forward_now(&t->hrt, ktime_set(0, delta_ns));
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c:121: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c-122- }
--
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c=1310=enum hrtimer_restart kvm_s390_idle_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c-1322- if (sltime && hrtimer_forward_now(timer, ns_to_ktime(sltime)))
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c:1323: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c-1324- kvm_s390_vcpu_wakeup(vcpu);
--
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c=3320=static enum hrtimer_restart gisa_vcpu_kicker(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c-3331- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, ns_to_ktime(gi->expires));
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c:3332: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c-3333- }
--
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c=100=static enum hrtimer_restart amd_uncore_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c-116- hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ns_to_ktime(ctx->hrtimer_duration));
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c:117: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c-118-}
--
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c=325=static enum hrtimer_restart uncore_pmu_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c-346- hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ns_to_ktime(box->hrtimer_duration));
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c:347: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c-348-}
--
arch/x86/events/rapl.c=253=static enum hrtimer_restart rapl_hrtimer_handle(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
arch/x86/events/rapl.c-270-
arch/x86/events/rapl.c:271: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/x86/events/rapl.c-272-}
--
arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c=268=static enum hrtimer_restart pit_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data)
--
arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c-279- hrtimer_add_expires_ns(&ps->timer, ps->period);
arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c:280: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c-281- } else
--
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c=3087=static enum hrtimer_restart apic_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data)
--
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c-3096- hrtimer_set_expires(&ktimer->timer, ktimer->target_expiration);
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:3097: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c-3098- } else
--
drivers/block/null_blk/main.c=1467=static enum hrtimer_restart nullb_bwtimer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/block/null_blk/main.c-1480-
drivers/block/null_blk/main.c:1481: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/block/null_blk/main.c-1482-}
--
drivers/devfreq/event/rockchip-dfi.c=575=static enum hrtimer_restart rockchip_dfi_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/devfreq/event/rockchip-dfi.c-591-
drivers/devfreq/event/rockchip-dfi.c:592: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/devfreq/event/rockchip-dfi.c-593-};
--
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vblank.c=2175=static enum hrtimer_restart drm_vblank_timer_function(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vblank.c-2204-
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vblank.c:2205: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vblank.c-2206-}
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/display.c=539=static enum hrtimer_restart vblank_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *data)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/display.c-550- hrtimer_add_expires_ns(&vblank_timer->timer, vblank_timer->period);
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/display.c:551: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/display.c-552-}
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/sched_policy.c=265=static enum hrtimer_restart tbs_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer_data)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/sched_policy.c-274-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/sched_policy.c:275: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/sched_policy.c-276-}
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c=3485=static enum hrtimer_restart oa_poll_check_timer_cb(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c-3497-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c:3498: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c-3499-}
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c=505=static enum hrtimer_restart i915_sample(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c-537-
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c:538: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c-539-}
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_uncore.c=463=intel_uncore_fw_release_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_uncore.c-472- if (xchg(&domain->active, false))
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_uncore.c:473: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_uncore.c-474-
--
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_perfcntr.c=308=sample_timer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_perfcntr.c-316-
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_perfcntr.c:317: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_perfcntr.c-318-}
--
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_oa.c=315=static enum hrtimer_restart xe_oa_poll_check_timer_cb(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_oa.c-324-
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_oa.c:325: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_oa.c-326-}
--
drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c=98=static enum hrtimer_restart iio_hrtimer_trig_handler(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c-106-
drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c:107: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/iio/trigger/iio-trig-hrtimer.c-108-}
--
drivers/leds/trigger/ledtrig-pattern.c=158=static enum hrtimer_restart pattern_trig_hrtimer_function(struct hrtimer *t)
--
drivers/leds/trigger/ledtrig-pattern.c-166-
drivers/leds/trigger/ledtrig-pattern.c:167: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/leds/trigger/ledtrig-pattern.c-168-}
--
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c=109=static enum hrtimer_restart txdone_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c-133-
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c:134: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c-135- }
--
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c=870=static enum hrtimer_restart cec_pin_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-903- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, us_to_ktime(100));
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c:904: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-905- }
--
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-910- us_to_ktime(pin->wait_usecs));
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c:911: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-912- }
--
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-916- pin->wait_usecs = 0;
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c:917: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-918- }
--
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-1050- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, us_to_ktime(usecs));
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c:1051: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-1052- }
--
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-1055- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, us_to_ktime(100));
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c:1056: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/cec/core/cec-pin.c-1057-}
--
drivers/media/pci/cx88/cx88-input.c=168=static enum hrtimer_restart cx88_ir_work(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/media/pci/cx88/cx88-input.c-178-
drivers/media/pci/cx88/cx88-input.c:179: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/pci/cx88/cx88-input.c-180-}
--
drivers/media/platform/chips-media/wave5/wave5-vpu.c=149=static enum hrtimer_restart wave5_vpu_timer_callback(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/media/platform/chips-media/wave5/wave5-vpu.c-156-
drivers/media/platform/chips-media/wave5/wave5-vpu.c:157: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/platform/chips-media/wave5/wave5-vpu.c-158-}
--
drivers/media/rc/pwm-ir-tx.c=117=static enum hrtimer_restart pwm_ir_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/media/rc/pwm-ir-tx.c-142-
drivers/media/rc/pwm-ir-tx.c:143: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/media/rc/pwm-ir-tx.c-144-}
--
drivers/misc/vcpu_stall_detector.c=59=vcpu_stall_detect_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/misc/vcpu_stall_detector.c-77-
drivers/misc/vcpu_stall_detector.c:78: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/misc/vcpu_stall_detector.c-79-}
--
drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c=2060=static enum hrtimer_restart m_can_polling_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c-2077-
drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c:2078: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c-2079-}
--
drivers/net/ethernet/ec_bhf.c=237=static enum hrtimer_restart ec_bhf_timer_fun(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/net/ethernet/ec_bhf.c-247- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, polling_frequency);
drivers/net/ethernet/ec_bhf.c:248: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/ethernet/ec_bhf.c-249-}
--
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c=3513=static enum hrtimer_restart mvpp2_hr_timer_cb(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c-3539-
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c:3540: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c-3541- }
--
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/ptp.c=116=static enum hrtimer_restart ptp_reset_thresh(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/ptp.c-140-
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/ptp.c:141: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/ptp.c-142-}
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_main.c=2499=mac80211_hwsim_beacon(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_main.c-2530-
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_main.c:2531: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_main.c-2532-}
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c=774=mac80211_hwsim_nan_slot_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c-800-
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c:801: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c-802- }
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c-862-
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c:863: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c-864-}
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c=867=mac80211_hwsim_nan_discovery_beacon_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c-905-
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c:906: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim_nan.c-907-}
--
drivers/perf/arm-ccn.c=1175=static enum hrtimer_restart arm_ccn_pmu_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/perf/arm-ccn.c-1185- hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, arm_ccn_pmu_timer_period());
drivers/perf/arm-ccn.c:1186: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/perf/arm-ccn.c-1187-}
--
drivers/perf/marvell_cn10k_ddr_pmu.c=900=static enum hrtimer_restart cn10k_ddr_pmu_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/perf/marvell_cn10k_ddr_pmu.c-910- hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, cn10k_ddr_pmu_timer_period());
drivers/perf/marvell_cn10k_ddr_pmu.c:911: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/perf/marvell_cn10k_ddr_pmu.c-912-}
--
drivers/perf/thunderx2_pmu.c=698=static enum hrtimer_restart tx2_hrtimer_callback(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/perf/thunderx2_pmu.c-714- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, ns_to_ktime(tx2_pmu->hrtimer_interval));
drivers/perf/thunderx2_pmu.c:715: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/perf/thunderx2_pmu.c-716-}
--
drivers/power/reset/ltc2952-poweroff.c=94=static enum hrtimer_restart ltc2952_poweroff_timer_wde(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/power/reset/ltc2952-poweroff.c-106-
drivers/power/reset/ltc2952-poweroff.c:107: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/power/reset/ltc2952-poweroff.c-108-}
--
drivers/powercap/idle_inject.c=124=static enum hrtimer_restart idle_inject_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/powercap/idle_inject.c-137-
drivers/powercap/idle_inject.c:138: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/powercap/idle_inject.c-139-}
--
drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c=1387=static enum hrtimer_restart rapl_hrtimer_handle(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c-1405-
drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c:1406: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c-1407-}
--
drivers/pps/generators/pps_gen_tio.c=130=static enum hrtimer_restart hrtimer_callback(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/pps/generators/pps_gen_tio.c-157- hrtimer_forward(timer, now, NSEC_PER_SEC / 2);
drivers/pps/generators/pps_gen_tio.c:158: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/pps/generators/pps_gen_tio.c-159-
--
drivers/rtc/interface.c=728=enum hrtimer_restart rtc_pie_update_irq(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/rtc/interface.c-740-
drivers/rtc/interface.c:741: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/rtc/interface.c-742-}
--
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c=5689=lpfc_cmf_stats_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c-5911-
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c:5912: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c-5913-}
--
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c=5959=lpfc_cmf_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c-6123- ktime_set(0, timer_interval * NSEC_PER_MSEC));
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c:6124: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c-6125-}
--
drivers/watchdog/softdog.c=78=static enum hrtimer_restart softdog_fire(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
drivers/watchdog/softdog.c-114-
drivers/watchdog/softdog.c:115: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
drivers/watchdog/softdog.c-116- }
--
include/kunit/run-in-irq-context.h=29=static enum hrtimer_restart kunit_irq_test_timer_func(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
include/kunit/run-in-irq-context.h-52- queue_work(system_bh_wq, &state->bh_work);
include/kunit/run-in-irq-context.h:53: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
include/kunit/run-in-irq-context.h-54-}
--
io_uring/wait.c=70=static enum hrtimer_restart io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
io_uring/wait.c-109- hrtimer_set_expires(timer, iowq->timeout);
io_uring/wait.c:110: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
io_uring/wait.c-111-out_wake:
--
kernel/rcu/rcutorture.c=4047=static enum hrtimer_restart rcu_gpwrap_lag_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
kernel/rcu/rcutorture.c-4066- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, next_delay);
kernel/rcu/rcutorture.c:4067: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/rcu/rcutorture.c-4068-}
--
kernel/sched/deadline.c=1140=static enum hrtimer_restart dl_server_timer(struct hrtimer *timer, struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se)
--
kernel/sched/deadline.c-1179- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, ns_to_ktime(fw));
kernel/sched/deadline.c:1180: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/sched/deadline.c-1181- }
--
kernel/sched/fair.c=7346=static enum hrtimer_restart sched_cfs_period_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
kernel/sched/fair.c-7399-
kernel/sched/fair.c:7400: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/sched/fair.c-7401-}
--
kernel/time/sched_clock.c=169=static enum hrtimer_restart sched_clock_poll(struct hrtimer *hrt)
--
kernel/time/sched_clock.c-173-
kernel/time/sched_clock.c:174: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/time/sched_clock.c-175-}
--
kernel/time/tick-sched.c=304=static enum hrtimer_restart tick_nohz_handler(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
kernel/time/tick-sched.c-330-
kernel/time/tick-sched.c:331: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/time/tick-sched.c-332-}
--
kernel/watchdog.c=795=static enum hrtimer_restart watchdog_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
kernel/watchdog.c-859- update_report_ts();
kernel/watchdog.c:860: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/watchdog.c-861- }
--
kernel/watchdog.c-876- if (test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &soft_lockup_nmi_warn))
kernel/watchdog.c:877: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/watchdog.c-878- }
--
kernel/watchdog.c-909-
kernel/watchdog.c:910: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
kernel/watchdog.c-911-}
--
lib/test_objpool.c=156=static enum hrtimer_restart ot_hrtimer_handler(struct hrtimer *hrt)
--
lib/test_objpool.c-167- hrtimer_forward_now(hrt, item->hrtcycle);
lib/test_objpool.c:168: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
lib/test_objpool.c-169-}
--
net/can/bcm.c=682=static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_thr_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
--
net/can/bcm.c-687- hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, op->kt_ival2);
net/can/bcm.c:688: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
net/can/bcm.c-689- } else {
--
net/packet/af_packet.c=682=static enum hrtimer_restart prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired(struct hrtimer *t)
--
net/packet/af_packet.c-733- spin_unlock(&po->sk.sk_receive_queue.lock);
net/packet/af_packet.c:734: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
net/packet/af_packet.c-735-}
--
net/sched/act_gate.c=71=static enum hrtimer_restart gate_timer_func(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
net/sched/act_gate.c-118-
net/sched/act_gate.c:119: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
net/sched/act_gate.c-120-}
--
net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c=742=static enum hrtimer_restart dualpi2_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c-756- rcu_read_unlock();
net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c:757: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c-758-}
--
net/sched/sch_taprio.c=918=static enum hrtimer_restart advance_sched(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
net/sched/sch_taprio.c-995-
net/sched/sch_taprio.c:996: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
net/sched/sch_taprio.c-997-}
--
sound/drivers/dummy.c=371=static enum hrtimer_restart dummy_hrtimer_callback(struct hrtimer *timer)
--
sound/drivers/dummy.c-386- hrtimer_forward_now(timer, dpcm->period_time);
sound/drivers/dummy.c:387: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
sound/drivers/dummy.c-388-}
--
sound/drivers/pcsp/pcsp_lib.c=128=enum hrtimer_restart pcsp_do_timer(struct hrtimer *handle)
--
sound/drivers/pcsp/pcsp_lib.c-148-
sound/drivers/pcsp/pcsp_lib.c:149: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
sound/drivers/pcsp/pcsp_lib.c-150-}
--
sound/soc/fsl/imx-pcm-fiq.c=44=static enum hrtimer_restart snd_hrtimer_callback(struct hrtimer *hrt)
--
sound/soc/fsl/imx-pcm-fiq.c-64-
sound/soc/fsl/imx-pcm-fiq.c:65: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
sound/soc/fsl/imx-pcm-fiq.c-66-}
]
|
| 62/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 69513
output: 41
thoughts: 500
Thoughts: **Infinite Loop Vulnerability in HRTIMER - Potential Denial of Service**
Okay, so I'm looking at this HRTIMER code and something's bugging me. There are numerous timer callbacks that return `HRTIMER_RESTART`, which is pretty common. But if one of these callbacks screws up and *doesn't* advance the timer properly – say, it forgets to call `hrtimer_forward_now` or calls it with a zero value – it looks like it could get stuck in an infinite loop.
My initial thought was, "wait, isn't there a retry mechanism in `hrtimer_interrupt`?" Yes, there is a `retry` loop. But then I realized, if `__hrtimer_run_queues` gets caught in an infinite loop, it never returns to `hrtimer_interrupt`. And looking a bit deeper at `__run_hrtimer`, I found:
```c
if (restart == HRTIMER_RESTART && !timer->is_queued)
enqueue_hrtimer(timer, base, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS, false);
```
Bingo! If a timer is re-enqueued, it goes *back* into the timer tree. Then, `clock_base_next_timer` retrieves the next timer. Now, here's the kicker: if the *same* timer is picked again, and its `softexpires` is *still* less than or equal to `basenow`, it runs again! Boom, infinite loop inside `__hrtimer_run_queues`.
The next question: is this exploitable? If an unprivileged user can trigger this, it's a denial-of-service. I need to figure out if it's possible for an unprivileged user to actually trigger this. I'm thinking about `io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup` in `io_uring/wait.c`.
```c
static enum hrtimer_restart io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct io_wait_queue *iowq = container_of(timer, struct io_wait_queue, t);
iowq->hit_timeout = 1;
wake_up_process(iowq->wq.private);
hrtimer_set_expires(timer, iowq->timeout);
return HRTIMER_RESTART;
}
```
Okay, so if `iowq->timeout` is in the past, it returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` and is re-enqueued with a time in the past! And `hrtimer_set_expires` sets the *absolute* expiration time! So, if `iowq->timeout` is an absolute time in the past, it *will* loop infinitely! I need to take a closer look at `io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup` to verify this and potentially confirm a serious vulnerability.
|
| 63/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:io_uring/wait.c Name:io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup]
Results: map[SourceCode: 65: /*
66: * Doing min_timeout portion. If we saw any timeouts, events, or have work,
67: * wake up. If not, and we have a normal timeout, switch to that and keep
68: * sleeping.
69: */
70: static enum hrtimer_restart io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
71: {
72: struct io_wait_queue *iowq = container_of(timer, struct io_wait_queue, t);
73: struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = iowq->ctx;
74:
75: /* no general timeout, or shorter (or equal), we are done */
76: if (iowq->timeout == KTIME_MAX ||
77: ktime_compare(iowq->min_timeout, iowq->timeout) >= 0)
78: goto out_wake;
79: /* work we may need to run, wake function will see if we need to wake */
80: if (io_has_work(ctx))
81: goto out_wake;
82: /* got events since we started waiting, min timeout is done */
83: scoped_guard(rcu) {
84: struct io_rings *rings = io_get_rings(ctx);
85:
86: if (iowq->cq_min_tail != READ_ONCE(rings->cq.tail))
87: goto out_wake;
88: /* if we have any events and min timeout expired, we're done */
89: if (io_cqring_events(ctx))
90: goto out_wake;
91: }
92: /*
93: * If using deferred task_work running and application is waiting on
94: * more than one request, ensure we reset it now where we are switching
95: * to normal sleeps. Any request completion post min_wait should wake
96: * the task and return.
97: */
98: if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN) {
99: atomic_set(&ctx->cq_wait_nr, 1);
100: smp_mb();
101: if (io_local_work_pending(ctx))
102: goto out_wake;
103: }
104:
105: /* any generated CQE posted past this time should wake us up */
106: iowq->cq_tail = iowq->cq_min_tail + 1;
107:
108: hrtimer_update_function(&iowq->t, io_cqring_timer_wakeup);
109: hrtimer_set_expires(timer, iowq->timeout);
110: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
111: out_wake:
112: return io_cqring_timer_wakeup(timer);
113: }
SourceFile:io_uring/wait.c]
|
| 64/2 |
2026/07/14 00:52 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 71528
output: 39
thoughts: 80
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of this snippet, rendered as a first-person thought process, keeping in mind my expertise:
**Diving into the io_uring Timer Mechanism**
Right, so I'm looking at this bit of code, and it's crystal clear. We're directly swapping out the timer function within the `io_uring` context. Previously, the timer was set up to use `io_cqring_min_timer_wakeup`, but now, boom, it's being updated with `io_cqring_timer_wakeup`. This is a classic example of a runtime adjustment.
```c
hrtimer_update_function(&iowq->t, io_cqring_timer_wakeup);
```
That `hrtimer_update_function` call is the key. It's atomic. So, from this point forward, the hardware timer will call the new `io_cqring_timer_wakeup` instead of the old function. It's a clean handover. This is how the kernel can dynamically adapt its behavior, based on some internal criteria or an external trigger. Makes perfect sense. This specific update likely signals some state change in the io_uring or some underlying io_wq.
|
| 65/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:io_uring/wait.c Name:io_cqring_timer_wakeup]
Results: map[SourceCode: 55: static enum hrtimer_restart io_cqring_timer_wakeup(struct hrtimer *timer)
56: {
57: struct io_wait_queue *iowq = container_of(timer, struct io_wait_queue, t);
58:
59: WRITE_ONCE(iowq->hit_timeout, 1);
60: iowq->min_timeout = 0;
61: wake_up_process(iowq->wq.private);
62: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
63: }
SourceFile:io_uring/wait.c]
|
| 66/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 72091
output: 36
thoughts: 144
Thoughts: **Analyzing Timer Mechanisms**
Okay, so `io_cqring_timer_wakeup` is designed correctly, it returns `HRTIMER_NORESTART`, which is good; no infinite loops there. Now, what about this `watchdog_timer_fn`? Let me pull up that code snippet... Aha, here it is:
```c
static enum hrtimer_restart watchdog_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
{
...
if (test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &soft_lockup_nmi_warn))
return HRTIMER_RESTART;
...
}
```
Wait a second... if `test_and_set_bit_lock` is true, it returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` *without* any indication that it advances the timer! If that condition is always met or persistently met, that's a recipe for an infinite loop, isn't it? The timer would just keep restarting at the same point in time. I need to investigate `watchdog_timer_fn` further. This warrants a deeper look.
|
| 67/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/watchdog.c Name:watchdog_timer_fn]
Results: map[SourceCode: 794: /* watchdog kicker functions */
795: static enum hrtimer_restart watchdog_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
796: {
797: unsigned long touch_ts, period_ts, now;
798: struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
799: int softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace;
800: int duration, thresh_count;
801: unsigned long flags;
802:
803: if (!watchdog_enabled)
804: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
805:
806: /*
807: * pass the buddy check if a panic is in process
808: */
809: if (panic_in_progress())
810: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
811:
812: softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace = (softlockup_si_mask & SYS_INFO_ALL_BT) ?
813: 1 : sysctl_softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace;
814:
815: watchdog_hardlockup_kick();
816:
817: /* kick the softlockup detector */
818: if (completion_done(this_cpu_ptr(&softlockup_completion))) {
819: reinit_completion(this_cpu_ptr(&softlockup_completion));
820: stop_one_cpu_nowait(smp_processor_id(),
821: softlockup_fn, NULL,
822: this_cpu_ptr(&softlockup_stop_work));
823: }
824:
825: /* .. and repeat */
826: hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, ns_to_ktime(sample_period));
827:
828: /*
829: * Read the current timestamp first. It might become invalid anytime
830: * when a virtual machine is stopped by the host or when the watchog
831: * is touched from NMI.
832: */
833: now = get_timestamp();
834: /*
835: * If a virtual machine is stopped by the host it can look to
836: * the watchdog like a soft lockup. This function touches the watchdog.
837: */
838: kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused();
839: /*
840: * The stored timestamp is comparable with @now only when not touched.
841: * It might get touched anytime from NMI. Make sure that is_softlockup()
842: * uses the same (valid) value.
843: */
844: period_ts = READ_ONCE(*this_cpu_ptr(&watchdog_report_ts));
845:
846: update_cpustat();
847:
848: /* Reset the interval when touched by known problematic code. */
849: if (period_ts == SOFTLOCKUP_DELAY_REPORT) {
850: if (unlikely(__this_cpu_read(softlockup_touch_sync))) {
851: /*
852: * If the time stamp was touched atomically
853: * make sure the scheduler tick is up to date.
854: */
855: __this_cpu_write(softlockup_touch_sync, false);
856: sched_clock_tick();
857: }
858:
859: update_report_ts();
860: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
861: }
862:
863: /* Check for a softlockup. */
864: touch_ts = __this_cpu_read(watchdog_touch_ts);
865: duration = is_softlockup(touch_ts, period_ts, now);
866: if (unlikely(duration)) {
867: #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
868: ++softlockup_count;
869: #endif
870:
871: /*
872: * Prevent multiple soft-lockup reports if one cpu is already
873: * engaged in dumping all cpu back traces.
874: */
875: if (softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace) {
876: if (test_and_set_bit_lock(0, &soft_lockup_nmi_warn))
877: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
878: }
879:
880: /* Start period for the next softlockup warning. */
881: update_report_ts();
882:
883: printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave(flags);
884: pr_emerg("BUG: soft lockup - CPU#%d stuck for %us! [%s:%d]\n",
885: smp_processor_id(), duration,
886: current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
887: report_cpu_status();
888: print_modules();
889: print_irqtrace_events(current);
890: if (regs)
891: show_regs(regs);
892: else
893: dump_stack();
894: printk_cpu_sync_put_irqrestore(flags);
895:
896: if (softlockup_all_cpu_backtrace) {
897: trigger_allbutcpu_cpu_backtrace(smp_processor_id());
898: if (!softlockup_panic)
899: clear_bit_unlock(0, &soft_lockup_nmi_warn);
900: }
901:
902: add_taint(TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
903: sys_info(softlockup_si_mask & ~SYS_INFO_ALL_BT);
904: thresh_count = duration / get_softlockup_thresh();
905:
906: if (softlockup_panic && thresh_count >= softlockup_panic)
907: panic("softlockup: hung tasks");
908: }
909:
910: return HRTIMER_RESTART;
911: }
SourceFile:kernel/watchdog.c]
|
| 68/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 74327
output: 45
thoughts: 813
Thoughts: **Analyzing the CPU Stall in the RCU Stalls Bug**
Okay, let's break this down. First, I confirmed that `watchdog_timer_fn` *does* advance the timer before restarting, so it's not an infinite loop causing the issue, that's good. Now, looking at the bug report, the RCU stalls are on CPU 0, and CPU 1 is waiting on it. CPU 0 is stalled in the interrupt path: `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` -> `hrtimer_interrupt` -> `__hrtimer_run_queues` -> `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` -> `lock_release` -> `find_held_lock`. Hmm, if it were a soft lockup caused by `watchdog_timer_fn`, we'd see "BUG: soft lockup," but we don't. Instead, it's an RCU stall.
CPU 1 is blocked in `csd_lock_wait`, which suggests that CPU 0 is holding a lock or some resource that CPU 1 needs. The challenge is figuring out *why* it's stalling for a seemingly long time, 10 seconds. Interrupts are disabled in `text_poke`, so if CPU 0 *was* in `text_poke`, it could be blocking. `__text_poke` disables interrupts, calls `flush_tlb_mm_range`, checks a memory region, and then re-enables interrupts. That sequence should be quick, right? But what if... `flush_tlb_mm_range` is the bottleneck?
The crucial bit is that `flush_tlb_mm_range` in `__text_poke` uses `text_poke_mm`. I remember checking `flush_tlb_mm_range` earlier. The critical section looks like:
```c
if (mm_global_asid(mm)) {
broadcast_tlb_flush(info);
} else if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), cpu) < nr_cpu_ids) {
info->trim_cpumask = should_trim_cpumask(mm);
flush_tlb_multi(mm_cpumask(mm), info);
consider_global_asid(mm);
} else if (mm == this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)) {
lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled();
local_irq_disable();
flush_tlb_func(info);
local_irq_enable();
}
```
Since `text_poke_mm` is special, could `mm_global_asid(mm)` return true? If so, it calls `broadcast_tlb_flush`. We need to investigate what `mm_global_asid` does and if it is true for `text_poke_mm`. That seems to be the critical area to dig into now.
|
| 69/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h Name:mm_global_asid]
Results: map[SourceCode: 271: static inline u16 mm_global_asid(struct mm_struct *mm)
272: {
273: u16 asid;
274:
275: if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB))
276: return 0;
277:
278: asid = smp_load_acquire(&mm->context.global_asid);
279:
280: /* mm->context.global_asid is either 0, or a global ASID */
281: VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid && is_dyn_asid(asid));
282:
283: return asid;
284: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h]
|
| 70/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 76093
output: 42
thoughts: 193
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Race Condition**
Okay, so I'm digging into this code and trying to understand a possible issue. First, I see that if the `X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB` feature isn't enabled, then `mm_global_asid(mm)` is going to return 0. Fine, makes sense. Now, the code then checks `cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), cpu) < nr_cpu_ids`. The goal here seems to be to ensure some kind of consistency related to the MMU.
`text_poke_mm` is loaded *only* on the local CPU, which is confirmed through the use of `use_temporary_mm`. But here's where my attention is piqued. The line `use_temporary_mm` *should* set the CPU bit in `mm_cpumask(mm)`, so at this point, the check should pass and the code continues.
But here's the kicker: I see the structure of the code, and there's a corresponding `unuse_temporary_mm` call later. This is where I start to suspect a race condition. Does `unuse_temporary_mm` *clear* that CPU bit in `mm_cpumask(mm)`? If it does, and if we're not careful about the timing, we might have a window where the MMU state isn't what we expect, or where the cpumask is inconsistently set. I need to dive into the implementation of `unuse_temporary_mm` to see precisely what it does. Time to go look at the source!
|
| 71/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/mm/tlb.c Name:unuse_temporary_mm]
Results: map[SourceCode:1027: void unuse_temporary_mm(struct mm_struct *prev_mm)
1028: {
1029: lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
1030: guard(irqsave)();
1031:
1032: /* Clear the cpumask, to indicate no TLB flushing is needed anywhere */
1033: cpumask_clear_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)));
1034:
1035: switch_mm_irqs_off(NULL, prev_mm, current);
1036:
1037: /*
1038: * Restore the breakpoints if they were disabled before the temporary mm
1039: * was loaded.
1040: */
1041: if (hw_breakpoint_active())
1042: hw_breakpoint_restore();
1043: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/mm/tlb.c]
|
| 72/2 |
2026/07/14 00:53 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 76972
output: 41
thoughts: 3910
Thoughts: **Analysis of Kernel Stall: A Deep Dive**
Okay, so the `unuse_temporary_mm` function *does* clear the CPU bit within `mm_cpumask(text_poke_mm)`. This makes `mm_cpumask(text_poke_mm)` empty, resulting in a false condition. The subsequent checks against `this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)` fail because `unuse_temporary_mm` has already switched back to the previous memory management context (`prev_mm`). Consequently, `flush_tlb_mm_range` effectively does *nothing*, and the `lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled()` call isn't hit. This is the intended behavior.
The core of the problem then appears to be: why is CPU 0 stalling? If CPU 0 is in the `text_poke` function, it calls `lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex)`, which in turn calls `lock_is_held_type`. The crucial detail is that a timer interrupt fired *while* CPU 0 was within `lock_is_held_type`, and the timer interrupt is now running `__hrtimer_run_queues`. CPU 1 is waiting for an IPI, and CPU 0 isn't finishing. CPU 0 is, crucially, currently stuck in `__hrtimer_run_queues`. This strongly suggests an infinite loop within that function or one of its called functions.
I began to consider the alternatives. Could this be a performance issue with *many* timers causing a significant delay? It could be a denial-of-service, especially if an unprivileged user can create a large number of timers via `timer_create` or `nanosleep`. However, the kernel usually handles a massive number of timers without stalling for 10 seconds. Also, a large number of timers usually would have NMI backtraces showing it within `__run_hrtimer` or a timer callback, not at `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore`.
Another possibility is lockdep overhead. `lockdep` adds significant overhead, and a large number of timers, each requiring locks, would amplify this. Even then, such a delay is unusual unless there is a lockdep bug, or the number of timers is exceedingly large. Perhaps this delay is due to a deadlock? I discounted this quickly because CPU 0 is not waiting for a lock.
So, the issue is either an infinite loop or significant slowness in `__hrtimer_run_queues`. In either case, it's a denial-of-service, but not an exploitable one. It's accessible from unprivileged processes because an unprivileged process can trigger `text_poke` through `prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, ...)`. It turns out that this `prctl` triggers `text_poke` via several indirect function calls.
Then I realized that `text_poke` isn't the direct cause of the stall; the timer interrupt's long execution is the stall's cause. `text_poke` running on CPU 0 is either a coincidence or a factor in a potential deadlock. But what of that? If a timer callback is calling `text_mutex` from within a timer interrupt handler on CPU 0, a deadlock could ensue. However, `mutex_lock` isn't allowed within the hardirq context, triggering a "BUG: scheduling while atomic" error message. The backtrace does *not* indicate that a deadlock on `text_mutex` is happening.
The possibility of a deadlock involving IPIs must be reconsidered. Could there be an IPI deadlock between `smp_text_poke_batch_finish` and `flush_tlb_multi`? However, `on_each_cpu` is called with interrupts enabled. So there is no deadlock between `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu` and `flush_tlb_multi`.
Re-examining the NMI backtrace, it's clear CPU 0 is in `text_poke`, *not* `smp_text_poke_sync_each_cpu`. CPU 0 is *not* waiting for CPU 1, which in turn is just waiting for CPU 0 to process its TLB flush IPI. CPU 0 is *not* processing the IPI because it is currently in the timer interrupt handler, which disables interrupts. This is now the key. CPU 0 is spending 10 seconds in the interrupt handler.
Thus, the root cause is the timer interrupt taking a very long time, either an infinite loop in `hrtimer_interrupt` or `__hrtimer_run_queues`, or a bug in a timer callback. Perhaps a `lockdep` performance issue is at play here, given the number
|
| 73/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c Name:poke_int3_handler]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 74/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 81969
output: 18
thoughts: 24
Thoughts: Here's my thought process, summarized as you requested:
**Finding the `int3` Handler in `alternative.c`**
Okay, so I need to track down the `int3` handler, specifically within the x86 architecture's kernel code. Given my familiarity with the Linux kernel's structure, I'll start with the most logical place: `arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c`. This file seems like the best candidate to house code related to instruction patching and handling alternatives, which often includes the mechanism to handle debug breakpoints like the `int3` instruction. I'm going to start my search there and see what I can find. I'm expecting to find either an explicit `int3` handling function or, more likely, a mechanism within that file that sets up or manages the execution of `int3` when an exception is triggered. Let's see what `alternative.c` reveals.
|
| 75/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:int3_handler]
Results: map[Output:arch/x86/include/asm/kprobes.h=115=extern int kprobe_fault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
arch/x86/include/asm/kprobes.h:116:extern int kprobe_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
arch/x86/include/asm/kprobes.h-117-
--
arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h=40=extern void *text_poke_set(void *addr, int c, size_t len);
arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h:41:extern int smp_text_poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h-42-extern void smp_text_poke_single(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate);
--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=2799=static DEFINE_PER_CPU(atomic_t, text_poke_array_refs);
--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-2802- * These four __always_inline annotations imply noinstr, necessary
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2803: * due to smp_text_poke_int3_handler() being noinstr:
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-2804- */
--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=2829=static __always_inline int patch_cmp(const void *tpl_a, const void *tpl_b)
--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-2837-
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2838:noinstr int smp_text_poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-2839-{
--
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c=968=static nokprobe_inline int kprobe_is_ss(struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb)
--
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c-977- */
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:978:int kprobe_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c-979-{
--
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c-1030-}
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c:1031:NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_int3_handler);
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c-1032-
--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c=974=static bool do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs)
--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-984-#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:985: if (kprobe_int3_handler(regs))
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-986- return true;
--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c=1004=DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_int3)
--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-1006- /*
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1007: * smp_text_poke_int3_handler() is completely self contained code; it does (and
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-1008- * must) *NOT* call out to anything, lest it hits upon yet another
--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-1010- */
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1011: if (smp_text_poke_int3_handler(regs))
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-1012- return;
--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-1015- * irqentry_enter_from_user_mode() uses static_branch_{,un}likely()
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1016: * and therefore can trigger INT3, hence smp_text_poke_int3_handler() must
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c-1017- * be done before. If the entry came from kernel mode, then use
]
|
| 76/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 83373
output: 46
thoughts: 17
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm an expert in this field, presented as a first-person summary:
**Digging into `smp_text_poke_int3_handler`**
Alright, time to get to it. Let's see what we're dealing with here – I'm thinking, "Let's check `smp_text_poke_int3_handler`". This function's name alone hints at a potentially critical area. "SMP" suggests we're dealing with Symmetric Multi-Processing, which always raises my eyebrows; concurrency issues are always fun. "Text Poke" immediately makes me think of code injection or debugging techniques related to memory manipulation, and the "int3" is the telltale sign of a breakpoint. I'm already anticipating some interesting possibilities. I'm probably looking at a low-level handler for instruction breakpoints, specifically, one used across multiple processors. This could be a good starting point to hunt for vulnerabilities, debug critical issues, or understand a particular optimization strategy. Time to dive in!
|
| 77/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c Name:smp_text_poke_int3_handler]
Results: map[SourceCode:2838: noinstr int smp_text_poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
2839: {
2840: struct smp_text_poke_loc *tpl;
2841: int ret = 0;
2842: void *ip;
2843:
2844: if (user_mode(regs))
2845: return 0;
2846:
2847: /*
2848: * Having observed our INT3 instruction, we now must observe
2849: * text_poke_array with non-zero refcount:
2850: *
2851: * text_poke_array_refs = 1 INT3
2852: * WMB RMB
2853: * write INT3 if (text_poke_array_refs != 0)
2854: */
2855: smp_rmb();
2856:
2857: if (!try_get_text_poke_array())
2858: return 0;
2859:
2860: /*
2861: * Discount the INT3. See smp_text_poke_batch_finish().
2862: */
2863: ip = (void *) regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE;
2864:
2865: /*
2866: * Skip the binary search if there is a single member in the vector.
2867: */
2868: if (unlikely(text_poke_array.nr_entries > 1)) {
2869: tpl = __inline_bsearch(ip, text_poke_array.vec, text_poke_array.nr_entries,
2870: sizeof(struct smp_text_poke_loc),
2871: patch_cmp);
2872: if (!tpl)
2873: goto out_put;
2874: } else {
2875: tpl = text_poke_array.vec;
2876: if (text_poke_addr(tpl) != ip)
2877: goto out_put;
2878: }
2879:
2880: ip += tpl->len;
2881:
2882: switch (tpl->opcode) {
2883: case INT3_INSN_OPCODE:
2884: /*
2885: * Someone poked an explicit INT3, they'll want to handle it,
2886: * do not consume.
2887: */
2888: goto out_put;
2889:
2890: case RET_INSN_OPCODE:
2891: int3_emulate_ret(regs);
2892: break;
2893:
2894: case CALL_INSN_OPCODE:
2895: int3_emulate_call(regs, (long)ip + tpl->disp);
2896: break;
2897:
2898: case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
2899: case JMP8_INSN_OPCODE:
2900: int3_emulate_jmp(regs, (long)ip + tpl->disp);
2901: break;
2902:
2903: case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* Jcc */
2904: int3_emulate_jcc(regs, tpl->opcode & 0xf, (long)ip, tpl->disp);
2905: break;
2906:
2907: default:
2908: BUG();
2909: }
2910:
2911: ret = 1;
2912:
2913: out_put:
2914: put_text_poke_array();
2915: return ret;
2916: }
SourceFile:arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c]
|
| 78/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 84783
output: 40
thoughts: 440
Thoughts: **Analyzing the INT3 Handler and Timer Bug**
Okay, let's break this down logically. If `smp_text_poke_int3_handler` correctly emulates the `INT3` instruction, it returns 1, and then `exc_int3` returns. Since the instruction pointer then advances, this scenario avoids an infinite loop. But, what if `try_get_text_poke_array()` returns 0? In that case, `exc_int3` calls `do_int3`, which might trigger a panic or `SIGTRAP`. Either way, we still avoid an infinite loop in the INT3 handler itself. So, I'm comfortable saying the INT3 handler is safe, as far as I can tell.
My primary concern now is with this `__hrtimer_run_queues` bug. I'm fairly certain the core issue is an infinite loop caused by a timer callback returning `HRTIMER_RESTART` without actually advancing the timer's state, essentially a Denial of Service. This is where things get interesting. I've confirmed that this is accessible by unprivileged processes and even within user namespaces. This makes it a VM guest trigger, but NOT a VM host trigger, it doesn't seem to be networked, peripheral related, or filesystem related. The good news (if we can call it that) is that it's NOT exploitable for privilege escalation or memory corruption.
Let's recap what we have:
* Exploitable: False
* DenialOfService: True
* Unprivileged: True
* UserNamespace: True
* VMGuestTrigger: True
* VMHostTrigger: False
* NetworkTrigger: False
* PeripheralTrigger: False
* FilesystemTrigger: False
* RemoteTrigger: False
Wait, hold on...could this be triggered by a network packet? If a network packet creates a timer that's bugged, for instance, a TCP retransmit timer, or any protocol timeout timer, and that timer has a bug, then it could be a network trigger. That's a valid point. Generally, network timers tend to use `timer_list` timers, but, hmmm, I'm thinking of high-resolution timeouts... TCP pacing! Does TCP pacing use `hrtimer`? Yes, yes it does! And I need to verify: does the TCP pacing timer return `HRTIMER_RESTART`? I need to check `tcp_pacing_timer` to be sure.
|
| 79/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:net/ipv4/tcp_output.c Name:tcp_pacing_timer]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 80/2 |
2026/07/14 00:54 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 85818
output: 40
thoughts: 16
Thoughts: Here's my take on the thought process, as if it were my own:
**Diving into the TCP Timer Code**
Okay, I need to understand this TCP behavior better. The place to start, as always, is with the core implementation. Let's see... based on my understanding of the kernel's architecture, and knowing we're dealing with TCP timeouts, `net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c` is the logical place to begin digging. I'll need to refresh my memory on the interactions of the timer functions with the rest of the TCP state machine. Hopefully, I can quickly get a handle on the key data structures and function calls responsible for handling retransmissions, keep-alives, and connection timeouts, and how they relate to the underlying IP layer.
|
| 81/2 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c Name:tcp_pacing_timer]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 82/2 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 86061
output: 41
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing `tcp_pace_kick_timer`**
Alright, let's dive into this `tcp_pace_kick_timer`. Immediately, my mind jumps to the nuances. I'm thinking about the implications for network congestion control and pacing algorithms. This timer... it's a critical component in ensuring smooth, controlled data flow, and I need to assess its current state. I'm wondering if it's behaving as expected within the context of the overall TCP implementation. Is it firing at the correct intervals? Are there any unexpected delays or jitters? Any potential sources for improvement or bottlenecks? I should also quickly check related configurations and interactions with the pacing code.
|
| 83/2 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
tool |
codesearch-definition-source |
0m
Error:
Args: map[ContextFile:net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c Name:tcp_pace_kick_timer]
Results: map[SourceCode: SourceFile:]
|
| 84/2 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 86294
output: 66
thoughts: 187
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Bug Report**
Okay, let's break this down. My initial instinct was to dive into `net/ipv4/tcp.c` or a similar networking file, but then I realized I don't actually need to pinpoint the *exact* timer involved. The real issue is the root cause. Given I'm missing that crucial piece, I'm going to lean towards *not* assuming a network trigger unless there's concrete evidence pointing that way.
The bug report itself (`syz.6.2315` performing `prctl`) doesn't give any hints about network interaction. So, based on the information I have, I'll set `NetworkTrigger` to `False`. This feels like a safe assumption, for now.
Now, let's see if there are any *other* ways this bug could manifest. Let's make sure we're seeing the complete picture. An infinite loop in a hard interrupt context... that would be nasty. It would lock up the CPU entirely. The watchdog would eventually trigger a panic (if `panic_on_oops` or `softlockup_panic` are configured) or, at the very least, print a warning. Yep, that's classic Denial-of-Service behavior.
Alright, I think I've got a solid understanding of the implications here. Time to call `set-results`.
|
| 85/2 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args: map[DenialOfService:true Exploitable:false FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:true UserNamespace:true VMGuestTrigger:true VMHostTrigger:false]
Results: map[DenialOfService:true Exploitable:false FilesystemTrigger:false NetworkTrigger:false PeripheralTrigger:false RemoteTrigger:false Unprivileged:true UserNamespace:true VMGuestTrigger:true VMHostTrigger:false]
|
| 86/2 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 86905
output: 668
thoughts: 481
Thoughts: **My Analysis of the RCU Stall**
Okay, here's the final breakdown. The results are in, and now I'm connecting the dots to solidify my reasoning.
The RCU stall observed is quite clearly linked to a CPU 1 (waiting on an IPI from CPU 0) waiting on a lock within the `csd_lock_wait` function. It seems CPU 0 is the root cause, having been interrupted by a timer interrupt (`sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`) *while* executing `text_poke` which had called `lock_is_held_type` from `lockdep_assert_held`.
Now, the critical part: while in this timer interrupt, CPU 0 is in `__hrtimer_run_queues`. The NMI backtrace nailed this down, specifically at `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` within `__run_hrtimer`. This is where the hrtimer code unlocks the base lock *before* invoking the timer callback.
Because the CPU 0 is in a hardirq context due to the timer interrupt, it has interrupts disabled. This means it can't process the pending IPI from CPU 1, which in turn leads to the stall. CPU 1 is left spinning in `csd_lock_wait`, effectively waiting on CPU 0 to finish its interrupt handler.
The fact that CPU 0 is *stuck* in `__hrtimer_run_queues` is a huge red flag – it *screams* infinite loop from a malfunctioning timer callback. If an hrtimer callback returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` but *fails* to move the timer's expiration time forward (using `hrtimer_forward`), the timer ends up re-enqueued with an expiration in the past. This causes `__hrtimer_run_queues` to pick it up again within the *same* while loop, resulting in a never-ending cycle within the hardirq handler.
The practical impact is a hard lockup on CPU 0. This lockup then stalls other CPUs waiting for IPIs from CPU 0, creating a Denial of Service.
Here's the kicker: unprivileged users can create these timers (POSIX timers, other kernel hrtimers), meaning this bug is easily triggered from any unprivileged process and user namespaces.
The good news, however, is that while this is a serious DoS, it's not a memory corruption or privilege escalation vulnerability. It's a pure logic error, an infinite loop in the timer processing. It can be triggered in a virtual machine guest, but doesn't affect the host, which is also helpful.
|
| 87/1 |
2026/07/14 00:55 |
action |
format-explanation |
0m
Results: map[Explanation:Based on the provided kernel bug report and source code analysis, here is the
assessment of the bug:
**Analysis:**
The bug report indicates an RCU stall detected by CPU 1.
- CPU 1 is in `csd_lock_wait` (via `flush_tlb_multi` ->
`smp_call_function_many_cond`), spinning and waiting for CPU 0 to acknowledge
and process a TLB flush IPI.
- CPU 0 was executing `text_poke` (specifically `lock_is_held_type` called from
`lockdep_assert_held`) when it was interrupted by a local APIC timer interrupt
(`sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt`).
- Inside the timer interrupt handler, CPU 0 is executing `__hrtimer_run_queues`.
The NMI backtrace captures CPU 0 exactly at `_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore` inside
`__run_hrtimer`, which is the point where the hrtimer subsystem drops the base
lock just before invoking a timer callback.
Because CPU 0 is executing a hardirq handler (the timer interrupt), it has
interrupts disabled and cannot process the pending IPI from CPU 1. CPU 1 is
spinning indefinitely waiting for CPU 0, which leads to the RCU stall.
The fact that CPU 0 is stuck inside `__hrtimer_run_queues` strongly indicates an
infinite loop caused by a misbehaving hrtimer callback. If an hrtimer callback
returns `HRTIMER_RESTART` without properly advancing the timer's expiration time
(e.g., via `hrtimer_forward` or `hrtimer_add_expires_ns`), the timer is
immediately re-enqueued with an expiration time that is still in the past.
`__hrtimer_run_queues` will then pick it up again in the same `while` loop,
leading to an infinite loop inside the hardirq handler.
**Security Impact:**
- **Exploitable:** No. This is a logical infinite loop in the timer processing
code. It does not involve memory corruption, out-of-bounds accesses, or
use-after-free conditions, so it cannot be exploited for privilege escalation or
information leaks.
- **Denial of Service:** Yes. The infinite loop in hardirq context completely
locks up the affected CPU and stalls any other CPUs attempting to send IPIs to
it, resulting in a system-wide hang/crash.
- **Unprivileged / User Namespace Accessible:** Yes. Unprivileged users can
create and arm various high-resolution timers (e.g., via `timer_create`,
`nanosleep`, `itimer`, or `io_uring` timeouts). If one of these paths contains
the buggy callback, an unprivileged user can trivially trigger the DoS.
- **VM Guest Trigger:** Yes. The bug occurs within the standard kernel timer
subsystem and can be triggered by a process running inside a VM guest.
- **VM Host / Network / Peripheral / Filesystem Trigger:** No. There is no
evidence that this requires malicious host interaction, network traffic, or
specific peripheral/filesystem data to trigger.]
|